F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 19 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 00-5182
v.
JOHNNY JOE SUITOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the N. District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 99-CR-162-C)
Submitted on the Briefs:
Thomas Scott Woodward, United States Attorney, R. Richard Love, III, Assistant
United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Stephen J. Greubel, Ungerman & Iola, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Johnny Joe Suitor, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to make, utter,
and possess forged securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 513(a), and
false representation of a social security account number in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 408(a)(7)(B). A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was prepared and
Suitor presented objections to the PSR. The district court sentenced Suitor to
twenty-seven months’ incarceration to be followed by a three-year term of
supervised release. The court also ordered Suitor to pay restitution in the amount
of $19,948.77 and to pay a special assessment of $200. In this appeal, Suitor
does not challenge his conviction but appeals the sentence imposed by the district
court. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), this court
affirms . 1
It is undisputed that Suitor was involved in a conspiracy to cash counterfeit
checks drawn on business accounts. The three other individuals involved in the
conspiracy included an eighteen-year-old male, Jeremy Isbell, and twin sisters,
both minors. The counterfeiting scheme was first discussed at Suitor’s home
some time during the Labor Day weekend of 1998. Suitor admitted that the two
minor girls were at his home during the initial discussion.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined
1
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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One of the co-conspirators thereafter purchased a computer software
program used to print business checks. Suitor installed the software on his home
computer. Using information from a paycheck he received from his employer,
Suitor printed several counterfeit checks drawn on the employer’s account. The
checks were signed by one of the minor girls. Isbell cashed three of the checks
resulting in a loss to NationsBank of approximately $4,128.18.
On September 18, 1998, the two minor girls obtained several additional
counterfeit checks. One girl signed the checks and the other presented them for
payment. The girls cashed a total of ten checks on September 18th, resulting in a
loss to NationsBank of approximately $6,266.77. Although Suitor disclaims any
prior knowledge of the girls’ activities on September 18th, one of the girls
testified before the grand jury that Suitor had created and printed half of the
checks cashed that day. In addition, Suitor’s fingerprint was found on one of the
checks. On September 19, 1998, Isbell cashed three counterfeit checks at various
NationsBank branches. The proceeds from these checks totaled approximately
$2,941.47.
In late September, the four individuals decided to print additional
counterfeit business checks. These checks were drawn on a Central Crude
Corporation account; the account number was obtained from a royalty check
Suitor received from Central Crude Corporation. One of the girls testified that
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all four individuals were present when Suitor printed these checks on his home
computer. The checks were signed using a signature stamp. On September 30,
1998, Suitor and one of the minor girls drove Isbell to several NationsBank
locations. Isbell successfully cashed three of the counterfeit Central Crude
Corporation checks. The loss to NationsBank from these three checks totaled
approximately $4,076.76. When Isbell attempted to cash the fourth check, bank
employees contacted the Tulsa Police Department and stalled Isbell until officers
arrived.
Suitor was named in a two-count indictment filed on November 3, 1999,
and was arrested on December 14, 1999. A superceding indictment was filed on
February 8, 2000. Suitor pleaded guilty to two of the counts in the superceding
indictment: conspiracy to utter a forged security of an organization, and false
representation of a social security account number. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
513(a); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). In the PSR prepared before sentencing, the
probation officer recommended, inter alia , a four-level increase in Suitor’s
offense level because the loss amount exceeded $20,000; a two-level increase
because Suitor used a minor to commit the conspiracy offense; and an additional
two-level increase because Suitor acted as an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor while committing the offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. §§
2F1.1(b)(1)(E), 3B1.4, 3B1.1(c). The PSR also recommended that Suitor’s base
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offense level be decreased two levels for acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
Suitor filed an objection to the PSR and an addendum was prepared. The
two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) based on Suitor’s role in the
offense was removed from the PSR but the remaining recommended increases
and decrease to Suitor’s base offense level were retained. At the sentencing
hearing, the district court found that Suitor was responsible for $21,493.12 in
losses; that Suitor was an organizer and leader of the conspiracy; that Suitor used
the minor girls in the commission of the offense; and that Suitor was not entitled
to a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility because he testified
untruthfully at the sentencing hearing. Suitor filed this appeal challenging the
district court’s determinations on these four sentencing issues.
This court reviews a district court’s factual findings relating to sentencing
for clear error and reviews legal conclusions de novo . See United States v.
Spencer , 178 F.3d 1365, 1367 (10th Cir. 1999). Suitor first contends the district
court erred when it concluded he was responsible for the losses suffered by
NationsBank from the counterfeit checks cashed by his co-conspirators on
September 18, 1998 and September 19, 1998. The district court included these
losses to arrive at the conclusion that the total loss exceeded $20,000, thereby
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warranting a four-level increase to Suitor’s base offense level pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(E).
“In a conspiracy case, loss is calculated on the basis of all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction . . . .” United States v. Schluneger , 184 F.3d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir.
