F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 3 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
SALLY BEAUTY COMPANY, INC.,
a Delaware corporation; MARIANNA
IMPORTS, INC., a Nebraska
corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
v. Nos. 01-6049 and 01-6075
BEAUTYCO, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 99-CV-1372-C)
Craig S. Fochler, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, Illinois (Charles R.
Mandly, Jr. and Nathan E. Ferguson, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago,
Illinois; and Jill Robb Ackerman and Michael Sullivan, Baird, Holm, McEachen,
Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, Omaha, Nebraska, with him on the briefs), for
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Joseph P. Titterington (G. Neal Rogers with him on the briefs), Dunlap, Codding
& Rogers, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
MURPHY , Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sally Beauty Co., Inc. (“Sally Beauty”) and Marianna Imports, Inc.
(“Marianna”), collectively “Plaintiffs,” sued Beautyco, Inc. (“Beautyco”) for
trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, and false advertising.
Beautyco markets a line of hair care products under the trade name GENERIX,
which the Plaintiffs claim infringes the trademark and trade dress of their
competing line of hair care products called Generic Value Products. The district
court granted summary judgment to Beautyco on the Plaintiffs’ claims. The court
also granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on Beautyco’s counterclaims for
violations of Oklahoma antitrust and unfair competition laws. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms in part , reverses in part ,
and remands .
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sally Beauty owns and operates stores under the name Sally
Beauty Supply and sells hair care, skin care, and nail care products. Plaintiff
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Marianna is a “filler” or contract manufacturer and packager of beauty supply
products. Defendant Beautyco operates a chain of beauty supply stores that
competes with Sally Beauty Supply and sells beauty supplies to the general public
and the salon trade.
Sometime in 1989 or 1990, Sally Beauty began selling a line of hair care
products called Generic Value Products, which Sally Beauty conceived as a
lower-priced alternative to brand name salon products. Generic Value Products
contain ingredients, colors, and fragrances similar to their salon counterparts.
Marianna helped design the packaging for Generic Value Products and
manufactures the line for Sally Beauty. The parties do not dispute that the trade
dress at issue includes Sally Beauty’s white bullet-shaped bottle with a flat, black
cap. In addition, the Generic Value Products mark appears in white lettering
against a black rectangular field near the top of the bottle. In the middle of the
bottle, the product compares itself to a brand name salon product. On the back,
there is a side-by-side listing of the ingredients in the Generic Value Products
item and the name brand salon product.
The Plaintiffs agreed with each other that Sally Beauty would own the trade
dress for the Generic Value Products line and Marianna would own the trademark.
Marianna applied for and received federal trademark protection for the Generic
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Value Products mark in 1998. Sally Beauty holds an exclusive license from
Marianna to use the trademark.
The mark consists of the words “Generic Value Products” when associated
with hair care products. Marianna’s mark is typed in capital letters in the
principal trademark register, which means that the registration covers all design
features and is not limited to any special form or lettering. See J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:58 (4th ed. &
June 2002 database update) [hereinafter McCarthy on Trademarks ]
(“‘Registrations with typed drawings are not limited to any particular rendition of
the mark and, in particular, are not limited to the mark as it is used in
commerce.’” (quoting Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp. , 222 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed.
Cir. 2000))). The registration explicitly disavows the right to use the words
“generic” and “products” separate from the mark. Since its introduction, Sally
Beauty has sold millions of dollars of the Generic Value Products line.
Beautyco was a customer of Marianna for many years. Around 1994,
Marianna had discussions with Larry Rhodes, the former owner of Beautyco, to
create a lower-priced alternative hair care line for Beautyco. Rhodes proposed a
product line called GENERIX to be packaged in a bullet-shaped bottle with a
black cap and a black-and-white design. Because Marianna believed that the
packaging and name for the proposed GENERIX line too closely resembled Sally
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Beauty’s Generic Value Products, Marianna asked Beautyco to change the
proposed packaging. Beautyco refused. Marianna did not produce the line and
Beautyco proceeded with production of the GENERIX line with another filler.
Beautyco launched the GENERIX line in 1995 or 1996. The GENERIX
shampoo product contains elements similar to the Generic Value Products line.
