F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
AUG 1 2003
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
MICHELLE STINNETT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 02-1200
SAFEWAY, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 00-S-406)
Submitted on the briefs: *
John W. McKendree and Elizabeth Kelly, Law Offices of John W. McKendree,
Denver, Colorado for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
Gregory A. Eurich and Megan C. Bertron, Holland & Hart, L.L.P., Denver,
Colorado for the Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR , LUCERO and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
LUCERO , Circuit Judge.
Michelle Stinnett brought this sex-discrimination suit against her employer,
Safeway, Inc. (“Safeway”), alleging disparate treatment and hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Safeway. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
I
Michelle Stinnett began working for Safeway in December 1989 and was
promoted in April 1996 to work as a meat wrapper in the retail stores. In January
1997, she received the opportunity to work as a temporary “project employee” on
a data processing assignment. “Project employees” are assigned to work
“backstage” temporarily on various assignments when the need arises, and
Safeway routinely returns them to their regular retail positions upon completion
of their project tasks. Working backstage is not a promotion and project
employees receive no increase in pay or benefits by virtue of their assignments.
At the time she accepted the data processing assignment, Stinnett understood the
temporary nature of the position. She worked in this position for approximately
eight months.
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When her data processing assignment ended in November 1997, she
obtained another assignment to work backstage in the Self-Maintenance
Department under Bill Smith, installing checkstand equipment. This project
lasted for two days. Between November 1997 and March 1998, she continued to
work backstage for Smith on various assignments such as installing checkstand
equipment and implementing a videoconferencing system in a number of retail
stores. Around March 1998, Smith informed Stinnett that he was running out of
work for her and that she would need to return to work at the retail store. At this
point, she contacted the Safeway West District Office, which informed her that
due to the lack of work for retail meat-wrappers, she would be placed on layoff
status unless she could obtain another backstage assignment. When Stinnett
informed Smith of this situation, Smith found another position for her in his
department. Stinnett was ultimately assigned to perform the duties of another
female employee, Renee Ayala, who had recently been promoted to a newly
created “watchdog” position. 1
In her new position, Stinnett assisted field technicians, who worked on
store computers, by filling in for them when they were on vacation or experienced
an overflow of work. In addition, she assisted in cleaning, repairing, shipping,
1
Smith also considered Stinnett for the watchdog position, but chose Ayala based
on her seniority in the department.
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and inventorying equipment, and sometimes answered phones and monitored
calls. Because she was working forty hours a week, Stinnett assumed that her
new position was permanent and that she would not be returned to her previous
retail meat-wrapper position. Around this time, Smith offered Stinnett a
permanent position as a Self-Maintenance field technician, but she declined
because she did not feel she had adequate experience and she did not wish to
relocate to Colorado Springs.
Sometime in November 1998, a male project-employee with less
department seniority, Malcolm Groves, was assigned to lead a business project
referred to as the “4694 rollout.” (Appellant’s App. at 168.) Smith rejected
Stinnett’s requests to be placed on the project, and instead brought another male,
Dan Krist, backstage to assist Groves with the 4694 project. At around the same
time, Smith informed Stinnett that he no longer needed assistants for field
technicians, and Stinnett was returned to her retail position as a meat wrapper.
During the entire course of her tenure as a project employee, Stinnett continued to
be a member of the retail-clerks bargaining unit, accrue seniority, and earn the
same wage that she would have earned in her retail role, as is the policy for all
temporary project employees. Consequently, she suffered no loss in salary or
benefits upon returning to her retail position.
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Stinnett filed a sex-discrimination suit against Safeway in Colorado state
court, alleging disparate treatment and hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402, which was removed to federal district court.
Granting Safeway’s motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded
that Stinnett failed to (1) establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination; (2)
produce evidence that Safeway’s actions were pretextual; and (3) produce
evidence of a hostile work environment. Stinnett appeals this judgment.
