F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 29 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
VIRGINIE GSCHWIND, in her own
right and administratrix of the estate
of Cyril Gschwind and Alexandra
Gschwind,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 99-3329
vs.
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY;
PRATT & WHITNEY CANADA,
INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 96-CV-1269-MLB)
Catherine B. Slavin, Wolk & Genter, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Plaintiff -
Appellant.
John C. Nettels, Jr. (and Thomas E. Nanney, Morrison & Hecker, L.L.P., Kansas
City, Missouri, with him on the briefs), Morrison & Hecker, L.L.P., Wichita,
Kansas, for Defendant - Appellee Cessna Aircraft Company.
John W. Cowden, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, L.L.C., Kansas City, Missouri,
for Defendant - Appellee Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Virginie Gschwind appeals from the district court’s
denial of her F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(b)(4) motion for relief from a judgment
dismissing an earlier action on forum non conveniens grounds. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM.
Background
Ms. Gschwind, a citizen of Belgium, brought a wrongful death and
survival action in Ohio state court against The Cessna Aircraft Company
(“Cessna”), a Kansas citizen, Pratt & Whitney, a Canadian citizen, and Hartzell
Propeller, Inc. (“Hartzell”), an Ohio citizen. 1
The action was then removed to the
Southern District of Ohio over Ms. Gschwind’s objection. She sought remand,
arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) prohibited removal because Hartzell was an
Ohio citizen. In initially ordering remand to state court on this basis, the district
court concluded that “[s]ince Plaintiff is a foreign national, a resident of
Belgium, there is complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and the
federal courts would have subject matter jurisdiction originally.” Aplt. App. at
Cessna and Pratt & Whitney are the Defendant-Appellees as Hartzell was
1
dismissed as a party by the District Court of Kansas.
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128. Upon reconsideration, the district court determined that Hartzell was
fraudulently joined and denied Ms. Gschwind’s motion to remand, implicitly
relying upon diversity jurisdiction. After removal, the action was transferred to
the District of Kansas where Hartzell was dismissed as a party and the district
court conditionally granted a forum non conveniens dismissal. Id. at 55-85.
On appeal, we affirmed the forum non conveniens dismissal. Ms.
Gschwind then petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc, arguing for the
first time that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over suits between
aliens. Id. at 173-77, 328-29. We denied the petition. Id. at 201-02. She then
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, again arguing lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 203-25. The petition was denied.
Ms. Gschwind next returned to federal district court and filed a Rule
60(b)(4) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court’s order
was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. , 189 F.R.D. 643 (D. Kan. 1999). The district court disagreed, concluding that
while it may have erroneously assumed jurisdiction, it did not usurp its authority
in interpreting the jurisdiction statute. Id. at 649. Accordingly, the district court
concluded that the judgment may have been erroneous, but was not void. Id.
The district court therefore concluded that the judgment could not be attacked by
a Rule 60(b)(4) motion because the case was no longer pending, as required by
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Tenth Circuit precedent. Id.
The court reviewed three cases– Wilmer v. Board of County Commissioners
of Leavenworth County , 69 F.3d 406, 409-10 (10th Cir. 1995) , Depex Reina 9
Partnership v. Texas Int’l Petroleum Corp. , 897 F.2d 461, 464 (10th Cir. 1990) ,
and Ramey Constr. Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation , 673 F.2d
315, 318 (10th Cir. 1982)–in which the Tenth Circuit allowed subject matter
jurisdiction to be attacked after appeal. In distinguishing those cases, the court
noted that the “appellate court had remanded the case to the district court and
then the district court considered subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to a Rule
60(b)(4) motion.” Id. at 648 (emphasis in original). By way of contrast, in this
case “the Tenth Circuit affirmed this court’s dismissal of the case. The Tenth
Circuit denied plaintiff’s motion for rehearing. The United States Supreme Court
denied plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari. Unlike the cases mentioned
above, the case was never remanded to the district court and at this point the case
is no longer pending.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The court found an unreported district court decision to be persuasive. See
SBKC Service Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. , No. 95-2540-JWL, 1998
WL 928408 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 1998). In SBKC , the plaintiff, like Ms. Gschwind,
moved to void the district court’s judgment for lack of diversity jurisdiction after
exhausting its appellate remedies. Id. at *1. The district court denied the
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motion, concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to contest jurisdiction on direct
appeal was fatal. Id. at *4. The district court also concluded that its exercise of
jurisdiction was not a usurpation of authority, presumably because the
defendant’s residence was subject to bona fide dispute.