Like the Sally Beauty trade dress, GENERIX uses packaging consisting of a white
bullet-shaped bottle with black lettering and a flat, black top. As in the Generic
Value Products line, the GENERIX trade dress also compares itself to a name
brand salon product on the front of the bottle and contains an ingredient
comparison chart on the back of the bottle.
In 1996, Beautyco applied for federal trademark registration of its
GENERIX mark. Marianna opposed the application. After settlement
negotiations between the parties failed, the Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging federal
and state law claims that Beautyco’s GENERIX products infringed on Marianna’s
Generic Value Products trademark, infringed on Sally Beauty’s trade dress, and
contained false advertising on their labels. Beautyco filed a counterclaim,
alleging, inter alia , that the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit violated Oklahoma antitrust and
unfair competition laws. Beautyco moved for summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs’ claims and the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on Beautyco’s
counterclaims. The district court granted Beautyco’s motion for summary
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judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
on Beautyco’s state antitrust and unfair competition counterclaims. The parties
cross-appealed from the district court’s orders.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo , employing the
same standard applied by the district court. King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp. , 185 F.3d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, other discovery materials, and affidavits
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial on a
dispositive issue, that party may make such a showing simply by indicating to the
court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the
nonmovant’s claim. Id. at 325. Once the moving party has properly supported its
motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go
beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 22 F.3d 1527,
1529 (10th Cir. 1994). An issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We construe the evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. King of the Mountain Sports , 185 F.3d at 1089.
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ APPEAL
A. Trademark Infringement
Congress has defined a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127. Marianna brought a federal trademark infringement claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1114, which prohibits the unauthorized use of a counterfeit or imitation
of the registered mark likely to cause confusion in the marketplace concerning the
source of the different products. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); First Sav. Bank,
F.S.B. v. First Bank Sys., Inc. , 101 F.3d 645, 651 (10th Cir. 1996). In
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists between two marks, this
court considers the following nonexhaustive factors: (1) the degree of similarity
between the marks; (2) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark; (3)
evidence of actual confusion; (4) similarity of products and manner of marketing;
(5) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the strength or
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weakness of the marks. See King of the Mountain Sports , 185 F.3d at 1089-90.
These factors are interrelated and no one factor is dispositive. Id. at 1090. In this
circuit, likelihood of confusion is a question of fact but one amenable to summary
judgment in appropriate cases. See id. at 1089 (“Courts retain an important
authority to monitor the outer limits of substantial similarity within which a jury
is permitted to make the factual determination whether there is a likelihood of
confusion.” (alteration and quotation omitted)). If the nonmovant demonstrates a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, however,
summary judgment is not appropriate. See id .
1. Similarity of Marks
The degree of similarity between marks rests on sight, sound, and meaning.
Id. This court must determine whether the allegedly infringing mark will confuse
the public when singly presented, rather than when presented side by side with the
protected trademark. Id. In so doing, similarities are weighed more heavily than
differences, particularly when the competing marks are used in virtually identical
products packaged in a similar manner. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. ,
805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Beer Nuts II ].
The district court concluded that the similarity of marks weighed in favor
of Marianna. “Generic Value Products,” however, is not visually similar to
“GENERIX.” Marianna’s mark consists of three words, while Beautyco’s
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consists of only one. Although both marks begin with the same six letters, this
similarity is not enough to outweigh the visual differences in the marks. 1
Cf. id.
at 926.
The sound of the marks is also different. “Generic Value Products” does
not sound similar to “GENERIX.” In considering this subfactor, the district court
erred by shortening “Generic Value Products” to simply “Generic” in comparing
aural similarities between the marks. The district court cited no authority which
would permit the shortening of the trademark for the likelihood of confusion
analysis. Marianna relies on Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc. , in
support, but that case involved marks consisting of pictorial designs with clearly
dominant visual elements. See 710 F.2d 1565, 1567, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
In this case, however, the Generic Value Products mark consists of words alone
and no one word takes precedence over the others.
