F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 4 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
SHARIEFF IMANI SALLAHDIN,
also known as Michael Pennington,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 99-6361
v.
GARY GIBSON, Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 97-CV-2051-A)
Fred L. Staggs, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
William L. Humes, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney
General of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Respondent-Appellee.
Before EBEL , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and BRISCOE ,
Circuit Judge.
BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner-Appellant Sharieff Imani Sallahdin, formerly Michael
Pennington, 1
appeals from the district court’s denial of his federal habeas corpus
petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2254. In his petition, Sallahdin lodged
eleven challenges to his first degree murder conviction and death sentence. His
appeal contests the district court’s disposition of each challenge, raising the
following issues: (1) four challenges concerning the jury and whether Sallahdin
was deprived of due process of law and a fair and impartial jury; (2) whether the
information was constitutionally adequate; (3) whether the trial court’s failure to
define life without parole for the jury was constitutional error; (4) whether the
reference to post-arrest silence violated his constitutional rights; (5) whether the
two aggravators applied to his sentencing are supported by sufficient evidence;
(6) whether the continuing threat aggravator is unconstitutional because it is
vague and applied in a standardless manner; (7) whether the jury instructions
failed to inform the jury that it did not have to be unanimous to find and apply
mitigating circumstances to his sentence; and (8) whether Sallahdin was deprived
of admissible mitigation evidence concerning steroid-induced psychosis. This
court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Sallahdin’s most troubling challenge concerns whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence of the effects of Sallahdin’s
1
Sallahdin formally changed his name.
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steroid use on his behavior at the time of the crime. After carefully examining the
record, we are persuaded that, had this evidence been presented, there is a
reasonable probability the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been
different, i.e., that the jury would have imposed a sentence other than death.
Because, however, we are not privy to trial counsel’s reasons for not presenting
this evidence, and because we can envision circumstances where it would have
been constitutionally reasonable for counsel not to introduce this evidence despite
its potentially mitigative effect, we find it necessary to reverse and remand this
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing solely on this specific issue
concerning trial counsel's performance. As regards all other issues raised by
Sallahdin, we affirm.
FACTS
The pertinent facts concerning the murder are undisputed as summarized by
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the opinion disposing of his direct
criminal appeal. Pennington v. State, 913 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995),
cert. denied , 519 U.S. 841 (1996). At approximately 5:00 a.m. on October 21,
1991, James Principe and Bradley Grooms were stocking shelves at the 7-Eleven
convenience store where they worked. Principe heard a loud bang and saw a
black man looking in Grooms’ direction. Principe ducked, made his way to the
back of the store and locked himself in the bathroom. After emerging from the
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bathroom, he contacted the police and then saw Grooms lying motionless on the
floor with a gunshot wound to the chest. Grooms died from his injuries. Principe
later identified Sallahdin as the man who shot Grooms.
That same morning, Lynn Smith stopped at the 7-Eleven to get some ice.
Sallahdin was behind the counter and gave her a cup of ice. She did not see
anyone else in the store. Upon leaving, she looked back and saw Sallahdin leave
the store and drive away in a car. The following day, Sallahdin was taken into
custody at his wife’s home in Akron, Ohio.
At trial, Sallahdin testified another man committed the murder. The jury
convicted Sallahdin of first degree malice murder, which is punishable by death in
Oklahoma. When the trial proceeded to the sentencing phase, the State sought the
death penalty based on three aggravators: (1) Sallahdin posed a continuing threat
to society; (2) he committed the murder to avoid arrest or prosecution; and (3) he
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. In addition to
the guilt phase evidence about the crime, the State presented evidence of threats
Sallahdin made while incarcerated. The jury found all three aggravating
circumstances. After Sallahdin presented his own testimony in mitigation and
mitigating testimony from friends, family, commanders, peers and others who
knew him; the jury determined the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
evidence and fixed punishment at death.
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On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
conviction and death sentence, after striking the great risk of death to more than
one person aggravator and reweighing the remaining aggravators against the
mitigating evidence. That court later denied post-conviction relief. Sallahdin v.
State , 947 P.2d 559 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because Sallahdin filed his federal habeas petition after the effective date
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), that Act
governs this court’s review. See Penry v. Johnson , 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1918 (2001).
Under AEDPA, if a claim is adjudicated on its merits in state court, a petitioner is
entitled to federal habeas relief only if he can establish that the state court
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas
corpus only if the state court reached a conclusion opposite to that
reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, decided the case
differently than the Supreme Court has decided a case with a
materially indistinguishable set of facts, or unreasonably applied the
governing legal principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. “Under
§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause . . ., a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
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incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable.” “In
sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal
habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of
habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in
state court.” AEDPA also requires federal courts to presume state
court factual findings are correct, and places the burden on the
petitioner to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Walker v. Gibson , 228 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting and citing
Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 411-13 (2000)), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 2560
(2001).
When the state courts have not considered the claim on the merits and the
federal district court made its determination in the first instance, the district
court’s conclusions of law are subjected to de novo review and its findings of
fact, if any, are examined for clear error. LaFevers v. Gibson , 182 F.3d 705, 711
(10th Cir. 1999). However, if the state courts did not adjudicate the issue on the
merits and the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, basing its factual
findings only on a review of the state court record, this court does not give those
findings the benefit of the clearly erroneous standard, but instead conducts an
independent review. See Walker, 228 F.3d at 1225 (citing Smallwood v. Gibson ,
191 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 833 (2000)).
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DISCUSSION
Failure to Excuse Juror for Cause
Sallahdin argues he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury when the trial
court did not reopen voir dire after juror Lyle Kurtis Cable stated he could not be
a fair juror, and then refused to remove him for cause. The parties had passed
Juror Cable for cause. Later, during voir dire of other prospective jurors, he
stated “I can’t see myself being a fair juror in this particular case.” Tr. Vol. 3 at
10. Immediately thereafter, the court held a bench conference and indicated that
if both sides jointly moved to reopen voir dire , the motion would be granted. The
State did not move to reopen. Defense counsel stated “I think we should hear
what he has to say at least, Your Honor,” and the judge replied, “All right. Thank
you all very much.” Id. The trial court did not reopen voir dire and denied
Sallahdin’s later challenge for cause.
Refusal to Reopen Voir Dire – The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected Sallahdin’s claim, stating “the manner and extent of voir dire
examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Pennington , 913
P.2d at 1363. The court also noted Sallahdin did not use his peremptory
challenges to remove Juror Cable. Id. In his application for post-conviction
relief, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals declined to rule on the issue
based on the doctrine of res judicata . Sallahdin, 947 P.2d at 561.
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“In a petition for habeas, our inquiry into the conduct of voir dire is limited
to whether the trial court’s restriction on voir dire rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair.” Mayes v. Gibson , 210 F.3d 1284, 1292 (10th Cir.) (citing
Mu’ Min v. Virginia , 500 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1991)), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 1020
(2000). A defendant’s right to an impartial jury includes the right to an adequate
voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 729
(1992); Moore v. Gibson , 195 F.3d 1152, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied ,
530 U.S. 1208 (2000). The trial court, however, retains great latitude in
conducting voir dire , Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 424, and the Constitution does not
require an additional opportunity to make a searching inquiry. See Moore , 195
F.3d at 1170.