II
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard used by the district court. McCowan v. All Star Maintenance, Inc. , 273
F.3d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 2001). If review of “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
reveals there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[A]ll
inferences arising from the record before us must be drawn and indulged in favor
of the party opposing summary judgment.” Id. “Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for
summary judgment or for a directed verdict.” Foster v. AlliedSignal, Inc. , 293
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F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). At the summary judgment stage, “our role is simply to
determine whether the evidence proffered by plaintiff would be sufficient, if
believed by the ultimate factfinder, to sustain her claim.” Id.
A
Stinnett argues that Safeway’s decision to transfer her back to her retail
meat-wrapper position constituted disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.
Applying the familiar analytical framework mandated by Texas Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district court concluded that Stinnett failed to satisfy the
first step of the inquiry because she could not show an adverse employment
action, the only disputed element of her prima facie case. Thus, we must consider
whether a required return of an employee from a temporary position to her
permanent assignment constitutes an “adverse employment action” subject to Title
VII protection.
This is not the first case in which we have considered what constitutes such
conduct. In Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools , 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir.
1998), we explained that the phrase “adverse employment action” is to be
liberally defined. “Such actions are not simply limited to monetary losses in the
form of wages or benefits. Instead, we take a case-by-case approach, examining
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the unique factors relevant to the situation at hand.” Id. (citation omitted).
Conduct rises to the level of “adverse employment action” when it “constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.” Id. (quoting Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth ,
524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)); see also Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods,
Inc. , 997 F.2d 793, 799 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that a reassignment may be an
adverse employment action when the employee “receives less pay, has less
responsibility, or is required to utilize a lesser degree of skill than his previous
assignment”), overruled on other grounds by Buchanan v. Sherrill , 51 F.3d 227,
229 (10th Cir. 1995). Actions presenting nothing beyond a “mere inconvenience
or alteration of responsibilities,” however, do not constitute adverse employment
action. Sanchez , 164 F.3d at 532 (characterizing the reassignment of a fourth-
grade teacher to work as a second-grade teacher at another school as a “purely
lateral transfer,” and rejecting the teacher’s argument that this constitutes an
adverse employment action merely because her commute-time increased and no
other teachers volunteered for the transfer).
We cannot say on this record that Stinnett’s transfer did not result in a
significant change in responsibilities—from providing skilled technical assistance
to wrapping meat. A lthough she maintained her wage level, seniority, and title as
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meat wrapper throughout the relevant time period, there is evidence that the
reassignment resulted in a de facto reduction in responsibility and required a
lesser degree of skill. We conclude that Stinnett has submitted sufficient
evidence to suggest that she suffered an “adverse employment action.” As to the
suggestion that the transfer did not constitute such conduct because Stinnett’s
temporary project had merely lapsed and there was no longer any need for her
assistance backstage, this goes to the second and third steps of the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry, discussed below, examining Safeway’s reason for the transfer,
and is not relevant to determining whether the transfer constitutes an adverse
employment action.
We do not propose to discourage commendable employee programs of the
type Safeway has implemented in this case. We stress that an employer always
retains the right to reassign a temporarily assigned employee to a permanent
position. We hold merely that reassignment of an employee to a permanent
position under circumstances such as those in this case presents a question of fact
as to whether an employment action is adverse under McDonnell Douglas.
If an adverse employment action is implicated, an employer may not exercise the
right of reassignment in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g. , Burdine , 450 U.S. at
259 (“[T]he employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified
candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria .” (emphasis
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added)). Title VII does not diminish employer discretion to promote or not
promote employees, for example, nor does it preclude Safeway’s discretionary
efforts to structure its hiring and assigning practices creatively. See, e.g. ,
Burdine , 450 U.S. at 259 (holding that Title VII “was not intended to diminish
traditional managerial prerogatives”) (quotation omitted); Simms v. Okla. ex rel.
Dep’t of Mental & Subst. Abuse Serv. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“Our role is to prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a super personnel
department that second guesses employers’ business judgments.” (quotation
omitted)).