In contrast, the meanings of “Generic Value Products” and “GENERIX” are
similar. Although “GENERIX” has no inherent meaning, Beautyco admits in its
motion for summary judgment that the use of the word is obviously intended to
Beautyco contends that because Marianna disclaimed the terms “generic”
1
and “products” in its trademark, the only part of Marianna’s mark which ought to
be considered in a likelihood of confusion analysis is “Value” or “Value
Products.” In this circuit, however, “the disclaimed material still forms a part of
the marks and cannot be ignored in determining likelihood of confusion.”
Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir.
1994) (quotation omitted). We thus consider Marianna’s mark in its entirety.
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convey the idea that its product is inexpensive. Beautyco further concedes that
Sally Beauty’s use of “Generic” conveys the same idea. Taken as a whole,
Generic Value Products conveys the same meaning as GENERIX.
On balance, the similarity in meaning between the marks favors Marianna,
but the differences in both sight and sound favor Beautyco. Although similarities
are to be weighed more heavily than differences, the differences in this case are
significant enough to lead us to conclude that this factor weighs in favor of
Beautyco.
2. Intent to Copy
Proof that a defendant chose a mark with the intent of copying the
plaintiff’s mark may, standing alone, justify an inference of likelihood of
confusion. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. , 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Beer Nuts I ]. “The proper focus under this factor is
whether defendant had the intent to derive benefit from the reputation or goodwill
of plaintiff.” King of the Mountain Sports , 185 F.3d at 1091 (quotation omitted).
“One who adopts a mark similar to another already established in the marketplace
does so at his peril, because the court presumes that he can accomplish his
purpose: that is, that the public will be deceived. All doubts must be resolved
against him.” Beer Nuts I , 711 F.2d at 941 (citations and quotation omitted).
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In support of the assertion that Beautyco intentionally copied Marianna’s
mark, Marianna cites to a June 1994 fax written by Beautyco’s supplier Charles
Coleman to another filler stating that Beautyco “wants to knock-off Sally’s
Generic line.” Coleman explained in his deposition that this statement meant that
Beautyco wanted to copy both the product and the packaging of the Generic Value
Products line. Marianna also cites to the deposition of Sid Lande, a
manufacturer’s representative who worked with Marianna on the Generic Value
Products line. Lande testified in a deposition that Rhodes said he wanted the
GENERIX line to “look like what Sally’s doing. . . . [Rhodes] wanted to make it
look very similar to what Sally was marketing.” Although it is not precisely clear
whether Beautyco specifically wanted to copy the Generic Value Products mark ,
as opposed to the line’s trade dress , a reasonable inference is that Beautyco
wanted to copy the whole of the Generic Value Products line. Any doubts about
this factor must be resolved against Beautyco. Beer Nuts I , 711 F.2d at 941.
Viewing the Coleman fax and the Coleman and Lande deposition testimony in the
light most favorable to Marianna, a reasonable jury could find that Beautyco
intended to copy the Generic Value Products trademark. This factor therefore
weighs in favor of Marianna.
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3. Actual Confusion
Although not necessary to prevail on a trademark infringement claim,
evidence of actual confusion in the marketplace may be the best indication of
likelihood of confusion. See King of the Mountain Sports , 185 F.3d at 1092.
Such evidence may be introduced through surveys, although their evidentiary
value depends on the methodology and questions asked. See Universal Money
Ctrs. , 22 F.3d at 1534 n.3. Evidence of actual confusion does not create a
genuine issue of fact regarding likelihood of confusion if it is de minimis . Id. at
1535.
Marianna cites to a survey conducted by its expert, George Mantis. The
survey reports that out of 180 participants, twelve individuals, or 6.7 percent of
the sample, believed that GENERIX and Generic Value Products were
manufactured by the same company based solely on similarities in their names.
The participants, however, were not shown the trademarks separately from the
packaging and bottles. Mantis admitted that the survey was not designed to test
confusion over the trademarks separate from the trade dress. He further conceded
that his survey does not support the conclusion “that Generix as a trademark is
confusingly similar or likely to cause confusion to [sic] Generic Value Products.”
