F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 18 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
HENRY LEE DENNIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6294
DAYTON POPPEL; JAMES L. SAFFLE,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 98-CV-335-A)
Mac Oyler, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Lori S. Carter (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, with her on the brief),
Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents-
Appellees.
Before BRORBY, McKAY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Henry Lee Dennis, an Oklahoma state prisoner, appeals an order
of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Dennis’ appeal centers on his contention the State of
Oklahoma impermissibly tried and convicted him of four offenses stemming from
a single transaction involving the same rock of cocaine, in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause and an Oklahoma statute prohibiting multiple punishments for a
single act. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts surrounding Mr. Dennis’ sale and possession of a controlled
dangerous substance are undisputed. County and city enforcement officials
involved in an undercover narcotic investigation used an informant, Charles
Shaw, to arrange a drug deal with Mr. Dennis. Under the officers’ supervision,
Mr. Shaw contacted Mr. Dennis in Vernon, Texas, and arranged to meet him at a
designated place in Frederick, Oklahoma, to purchase “a half” or one-half ounce
of rock cocaine. At the designated meeting spot, Mr. Shaw gave Mr. Dennis $450
in exchange for a large, ten-gram rock of “cocaine base” scored into four
sections. After selling the rock cocaine to Mr. Shaw, Mr. Dennis drove away.
Officers immediately followed Mr. Dennis’ vehicle and pulled him over. In Mr.
Dennis’ vehicle, officers discovered two rocks consisting of 20.7 grams of
“cocaine base” wrapped in a cellophane package. Each piece was scored into four
sections. Mr. Dennis’ vehicle also contained a knife with a blackened edge,
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which an officer testified Mr. Dennis probably heated to score the rock cocaine
into multiple pieces for sale. Neither the rock cocaine sold to Mr. Shaw nor that
found in Mr. Dennis’ vehicle had tax stamps affixed.
A jury convicted Mr. Dennis of two counts of trafficking in illegal drugs,
under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415, and set his punishment at life in prison and a
$100,000 fine for each count. The jury also convicted him of two counts of
possession of cocaine base without proper tax stamps affixed, under the
Oklahoma Controlled Dangerous Substance Tax Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 68, §§ 450.1 -
450.9, setting his punishment at ten years in prison for each count. Based on the
jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced Mr. Dennis to two terms of life
in prison together with two $100,000 fines, and two ten-year sentences – all to
run consecutively.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr. Dennis’ conviction
on direct appeal. Thereafter, Mr. Dennis unsuccessfully sought state habeas post-
conviction relief at the district and appellate court levels. Following his
unsuccessful state litigation, Mr. Dennis filed his federal habeas corpus petition
raising eight grounds for habeas relief. Mr. Dennis based six of his claims on
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double jeopardy or related grounds. The thrust of these claims centered on his
suggestion he can only receive one conviction, not four convictions, for his
activities involving the same rock of cocaine. 1
1
Specifically, Mr. Dennis claimed:
1) a double jeopardy violation for receiving two convictions for the same
drug trafficking offense;
2) a double jeopardy violation for receiving two convictions for failing to
purchase and affix tax stamps, even though Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.3
requires only one tax stamp on the entire quantity of rock cocaine;
3) a double jeopardy violation for receiving convictions for the “lesser
included offense” of drug trafficking when he already was convicted for the
offense of possession of rock cocaine without proper tax stamps;
4) a violation of Okla Stat. tit. 21, § 11, which prohibits punishment of one
illegal act under more than one statutory penalty provision;
5) a denial of his due process and equal protection rights based on the state
court’s failure to apply § 11; and
6) invalid convictions based on multiple punishments for offenses that
should have been merged;
and in addition to his double jeopardy claims, Mr. Dennis also claimed:
7) a due process and equal protection violation based on the vagueness of
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415, which calls for enhanced penalties for certain
quantities of “cocaine base” as opposed to greater quantities of “cocaine”;
and
8) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise
the seven other underlying claims either at trial or on direct appeal.
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The district court referred Mr. Dennis’ petition to a magistrate judge who
recommended denial of Mr. Dennis’ petition. In making this recommendation, the
magistrate judge began by reviewing the procedural disposition of each of Mr.
Dennis’ claims. First, the magistrate judge determined Mr. Dennis raised only
two of the eight claims in his direct state appeal. 2 As to the remaining six issues,
the magistrate judge determined Mr. Dennis raised them for the first time in his
state application for post-conviction relief. The magistrate judge noted the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied Mr. Dennis post-conviction relief in
a summary decision, rejecting two of his claims under the principles of res
judicata and five of his claims for procedural default. However, the Oklahoma
court did consider and reject Mr. Dennis’ ineffective assistance claim on the
merits, holding he failed to present a claim constituting a “dead bang winner.”
After determining Mr. Dennis must show cause for his state procedural
default and actual prejudice therefrom, the magistrate judge proceeded to the
merits of Mr. Dennis’ claims based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
2
The two issues Mr. Dennis previously raised included claims of: 1) a
double jeopardy violation because he was convicted for possession of rock
cocaine without affixed tax stamps when he already was convicted for trafficking
the same cocaine, and 2) a violation of his due process and equal protection rights
due to the vagueness of § 2-415.