Here, the parties examined Juror Cable thoroughly with specific questions
regarding the death penalty. While he was being questioned on voir dire , he
affirmatively stated he could be fair and impartial, would follow the court’s
instructions, and would consider all three possible punishments. Both parties then
passed Juror Cable for cause. Significantly, although he had four peremptory
challenges remaining, Sallahdin did not use a peremptory challenge to remove
Juror Cable. If Sallahdin believed he needed to make further inquiry to determine
whether Juror Cable was biased and could not follow the law, he could have used
one of his peremptory challenges to remove him from the panel. Based on these
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facts and our limited scope of review, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion when it decided to disallow further inquiry. Sallahdin was not denied
his right to a fair and impartial jury. See Morgan , 504 U.S. at 730 & n.5; Mayes ,
210 F.3d at 1292.
Denial of Request to Remove Juror Cable for Cause -- For similar reasons,
Sallahdin’s claim of error concerning the trial court’s refusal to remove Juror
Cable for cause must also fail.
It is a long settled principle of Oklahoma law that a defendant who
disagrees with the trial court’s ruling on a for-cause challenge must,
in order to preserve the claim that the ruling deprived him of a fair
trial, exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Even
then, the error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts
all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon
him.
Ross v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988). Sallahdin does not argue he was
forced to use his four remaining peremptory challenges to remove incompetent
jurors. Rather, he cites to post-trial affidavits of Jurors Marie Bryant and Ruth
McGee to support his assertion the jury was biased. Juror Bryant stated she did
not want the death penalty, but other jurors believed that if one life is taken
another should be given in return. Juror McGee indicated she believed, after
hearing the evidence, that the only possible punishments were the death penalty or
life without parole.
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We agree with the district court that these affidavits merely represent brief,
conclusory perceptions and opinions of these jurors, which do not reflect any
misrepresentation by themselves or other jurors during voir dire . See United
States v. McVeigh , 118 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1153 (D. Colo. 2000) (28 U.S.C. § 2255
proceeding) (“statements made by trial jurors after they experienced the entire
trial and sentence hearing and after deliberating on the verdicts are not reasonably
probative of . . . whether [jurors] could consider the evidence with open minds
and follow the court’s instructions on the law in both phases of trial”). Therefore,
Sallahdin has not shown the trial court abused its discretion or denied him the
right to a fair trial when it declined to remove Juror Cable for cause. We affirm
the district court’s denial of habeas relief on this issue.
Excusing Two Jurors and Failing to Remove Another for Caus e
Sallahdin argues the trial court deprived him of a fair and impartial jury by
removing for cause two jurors who had reservations about the death penalty, but
who indicated they could still follow the court’s instructions and could consider
the death penalty as a sentencing option. He also argues the trial court deprived
him of a fair and impartial jury by failing to remove for cause another juror who
stated he would not consider any penalty other than death for intentional murder.
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Thus, Sallahdin contends the jury was not impartial, but instead was death-
positive. 2
It is well-settled that “‘a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his
views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985) (quoting Adams v.
Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)) (emphasis omitted). “The crucial inquiry is
whether the venireman could follow the court’s instructions and obey his oath,
notwithstanding his views on capital punishment.” United States v. Chanthadara ,
230 F.3d 1237, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000) (further quotation omitted), cert. denied ,
122 S. Ct. 457 (2001). “A trial judge’s determination of a potential juror’s bias
under this standard is a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness.”
Moore , 195 F.3d at 1168 (citations omitted).
Prospective Juror Brierton -- Sallahdin argues the trial court improperly
refused to excuse Darrel K. Brierton for cause, forcing him to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove this juror. The Oklahoma appellate court
determined the trial court properly refused to excuse this juror for cause, because
2
Again, Sallahdin cites to the affidavit of Juror Bryant to support his belief
that the jurors who served were not entirely truthful about their attitude toward
the three possible punishments. We reject this affidavit for the reasons discussed
previously.
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he unequivocally stated he would follow the instructions, would consider all
punishments, and would base his decision on the evidence. Pennington , 913 P.2d
at 1364. Sallahdin has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness afforded the
state court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1).
Even if the trial court should have removed Juror Brierton for cause,
Sallahdin cured any constitutional error when he used a peremptory challenge to
achieve an impartial jury. United States v. Martinez-Salazar , 528 U.S. 304, 307
(2000); Ross , 487 U.S. at 88. Thus, this claim also fails because Sallahdin has
failed to show the jurors who sat were not fair and impartial. See Ross , 487 U.S.
at 86, 88.
Prospective Jurors Peck and Gerald -- Sallahdin argues the trial court
improperly excused two jurors for cause. Robert Pruitt Peck, Jr., indicated that,
although he believed he could be fair and impartial, he would not consider the
death penalty due to his personal beliefs. He did equivocate by saying that
maybe, in an extreme circumstance, he could consider the death penalty, and he
could base his decision on the judge’s instructions and not on his personal
opinion. Later, he indicated there must be multiple deaths for him to consider the
death penalty. Finally, he indicated he would set aside his personal beliefs and
follow the instructions.
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Cora Elizabeth Gerald stated she did not believe in the death penalty for
any case; nor did she believe she could set aside her personal feelings.
Nonetheless, based on defense counsel’s questioning, she stated she could follow
the judge’s instructions.
Examining the entirety of their voir dire , the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals determined that even though both prospective jurors indicated they would
try to follow the instructions, the bulk of their voir dire indicated they could not
impose a death sentence. Pennington , 913 P.2d at 1364. Thus, the court relied on
the trial court’s ability to determine whether these jurors would carry out their
duties and found no abuse of discretion. Id.
We defer to a trial court’s finding a juror would be partial because such a
finding turns on the juror’s credibility and demeanor — matters which the trial
court is in the best position to assess. Witt , 469 U.S. at 424-26; Patton v. Yount ,
467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12, 1038 & n.14, 1039-40 (1984). Having the benefit of
observing demeanor, the trial judge may resolve any ambiguity in favor of the
State. Chanthadara , 230 F.3d at 1272; see also Witt , 469 U.S. at 424, 434
(rejecting idea that juror’s bias must be proved with unmistakable clarity to
excuse juror for cause).
Again, given the deference we must accord the trial court under the
applicable scope of review, it was reasonable for that court to conclude these
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prospective jurors’ beliefs would prevent or substantially impair their duties as
jurors. Sallahdin has failed to rebut the trial court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Therefore, we affirm the
district court’s denial of his petition for habeas relief on these juror issues.
State Exercise of Peremptory Challenge Against Black Juror
Sallahdin argues the State improperly used a peremptory challenge to
remove Juror Claiborne Cecil Jones, Jr., a black man, without providing a
sufficiently race-neutral reason to support the challenge. The prosecutor may not
exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky ,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) . Batson sets forth a three-step test for evaluating such claims
of racial bias: (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing the prosecutor
exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race; (2) if the defendant makes a
prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-
neutral explanation for striking the juror; and (3) the trial court must then
determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995).