1999) (quotation omitted). Count I of the superceding indictment charged Suitor
with committing all the overt acts of September 18, 1998 and September 19,
1998. In his plea agreement, Suitor admitted that he “knowingly, willfully, and
intentionally committed or caused to be committed the acts constituting the
crimes alleged in Count I” of the superceding indictment. By admitting legal
responsibility for the acts of his co-conspirators on September 18, 1998 and
September 19, 1998, Suitor necessarily admitted that those acts were reasonably
foreseeable and were undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United
States v. Brewer , 983 F.2d 181, 185 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A conspiracy participant
is legally liable for all reasonably foreseeable acts of his or her coconspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy”). This court, therefore, concludes that there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that Suitor
was responsible for losses in excess of $20,000. Thus, Suitor’s base offense
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level was properly increased by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2F1.1(b)(1)(E).
Suitor next argues that the district court erroneously found that he
intentionally used the minors in the commission of the conspiracy offense. The
sentencing guidelines provide that a defendant’s base offense level should be
increased two levels if the defendant “used or attempted to use a person less than
eighteen years of age to commit the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4. The application
notes to this sentencing guideline define the term “used or attempted to use” as
encompassing “directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling,
training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting.” Id. at cmt. n.1.
In his plea agreement, Suitor admitted that he “conspired with [Isbell], and
two juvenile females . . . to manufacture and utter counterfeit checks drawn on
the NationsBank accounts of two businesses . . . .” The district court relied on
Suitor’s admission that the minors were involved in the conspiracy to support its
conclusion that Suitor used the minor girls in the commission of the offense.
On appeal, Suitor readily admits that the two minors were a part of the
conspiracy. He argues, however, that he did not “use” the minors and that he
never intentionally involved them in the conspiracy. Suitor contends that the
government was required to produce some evidence that he actively involved the
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minors in the conspiracy to support the imposition of the § 3B1.4 increase but
failed to do so.
Pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the two-level § 3B1.4 increase is
only applicable if a defendant directs, trains, or in some other way affirmatively
engages the minor participant in the crime of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4,
cmt. n.1. The evidence, therefore, must demonstrate more than the simple fact
that Suitor was involved in a conspiracy with the minors. See United States v.
Parker , 241 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001). Based on this court’s review of the
record, however, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to the
district court to enable that court to conclude Suitor “used” the girls as that term
is defined in § 3B1.4. Specifically, Isbell testified at the sentencing hearing that
Suitor instructed all three co-conspirators, inter alia , on which banks to visit and
how to dress when presenting the checks. Additionally, one of the minors
testified before the grand jury 2
that Suitor counseled them on how to behave if
they were caught while cashing a counterfeit check. The district court’s finding
that Suitor used the minors in the commission of the offense of conviction is
supported by the record and, thus, is not clearly erroneous. The court properly
increased Suitor’s base offense level two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4.
Portions of the minors’ grand jury testimony were read into the record at
2
Suitor’s sentencing hearing.
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Suitor next argues that the district court’s finding that he was an organizer
and leader of the conspiracy was clearly erroneous. The commentary to § 3B1.1
of the sentencing guidelines delineates factors to be considered by a sentencing
court when evaluating whether a defendant is an organizer or leader. These
factors include,
the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation
in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree
of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and
scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority
exercised over others.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4. The testimony presented at the sentencing hearing
included statements made by Suitor’s co-conspirators that Suitor: instructed them
on how to use the computer software to print the checks and that Suitor’s
computer was used to print the checks; provided the account numbers used to
print all the checks; furnished the paper upon which the checks were printed;
instructed them on how to dress and conduct themselves when cashing the
counterfeit checks; decided which banks to visit; advised them on what to expect
when the check was presented to the teller; and warned them of the consequences
if one or all were caught. The district court, after hearing this evidence,
concluded that Suitor was a leader and organizer and increased his base offense
level by two levels pursuant to § 3B1.1(c). The district court’s finding that
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Suitor was a leader or organizer is amply supported by the evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing and, thus, is not clearly erroneous.
The district court also concluded that Suitor’s testimony regarding the
involvement of the minors in the conspiracy was not truthful and, accordingly,
refused to decrease his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Suitor contends that the district court’s conclusion that he
lied during his sentencing hearing was clearly erroneous because the district
court improperly construed his legal arguments as untruthful statements. Suitor
maintains that the court should have granted the acceptance of responsibility
decrease.
The district court’s finding that Suitor’s testified untruthfully at the
sentencing hearing is supported by the record. At the hearing, Suitor continually
denied that he used the minors in the commission of the offense. As discussed,
supra , however, the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was not clearly
erroneous. Consequently, the court’s conclusion that Suitor acted in a manner
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility by continually denying relevant
conduct is also not clearly erroneous. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(a) (“[A]
defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the
court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of
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responsibility.”). This district court did not err in denying Suitor a decrease
pursuant to § 3E1.1.
This court concludes that the factual findings made by the district court at
Suitor’s sentencing hearing are supported by the record and thus are not clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the district court is hereby
affirmed .
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