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recognizing the ineffective assistance claim may constitute cause for procedural
default in state court. Following a determination Mr. Dennis’ underlying claims
lacked merit, the magistrate judge held no prejudice resulted from Mr. Dennis’
counsel’s failure to raise them either at trial or on direct appeal. After reviewing
Mr. Dennis’ objections to the magistrate judge’s determinations, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, denied Mr. Dennis’
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and denied his request for a certificate of
appealability.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Dennis raises the same eight issues addressed by the district
court and requests a certificate of appealability for the purpose of reviewing the
merits of his appeal. In order for this court to grant a certificate of appealability
and proceed to the merits of Mr. Dennis’ appeal, he must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where,
as here, the “district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the
showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must
demonstrate reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, ___,
120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). This court determined Mr. Dennis made the
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necessary showing, granted him a certificate of appealability to proceed on
appeal, and ordered briefing on his claims. (We review Mr. Dennis’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and other constitutional or underlying claims,
applying the following standard of review.
A. Standard of Review
Because Mr. Dennis seeks relief from a state conviction, he must show the
state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The district
court determined Mr. Dennis’ petition failed to meet this requirement. We review
the legal basis for the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Dennis’ § 2254 petition de
novo. See Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 950 (1998). We note the district court’s denial of Mr. Dennis’ petition
stemmed, in part, from his procedural default in failing to raise six of his claims
on direct appeal. Oklahoma law denying post-conviction relief on defaulted
claims that could have been raised on direct appeal provides an independent and
adequate state ground permitting us to refuse to review such claims. See Odum v.
Boone, 62 F.3d 327, 331 (10th Cir. 1995). This court will not perform a habeas
review on issues defaulted in state court on independent and adequate state
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procedural grounds, unless Mr. Dennis can demonstrate “cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1271
(10th Cir. 1998) (relying on Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991)).
As the magistrate judge in this case ascertained, an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim can serve as “cause” to excuse Mr. Dennis’ procedural default on
his other underlying or constitutional claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54.
We determine whether Mr. Dennis has shown “cause” for his state
procedural default on his other claims by assessing his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Hickman, 160 F.3d at 1273. Mr. Dennis’ ineffective assistance of
counsel claim “presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review de
novo.” Id. at 1273 (quotation marks omitted). To prevail on this claim, Mr.
Dennis must show: “(1) that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) that the deficient performance was prejudicial
to his defense.” Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694
(1984)). Under Strickland, we need not separately determine the effectiveness of
Mr. Dennis’ counsel if we find the alleged deficiency did not prejudice Mr.
Dennis. See Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1523 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1123 (1996). In order to determine if prejudice occurred, we
review the merits of Mr. Dennis’ underlying or constitutional claims. See Banks
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v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1514, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995). If those claims lack
merit, Mr. Dennis cannot claim prejudice from his attorney’s failure to raise them
at trial or on direct state appeal. Id. With these standards in mind, we proceed to
examine the merits of each of Mr. Dennis’ grounds for appeal.
B. Double Jeopardy and Related Claims
The crux of Mr. Dennis’ double jeopardy and related claims rests on the
fact Mr. Dennis received four convictions for what he describes as a single act or
transaction, occurring at the same time and place, and involving the same rock of
cocaine, which he scored, broke apart and delivered a part of to Mr. Shaw. Mr.
Dennis suggests he should be convicted of only one offense and not receive four
convictions in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
11 prohibiting multiple punishments. The arguments Mr. Dennis uses to support
these claims are addressed below.
1. Two Drug Trafficking Convictions
Mr. Dennis’ most ardent argument surrounds his claim the two drug
trafficking convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state
impermissibly charged him with two “means” or “methods” of committing the
same offense of “trafficking.” In support of this argument, Mr. Dennis directs us
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to Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415, which states drug trafficking is committed when
individuals “[k]nowingly distribute, manufacture, bring into [the State of
Oklahoma] or possess a controlled substance.” Okla Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415. Mr.
Dennis asserts this language presents four means or methods of “trafficking,” i.e.,
1) distributing, 2) manufacturing, 3) bringing into the state, or 4) possessing a
controlled substance. Because the state charged and convicted him of “two
means” of committing drug trafficking – possession and distribution – Mr. Dennis
argues the state impermissibly convicted him of “two means” of committing the
same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause.
Ultimately, the question Mr. Dennis presents is whether § 2-415 deals with one
offense or multiple offenses.
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides constitutional protections against
multiple punishments for the same offense. See Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d
610, 614 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1360 (1999). The question of
whether Mr. Dennis’ punishments are multiple in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is “‘essentially one of legislative intent.’” Id. (quoting Ohio v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984)). As the magistrate judge in this case aptly
surmised, “[w]hether the Oklahoma legislature intended for multiple punishments
to be imposed pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415(B)(1) is an issue not
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previously addressed by the Oklahoma courts.”
Because the legislative intent is not clear on whether § 2-415 deals with
one or multiple offenses, we apply the “same evidence” test established in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), which the Oklahoma courts,
when addressing similar double jeopardy determinations, have used for guidance.
For instance, in Ferguson v. State, 644 P.2d 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), a
situation arose in which the defendant was convicted under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-
401 in two separate proceedings, for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute, and for unlawful delivery of marijuana. Id. at 122. The Oklahoma
court, in determining whether § 2-401 dealt with one or multiple offenses, relied
on the Blockburger “same evidence” test. Id. The “same evidence” test requires
us to determine whether Mr. Dennis’ convictions arising under the same statutory
provision are based on offenses containing different or the same factual elements
of proof. Id.; see also Davis v. State, 993 P.2d 124, 125 n.1 (Okla. Crim. App
1999) (relying on Mooney v. State, 990 P.2d 875, 883 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999)).
This circuit has applied the same criteria when faced with double jeopardy
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issues. 3 Specifically, we and other circuits have performed the same or a similar
analysis on a similar federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), which makes it unlawful
“to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” In construing § 841(a), we
determined “various stashes of [a] drug are considered separate where the
evidence indicates they were intended for different purposes or transactions.”