The disposition of a Batson claim is a question of fact subjected to the
standard enunciated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Weaver v. Bowersox , 241 F.3d
1024, 1029-30, 1031 (8th Cir. 2001). We presume the state court findings are
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correct unless they are rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1).
Here, the prosecutor indicated he based the peremptory challenge primarily
on Juror Jones’ reservations about imposing the death penalty. In addition, the
prosecutor noted Juror Jones had possible pending traffic violations and he had
been excused as a juror in another murder case after his brother had been
murdered. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined this explanation
was race-neutral. Pennington , 913 P.2d at 1365 (applying Batson ).
The record supports a finding that the prosecutor’s proffered reasons were
not pretextual. See, e.g., United States v. Barnette , 211 F.3d 803, 812 (4th Cir.
2000) (deciding that juror’s disfavor of death penalty was race-neutral
explanation and record supported conclusion that this justification was not
pretextual); United States v. Moore , 149 F.3d 773, 780 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
Batson challenge where government struck four jurors due to their opposition to
death penalty). Sallahdin has failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. See Moore, 149 F.3d at 780. Because he has not rebutted the trial
court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the district court’s
denial of habeas relief on Sallahdin’s Batson claim.
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Failure to Remove Sleeping Juror
Sallahdin argues the trial court should have removed Juror McGee, who
allegedly fell asleep during the defense presentation. Sallahdin first raised this
claim in state post-conviction proceedings. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals deemed it waived. Sallahdin , 947 P.2d at 560-61 & 561 n.2. This state
procedural bar is an independent and adequate state procedural ground to preclude
habeas review of this claim. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991) ; Hale v. Gibson , 227 F.3d 1298, 1328 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121
S. Ct. 2608 (2001).
In an attempt to overcome this procedural bar, Sallahdin asserts his
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this claim on direct appeal.
Sallahdin relies exclusively on a post-trial affidavit from the sleeping juror.
Although she stated she was “on a lot of medication” and had trouble staying alert
during the defense's case due to the defense attorney's “monotone voice,” she at
no time stated that she actually fell asleep during any portion of the trial.
Addendum to Appl. for Post-Conviction Relief, Exh. 12. To the contrary, she
stated: “I think that the judge noticed that I was having trouble staying alert. . . .
The judge would usually call a recess and I'd become more alert and take my
medication.” Id. In light of the obvious deficiencies in this affidavit, and in light
of the fact there is no indication in the trial transcript that the juror ever fell
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asleep, there is clearly no basis to the claim. See generally United States v.
Carter , 433 F.2d 874 (876) (10th Cir. 1970) (concluding duty lies with defendant
to promptly bring such matters as an allegedly sleeping juror to the attention of
the court). Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue on
direct appeal.
Failure of Information to Allege Elements of First Degree Murder
Sufficiency of Information -- Sallahdin argues the State violated his due
process rights because the Information improperly failed to allege malice
aforethought, an element of first degree murder, as required under the law in
effect at the time of the crime. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (“A person
commits murder in the first degree when that person unlawfully and with malice
aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested
by external circumstances capable of proof.”). Sallahdin first raised this claim on
direct appeal, after the appeal had been fully briefed, in a motion to present an
additional issue based on an intervening change of law. Sallahdin argued that
Pickens v. State , 885 P.2d 678, 683 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), 3
the intervening
3
Pickens was overruled by Parker v. State, 917 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1996) (failure of Information to allege all elements of crime is not
jurisdictional, rather, court must determine whether defendant was denied due
process; i.e., whether the Information provided defendant with adequate notice of
(continued...)
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change of law, required the Information to allege malice aforethought in order to
allege the elements of malice aforethought murder. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals granted the motion, but did not address the issue in its opinion.
Sallahdin requested rehearing. Without explanation, the court denied rehearing.
Sallahdin again raised the issue in post-conviction proceedings, but the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals declined to consider it. Sallahdin , 947 P.2d at 560-61
& 561 n.2.
The Information provided:
[O]n or about the 21st day of October, 1991, MICHAEL L.
PENNINGTON then and there being, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, wrongfully, and feloniously commit the crime of:
MURDER FIRST DEGREE in the manner and form as follows,
to-wit: That the said MICHAEL L. PENNINGTON did unlawfully,
wilfully and feloniously, without authority of law, and with a
premeditated design to effect the death of one Bradley Thomas
Grooms, a human being, did then and there kill one Bradley Thomas
Grooms by means of a firearm loaded with powder and shot, held in
the hands of the said defendant and with which he fired shot into the
body of the said Bradley Thomas Grooms, causing mortal wounds in
the body of the said Bradley Thomas Grooms, from which mortal
wounds the said Bradley Thomas Grooms did languish and die.
D. Ct. Rec. Vol. 1 at 1.
In Oklahoma, an Information must contain “[a] statement of the acts
constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as
3
(...continued)
the charges against him and apprised him of what he must defend against at trial).
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to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.”
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 401(2). A challenge to the adequacy of the Information
under Oklahoma law, however, is a question of state law, which this court has no
power to address. Johnson v. Gibson , 169 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied , 528 U.S. 972 (1999). Rather, this court may grant habeas relief only if
the state court error deprived the defendant of fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. Id. An Information may violate the Sixth Amendment by
failing to provide adequate notice of the nature and cause of the accusations
against the defendant. Id. ; see also Hamling v. United States , 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974) (providing indictment is sufficient if it contains elements of the charged
offense, fairly informs defendant of charge against which he must defend and
allows the defendant to bar future prosecutions for the same offense).
Considering the Information along with the material available at the
preliminary hearing and through discovery, we conclude Sallahdin received
sufficient notice of the charge against him. The specific intent element of first
degree murder was sufficiently alleged by use of the words “premeditated
design.” Cf. Van White v. State , 990 P.2d 253, 261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999)
(citing Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7(A)); Toles v. State , 947 P.2d 180, 184 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1997). See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 969, 1199 (7th ed.
1999) (defining malice aforethought as the requisite mental state for common-law
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murder, including intent to kill; defining premeditated as a killing done with
willful deliberation and planning). The record is clear that Sallahdin knew he was
charged with malice aforethought murder. There was no confusion, as there was
in Pickens , that the State may have instead charged him with felony murder. Cf.
Toles , 947 P.2d at 184-85 (recognizing defect in Pickens was irreconcilable
confusion whether Information charged felony or malice aforethought murder).
Furthermore, in closing argument, the State acknowledged it must prove malice
aforethought. Finally, the trial court here instructed the jury on malice
aforethought murder. See generally Penry , 121 S. Ct. at 1922 (presuming jurors
follow instructions).
Ex Post Facto -- Sallahdin also argues that application of Parker violates
ex post facto prohibitions because, in his view, Parker's overruling of Miller v.
State , 827 P.2d 875, 879 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992), was unforeseeable and
indefensible. Whether an ex post facto violation has occurred presents a question
of law. Cf. Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 553 (10th Cir.1992). “To fall
within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective–that is, it must
apply to events occurring before its enactment–and it must disadvantage the
offender affected by it, by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing
the punishment for the crime.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997)
(quotations and citations omitted). Although “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause is a
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limitation upon the powers of the Legislature and does not of its own force apply
to the Judicial Branch of government,” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191
(1977) (citation omitted), the Supreme Court has recognized that “limitations on
ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.”
Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 1697 (2001). We therefore proceed to
analyze Sallahdin’s claim in the context of the Due Process Clause.
We fail to see any due process problem arising out of the application of
Parker to Sallahdin’s case. To begin with, we note that the decision in Parker
had nothing “to do with the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments.”
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 51 (1990). Instead, it addressed an issue of
state criminal procedure, announcing that an information need not allege each
element of a charged crime, and that a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is
not dependent upon an information containing each element of the charged crime.
Thus, Parker does not fall within the scope of what could even remotely be
described as ex post facto judicial decisionmaking. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 45.
Even if we were to conclude otherwise, it is apparent after reviewing
Oklahoma case law that the decision in Parker was foreseeable and defensible.
See Fultz v. Embry, 158 F.3d 1101, 1103 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing the test for
determining whether the retroactive application of a judicial decision violates due
process). Since the early 1900s, Oklahoma statutes have required that an
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information “contain a statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary
and concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended.” Parker, 917 P.2d at 985; see Miller,
827 P.2d at 880 (Lumpkin, Vice-Presiding J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Although the language of these statutes has remained constant, judicial
interpretation of them by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has
“continually changed and show[n] at least two distinct paths.” Miles v. State, 922
P.2d 629, 631 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); see Miller, 827 P.2d at 880 (Lumpkin,
Vice-Presiding J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting “diametric
opposing lines of caselaw authority” in Oklahoma concerning the sufficiency of
an indictment). On one side of the ledger were cases, such as Miller and Pickens,
which construed the Oklahoma statutes as requiring an information to “allege all
elements of the crime charged.” Parker, 917 P.2d at 985. On the other side of
the ledger were cases which, consistent with the statutory language, simply
required that an information place a defendant on notice of the facts constituting
the charge against him. See Miller, 827 P.2d at 880 ((Lumpkin, Vice-Presiding J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing cases). In light of this history, as
well as the divergence of opinion on the issue among members of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, it was not at all unforeseeable that the court attempt
to reconcile its case law in Parker. Moreover, we believe that the decision in
-22-
Parker is entirely consistent with the language of the Oklahoma statutes
governing the requirements for an information. See Miles, 922 P.2d at 631
(rejecting identical ex post facto attack on Parker).
Failure to Define Life Without Parole
Sallahdin argues the jury instructions should have defined life without
parole further, because post-conviction juror interviews revealed that if jurors had
known he would spend the rest of his life in prison with a sentence of life without
parole, some jurors would have selected that sentence. He maintains the trial
court’s failure to instruct, and counsel’s failure to request an instruction,
regarding parole ineligibility violates Skipper v. South Carolina , 476 U.S. 1, 4-5
& 5 n.1 (1986), and Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154, 156, 171 (1994)
(plurality).
Sallahdin first raised this claim in post-conviction proceedings. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals therefore deemed it waived because
Sallahdin could have, but did not, raise it on direct appeal. Sallahdin , 947 P.2d at
560-61 & 561 n.2. Although the State continues to assert this claim is
procedurally barred, we instead address this claim’s merits, because the denial of
relief can be “more easily and succinctly affirmed” on that basis. Romero v.
Furlong , 215 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 982 (2000).
Indeed, this court has previously rejected this claim. Mayes , 210 F.3d at 1294.
-23-
Further, defense counsel, in his sentencing phase closing argument, explained that
life without parole meant that Sallahdin would die in prison. Tr. Vol. 9 at 37.
Neither the trial court’s failure to instruct on parole nor counsel’s failure to
request an instruction violated Sallahdin’s constitutional rights.
Prosecutor’s References to Sallahdin’s Post-Arrest Silence
Sallahdin argues the prosecutor’s improper comments on his post-arrest
silence denied him a fair trial. In Doyle v. Ohio , the Supreme Court held a
prosecutor deprives a criminal defendant of due process by making improper
comments about the defendant’s post- Miranda 4 silence. 426 U.S. 610, 611, 619
(1976). Such impeachment is “fundamentally unfair because Miranda warnings
inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly,
that his silence will not be used against him.” Anderson v. Charles , 447 U.S. 404,
407-08 (1980). Doyle , however, does not bar cross-examination concerning a
defendant’s prior inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Anderson , 447 U.S. at 408;
Earnest v. Dorsey , 87 F.3d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1996). “Such questioning
makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the
subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.”
Anderson , 447 U.S. at 408.
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-24-
According to Sallahdin, the prosecutor improperly asked Lieutenant Pfahl
on direct examination if Sallahdin had invoked his right to an attorney during
interrogation. Sallahdin first challenged this questioning in his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Because the State does not raise any exhaustion or procedural
bar concerns, we consider this portion of the claim on its merits, reviewing de
novo . See Moore , 195 F.3d at 1178.
Sallahdin fails to indicate how asking this question violated his right to
remain silent. The right to an attorney is separate and distinct from the right to
remain silent. See generally Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96, 101 n.7 (1975).
Even if the question was tantamount to asking if Sallahdin invoked his right to
silence, the record shows he had waived that right.
Sallahdin further argues the prosecutor improperly asked Detective
Mahamed when he first heard about Sallahdin’s involvement in gun-running and
exchange of weapons. The record shows the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals reasonably determined Sallahdin expressly waived his right to remain
silent during his initial contact with police in Oklahoma. Pennington , 913 P.2d at
1366.
Sallahdin also argues the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him by
asking him if he ever told the Akron police that another man shot the victim and
that man’s fingerprints would be on the shotgun, which was at Sallahdin’s home.
-25-
He maintains the prosecutor improperly asked him if it was accurate that he
remained silent when Detective Mahamed asked him why this death occurred.
Viewed in context, these questions were designed to elicit an explanation for a
prior inconsistent statement, not to infer guilt from Sallahdin’s post-arrest silence.
Anderson , 447 U.S. at 409; cf. United States v. Canterbury , 985 F.2d 483, 486
(10th Cir. 1993) (reaching opposite conclusion under different set of facts).
Citing Anderson , 447 U.S. at 408-09, the state appellate court reasonably held the
prosecutor’s cross-examination of Sallahdin was within permissible limits because
he presented a new story at trial that was materially different from the information
he provided to the police. Pennington , 913 P.2d at 1366.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also determined that even if the
prosecutor’s isolated remarks were erroneous, they were harmless. Pennington ,
913 P.2d at 1366. Because the state appellate court did not rely on Supreme
Court authority in assessing harmlessness, we assess whether the challenged
comments had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotation
omitted); see also Hale , 227 F.3d at 1324-25 ; Bryson v. Ward , 187 F.3d 1193,
1204-06 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 529 U.S. 1058 (2000).
We may consider the following factors in assessing harmless error: (1) the
prosecutor’s use of the post-arrest silence; (2) whether the defense or prosecution
-26-
pursued this line of questioning; (3) the amount of evidence indicating guilt;
(4) the frequency and force of the reference; and (5) if the defense requested a
mistrial or curative instructions. See Canterbury , 985 F.2d at 486-87. The first
and third inquiries are the most important. Id. at 487.