Even if Marianna’s expert testimony could be construed as evidence of a
likelihood of confusion between the trademarks only, we conclude that such
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evidence is de minimis . This factor is thus neutral. This court has stated,
however, that the “absence of [actual confusion] does not necessarily support a
finding of no likelihood of confusion, especially when the products involved are
inexpensive.” Beer Nuts II , 805 F.2d at 928.
4. Similarity of Products and Manner of Marketing
“The greater the similarity between the products . . ., the greater the
likelihood of confusion.” Universal Money Ctrs. , 22 F.3d at 1532. This court has
previously analyzed this factor by separately considering (1) the similarity of
products and (2) the similarity in the manner of marketing the products. See id. at
1532-33. Here, Beautyco concedes the first factor, that both Generic Value
Products and GENERIX are cheaper versions of salon brand hair care products.
“Confusing similarity is most likely when the products themselves are very
similar.” Beer Nuts I , 711 F.2d at 941.
In analyzing the similarity in the manner of marketing, this court has
previously considered whether the parties were competitors in consumer markets.
See Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc. , 143 F.3d 550, 556-57 (10th Cir.
1998); First Sav. Bank , 101 F.3d at 656. Beautyco concedes that it and Sally
Beauty sell their products at their respective retail stores and that its primary
competitor in the beauty salon products business is Sally Beauty. Similar hair
care product lines were thus reaching consumers through similar commercial
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channels to the same retail market, the beauty supply trade. Cf. Heartsprings , 143
F.3d at 557 (concluding that evidence indicating that parties “operate[d] in
distinctly different markets, [sold] distinctly different products, and contact[ed],
for the most part, very different people in their marketing efforts” reduced the
likelihood of confusion). A consumer who bought either party’s products, which
are similar in nature and packaging, thus did so in competing retail outlets.
Beautyco does not allege that there are differences in the parties’ advertising
strategies, which could reduce the likelihood of confusion. See Universal Money
Ctrs. , 22 F.3d at 1532.
Although the district court recognized these “significant similarit[ies]” in
the products and marketing, it explained that the products do not compete in the
same retail outlets and thus there is little risk of confusion. This court has
recognized that “[t]he possibility of confusion is greatest when products reach the
public by the same retail outlets.” Beer Nuts I , 711 F.2d at 941. None of our
cases, however, require that the allegedly infringing product be available on the
same shelves as the plaintiff’s product. Accord Paco Rabanne Parfums, S.A. v.
Norco Enters., Inc. , 680 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that, in the
context of preliminary injunctions, “it is well established that products need not
be sold side by side for a plaintiff to show that there is a likelihood of
confusion”). As already discussed, the parties had similar and competing
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products marketed to consumers through similar commercial channels.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Marianna.
5. Degree of Care Exercised by Consumers
A consumer exercising a high degree of care in selecting a product reduces
the likelihood of confusion. Heartsprings , 143 F.3d at 557. This court has
explained that “buyers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive
items that may be purchased on impulse.” Beer Nuts II , 805 F.2d at 926
(quotation omitted). Accordingly, items purchased on impulse are more likely to
be confused than expensive items, which are typically chosen carefully. See id.
The relevant inquiry focuses on the consumer’s degree of care exercised at the
time of purchase. See Universal Money Ctrs. , 22 F.3d at 1533.
When Beautyco’s Rhodes was asked whether GENERIX products were
impulse sales, he testified: “Well, I’d say probably the majority of the time the
customer wasn’t coming in for them. You know, that’s kind of what I call an
impulse. If the customer wasn’t driven to it, then it kind of becomes, oh, I think
I’ll try that. That’s impulse.” Rhodes indicated that GENERIX products are
impulse items and thus typically purchased with a low degree of consumer care.
Contrary to this testimony, however, the district court concluded that this factor
weighed in favor of Beautyco. Because the products were sold only in the
parties’ respective stores, the district court reasoned, a consumer who “uses
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enough care to shop at a specialty store would [] also use enough care to
remember which specialty store carries its product.” Beautyco, however, does not
cite to anything in the record to support this conclusion on appeal. Moreover,
Rhodes’ testimony that “the majority of the time the customer wasn’t coming in
for [GENERIX products]” belies the district court’s conclusion. Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, this factor weighs in favor
of Marianna.