United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1070 (1993). See also United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 209-10 (4th
Cir. 1999) (holding the acts of “possession with intent to distribute” and
“distribution” require different elements so no double jeopardy violation arises
from conviction for two separate offenses contained in two separate clauses of the
same statute) (relying on United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 45-57 (2d Cir.
1998); United States v. Sepulveda, 102 F.3d 1313, 1316 (1st Cir. 1996); United
States v. Tejada, 886 F.2d 483, 490 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Zabaneh, 837
F.2d 1249, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Brunty, 701 F.2d 1375, 1381 &
n.16 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983); United States v. Winston, 687
F.2d 832, 834 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nelson, 563 F.2d 928, 931 (8th
3
See also Cummings, 161 F.3d at 614. In Cummings, unlike here, the
double jeopardy issue concerned convictions under two statutory provisions, not
one. Nevertheless, like here, we applied the Blockburger “same evidence” test to
determine if each offense requires a proof of fact the other does not.
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Cir. 1977)).
In applying the “same evidence” test in this case, we must compare the acts
of “distribution” and “possession” contained in the same provision of § 2-415 to
determine if the legislature intended them to be different offenses. In other
words, we must determine if a difference exists in the proof of facts required to
prove Mr. Dennis’ “distribution” of the rock cocaine to Mr. Shaw compared to
those facts required to prove his “possession” of the rock cocaine found in his
car. See Branch v. Mills, 500 P.2d 590, 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
While the differences between “distribution” and “possession” seem readily
apparent, we nevertheless turn to Oklahoma law to address the issue. Both
Oklahoma statutory and case law set out the elements for proving “distribution”
and “possession” as contemplated by the legislature. While Okla. Stat. tit., 63, §
2-415 does not define “distribute,” the definitions listed in Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-
401 apply to the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, including § 2-
415. Under § 2-401(12),“the word ‘distribute’ means to deliver ... in any manner
other than to ‘administer’ or ‘dispense,’ which would encompass the act of selling
a controlled dangerous substance.” Starks v. State, 523 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1974) (emphasis added). On the other hand, “the elements of
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possession are (1) knowing and intentional; (2) possession; ... (3) [of] a controlled
dangerous substance.” White v. State, 900 P.2d 982, 986 & nn. 5 & 6 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995) (relying, in part, on Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415)). The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also has determined that “[p]ossession itself
means that the possessor has ‘dominion and control’ over the possessed drug, that
is, a right to control its disposition.” Miller v. State, 579 P.2d 200, 202 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1978).
A comparison of these elements leads us to conclude “distribution” and
“possession” clearly require distinct and separate elements. See Davis, 993 P.2d
at 125; Mooney, 900 P.2d at 883. This persuades us the Oklahoma legislature
intended different offenses and punishments for “distribution” and “possession,”
even though both are contained within the same provision of § 2-415. Applying
the specific elements of each offense to the case at hand, we acknowledge that at
one point, Mr. Dennis obviously possessed all three pieces of the rock cocaine.
However, at the time he separated, sold and delivered the ten-gram portion to Mr.
Shaw, he no longer possessed or retained control over that quantity of rock
cocaine, and instead committed the act of distribution in violation of the
prohibition in § 2-415. When Mr. Dennis retained the other two pieces of rock
cocaine in his vehicle and drove away, he knowingly and intentionally possessed a
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separate and distinct quantity of cocaine in violation of another separate
prohibition in § 2-415. 4 Therefore, the trafficking crimes for which Mr. Dennis
was convicted do not constitute, as Mr. Dennis claims, simultaneous methods for
committing the same offense. Instead, his conduct implicates separate offenses
identified within the trafficking provision of § 2-415.
Mr. Dennis’ reliance on Watkins v. State, 855 P.2d 141, 142 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1992) to support his argument does not dissuade us from our holding. In
Watkins, the defendant shipped a single package containing two types of
controlled substances – cocaine and phencyclidine. 855 P.2d at 141. The State
charged Mr. Watkins with two counts of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401(A)(1) 5 – one for the
cocaine, and one for the phencyclidine. Id. Likewise, the State charged Mr.
Watkins with two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
4
Accord Ferguson v. State, 644 P.2d at 122 (holding no double jeopardy
violation occurs where separate caches of marijuana support one conviction for
unlawful delivery and another conviction for possession with intent to distribute).
5
Section 2-401(A)(1) states, in part, that it is unlawful for any person:
To distribute, dispense, transport with intent to distribute or
dispense, possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
a controlled dangerous substance ....
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dangerous substance under § 2-401(A)(1) – again, one count for each type of
drug. Id. Applying the “same evidence test,” the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held a double jeopardy violation arose because § 2-401 did not
distinguish between types or classifications of controlled dangerous drugs. Id. at
142. The court held the elements of each count of conspiracy to distribute a
controlled substance were the same and could not be distinguished by the type of
drug. Similarly, the court determined the elements in each count of possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance were also the same and could not
be distinguished by the type of drug. Id. at 141-142. In so holding, the Oklahoma
court determined that while the legislature had the power to create separate penal
provisions prohibiting different acts that may be committed at the same time, it
had not exercised that power in passing § 2-401, as that statute applied only to a
“controlled dangerous substance,” and not to separate drugs included within a
single package. Id. at 142.
As both the state and federal district courts in this case determined, Watkins
is clearly distinguishable from the facts here. First, Mr. Dennis’ convictions
arose from violating § 2-415, under which, as previously discussed, the legislature
clearly intended to penalize different acts based on different elements of proof.