The evidence of Sallahdin’s guilt was overwhelming. The prosecutor did
not attempt to use this information to establish guilt, nor did he pursue further
questioning after the trial court sustained defense objections. In addition, on
cross-examination of Mahamed, defense counsel emphasized that Sallahdin
remained silent when asked certain questions. Tr. Vol. 5 at 63-66. Thus, any
error was harmless. 5
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Aggravating Factors
Sallahdin argues insufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s findings
that he intended to kill the victim to avoid arrest or prosecution and that he poses
a continuing threat to society. In assessing sufficiency of the evidence, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
5
Sallahdin attempts to show any error was not harmless by the
post-conviction affidavit of Juror Barbara Bowen, which indicated she was
bothered by Sallahdin’s failure to tell law enforcement initially that there was
another shooter. His failure to do so apparently influenced her perception of his
truthfulness. We agree with the district court that this affidavit does not indicate
whether the remarks elicited by defense counsel or the prosecutor concerned her.
It therefore fails to establish error.
-27-
favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have found the existence of the
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Lewis v. Jeffers , 497 U.S. 764,
780-82 (1990).
Avoid Arrest or Prosecution Aggravator – Sallahdin asserts, without
discussion, that insufficient evidence exists to support this aggravator. We need
not consider this undeveloped argument. See Walker , 228 F.3d at 1240. Because
this is a capital case, however, we will consider this claim. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals’ determined there was sufficient evidence to support this
aggravator. 6
[Sallahdin] shot Grooms almost immediately upon entering the store.
No evidence was presented that the victim posed any threat to
[Sallahdin] or that he even attempted to defend himself. Once
Grooms had been shot several times, [Sallahdin] did not go near him,
but rather, attempted to rob the store by repeatedly shooting the cash
register. Because he was unable to open the cash register,
[Sallahdin] was forced to leave empty-handed.
Additional evidence to consider is that [Sallahdin] wore no
disguise, nor made any attempt to conceal his identity, other than
killing the only person he saw in the store. Furthermore, by the time
the witness Lynn Smith entered the store for a cup of ice, [Sallahdin]
had no means to shoot her as he had run out of ammunition.
6
This circuit has not resolved whether sufficiency of the evidence is a
factual or legal question. Hale, 227 F.3d at 1335 n.17. We need not resolve this
question in this case. In either event, the Oklahoma appellate court’s
determination is reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also Hale,
227 F.3d at 1335 n.17.
-28-
Pennington , 913 P.2d at 1371. We conclude that determination was not
unreasonable.
Continuing Threat Aggravtor -- Sallahdin also contends that commission of
the crime, by itself, is insufficient evidence to show he would be a continuing
threat to society. In Oklahoma, however, the continuing threat aggravator’s
existence, as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals noted, may be based solely
on the evidence of the calloused nature of the crime. Pennington , 913 P.2d at
1371; accord Cooks v. Ward , 165 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied ,
528 U.S. 834 (1999); Snow v. State , 876 P.2d 291, 298 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
In determining there was sufficient evidence, the state appellate court did not rely
solely on the underlying crime, however.
[Sallahdin] immediately shot the victim upon entering the store.
Grooms was shot as a matter of course in [Sallahdin’s] attempted
robbery. Grooms was never given an opportunity to cooperate in any
way to save his life. In addition to this evidence, other evidence was
presented that [Sallahdin] had made threats of violence while in
custody.
Pennington , 913 P.2d at 1371. This determination was not unreasonable under
either 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (2). See Hale , 227 F.3d at 1335 n.17.
Constitutionality of Continuing Threat Aggravator
Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses Sallahdin’s argument that Oklahoma’s
application of the continuing threat aggravator is unconstitutional. See, e.g. ,
-29-
Medlock v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1314, 1319 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 882
(2000).
Mitigating Evidence Instruction
Sallahdin argues the mitigating instructions suggested the jury must find
the mitigating factors unanimously, because they were “sandwiched” among the
instructions requiring unanimity in finding the aggravating factors. However, he
recognizes this court has rejected similar arguments. See, e.g. , Fox v. Ward ,
200 F.3d 1286, 1302 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 938 (2000); Smallwood ,
191 F.3d at 1270-71; Duvall v. Reynolds , 139 F.3d 768, 791-92 (10th Cir.1998).
Because we are bound by circuit precedent, this claim is foreclosed. See, e.g. ,
Smallwood , 191 F.3d at 1271.
Steroid-Use Evidence
Sallahdin argues the trial court erroneously denied him an opportunity to
present mitigating evidence that he was experiencing psychiatric effects from
anabolic steroid use at the time of the crime. According to Sallahdin, the
steroids, taken to enhance his weight lifting and body building regimen, altered
his normal behavior and therefore the trial court wrongly prevented him from
explaining what transformed him from a disciplined soldier into a fleeing killer.
He contends that if this steroid evidence had been admitted, he probably would
not have received a death sentence. He also argues his conviction and death
-30-
sentence are constitutionally infirm because counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to investigate and present evidence of the effects of his
anabolic steroid use on his behavior at the time of the crime. Apt. Reply Br. at
19-20.
Preclusion of Steroid Evidence by Trial Court -- Prior to trial, Sallahdin
disclosed that he intended to present the testimony of Dr. Harrison Pope, a
psychiatrist and steroid expert. The State filed a motion in limine requesting that
the trial court enter an order prohibiting any testimony concerning “Steroid Rage
Syndrome.” At the hearing on the motion, Dr. John A. Call, a psychologist,
testified for the State that “Steroid Rage Syndrome” is not generally accepted as a
bona fide diagnosable syndrome. Tr. of Hear’g of May 4, 1993 at 4-6, 14.
During the hearing, Sallahdin’s counsel stated the defense intended to call
Dr. Pope only at the sentencing phase to introduce expert testimony that steroid
use may explain the change in Sallahdin’s personality, and did not necessarily
intend to refer to “Steroid Rage Syndrome.” See id. at 18-19. The trial court
granted the State’s motion in limine, limiting its decision to finding only that the
State showed there is no scientific theory called “Steroid Rage Syndrome.” Id. at
19-20. The court acknowledged there may be other reasons steroid-use evidence
could be admissible and ordered written notice of Dr. Pope’s testimony. Id. at 20,
30; D. Ct. Rec. Vol. 3 at 77. In sum, contrary to Sallahdin’s contention the trial
-31-
court denied him the opportunity to present any steroid use testimony during
either stage of the trial, the trial court precluded only expert testimony concerning
“Steroid Rage Syndrome,” not all testimony, be it expert or otherwise, concerning
the effects of steroid use on Sallahdin.
Sallahdin filed a discovery supplement withdrawing Dr. Pope as a possible
first-stage witness and, in response to the trial court’s order, delineating
Dr. Pope’s anticipated sentencing phase testimony. The supplement anticipated
Dr. Pope would testify: (1) steroids caused manic symptoms while Sallahdin took
them and depressive symptoms and impulse control disorder during his
withdrawal from them; and (2) to a reasonable medical certainty, the change in
Sallahdin’s behavior was attributable to steroid use. D. Ct. Rec. Vol. 3 at 70-73.