6. Strength of the “Generic Value Products” Mark
The stronger the mark, the greater the likelihood that encroachment on the
mark will cause confusion. See King of the Mountain Sports , 185 F.3d at 1093.
The categories of trademarks in ascending order of relative strength are: (1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.
Heartsprings , 143 F.3d at 555 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. , 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). A generic mark refers to a general class of goods, such as
“cola,” of which an individual article is but a member. Beer Nuts I , 711 F.2d at
939. Such marks do not indicate the particular source of an item and are not
entitled to any trademark protection. Id. A descriptive mark identifies a
characteristic or quality of an article or service, such as its color, odor, function,
dimensions, or ingredients. Id. A descriptive mark may receive protection “only
when it has acquired a secondary meaning by becoming distinctive of the
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applicant’s goods in commerce.” Id. at 940 (quotation omitted). Suggestive
marks “suggest[] rather than describe[] a characteristic of the product and
require[] the consumer to use imagination and perception to determine the
product’s nature.” First Sav. Bank , 101 F.3d at 655. Arbitrary marks use
common words, symbols, and pictures that do not suggest or describe any quality
or characteristic of the goods or services. King of the Mountain Sports , 185 F.3d
at 1093. Finally, fanciful marks are words invented or selected for the sole
purpose of functioning as a trademark. Id. Suggestive, fanciful, and arbitrary
marks are considered inherently distinctive and entitled to trademark protection.
See Two Pesos , 505 U.S. at 768.
In this case, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted Marianna’s
application to register the “Generic Value Products” mark without requiring proof
of secondary meaning. Beautyco does not challenge Marianna’s argument that the
PTO action creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently
distinctive. See generally GTE Corp. v. Williams , 904 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir.
1990) (citing cases). Beautyco has also failed to cite any evidence that
Marianna’s mark is generic or descriptive. Rather, Beautyco’s only argument is
that the Generic Value Products line’s prominent use of the word “generic” in its
packaging and advertising signals that the mark itself is generic. Merely because
a producer manufactures goods which feature the word “generic,” however, does
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not render the trademark itself generic. Beautyco mistakenly asserts that
Marianna’s mark identifies only a general class of goods, but the “Generic Value
Products” mark does not, by its terms, describe hair care products. Marianna is
entitled to a presumption that the Generic Value Products mark is inherently
distinctive, one that Beautyco does not rebut. This factor therefore weighs in
favor of Marianna.
7. Summary Judgment Inappropriate
Beautyco’s intent to copy, standing alone, may be enough to preclude
summary judgment in its favor. See Beer Nuts I , 711 F.2d at 941. When this
court weighs the similarities in products and marketing, the low degree of
consumer care, and the relative strength of the Generic Value Products mark into
the balance of factors, we conclude that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for Marianna. Although the dissimilarities between the marks favor Beautyco,
that factor alone is not dispositive. “It is certainly not necessary to use an exact
copy of another’s mark for a reasonable buyer to be likely to be confused.”
McCarthy on Trademarks § 23.20. Because Marianna has demonstrated a genuine
issue of material fact on the likelihood of confusion, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to Beautyco. 2
In their complaint, Marianna also asserted a trademark infringement claim
2
under Oklahoma common law. The district court concluded that its resolution of
(continued...)
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B. Trade Dress Infringement
The trade dress of a product is its overall image and appearance, and may
include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, and even particular sales techniques. Two Pesos , 505 U.S. at 764 n.1
(quotation omitted). Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff has a cause of
action against any person whose use of a word, symbol, or device is likely to
cause confusion regarding the source or origin of the plaintiff’s goods. See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. , 529 U.S. 205,
209 (2000). Protection may extend to a single feature or a combination of
features in a trade dress. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft
Corp. , 58 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995). In order to demonstrate trade dress
infringement for product packaging, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that its
trade dress is inherently distinctive or has become distinctive through secondary
meaning; and (2) likelihood of confusion. See id. at 1502-03. In addition, the
party asserting trade dress infringement bears the burden of demonstrating that
2
(...continued)
the federal trademark claim also disposed of the state claim. Beautyco does not
contest this conclusion on appeal or offer any other basis for this court to affirm
the district court. Accordingly, this court concludes that the district court’s
judgment on Marianna’s state trademark claim must also be reversed and
remanded.