Second, Mr. Dennis’ conduct satisfied all element of both offenses – distribution
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and possession. Finally, law enforcement officers found the cocaine base rocks in
separate locations, and not together in a single package. Consequently, at the
time of arrest, unlike in Watkins, Mr. Dennis plainly committed two separate
offenses of distribution and possession of rock cocaine under § 2-415, for which
he received two convictions. Under the circumstances presented, Mr. Dennis fails
to show the Oklahoma court’s adjudication resulted in a contrary or unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
2. Two Tax Stamp Convictions
In a related argument, Mr. Dennis suggests his conviction for two tax stamp
offenses – one for failure to affix a tax stamp on the rock cocaine sold and
another for failure to affix a tax stamp on the rock cocaine retained – violates his
right against double jeopardy. In support, Mr. Dennis relies on Okla. Stat. tit. 68,
§ 450.3, which requires a tax stamp to be immediately affixed at the time he
brought the cocaine into the state. Specifically, § 450.3 states:
Manner of payment of tax – Intent and purpose of act
A. The tax levied by Section 2 of this act ... shall be paid by affixing
stamps in the manner and at the time herein set forth.
When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this
state a controlled dangerous substance on which a tax is levied by
Section 2 of this act, the dealer shall have the stamp affixed on the
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controlled dangerous substance immediately after receiving the
controlled dangerous substance. Each stamp may be used only once.
Taxes imposed upon controlled dangerous substances ... are due and
payable immediately upon acquisition or possession of a controlled
dangerous substance in this state by a dealer.
B. It is the intent and purpose of this act that no dealer shall possess
any controlled dangerous substance upon which a tax is imposed by
Section 2 of this act unless the tax has been paid on the controlled
dangerous substance as evidenced by a stamp issued by the
Commission.
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.3 (emphasis added). In relying on this statute, Mr.
Dennis is essentially contending only one tax stamp was required for the original
quantity or rock of cocaine, before he divided it and sold part to Mr. Shaw.
If § 450.3 is read in isolation, it might lend support to Mr. Dennis’
proposition that once he imported the one rock or quantity of cocaine into the
state, only one tax stamp was required. However, in order to ascertain the intent
of the legislature, Oklahoma law requires us to look to each part of the Controlled
Dangerous Substance Tax Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 68, §§ 450.1 - 450.9, under which
Mr. Dennis was convicted. See generally Lozoya v. State, 932 P.2d 22, 28-29
(Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
The Oklahoma Controlled Dangerous Substance Tax Act clearly requires
Mr. Dennis to pay a tax proportionate to the quantity of rock cocaine he imported
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into the state and immediately affix at least one tax stamp on receipt or
importation of that cocaine. See Okla. Stat. tit. 68, §§ 450.2 and 450.3.
However, the number of tax stamps required to be affixed depends on the quantity
of drugs brought into the state. For example, § 450.2 requires a tax of $200 per
gram or portion of a gram of controlled dangerous substance, and § 450.4(B)
requires the stamps to be in denominations of $10. Arguably then, for one gram
of rock cocaine, a dealer could be required to obtain and affix twenty tax stamps. 6
Regardless of the exact number of stamps required, for the purposes of resolving
the issue at hand, we can clearly determine from these statutes that more than one
tax stamp was required for the thirty grams of rock cocaine Mr. Dennis brought
into the state. The remaining question is whether Mr. Dennis can be convicted of
two counts of failing to apportion and affix those stamps proportionately to the
rock cocaine he sold and that which he retained in his possession.
6
For the purposes of this appeal, we need not discern the meaning of these
sections other than to determine whether Mr. Dennis was required to obtain more
than one tax stamp for the ten grams he sold and the 20.7 grams he possessed, and
to then affix the proper corresponding number of tax stamps to the portion he sold
and the portion he retained. We leave the specifics of the exact number of tax
stamps required for any portion of a controlled dangerous substance to the
Oklahoma Tax Commission, which is required to promulgate rules and regulations
for a uniform system of providing, affixing and displaying official tax stamps.
See Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.4(A).
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In addressing this issue, we note another relevant provision of the Act
provides, in part:
Any dealer manufacturing, distributing, producing, shipping,
transporting, importing or possessing any controlled dangerous
substance without affixing the appropriate stamp, upon conviction, is
guilty of a felony ....
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.8(B) (emphasis added). In interpreting this provision,
the magistrate judge simply determined it “creates a separate offense for failure to
affix the requisite tax stamp with regard to each act identified therein. The
legislative intent is clear that punishment for both offenses [of distribution and
possession] is authorized.” The state district court similarly held “there were two
separate and distinct instances of ‘distribution and/or possession of controlled
dangerous substance without purchasing and affixing tax stamps.’” We agree.
Our reading of both §§ 450.3 and 450.8 convinces us the two statutes may
be reconciled, and are not inconsistent. Specifically, § 450.3 deals primarily with
“when” (1) a dealer is required to pay taxes – namely, immediately on his
possession or importation of the controlled dangerous substance, and (2) the tax
stamp(s) would be affixed – namely, immediately on the dealer’s possession of
the substance. In contrast, § 450.8 identifies which acts require tax stamps,
making it a felony offense for a dealer to fail to affix tax stamps when he
transports, imports, manufactures, produces, distributes, or possesses a controlled
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dangerous substance. Applying both statutes to the case at hand, it is clear that
under Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.3, Mr. Dennis was required to pay, based on total
weight, a tax on the total quantity of rock cocaine he imported into the state, and
to immediately affix the appropriate number of tax stamps to that cocaine. In
turn, under § 450.8, Mr. Dennis was required to affix the necessary number of tax
stamps on the rock cocaine he sold to Mr. Shaw, and on the rock cocaine he
retained. Under these circumstances, we conclude no double jeopardy violation
arose in convicting Mr. Dennis of two tax stamp violations for failing to affix the
necessary number of tax stamps to the rock cocaine distributed to Mr. Shaw and a
separate, corresponding number of tax stamps to the rock cocaine Mr. Dennis
retained and possessed. We hold the Oklahoma court’s adjudication of this issue
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
3. Tax Stamp Violations for Trafficking of Same Cocaine
In his last Double Jeopardy Clause claim, Mr. Dennis argues that because
he already received two tax-stamp convictions, he cannot also be convicted for
what he describes as the “lesser included offense” of trafficking the same cocaine.