The district court in this action then concluded: “It follows that a Rule
60(b)(4) motion . . . cannot be used by plaintiff who did not succeed on her
argument concerning subject matter jurisdiction during the appellate process.”
Gschwind , 189 F.R.D. at 649.
Discussion
We review the district court’s denial of Ms. Gschwind’s Rule 60(b)(4)
motion de novo. Wilmer , 69 F.3d at 409; King Fisher Marine Service, Inc. v.
21st Phoenix Corp ., 893 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1990). A district court has
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between (1) citizens of different States; (2)
citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3)
citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). On its face, § 1332(a) does not vest the district court with
jurisdiction over actions between parties only of foreign citizenship. §
1332(a)(3) does, however, permit foreign citizens to be a party to an action
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between citizens of different states. § 1332(a)(3) could not have been a basis for
jurisdiction in this action, however, because the action was not between citizens
of different states. Ms. Gschwind, a foreign citizen, was the lone plaintiff.
Therefore, the district court could have exercised jurisdiction pursuant only to §
1332(a)(2), if at all. While the circuits that have considered the issue read §
1332(a)(2) to require United States citizens on both sides of an action between
foreign citizens, Franceskin v. Credit Suisse , 214 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2000);
Faysound Ltd. v. United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. , 878 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir.
1989); Kuehne & Nagel (AG & Co.) v. Geosource, Inc. , 874 F.2d 283, 290-91
(5th Cir. 1989); Eze v. Yellow Cab Co. of Alexandria, Virginia, Inc. , 782 F.2d
1064, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986), Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters
Corp. , 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1975); M OORE ’ S F EDERAL P RACTICE § 102.77,
at 143-44 (3d ed. 1997), we concur with Judge Posner’s observation that this
interpretation is far from apparent from the face of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See
Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc. , 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir.
1993) (“Exactly what sense all this makes rather eludes us.”). Nevertheless, the
Defendants assume for the sake of argument that the requirements of §
1332(a)(2) were not satisfied because Ms. Gschwind was not joined by a United
States citizen. Aplee. Br. (Pratt & Whitney) at 5; Aplee. Br. (Cessna) at 21. We
make this same assumption inasmuch as the district court’s views on jurisdiction
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are not dispositive to our analysis.
Rule 60(b) provides in part: “On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is
void.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 60(b)(4) (2000). “Rule 60(b)(4) . . . is not subject to any
time limitation.” Orner v. Shalala , 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
A judgment is void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the “rendering court was
powerless to enter it.” V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc. , 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir.
1979). A judgment may in some instances be void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. E.g. id. ; In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation , 502 F.2d
834, 842 (10th Cir. 1974). “However, this occurs only where there is a plain
usurpation of power, when a court wrongfully extends its jurisdiction beyond the
scope of its authority.” Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon
Corp. , 624 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); accord Nemaizer v.
Baker , 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1986) (observing that collateral attack is
permitted under Rule 60(b)(4) where there is “a clear usurpation of power by a
district court, and not an error of law in determining whether it has jurisdiction”)
(citations omitted).
A court does not usurp its power when it erroneously exercises
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jurisdiction. Kansas City Southern , 624 F.2d at 825. “Since federal courts have
‘jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction,’ that is, ‘power to interpret the language
of the jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue by the court,’ error
in interpreting a statutory grant of jurisdiction is not equivalent to acting with
total want of jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Stoll v. Gottlieb , 305 U.S. 165, 171
(1938)); see also Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Board No. 27 . , 453 F.2d
645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972) (“While absence of subject matter jurisdiction may make
a judgment void, such total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an
error in the exercise of jurisdiction.”) (footnote omitted). There must be “no
arguable basis on which [the court] could have rested a finding that it had
jurisdiction.” Nemaizer , 793 F.2d at 65.
Applying these principles, we hold that the district court’s judgment was
not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Ohio federal district court
concluded that “[s]ince Plaintiff is a foreign national, a resident of Belgium,
there is complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and the federal courts
would have subject matter jurisdiction originally.” Aplt. App. at 128. In doing
so, the district court erroneously interpreted § 1332(a). However, an erroneous
interpretation of a jurisdictional statute does not render the underlying judgment
void. Stoll , 305 U.S. at 171-72; Kansas City Southern , 624 F.2d at 825.