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the trade dress is not functional. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3); Samara Bros. , 529 U.S.
at 210. 3
1. Distinctiveness and Secondary Meaning
A trade dress is inherently distinctive if its “intrinsic nature serves to
identify a particular source.” Two Pesos , 505 U.S. at 768. Such trade dresses
“almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand and immediately
signal a brand or a product source.” Samara Bros. , 529 U.S. at 212-13 (citation,
quotations, and alteration omitted). Like trademarks, the inherent distinctiveness
of a trade dress is categorized along the generic-descriptive-suggestive-arbitrary-
fanciful spectrum. See Two Pesos , 505 U.S. at 768. A trade dress which is not
inherently distinctive, however, may acquire distinctiveness through secondary
meaning. Id. at 769. In other words, over time customers may associate the
primary significance of a dress feature with the source of the product rather than
the product itself. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. , 514 U.S. 159, 163
(1995). When a trade dress has become distinctive of a product’s source, courts
have permitted protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See Two Pesos , 505
U.S. at 769.
Beautyco did not assert before the district court that there was no genuine
3
issue of material fact on functionality. Beautyco therefore waived on appeal its
argument that Sally Beauty’s trade dress is nonfunctional. See Walker v. Mather
(In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sally Beauty, this court
concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists whether Sally Beauty’s trade
dress is descriptive. A trade dress is descriptive if it “conveys an immediate idea
of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.” Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. , 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). Sally Beauty’s
trade dress includes the mark “Generic Value Products,” a product comparison to
a salon brand product, and side-by-side ingredients listing for the product and the
comparable salon brand product. Taken together, a reasonable jury could
conclude that these elements immediately convey the qualities and characteristics
of the product, i.e. , Generic Value Products is a comparable alternative to salon
brand products. Indeed, the trade dress includes a textual element called “The
Generic Story,” which states that Generic Value Products are “as good as the
‘higher priced’ quality NAME BRANDS” but available at “‘Popular Prices.’”
A descriptive trade dress, however, is not entitled to trade dress protection
unless it has acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace. See Two Pesos , 505
U.S. at 769. Whether a trade dress has acquired secondary meaning is a question
of fact and thus generally should not be decided at the summary judgment stage.
See Marker Int’l v. deBruler , 844 F.2d 763, 764 (10th Cir. 1988). A trade dress
acquires secondary meaning when “its primary significance in the minds of
potential consumers is no longer as an indicator of something about the product
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itself but as an indicator of its source or brand.” Vornado Air Circulation Sys. , 58
F.3d at 1502; see also Two Pesos , 505 U.S. at 766 n.4. “The ultimate inquiry is
whether in the consumer’s mind the mark denotes a single thing coming from a
single source. That single source, however, need not be known by name by
consumers.” Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp. , 51 F.3d 780, 789 (8th Cir. 1995)
(quotations and citations omitted).
Sally Beauty relies on three categories of evidence which it argues establish
secondary meaning: (1) a history of successful sales; (2) evidence of intentional
copying by Beautyco; and (3) long use of the Sally Beauty trade dress. This court
has previously considered proof of intentional copying as relevant to whether a
trademark has acquired secondary meaning. See Marker Int’l , 844 F.2d at 764.
Other circuits have considered the sales volume of the product featuring the trade
dress in a likelihood of confusion analysis. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. , 280 F.3d 619, 640 n.14 (6th Cir. 2002); Checkpoint
Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc ., 269 F.3d 270, 283 n.10 (3d Cir.
2001).
The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiffs have sold millions of dollars of
Generic Value Products featuring the Sally Beauty trade dress. Standing alone,
sales volume may not be indicative of secondary meaning because it could be
related to factors other than source identification. See Herman Miller, Inc. v.