Mr. Dennis bases his argument on the fact the elements required for “trafficking”
under § 2-415 are the same as for the offense of failing to affix the proper tax
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stamp under §§ 450.1 - 450.9, except the tax stamp offense requires the added
element of requiring a tax stamp to be affixed. Because the elements are almost
identical, Mr. Dennis claims the trafficking offenses are the “lesser included
offense” of the tax stamp convictions. To support his argument, Mr. Dennis relies
on State v. Uriarite, 815 P.2d 193, 195 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), in which the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the offense of “Unlawful Possession
of CDS With Intent to Distribute” a lesser included offense of “Unlawful
Possession of CDS With Intent to Distribute Within 1000 Feet of School
Grounds” for double jeopardy purposes.
We agree the offense of “trafficking” under § 2-415 requires four elements,
including: (1) knowing and intentional (2) possession, distribution manufacture
or importation (3) of five grams or more (4) of cocaine base. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §
2-415. See also White, 900 P.2d at 991. The offense of failing to affix the
appropriate tax stamp under § 450.8 requires proof of a fifth element – no tax
stamp was “obtained, affixed and displayed.” White, 900 P.2d at 991. While the
elements are similar, our determination of whether Mr. Dennis’ punishment under
each statute constitutes multiple punishment for the same offense in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause depends on the Oklahoma legislature’s intent. See
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). If the legislature intended
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cumulative punishments for both violations and the sentences are imposed in the
same proceeding, no double jeopardy violation arises. Id. This is true “regardless
of whether [the] two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct under [the]
Blockburger [test,]” which we apply when the legislative intent is unclear. Id.
We begin our analysis by noting the Oklahoma courts have not ruled on the
Oklahoma legislature’s intent with respect to the two statutes at issue in this case.
Our review of Oklahoma’s Controlled Dangerous Substance Tax Act shows the
legislature clearly intended the punishment for the statutory offense of failure to
affix tax stamps to be in addition or cumulative to the punishment for the
statutory trafficking offense found in the Oklahoma Uniform Controlled
Dangerous Substance Act. Compare Okla. Stat. tit. 68, §§ 450.2, 450.8 with
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415. As the magistrate judge in this case pointed out:
Section 450.1(2) of the Tax Act defines “dealer” as a person who “in
violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act
manufactures, distributes, produces, ships, transports, or imports into
Oklahoma or in any manner acquires or possesses ... seven or more
grams of any controlled dangerous substance ....” This statutory
language makes clear that when the legislature created additional
penalties for the crime of failure to affix a drug tax stamp, the
legislature recognized that the drug tax stamp requirement would
apply against one who was also in violation of a separate criminal
law....
Further confirmation that punishment for violation of the Tax
Act was intended to be in addition to other punishments is found in
§ 450.8(C) which provides: ‘Nothing in this Act may in any manner
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provide immunity for a dealer from criminal prosecution pursuant to
Oklahoma law.’ See Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.8(C). This section
recognizes that compliance with the tax stamp requirements does not
insulate a dealer who possesses or distributes a taxable substance like
cocaine base from prosecution or conviction under Oklahoma law.
Having reviewed the Oklahoma statutes at issue, we are convinced Mr.
Dennis’ convictions for trafficking and failing to affix tax stamps do not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. While the elements for both offenses are similar, it
is readily apparent the legislature intended the punishment for the trafficking
offense to be cumulative to the punishment for failing to affix a tax stamp. 7
Given this intent, we cannot conclude the two statutes at issue here are similar to
the two statutes at issue in Uriarite. In Uriarite, the defendant was convicted of
unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute
under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401, and unlawful intent to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school ground
under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401(A). 815 P.2d at 194-95. The Oklahoma court
7
Our decision comports with state decisions dealing with the same issue.
In those cases, the state courts determined punishment for both failure to pay a
drug tax and for delivery- or possession-related offenses did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause because their respective state legislatures clearly
intended the punishment for both offenses to be cumulative. See State v.
Detweiler, 544 N.W.2d 83, 91-92 (Neb. 1996); Anderson v. State, 649 N.E.2d
1060, 1062-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); de La Garza v. State, 898 S.W.2d 376, 377-
78 (Tex. App. 1995); State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 442-43 (Iowa 1993); Ex
parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 959-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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found the legislative intent was entirely unclear as to the application of one
offense to the other. Id. at 195. In so finding, the court compared the elements of
each offense and held a double jeopardy violation occurred because a single act
could constitute a violation of both offenses. Id. In contrast, in this case the
legislature clearly intended cumulative punishments to arise from both the tax
stamp and the trafficking offenses, and thus, the fact the elements of each offense
are similar is immaterial to our double jeopardy determination.