Having concluded that Stinnett submitted sufficient evidence to permit a
jury to find an adverse employment action, we conclude that Stinnett’s disparate
treatment claim survives summary judgment at the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a facially non-discriminatory
reason for its action. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253. “[This] does not require the
defendant to explain any differences in treatment between the plaintiff and others.
In other words, step two is not a comparative step .” EEOC v. Flasher Co. , 986
F.2d 1312, 1318 (10th Cir. 1992). Safeway’s stated reasons for sending Stinnett
back to her former retail role are as follows: (1) backstage project employees are
routinely returned to their former retail positions when the project has been
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completed, and (2) there was no more work for assistants to field technicians, the
role Stinnett performed. As these reasons are facially non-discriminatory, they
satisfy Safeway’s burden of defending its decision to transfer Stinnett back to her
retail position.
Accordingly, the burden shifts back to Stinnett, who must show that
Safeway’s stated reasons were a pretext for its discriminatory intentions. See
Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253; Flasher , 986 F.2d at 1321. “A plaintiff demonstrates
pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp. , 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation
omitted). In order to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Safeway, we must conclude that Stinnett has “failed to produce any evidence from
which a reasonable inference could be drawn” that Safeway’s proffered reasons
were pretextual. Foster , 293 F.3d at 1196.
Stinnett argues that Safeway’s justification for the transfer—that it had run
out of work for her to perform—is belied by its decision to hire more employees
to work in her department after she was transferred. Although Safeway insists
that none of these new employees performed Stinnett’s specific duties of assisting
field technicians, Stinnett argues that her backstage duties encompassed other
tasks such as answering phones and inventorying equipment. These allegations
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are supported by Paula Martinez’s affidavit, in which Martinez asserts that “the
demand for [Stinnett’s] services . . . had not diminished. Since [Stinnett’s]
departure there [had] been several males pulled out of stores to help the field
technicians.” (Appellant’s App. at 182.) Moreover, there was work available to
lead and assist in the 4694 rollout, but those assignments went to male employees
Malcolm Groves and Dan Krist, both of whom had less department experience
than Stinnett. This evidence suggests that Safeway’s stated reason for the
transfer—that it had run out of work for Stinnett to perform—is unworthy of
credence.
As additional evidence to support the inference of discriminatory intent,
Stinnett claims that in a practice not applied to men, Safeway sent women in her
department to remote areas on-call and required them to clean at night underneath
checkstands. Stinnett also claims that Safeway disparately provided males with
additional training. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, these allegations,
if believed, provide circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder might derive
an inference of discriminatory intent. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Safeway on the disparate treatment claim.
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B
We next consider the hostile work environment claim. In order to survive
summary judgment on this claim, Stinnett must “show that a rational jury could
find that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Davis v. U.S.
Postal Serv. , 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). “Whether
an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the
circumstances including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “[A] sexually objectionable environment must be both
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998).
In support of this claim, Stinnett reiterates her allegations that female
employees were subject to more onerous working conditions than their male
counterparts. In particular, she claims that only female employees were required
to clean underneath checkstands and serve on-call to remote locations. In
addition, she maintains that males obtained extra training. This evidence, in and
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of itself, fails to create a material dispute as to whether Safeway was permeated
with the “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” sufficient to establish
an abusive working environment. Davis , 142 F.3d at 1341 (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Safeway on the hostile work environment claim.
C
Colorado has adopted the same standards applicable to Title VII cases when
considering claims brought under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Big O Tires, Inc. , 940 P.2d 397, 400–01 (Colo. 1997).
Because we hold that Stinnett satisfied her burden to survive summary judgment
on the disparate treatment claim under Title VII, we hold that she has done so for
her state-law disparate treatment claim as well. As to her state-law hostile work
environment claim, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Safeway in light of our conclusion that Stinnett has not satisfied her
burden to state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
III
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the judgment of the district
court granting summary judgment in favor of Safeway on the disparate treatment
claims under Title VII and state law, and AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal
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of the hostile work environment claims. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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