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Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc. , 270 F.3d 298, 313-14 (6th Cir. 2001). Sales
volume, however, may indicate secondary meaning when presented in conjunction
with other evidence. See id. Here, Sally Beauty also cites to record evidence
which indicates that Beautyco intentionally copied some aspect of the Generic
Value Products line. See Section IV.A.2, supra . Viewing this evidence in the
light most favorable to Sally Beauty, we conclude that a genuine issue of material
fact exists whether Sally Beauty’s trade dress has acquired distinctiveness. 4
2. Likelihood of Confusion
The factors underlying a likelihood of confusion analysis in a trademark
infringement claim apply equally to trade dress infringement claims. See
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co. , 832 F.2d 513, 521 (10th Cir. 1987). In the
trade dress context, the relevant inquiry is “whether there is a likelihood of
confusion resulting from the total image and impression created by the
defendant’s product or package on the eye and mind of an ordinary purchaser.”
4
Sally Beauty also relies on its long use of the trade dress as additional
evidence of secondary meaning. This court has explained, however, that “[t]o
acquire secondary meaning, a descriptive mark must have been used so long and
so exclusively by one producer with reference to his goods” that it has acquired
distinctiveness. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467,
1470 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (permitting Patent and Trademark Office to accept “proof of
substantially exclusive and continuous use” of mark as prima facie evidence of
secondary meaning in application for trademark registration (emphasis added)).
Sally Beauty offered no evidence below or on appeal that its use of trade dress
was substantially exclusive.
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McCarthy on Trademarks § 8:15. In this case, equally applicable to Sally
Beauty’s trade dress infringement claim is our discussion in the trademark context
on (1) Beautyco’s intent to copy; (2) similarity of products and manner of
marketing; and (3) degree of consumer care. See Section IV.A., supra . We
address here only the remaining factors of (4) the degree of similarity between the
parties’ trade dresses; (5) strength of the Sally Beauty trade dress; and (6)
evidence of actual confusion.
a) Similarity of Trade Dresses
Viewing the parties’ trade dresses singly, an ordinary consumer would be
struck by the high degree of similarity between them. Both trade dresses consist
of white, bullet-shaped bottles with flat, black tops. Near the top of the bottles,
both dresses have black-and-white trade marks which feature either the word
“Generic” or the word “GENERIX” prominently. In the middle of the bottles,
each product compares itself to a salon brand product. The back of both bottles
list its product’s ingredients side-by-side with those of a salon brand product.
The overall color scheme of the two dresses consist of black and white; no other
color is used in either dress. Although the dresses are not identical, they are
remarkably similar. This factor therefore weighs heavily in favor of Sally Beauty.
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b) Strength of Sally Beauty’s Trade Dress
As discussed earlier, a genuine issue of material fact exists that Sally
Beauty’s trade dress is descriptive and has acquired secondary meaning. See
Section IV.B.1, supra. This court has previously indicated that descriptive marks
can weigh against a likelihood of confusion when there exist dissimilarities
between the two marks. See First Sav. Bank , 101 F.3d at 655 (concluding that
bank’s use of the words “First Bank” in its service mark is “weakly descriptive”
and not confusingly similar when considering the marked differences between its
service mark and competing bank’s service mark). Although dissimilarities exist
between the Generic Value Products dress and the GENERIX dress, they are not
as significant as the differences between the marks in First Savings Bank . Cf. id.
at 653. Nevertheless, we conclude that the relative weakness of Sally Beauty’s
trade dress weighs against a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
c) Actual Confusion
In the trade dress context, evidence of actual confusion is not necessary for
a finding of likelihood of confusion but “may be the strongest evidence to support
such a determination.” Brunswick Corp. , 832 F.2d at 521. Sally Beauty points to
the survey conducted by its expert, George Mantis, which reports that 51 out of
180 participants, or twenty-six percent of participants after adjusting for error,
believed that GENERIX was manufactured by Sally Beauty based solely on the
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products’ packaging or appearances. The survey concludes that “[a] significant
number of respondents provide ‘package/appearance’ related reasons as a basis
for their mistaken belief that Generix is put out by the same company that puts
out Generic Value Products. . . . Even after adjusting for ‘noise,’ confusion
remains high[,] accounting for more than one out of four respondents.”