Our discussion does not end here. In White, 900 P.2d 982, the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals briefly addressed the double jeopardy consequences involved
when a defendant is convicted of the same two offenses involved in this case. In
White, like here, the defendant was convicted of both a § 2-415 trafficking
violation and a § 450 tax stamp violation. Id. at 985. While the Oklahoma court
did not discuss the legislature’s intent as to the cumulative nature of the
punishments, it did explicitly hold that “where a defendant is punished for both
failing to pay a drug tax and committing a drug offense, all in the same
proceeding, no Double Jeopardy problem exists.” Id. at 996.
We find the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal’s ruling in White
consistent with the legislature’s intent to create cumulative punishments and the
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kurth Ranch – to the extent it holds no double
jeopardy violation arises when both punishments are addressed in one proceeding.
For the same reasons, we conclude the Oklahoma court that adjudicated Mr.
Dennis’ case properly determined no double jeopardy issue arose when he
received cumulative punishments in the same proceeding for the separate tax
stamp and trafficking offenses. We hold the Oklahoma court’s adjudication on
this issue comports with § 2254(d)(1) because it was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.
4. Section 11 Violation
In a separate but related argument to his double jeopardy claims, Mr.
Dennis argues his convictions violate Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 11, which prohibits
multiple punishments for a single act. Mr. Dennis generally contends that in
enacting § 11, the legislature intended to prevent the state from imposing multiple
punishments under the “same statute” for a single act. He relies on Hale v. State,
888 P.2d 1027 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), and cases following Hale, to support his
position.
The pertinent part of § 11 states:
[A]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this title may be punished under any of such
provisions, ... but in no case can a criminal act or omission be
punished under more than one section of law.
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Okla. Stat., tit. 21, § 11. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined
§ 11 “grants no greater protection than what is clearly spelled out in ... [its]
language.” Davis, 993 P.2d at 126. In so holding, the Oklahoma Court rejected
the language in Hale which states that § 11 “is violated when a defendant is
convicted of two offenses, one of ‘which is ... a mere means to some other
ultimate objective, ... or ... merely a different incident or facet of some primary
offense.’” Id. at 126 (quoting Hale, 888 P.3d at 1028). In rejecting Hale’s
“ultimate objective” or “primary offense” test, the Oklahoma Court stated:
The proper analysis of a claim raised under Section 11 is then to
focus on the relationship between the crimes.... One act that violates
two criminal provisions cannot be punished twice, absent specific
legislative intent.
This analysis does not bar the charging and conviction of separate
crimes which may only tangentially relate to one or more crimes
committed during a continuing course of conduct.
Id. at 126-27 & n.5 (emphasis added).
We are bound to accept the Oklahoma court’s construction of its state
statutes, including § 11. See Missouri, 459 U.S. at 368 (relying on O’Brien v.
Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974)). Applying the Oklahoma court’s construction
of § 11 to the case at hand, we have already ascertained Mr. Dennis’ sale and
distribution of rock cocaine to Mr. Shaw constitutes a separate and distinct crime
from Mr. Dennis’ possession of the remaining cocaine. Specifically, at the point
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Mr. Dennis sold and no longer retained control of the ten grams of rock cocaine,
he committed the separate and distinct criminal offense of “distribution.” In turn,
the fact he retained the remaining rock cocaine evidences he separately committed
the criminal offense of “possession.” 8 While these two acts or offenses may have
occurred during a continuing course of conduct in which Mr. Dennis sold a
portion of his rock cocaine while still possessing the remaining cocaine, the two
acts are, at most, only tangentially related and thereby insufficient to cause a § 11
violation.
For these reasons, we reject Mr. Dennis’ argument § 11 applies to his
convictions. Because § 11 does not apply, we also reject his claim that the state’s
failure to apply § 11 violated his due process and equal protection rights.
Accordingly, the Oklahoma court’s adjudication of this issue comports with the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
5. Merger
Mr. Dennis claims “there was a merger of offenses under the facts and
8
If, instead, Mr. Dennis had sold the entire 30.7 grams to Mr. Shaw, he
conceivably would have committed only the offense of distribution. However, by
keeping some cocaine, Mr. Dennis also committed the separate and distinct
criminal offense of possession.
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circumstances of the case that prohibits separate punishments, or at the minimum
prohibits consecutive sentencing.” Specifically, Mr. Dennis contends his offenses
should have been merged because they stemmed from a single transaction or
included underlying offenses. Even if his actions constituted separate offenses,
he contends the state court should have merged his offenses together at sentencing
under Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 976, 9 and thus sentenced him to concurrent instead of
consecutive sentences.
As previously determined, Mr. Dennis clearly was convicted of four
separate and distinct offenses so no double jeopardy implications arise for the
purpose of merging his offenses. As to the sentencing issue, the application of
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 976 is a question of state law, not cognizable on federal
habeas review. See Handley v. Page, 398 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 935 (1969). We afford wide discretion to the state trial court’s
9
Section 976 states:
If the defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses,
before judgment on either, the judgment may be that the
imprisonment upon any one may commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment upon any other of the offenses. Provided, that the
sentencing judge shall, at all times, have the discretion to enter a
sentence concurrent with any other sentence.
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 976.
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sentencing decision, and challenges to that decision are not generally
constitutionally cognizable, unless it is shown the sentence imposed is outside the
statutory limits or unauthorized by law. See Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 923-
24 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1014 (1988); see also Handley, 398
F.2d at 352). Generally, our review of a sentence ends once we determine the
sentence is within the limitation set by statute. See Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d
250, 255 (10th Cir. 1988). In this case, the sentences Mr. Dennis received are
within the statutory range of permissible punishment. 10 We find no merit to Mr.