The supplement also represented Dr. Pope would not testify that “Steroid Rage
Syndrome” is a mental illness or that it was identified as such in the medical or
scientific communities. Id. at 73.
Approximately one month before trial, in a motion to prohibit the State’s
expert from examining Sallahdin, counsel again set forth his purpose for
presenting expert testimony on the effect of steroids on Sallahdin. D. Ct. Rec.
Vol. 3 at 92-96. The motion indicated steroid use was comparable to problems
caused by alcohol consumption, was not a mental illness, and the steroid evidence
would only be used as mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial
-32-
to show the effects of steroid use on Sallahdin — not to show steroids caused him
to commit the murder, or to lower the degree of homicide, or as a defense. Id. at
92, 93-94. Despite the court-ordered supplementation of Dr. Pope’s testimony
and the motion delineating the intended use of the testimony, counsel failed to
call on Dr. Pope to testify or to present any steroid evidence to the jury at either
stage of the trial.
Sallahdin now argues on federal habeas that the trial court erred in
precluding evidence concerning the effects of steroid use during the trial.
Neither the trial court nor the state appellate court addressed this specific issue on
the merits. See Pennington , 913 P.2d at 1370. The federal district court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter and relied solely on the state court
record. Accordingly, we review the federal district court’s conclusions of law de
novo and perform an independent review of its factual findings. See LaFevers ,
182 F.3d at 711; Walker , 228 F.3d at 1225.
The federal district court determined the trial court did not err in refusing
to admit steroid-use evidence because: (1) “Steroid Rage Syndrome” was not
shown to be a reliable theory at the time of the hearing, under either Frye or
Daubert; 7 (2) counsel specifically denied any intent to use the testimony during
7
Frye v. United States, 293 F.1013 (App. D.C. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
-33-
the guilt phase; and (3) counsel did not request permission to present the evidence
at the sentencing proceeding. ROA, Vol. 1, Doc 27 at 5-6; 8-11. Although we
agree with the district court’s determinations, the dispositive fact is that the trial
court did not actually preclude presentation of evidence about the effects of
steroid use on Sallahdin.
The trial court’s ruling precluded only evidence of “Steroid Rage
Syndrome.” The court expressly left open the possibility of introducing other
steroid evidence and ordered counsel to provide the State with clarification of the
steroid expert’s probable testimony. Counsel subsequently provided a detailed
discovery supplement containing the steroid expert’s anticipated testimony. D.
Ct. Rec. Vol. 3 at 70-73. Counsel, however, did not attempt to present such
evidence to the jury and did not ask the trial court for a ruling on its admissibility.
Consequently, the trial court never ruled on the admissibility of the steroid use
evidence and did not preclude Sallahdin from introducing such evidence at either
stage of the trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err as Sallahdin claims. See
Romano v. Gibson , 239 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 628
(2001). The constitutional error, if any, stems from defense counsel’s actions.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel -- We now turn to Sallahdin’s claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to investigate and present
evidence concerning the effects of steroid use to the jury. Sallahdin first
-34-
presented this argument in post-conviction proceedings. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals determined the claim was barred because it did not turn on facts
unavailable at the time of the direct appeal. Sallahdin , 947 P.2d at 562. When
Sallahdin again asserted the claim in his federal habeas petition, the State, relying
on our decision in Brecheen v. Reynolds , 41 F.3d 1343, 1363 (10th Cir. 1994),
conceded that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal’s procedural bar ruling
was not binding for purposes of federal habeas review. Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 21 at
10. Accordingly, the federal district court resolved the claim on the merits.
Although the State now makes a conclusory suggestion that the claim is
procedurally barred, Response to Apt. Br. at 13 n.1., this assertion is insufficient
to preclude consideration of the merits. See Walker , 228 F.3d at 1240 (refusing to
consider conclusory, unsupported and undeveloped arguments).
Even if the State had adequately addressed the procedural bar issue, we
would not be bound by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal’s ruling. In order
to prevail on a procedural bar claim, the State must demonstrate that the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could have resolved Sallahdin’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal on the basis of the trial record
alone. See, e.g., McGregor v. Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245, 1252 (10th Cir. 2000).
Although the trial record indicates that trial counsel made preparations to present
the expert testimony of Dr. Pope, it is silent regarding why trial counsel
-35-
ultimately failed to present that testimony. Further, Sallahdin’s claim depends, to
some extent, on post-conviction affidavits that are not part of the trial record.
Therefore, the State’s procedural bar is inadequate to preclude habeas review.
See Romano , 239 F.3d at 1180 (citing English v. Cody , 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th
Cir. 1998)).
Because the state courts did not address the merits of this ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, we review the district court’s conclusions of law de
novo . LaFevers , 182 F.3d at 711. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
mixed questions of law and fact. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,
698 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Sallahdin must meet
both prongs of the Strickland analysis. First, he must prove counsel’s
performance was constitutionally deficient. Second, he must show counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced his defense, depriving him of a fair trial with a
reliable result. Id. at 687.
To prove deficient performance, Sallahdin must show “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88.
Reviewing courts “‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ and that counsel’s
conduct was not the result of error or omission but derived instead from trial
-36-
strategy.” Elliott v. Williams , 248 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir.) (quoting
Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 286 (2001).
To establish prejudice, Sallahdin must show that, but for counsel’s errors,
there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. If the alleged ineffective
assistance occurred during the guilt phase, the question is whether there is a
reasonable probability the jury would have had reasonable doubt regarding guilt.
Id. at 695. In answering this question, we review the totality of the evidence, not
just the evidence helpful to Sallahdin. Cooks , 165 F.3d at 1293.
If the alleged ineffectiveness occurred during the sentencing phase, this
court considers “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695. In
answering this question, we keep in mind the strength of the government’s case
and the aggravating factors the jury found, as well as the totality of the mitigating
factors that might have been presented if counsel’s performance had not been
deficient. Walker , 228 F.3d at 1234 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695).
Guilt Phase -- In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and his
present admission of guilt, Apt. Br. at 31-32, Sallahdin argues counsel’s
-37-
presentation of an innocence defense was not a reasonable strategy. Rather,
Sallahdin believes counsel should have learned about the impact of steroids on
Sallahdin’s mental state at the time of the crime and defended based on steroid
usage. If counsel had done so, Sallahdin believes the jury would have learned he
was in an abnormal psychotic state at the time of the crime due to anabolic steroid
use. Next, Sallahdin criticizes counsel for being unprepared at the motion in
limine hearing and at trial, because he failed to establish the effects of steroid use.
Sallahdin argues trial counsel should have presented testimony from Dr. Pope,
questioned the State’s expert, Dr. Call, more vigorously, and presented more of
the scientific evidence available at the time of the hearing. Id. at 32-40.
In addition, Sallahdin appears to argue he did not know how his steroid use
would affect his behavior, a sort of involuntary intoxication defense. Id. at 36.