Beautyco’s survey is strong evidence of actual confusion between Sally Beauty’s
and Beautyco’s trade dresses. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of
Sally Beauty.
d) Conclusion on Likelihood of Confusion
Based on the strong similarities between the trade dresses, evidence of
actual confusion, deposition testimony indicating Beautyco intended to copy the
Generic Value Products line, similarity in the products and manner of marketing,
and the low degree of consumer care, Sally Beauty has demonstrated a genuine
issue of material fact on the likelihood of confusion. That a genuine issue of
material fact exists on whether Sally Beauty’s trade dress is descriptive does not
change our conclusion.
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3. Summary Judgment Inappropriate
Because Sally Beauty has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on
the distinctiveness of Sally Beauty’s trade dress and likelihood of confusion, the
district court erred in granting summary judgment for Beautyco. 5
C. False Advertising
The district court granted summary judgment to Beautyco on the Plaintiffs’
false advertising claims under the Lanham Act, the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and Oklahoma’s common law of unfair competition. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §§ 51-55. The Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
that Beautyco’s use of the words “generic version of” on its GENERIX packaging
gives a false or misleading impression that GENERIX products contain the exact
same ingredients as their salon brand counterpart. In order to succeed on a false
advertising claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must
demonstrate:
(1) that defendant made material false or misleading representations
of fact in connection with the commercial advertising or promotion
of its product; (2) in commerce; (3) that are either likely to cause
5
In their complaint, Sally Beauty also asserted a trade dress infringement
claim under the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 78
§§ 51-55. The district court concluded that its resolution of the federal trade
dress claim also disposed of the state claim. Because we conclude that the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Beautyco on the federal trade dress claim
must be reversed, the state trade dress infringement claim must be reversed and
remanded as well.
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confusion or mistake as to (a) the origin, association or approval of
the product with or by another, or (b) the characteristics of the goods
or services; and (4) injure the plaintiff.
Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc. , 191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). The district court concluded, inter alia , that the Plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Beautyco’s use of
“generic version of” on its GENERIX products was materially false or
misleading. Although the Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s conclusions on
other elements of the false advertising claim, they make no arguments that
Beautyco’s product labeling is false or misleading. Because the Plaintiffs have
failed to submit any evidence of the falsity of Beautyco’s labeling, the district
court did not err in granting summary judgment. 6
V. DEFENDANT’S CROSS-APPEAL
Beautyco counterclaims that the Plaintiffs brought suit not to redress a
legitimate grievance, but to force Beautyco to defend costly litigation as a means
to advance the Plaintiffs’ commercial interests. Specifically, Beautyco claims
6
Under the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act, prima facie evidence
of a deceptive trade practice exists when a party “knowingly makes a false
representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities of
goods or services.” Okla. Stat. tit. 78, § 53(a)(5). Because we conclude that no
genuine issue exists on whether Beautyco’s representation is false, the district
court properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ false advertising claims
under the Oklahoma statute. The Plaintiffs have failed to make any argument or
cite any cases in support of their common law false advertising claim, and thus
the claim is deemed waived.
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that the Plaintiffs’ suit violates Oklahoma’s law of unfair competition; the
Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 79, §§ 201-212; and the
Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §§ 51-55. The
Plaintiffs argue that they are immune from these claims under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine or the Petition Clause of the Constitution. See United Mine
Workers v. Pennington , 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. , 365 U.S. 127 (1961); U.S. Const. amend. I.
We need not address whether the Plaintiffs are immune from liability under
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, nor do we need to reach the underlying merits of
Beautyco’s state claims. Beautyco concedes that if the Plaintiffs prevail on
appeal, the Plaintiffs should also prevail on Beautyco’s counterclaims. We
determined in Sections IV.A. and B., supra , that the Plaintiffs’ trademark and
trade dress infringement claims survive summary judgment. The district court
thus properly granted the Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on Beautyco’s
counterclaims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact
on the likelihood of confusion between the marks, we REVERSE the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for Beautyco on Marianna’s trademark
infringement claim and REMAND for further proceedings. We also REVERSE
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the grant of summary judgment to Beautyco on Sally Beauty’s trade dress
infringement claim and REMAND for further proceedings. This court
AFFIRMS the grant of summary judgment to Beautyco on the false advertising
claims. The grant of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Beautyco’s
counterclaims is also AFFIRMED .
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