F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 19 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-2308
DAVID SARRACINO,
Defendant - Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-2310
BRANDON CHEROSPOSY,
Defendant - Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-2312
ROBERT MANUELITO,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. CR-00-95-LH)
No. 01-2308:
John F. Moon Samore, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant - Appellant
David Saracino.
Laura Fashing, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff -
Appellee United States of America.
No. 01-2310, submitted on the briefs:
Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, James P. Moran, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Denver Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant Brandon
Cherosposy.
David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, Laura Fashing, Assistant United States
Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff - Appellee, United States of
America.
No. 01-2312:
Michael A. Keefe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
for Defendant - Appellant Robert Manuelito.
Laura Fashing, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff -
Appellee United States of America.
Before EBEL , ALDISERT , *and HOLLOWAY Circuit Judges.
*
The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
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HOLLOWAY , Senior Circuit Judge.
Defendants/appellants Robert Manuelito, Brandon Cherosposy, and David
Sarracino were jointly indicted, tried, and convicted on a single charge of second
degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111(b) & 1153. 1
Each now appeals.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We will
decide all three appeals in this single opinion.
I
The background facts
The victim of the homicide was Raynard Martinez, who died from multiple
injuries which were admittedly inflicted by the defendants. Other than one neighbor
who heard some voices and dimly saw some figures, whom he could not identify,
rolling on the ground, the defendants were the only surviving witnesses to the fight
that resulted in the death. All three had voluntarily given statements to officials
within hours of the beating. These recorded statements were heard by the jury, and
transcripts of these statements were also admitted in evidence.
Manuelito and Cherosposy testified at trial as well, while Sarracino did not.
The following description of the fracas is condensed from these several versions of
1
The parties stipulated at trial that all three defendants are Indian and that
the crime charged had occurred in Indian country within the meaning of section
1153(a). Thus the district court’s jurisdiction was clear.
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the event. It should be noted that this summary will gloss over some discrepancies
in the evidence. More importantly, it should be noted that the jury verdict leaves us
with no way of knowing how much of the defendants’ versions of events the jury
credited. Nevertheless, a summary of the defendants’ descriptions of the events
should be useful to provide context for the legal arguments.
The assault occurred around three o’clock on the morning of October 30, 1999,
within the Laguna Pueblo Indian Reservation in New Mexico, in a portion of the
pueblo identified as Encinal Village or the Encinal subdivision. All three of the
defendants lived in Encinal and were members of the Laguna Pueblo tribe.
Manuelito and Cherosposy were nineteen years old at the time; Sarracino was
eighteen. Cherosposy and Manuelito had been together since early on the evening
of Friday, October 29. They had attended a high school football game with some
other friends, and after the game had drunk some beer with those friends. The two
of them returned to Encinal around midnight. Sarracino soon joined them outside
Sarracino’s house, which was next door to Cherosposy’s house, and the three young
men were just talking and smoking cigarettes until Martinez arrived about 3:00 a.m.
At first the three defendants noticed a car drive very slowly through the
subdivision and then begin to circle through again. The car pulled into the driveway
close to where the three were standing, and Martinez emerged. Martinez and
Cherosposy were cousins, but the other two young men did not know Martinez.
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Martinez was normally sober and easy going, but according to a co-worker,
Martinez was very upset that evening. He and his wife had separated, and he
apparently knew that she was having an affair. Martinez also apparently knew, or
suspected, that his wife was staying at Encinal in the home of Wendy Cheromiah.
Martinez had visited a bar and had at least two beers after leaving work at around
11:00 p.m. on the evening of October 29, a few hours before the events at issue.
When Martinez encountered the three defendants, he asked where Ms.
Cheromiah’s house was. After the house had been pointed out to him, according to
most versions Martinez walked the short distance to that house and very soon
returned to his car. While he was gone, Manuelito opened the door of the car,
purportedly to see if anyone else was inside. As Martinez was returning, he seemed
to have seen Manuelito closing the car door. He soon began accusing the three of
stealing things from his car and became enraged. After some verbal exchanges,
Martinez opened the trunk of his car and got out his rifle, which he then loaded. He
continued to demand that the defendants return his property while pointing the rifle
at them. Then, as the defendants tried to explain that they had not stolen anything,
Martinez hit Manuelito with the stock of the rifle, breaking a tooth. He then hit
Cherosposy with the rifle. Manuelito and Sarracino then began to try to wrest the
gun away from Martinez.
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As they wrestled, Manuelito tripped Martinez and the two of them, and
perhaps Sarracino also, fell to the ground. Eventually, Sarracino succeeded in
getting the gun away from Martinez. Sarracino ran around behind the house and hid
the rifle in an old refrigerator. Manuelito and Sarracino had hit and kicked Martinez
a number of times during the melee, and Manuelito continued kicking him after
Sarracino removed the rifle from Martinez’s grasp. Then, Cherosposy, who had not
been part of the fighting, came up and kicked Martinez in the body once or twice.