To invoke the defense of involuntary intoxication, the defendant must produce
sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of his
intoxication. Involuntary intoxication results from fraud, trickery or duress of
another, accident or mistake on defendant’s part, pathological condition, or
ignorance as to the effects of prescribed medication. Wooldridge v. State , 801
P.2d 729, 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 153) (citation
omitted). “‘[I]nvoluntary intoxication is a complete defense,’” but only “‘where
the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unable to distinguish between right and
-38-
wrong, the same standard as applied in an insanity defense.’” Id. (quoting Jones
v. State , 648 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982)). Nothing presented at
trial or in the post-conviction affidavits indicates Sallahdin could not understand
the nature or consequences of his acts or differentiate between right and wrong. 8
When counsel declines to present a defense for which there is no arguable basis,
in law or in fact, counsel’s performance is not deficient.
In addition, during the motion in limine hearing, trial counsel made a
strategic decision not to present the steroid use evidence during the guilt phase of
the trial. Sallahdin has not shown “counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88. He has
8
Because the trial court was not given the opportunity to rule on the
admissibility of the evidence concerning the effects of steroid use on Sallahdin,
for the purpose of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will assume,
without deciding, the steroid-use evidence was admissible during the guilt phase.
Although some courts have allowed presentation of steroid-use evidence by a
defendant, the defense has met with limited success. See, e.g., United States v.
Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting diminished
responsibility defense despite expert evidence showing defendant had taken heavy
doses of steroids to treat medical condition); United States v. Warren, 447 F.2d
278, 280 (2d Cir. 1971) (taking steroid prednisone to relieve asthma in part
forming basis for legal insanity defense theory, rejected by jury); State v.
Knowles, 598 So.2d 430, 433-35 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (defense presented through
expert testimony that nine-month abuse of anabolic steroids by avid weight lifter
precluded specific intent for murder and removed ability to distinguish between
right and wrong rejected by jury); Boblett v. Commonwealth, 396 S.E.2d 131,
136-37 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (jury rejected insanity defense based on use of
anabolic steroids; court instructed jury on voluntary intoxication defense based on
use of steroids).
-39-
not rebutted the presumption “‘that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance’ and that counsel’s conduct was not the
result of error or omission but derived instead from trial strategy.” Elliott , 248
F.3d at 1208 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689).
Even if counsel’s performance had been deficient, the federal district court
determined Sallahdin was not prejudiced because, among other things: (1) counsel
thoroughly cross-examined Dr. Call; (2) Dr. Pope’s post-conviction affidavit did
not indicate Sallahdin did not know the difference between right and wrong at the
time of the murder; and (3) Dr. Pope’s affidavit did not establish steroid use alone
caused Sallahdin to commit the murder. Rather, Dr. Pope merely indicated
Sallahdin may have been affected by steroid use. ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 27 at 16-17.
Our independent review of the record verifies the district court’s factual
findings. The cases cited by Sallahdin concerning ineffective assistance of
counsel during the guilt phase are inapposite in light of these facts. Reviewing
the district court’s conclusions of law de novo , LaFevers , 182 F.3d at 711, we
agree with its reasoning. The steroid-use evidence would not have excused
Sallahdin’s commission of murder, or lessened his culpability. Therefore,
Sallahdin’s defense in the guilt phase of trial was not prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to present steroid-use evidence and nothing undermines our confidence in
the jury’s first-stage verdict. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694.
-40-
Sentencing Phase -- In reviewing whether trial counsel’s representation in
the sentencing phase of trial was constitutionally deficient, we must first
determine whether the evidence was admissible during the sentencing phase.
Lockett v. Ohio , 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality), and Eddings v. Oklahoma ,
455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982), set the standards for admission of mitigating evidence
during the sentencing phase of a capital case. Those cases require “that a capital
sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor , any aspect of
a defendant’s character or record, and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Boyd v. Ward ,
179 F.3d 904, 921 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied , 528
U.S. 1167 (2000). Thus, the jury cannot be precluded from considering any
“constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.” Buchanan v. Angelone , 522 U.S.
269, 276 (1998) (citations omitted).
Consistent with these holdings, the Supreme Court has indicated “that a
state court may not apply a state rule of evidence in a per se or mechanistic
manner so as to infringe upon a defendant’s constitutional right . . . to present
mitigating evidence in a capital proceeding.” Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197,
1214 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing Supreme Court cases on the issue). Thus, for
example, in Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), the Court concluded it was
constitutional error for a trial court in a capital case to mechanistically exclude
-41-
proffered mitigation evidence under a state hearsay rule, particularly when the
proffered evidence bore sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 97. Likewise, this
circuit and others have found constitutional errors arising out of the wholesale
exclusion of proffered mitigating evidence pursuant to state evidentiary rules.
See, e.g., Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1439-41 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
the exclusion of polygraph evidence pursuant to state evidentiary rules violated a
capital defendant’s right to present mitigating evidence); Dutton v. Brown, 812
F.2d 593, 602 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (concluding that constitutional error
occurred when mitigating evidence was excluded in the sentencing phase of a
capital case on the basis of a state witness sequestration rule).
This is not to say, however, that a trial court must admit any and all
mitigation evidence proffered by a capital defendant. Review of the above-cited
cases indicates that proffered mitigation evidence must be reliable and relevant to
be admitted. See, e.g., Green, 442 U.S. at 96 (emphasizing that “substantial
reasons existed to assume” the reliability of the proffered mitigation evidence);
Paxton, 199 F.3d at 1214 (noting that “the reliability of the excluded polygraph
test was corroborated by the fact that the state relied upon it in dismissing the
earlier charges against” the defendant); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690 (1986) (“[W]e have never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence
through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of
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fairness and reliability-even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence
admitted.”); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (noting that a
defendant “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence”).
In his January 13, 1997, affidavit, Dr. Pope stated that, “[a]t the time of
[Sallahdin’s] trial in 1993, a substantial and consistent scientific literature had
already accumulated, showing that anabolic steroids could cause severe
psychiatric effects . . . in some individuals.” Post-Conviction Addendum, App.
20 at 2. Although Pope conceded that the term “steroid rage syndrome” was “a
popular term with no scientific acceptance,” he stated “it was [nevertheless] well
recognized in the scientific community that anabolic steroids could cause severe
psychiatric effects in some individuals.” Id.
With respect to Sallahdin in particular, Dr. Pope recognized he had no
significant history of serious psychological disorders, criminal behavior or
violence before using steroids. Dr. Pope further stated:
Since 1987, when he started using [steroids], he has displayed
characteristic psychiatric symptoms which are sometimes seen in
individuals who are sensitive to the psychiatric effects of these
drugs. Among specific symptoms he displayed during steroid
exposure were manic symptoms (euphoria, irritability, grandiosity of
delusional proportions, impaired judgment, and reckless behavior)
and depressive symptoms during steroid withdrawal (depressed
mood, loss of interest in usual activities, sleep and appetite
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disturbance, feelings of guilt, psychomotor retardation, and
pronounced suicidal impulses). It is clear from his psychiatric
history that [Sallahdin] was one of those individuals who are
unusually vulnerable to the psychiatric effects of steroids, and hence
liable to experience severe behavioral changes as a result.