Moreover, there was at least an arguable basis for jurisdiction, cf. Nemaizer , 793
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F.2d at 65, because the scope of the district court’s jurisdiction over a case with
foreign parties on both sides of an action is far from clear from the face of the
statute. The express language of § 1332(a)(2) does not require a United States
citizen on both sides of an action between foreign citizens. The requirement only
begins to become vaguely apparent when (a)(2) is read together with (a)(3) and
even then it is not absolutely clear. Allendale , 10 F.3d at 428.
Ms. Gschwind argues that the district court mischaracterized its exercise of
jurisdiction as quasi-jurisdictional, i.e., that jurisdiction was premised upon the
finding of jurisdictional facts. Ms. Gschwind argues that the district court
instead exercised jurisdiction upon a general finding of jurisdiction over cases
between a foreign citizen and a foreign and United States citizen and that this
exercise of jurisdiction rendered the underlying judgment void. Aplt. Brief at 16.
Ms. Gschwind correctly observes that the district court’s jurisdiction was not
based upon quasi-jurisdictional facts. The citizenship of the parties was not in
dispute. But this is not dispositive. As we explained, an “error in interpreting a
statutory grant of jurisdiction is not equivalent to acting with total want of
jurisdiction.” Kansas City Southern , 624 F.2d at 825.
Ms. Gschwind also asserts that the district court impermissibly extended its
jurisdiction in ordering the forum non conveniens dismissal. Aplt. Br. at 17. Ms.
Gschwind relies upon a distinction drawn in M OORE ’ S F EDERAL P RACTICE
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between the exercise of jurisdiction over an entire category of cases over which
the court does not have jurisdiction (e.g., cases on interlocutory appeal) and the
erroneous exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case that falls within a
category of cases over which a court generally does have jurisdiction (e.g.,
diversity cases). Id. (quoting M OORE ’ S F EDERAL P RACTICE 3 D § 60.44[2][a-b]
(3d 1997) (“[A] lack of subject matter jurisdiction means a court’s lack of
jurisdiction over an entire category of cases, not whether the court makes a
proper or improper determination of subject-matter jurisdiction in a particular
case.”). Ms. Gschwind argues that the district court in this case exercised
jurisdiction over an entire category of cases over which it lacked jurisdiction:
cases brought by a foreign citizen against a foreign citizen and a United States
citizen. Aplt. Br. at 16; Aplt. Reply Br. at 3.
Assuming this approach is appropriate in distinguishing void, as opposed
to voidable, judgments, we disagree with Ms. Gschwind’s characterization of the
district court’s decision. The district court did not exercise jurisdiction over an
entire category of cases over which it lacked jurisdiction. The district court had
jurisdiction over cases between diverse parties and assumed that the parties
before it satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It did nothing more
than erroneously exercise its diversity jurisdiction in this particular case.
Finally, Ms. Gschwind asserts that the Supreme Court’s decision in Vallely
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v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 254 U.S. 348 (1920), requires the conclusion
that the district court’s judgment was void. Aplt. Reply Br. at 5.
In Vallely , the district court entertained involuntary bankruptcy proceedings
against an insurance company. At the time, the Bankruptcy Act expressly
provided that insurance companies were not subject to the district court’s
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Vallely , 254 U.S. at 351-52. The district court entered
judgment and the time for appeal lapsed, at which time the insurance company
contested jurisdiction by filing a motion to vacate the judgment. Id. at 351. The
Court held that “[c]ourts are constituted by authority and they cannot [act]
beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and
certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as
nullities.” Id. at 353. The Court distinguished the case from those in which the
exercise of jurisdiction was held to be merely erroneous. “[In those cases] the
courts had jurisdiction of their subject-matter and necessarily power to pass upon
the fact (diversity of citizenship) upon which that jurisdiction depended in the
given case. The subject-matter of the suit was not withheld from them by explicit
provision of the law which was their sole warrant of power.” Id. at 354.
Because the jurisdictional statute in question clearly excluded insurance
companies from jurisdiction, the Court concluded that there was “no power in the
District Court to include them . . . For a court to extend the act to corporations of
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either kind is to enact a law, not to execute one.” Id. at 355-56.
Vallely is distinguishable. While the jurisdictional statute in Vallely
plainly excluded insurance companies from jurisdiction, § 1332 does not on its
face exclude actions brought by a foreign citizen against a foreign and United
States citizen. Thus, unlike the district court’s actions in Vallely , the district
court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this instance does not amount to a total
usurpation or extension of jurisdiction.
In light of our holding that the district court’s judgment was not void, we
need not address whether Ms. Gschwind was barred from attacking subject matter
jurisdiction on principles of res judicata.
AFFIRMED.
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