Dennis’ merger arguments and find the state court’s adjudication of these
arguments satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
6. Vagueness of § 2-415
Mr. Dennis’ final underlying constitutional claim centers on his contention
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415 is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, Mr. Dennis
claims a denial of due process and equal protection rights on what he perceives as
10
The statutory sentences and fines Mr. Dennis received for his trafficking
convictions are discussed in the following section. His two life sentences and
$100,000 fines are within the statutory range for his trafficking convictions. As
to his stamp tax convictions, § 450.8 sets punishment in prison for not more than
five years. Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 450.8. However, because Mr. Dennis was
convicted of a prior felony, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51 applies and provides for “a
term not exceeding ten (10) years.” Therefore, Mr. Dennis’ two ten-year
sentences for failure to affix tax stamps are within the statutory range.
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the unconstitutional vagueness of § 2-415, which calls for enhanced penalties for
trafficking certain quantities of “cocaine base” as opposed to trafficking greater
quantities of “cocaine.” Mr. Dennis raised this claim in his direct state appeal. In
affirming Mr. Dennis’ conviction on direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals found no merit to his vagueness argument. We review the
merits of Mr. Dennis’ vagueness claim to determine whether the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals’ adjudication of this issue resulted in a decision contrary to
or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
To understand Mr. Dennis’ argument, we must first examine the portion of
§ 2-415 he attacks, as well as the statutory scheme under which he was sentenced.
We begin by noting § 2-415, under which Mr. Dennis was convicted, applies to
those individuals considered to be “trafficking in illegal drugs.” Okla. Stat. tit.
63, § 2-415(B)(3). In order to be “trafficking in illegal drugs,” a dealer must
distribute, manufacture, bring into the state, or possess a certain quantity of the
controlled dangerous substance. Id., § 2-415(B)(1). Section 2-415 applies if the
quantity of the controlled dangerous substance at issue involves twenty-eight
grams or more of “cocaine or coca leaves,” or five grams or more of “cocaine
base.” Id., § 2-415(C)(2)(a) and (C)(7)(a). Section 2-101(5) defines “coca
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leaves” to include “cocaine and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture or preparation of coca leaves, except derivatives of coca leaves which do
not contain cocaine or ecgonine.” Id., § 2-101(5). Although the Oklahoma
statutes do not specifically define “cocaine base,” § 2-415(A)(7) expressly states
“trafficking” applies to “cocaine base, commonly known as ‘crack’ or ‘rock.’”
The monetary fines for trafficking twenty-eight grams or more of “cocaine”
or “coca leaves” and for trafficking five grams or more of “cocaine base” are the
same – not less than $25,000 and not more than $100,000. Id., § 2-415(c)(2)(a)
and (c)(7)(a). In addition, the terms of imprisonment are identical – both require
not less than ten years nor more than life in prison. 11 Id., §§ 2-415(D)(1); 2-
401(B)(1); 2-206(4). In contrast, the term of imprisonment for simple possession
or distribution of any form of cocaine, in quantities not constituting “trafficking,”
is “not less than five (5) years nor more than life” and the fine is not more than
$100,000. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401(B)(1). Consequently, the primary
11
Section 2-415 requires a term of imprisonment for trafficking any form
of cocaine of “[n]ot less than twice the term of imprisonment provided for in
Section 2-401.” Okla. Stat., tit. 63, § 2-415(D)(1). Section 2-401 requires a term
of imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than life for Schedule II
narcotic drugs. Id., § 2-401(B)(1). Under §§ 2-206 and 2-101(26), cocaine
leaves, cocaine and any compound thereof are considered a Schedule II narcotic
drug. Id., §§ 2-206, 2-101(26). Because the term of imprisonment must be at
least twice the five years provided in § 2-401, the term of imprisonment under
§ 2-415 is ten years to life.
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difference between a conviction for “trafficking” and a conviction for simple
possession or distribution (i.e., “non-trafficking”) of cocaine or cocaine base is
that the minimum sentence for “trafficking” is ten years compared to a minimum
sentence of five years for “non-trafficking.” The minimum fine for “trafficking”
is $25,000, while no minimum fine exists for “non-trafficking.” The maximum
fine for both offenses is $100,000.
With this statutory structure in mind, we look more closely at Mr. Dennis’
argument. Mr. Dennis suggests § 2-415 and other related statutes are
unconstitutionally vague because they do not “provide any definitional or
explanatory chemical, biological or commonly understood distinction” between
trafficking in “cocaine” and “cocaine base.” Specifically, Mr. Dennis contends
§ 2-415 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not clearly distinguish
“cocaine” from “cocaine base” yet requires only five grams of “cocaine base” to
constitute “trafficking,” while it takes a total of twenty-eight grams of “cocaine”
to constitute “trafficking.” As a result, Mr. Dennis asserts the Oklahoma
legislature impermissibly provides separate, distinct and unequal punishments for
“trafficking” in “cocaine” as opposed to “cocaine base.” Mr. Dennis points out
that if the twenty-eight-gram limit for “cocaine” had been applied in his case, he
would not have received two “trafficking” convictions under § 2-415 for the ten
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grams distributed and 20.7 grams possessed, because neither equals twenty-eight
grams as required for a “cocaine” trafficking conviction. 12 Continuing with this
premise, Mr. Dennis claims the state would only have been able to charge him
with “non-trafficking” offenses under § 2-401, which provides for a lesser
sentence, and thus “the jury might have imposed a lesser sentence.”