Id. at 1-2. Dr. Pope believed Sallahdin used anabolic steroids until only a few
weeks, if not a few days, before the crime, and therefore “was suffering from the
acute effects of steroids, or at the very minimum from the acute withdrawal
effects of steroids, at the time of the crime.” Id. at 2. It was Dr. Pope’s opinion:
to a reasonable medical certainty, that [Sallahdin] had used anabolic
steroids, and was experiencing prominent psychiatric effects from
anabolic steroids at the time of the crime. As a result [his] behavior
and judgement were markedly altered from those of his normal
baseline personality at the time of the crime.
Id. at 3.
Applying the above-outlined standards to Dr. Pope’s proposed testimony,
we conclude that the proposed testimony was admissible during the sentencing
phase of the trial. In short, we are persuaded that Dr. Pope’s conclusions
regarding the effects of anabolic steroids were based upon scientific knowledge
(for purposes of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993)) and thus were sufficiently reliable. Further, the record indicates that Dr.
Pope previously had been admitted to testify as an expert witness on the precise
topic in three criminal trials in the states of Florida, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin.
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Having concluded that Dr. Pope’s testimony was admissible, we now turn
to application of the Strickland test. The federal district court found it
unnecessary to decide whether trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient because, in its view, Sallahdin was not prejudiced by the absence of Dr.
Pope’s testimony:
First, the trial court properly excluded expert testimony regarding
steroid use. Second, the steroid effects could have been viewed as an
aggravating circumstance, rather than as mitigating evidence.
(Citation omitted.) Use of steroids could have been viewed as an
attempt by petitioner to become tough, powerful and macho, all of
which support petitioner’s cold-hearted domination over a weaker
store clerk solely for money. This portrayal of petitioner would not
evoke sympathy from a jury sufficient to overcome the aggravating
circumstances. Trial counsel fully advised the jury of the difference
in petitioner’s personality, i.e., that he was under tremendous stress
and that typically he was well-liked by his family, friends and peers.
The jury merely found this insufficient to overcome the crime.
ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 27 at 18-19. Further, the federal district court noted Sallahdin
could have personally testified at the sentencing phase about the effects of steroid
use, but did not. Id. at 19. Finally, the federal district court found that the
strength of the evidence against Sallahdin, the brutality of the crime, and evidence
of additional threats he made during a period of pretrial detention would have
overwhelmed any mitigating effect that the steroid evidence might have brought
to the deliberations. Id.
We are persuaded that Dr. Pope’s proposed testimony is considerably
stronger than the district court determined it to be. During the sentencing phase,
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Sallahdin presented testimony from family members, friends, his Army
commander, and correctional officers at the jail where he was confined prior to
trial. Generally speaking, this evidence indicated that Sallahdin (a) had a normal
upbringing, (b) experienced success academically, athletically and (at least
initially) with the military, (c) did not have a prior criminal record, (d) was non-
violent, (e) was perhaps undergoing marital-related stress, and (f) was a good,
quiet prisoner who did not cause any problems. In our view, evidence from Dr.
Pope regarding the potential of steroid use to cause severe personality changes in
the user could have explained how Sallahdin could have been transformed from
an allegedly mild-mannered, law-abiding individual into a person capable of
committing the brutal murder with which he was found guilty. 9
In addition to
mitigating Sallahdin’s culpability in the crime, Dr. Pope’s testimony could have
specifically helped to rebut one of the two remaining aggravators found by the
jury: that there was a probability Sallahdin “would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
§ 701.12. If the jury believed Dr. Pope, it could well have rejected the future
threat argument by concluding that Sallahdin’s crimes were an aberration in the
9
We disagree with the district court that Sallahdin’s own testimony would
have sufficed in this regard. In our view, it would have taken an expert witness
such as Dr. Pope to adequately explain for the jury the psychological effects of
steroid use and to further explain Sallahdin's alleged personality changes as
described in Sallahdin’s other anecdotal evidence.
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overall context of his life that could be explained by his use of or withdrawal
from steroids. Once the effects of the steroids passed from Sallahdin’s system, he
arguably would no longer have represented a threat to his community. Assuming
the jury determined that Sallahdin did not represent a continuing threat, the
overall balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would have been
substantially altered, leaving the jury to weigh Sallahdin’s mitigating evidence
against a single aggravating factor.
Although we conclude there is a reasonable probability that the presentation
of Dr. Pope’s testimony could have altered the outcome of the sentencing phase,
we are unable at this point to conclude that Sallahdin was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel and, in turn, his right to a fair trial. Instead,
Sallahdin must also demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient, i.e., “that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688. As the
Supreme Court noted in Strickland , “[t]here are countless ways to provide
effective assistance in any given case,” and “[e]ven the best criminal attorneys
would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Id. at 689. Thus, as
previously noted, we must “indulge a strong presumption . . . that counsel’s
conduct was not the result of error or omission but derived instead from trial
strategy.” Elliott , 248 F.3d at 1208 (internal quotations omitted).
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Notwithstanding our conclusions regarding the relative strength of Dr.
Pope’s proposed testimony, we cannot say that presentation of a steroid-use
defense was without risk of negative consequences, or was the only reasonable
second-stage strategy that trial counsel could have adopted. 10
It is thus imperative
to determine trial counsel’s reasons, or lack thereof, for presenting Dr. Pope’s
testimony during the second-stage proceedings. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689
(“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time.”).
Because the record on appeal is inadequate to allow us to properly conduct
this inquiry, 11
we conclude it is necessary to remand this case to the district court
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of trial counsel’s performance.
10
For example, it may have been reasonable for trial counsel, having asserted
a defense of actual innocence during the first stage of trial, to have adopted a
residual doubt strategy during the sentencing phase. Indeed, we note that the
mitigating evidence actually presented by Sallahdin’s trial counsel during the
sentencing phase (e.g., Sallahdin’s lack of a criminal record and his non-violent
nature) was largely consistent with such a strategy.
11
The trial record is silent regarding trial counsel’s reasons, or lack thereof,
for not presenting Dr. Pope. The only evidence we have on this issue is an
affidavit from trial counsel that was attached to the reply brief Sallahdin filed in
support of his federal habeas petition. The affidavit is extremely vague
concerning counsel’s reasons for not presenting Pope’s testimony during the
sentencing phase.
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More specifically, the purpose of the evidentiary hearing will be to determine trial
counsel’s reasons, or lack thereof, for foregoing the use of Dr. Pope’s testimony
during the sentencing phase. If trial counsel made a strategic decision not to use
Dr. Pope’s testimony, the district court will then need to assess whether that was a
constitutionally reasonable decision under the circumstances. If, however, it is
established that trial counsel was neglectful, or otherwise erred, in failing to call
Dr. Pope as a second-stage witness, then trial counsel’s performance cannot be
deemed constitutionally reasonable. In turn, Sallahdin would be entitled to
federal habeas relief in the form of a new sentencing proceeding.
CONCLUSION
After considering Sallahdin’s arguments on appeal, we are not persuaded
that constitutional error infected the first stage of his trial. Likewise, we reject
the majority of his arguments concerning his sentence. We do, however, have
concerns regarding his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
present steroid-use evidence during the second stage of trial. We AFFIRM in
part, and REVERSE in part, and REMAND the case to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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