Admittedly, “vague sentencing provisions may post constitutional questions
if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given
criminal statute.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
However, to raise a vagueness claim, it is not sufficient for Mr. Dennis to simply
complain the Oklahoma legislature should have chosen clearer and more precise
language to clarify any differences between cocaine base and cocaine, and the
corresponding fines and sentences. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94
(1975). As we have previously held, “the Constitution does not require the
legislature to incorporate Webster’s [Dictionary] into each statute in order to
insulate it from vagueness challenges.” Stewart v. United States Trustee (In re
12
At oral argument, Mr. Dennis’ counsel described the cocaine in this case
as rock cocaine, and in his brief, Mr. Dennis does not seem to dispute the fact he
distributed and possessed “cocaine base,” which the Oklahoma legislature
intended to also mean “rock cocaine.” Instead, Mr. Dennis suggests the statute
does not sufficiently differentiate “cocaine base” from “cocaine.” We disagree
for the reasons set forth in our discussion.
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Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 811 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Instead, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires only that a penal
statute “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983). As the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated, when
addressing the same issue:
In deciding whether the term “cocaine base” renders the statute
unconstitutional, we are guided by the well-settled rule that a statute,
if it can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable
construction, must be given that construction .... Words of a statute
are to be given their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive
reasons to the contrary.
State v. Moore, 431 N.W.2d 565, 567-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (relying on
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S.
575, 580-81 (1975)). Moreover, it is well established that “[v]agueness
challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment rights are limited to
the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 727 (10th
Cir. 1982) (relying on United State v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)).
Applying these principles to the term “cocaine base,” we note the
Oklahoma legislature, by distinguishing “cocaine” from “cocaine base”
throughout the Controlled Dangerous Substance Act, clearly intended “cocaine”
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and “cocaine base” to be treated as different substances. By requiring only five
grams of “cocaine base” to constitute “trafficking,” in comparison to twenty-eight
grams of “cocaine,” it is also evident the legislature intended to differentiate
between the punishment for trafficking in smaller quantities of “cocaine base” as
opposed to trafficking in larger quantities of “cocaine.”
It is also clear the Oklahoma legislature intended “cocaine base” to include
crack or rock cocaine, when it stated § 2-415 shall apply to “[c]ocaine base,
commonly known as ‘crack’ or ‘rock.’” 13 In referring to “cocaine base” as
“crack” or “rock” the Oklahoma legislature recognized, as do our federal
sentencing guidelines, that “‘crack’ is the street name for a form of cocaine
13
Unlike here, the Minnesota statute at issue in Moore did not have the
benefit of this or any provision defining “cocaine base.” Thus, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals addressed this issue by determining the common meaning of the
word “base,” stating:
The word “base” ... has an ordinary meaning when used to describe a
chemical substance. Webster’s Dictionary defines “base” as “ the
chief active ingredient ... the predominating substance ... left as a
residue on refining.... The American Heritage Dictionary defines
“base” as a “fundamental ingredient” or “chief constituent.”
431 N.W.2d at 568 (quotation marks, alterations and citations omitted). Based in
part on this definition, the Minnesota court concluded its legislature intended, by
using the word “base,” for the substance of “cocaine base” to contain a chemical
formula different than “cocaine.” Id.
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base.” 14 Moreover, we take judicial notice of the fact that cocaine base, including
rock and crack cocaine, are generally considered very different substances than
what is commonly considered “cocaine.” On the federal level, we have faced this
issue numerous times in cases contesting the constitutionality of federal statutes
and sentencing guidelines that provide stiffer sentences for “cocaine base”
offenses than for “cocaine” offenses. 15 See, e.g., Brooks, 161 F.3d at 1247
(holding Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses argument that the distinction between
cocaine powder and crack cocaine violates due process and equal protection
rights); United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947, 950, 953 (10th Cir. 1993)
(concluding “cocaine base is simply a different drug than cocaine powder, with a
different chemical composition”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1199 (1994); United
States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding “different penalties
for cocaine base and cocaine in its other forms do not violate due process.”)
14
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(Drug Quantity Table, n. D) (stating crack
cocaine is “usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium
bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form”).
15
The federal sentencing guidelines equate one gram of “cocaine base” or
“crack” to 100 grams of various forms of “cocaine.” See United States v. Brooks,
161 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (relying on U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Drug
Quantity Table)). Obviously, this one-to-100 gram ratio is a much higher ratio
than the Oklahoma ratio.
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Given § 2-415 equates “cocaine base” with “rock” or “crack” cocaine, we
hold the statute defines the criminal offense of trafficking in “cocaine base” with
sufficient definiteness that it does not violate Mr. Dennis’ due process or equal
protection rights. Because the Oklahoma court’s adjudication on this issue was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court, Mr. Dennis’ vagueness argument must fail.
7. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Having reviewed Mr. Dennis’ underlying constitutional claims raised in his
habeas corpus petition, we conclude that although novel, each lacks merit. In so
concluding, it follows Mr. Dennis’ counsel’s failure to raise these meritless
claims at trial or on direct appeal did not prejudice Mr. Dennis’ case. In other
words, Mr. Dennis fails to show “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” Hickman, 160 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Our conclusion comports with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection
of Mr. Dennis’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on its determination
none of his underlying claims constituted a “dead bang winner” and therefore, no
prejudice arose as required by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. (Apt. App. at 36-
37.) Accordingly, we hold the Oklahoma court’s adjudication on this issue meets
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the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Dennis fails to establish the prejudice
required for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, or to otherwise
independently provide a basis for relief as sought in his habeas petition. We are
satisfied the Oklahoma court’s decision on Mr. Dennis’ ineffective assistance of
counsel claim and underlying claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, the district court’s decision denying
Mr. Dennis a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.
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