With Martinez completely subdued, according to the defendants’ out of court
statements and testimony at trial, the defendants helped Martinez to his feet and
agreed to take him home. According to the trial testimony, Martinez was conscious,
talking with the defendants, and able to get into the back of his car with little or no
assistance. Manuelito and Cherosposy got into the front of the car, with Manuelito
driving. Cherosposy said that Martinez lived in Acoma (or Acomita), about eight
miles away. After they had driven a short way, Manuelito and Cherosposy realized
that they would have no way to get home themselves if they drove Martinez to his
home and left his car with him. At that point, Martinez reportedly told the two to
just leave him where they were. Manuelito and Cherosposy, however, thought it
would be better to get off the road they were on so that Martinez could “sleep it off”
without being found by the police and getting arrested. They turned onto a road that
led to a site that had formerly been a trash dump but had since been covered over.
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The two stopped the car there and returned to Encinal on foot. Cherosposy walked
with his shoes off for part of the way. He testified that he did this because he was
picking burrs out of his shoes.
A resident of Encinal noticed the car at the old dumping grounds when it got
light the next morning. The resident looked out occasionally and eventually called
the police when the car had remained there for some time. Officers responding to
the call found Martinez’s body in the back seat of the small car. He was lying face
down and his legs were folded up behind him to fit in the confined space. As more
officers gathered to investigate, two sets of footprints, Manuelito’s and
Cherosposy’s, were followed to the Encinal subdivision. Manuelito and Sarracino
had been playing basketball that afternoon. When they returned to Manuelito’s
house, they saw that the area in front of Sarracino’s home where the struggle took
place had been marked off with yellow crime scene tape. Manuelito called
Cherosposy, who was at his girlfriend’s house in Casa Blanca, ten or fifteen miles
away. Manuelito told Cherosposy to come to Encinal so the three of them could “see
what’s up.” X R. 694.
Cherosposy returned to Encinal and met the other two defendants at
Manuelito’s house. The three of them then walked together toward Sarracino’s
house. They encountered an officer on the way and told him that they had something
to say. The three defendants were then separated. Each consented to be interviewed
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and for a portion of the interview to be recorded on audio tape. Each also agreed to
provide the clothes he had been wearing during the fight, although Manuelito had
previously washed blood from his shoes. The defendants were arrested following the
interviews.
The prosecution’s medical witness, Dr. Patricia Aronica-Pollak, testified that
the victim had died from blunt trauma to the head, neck, chest and abdomen. There
were a number of external injuries, cuts and bruises, which could have been caused
by punching or kicking. Internally, the victim suffered a subdural hemorrhage.
Blood surrounded the brain, which was swollen and bruised. This caused the brain
to press on the vital areas at the base of the skull, which could stop breathing and the
heartbeat. Two ribs were broken but not displaced. The doctor said that it was
possible that the victim could have remained conscious immediately after receiving
such a beating. The first stages of brain swelling could have caused him to mumble,
lose coordination, and feel sleepy, effects similar to intoxication.
The expert said that all of the traumatic injuries to the head, neck, chest and
abdomen contributed to Martinez’s death. The bleeding and swelling in the brain
was a very serious, lethal factor and would not have been visible or apparent to the
defendants. The expert said that the victim would have had at least some chance to
survive if he had received immediate medical care.
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II
No. 01-2312: Mr. Manuelito’s Appeal
Mr. Manuelito raises several issues for reversal of his conviction. First, he
contends that he should have been tried separately rather than with his co-defendants.
Second, he argues that the trial judge improperly limited his attempts to impeach a
prosecution witness. Third, he asserts that unduly inflammatory photographs of the
victim and the prosecution’s use of those photographs denied him a fair trial.
Finally, he argues that cumulative error requires reversal, even if this court should
conclude that no alleged error by itself merits reversal.
A
The severance issues
Manuelito argues that denial of his motions for severance violated his right to
confront the witnesses against him, a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and
he relies principally on the landmark decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968). “We review de novo the legal issue of whether the admission of the non-
testifying codefendant’s statements/confession in a joint trial violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.” United States v. Verduzco-
Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999). The government, however,
contends that this issue has been waived, so we must first consider whether to apply
the standard of review just stated or only the standard of plain error.
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1
Has this issue been preserved for review?
Counsel for Mr. Manuelito moved unsuccessfully for a severance before trial.
At a hearing on pretrial motions, the judge and counsel discussed the possibility of
handling the Bruton problems by redacting portions of the defendants’ pretrial
statements. 2 Counsel for Mr. Manuelito agreed to cooperate in an effort by all
counsel to see if an agreement on redactions could be reached, but counsel stated that
he did not wish to waive his objection to a joint trial. VI R. 18. We believe that
counsel’s position was clear and that the severance issue was not waived at that
point. 3
The government also contends that the objection was waived when counsel did
not restate the objection when the statements of the co-defendants were actually
See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), on the use of
2
redactions of references to the defendant from statements by a co-defendant to
address Bruton issues. The Court later recognized that redaction may not satisfy
the concerns of Bruton where it would still be obvious to the jury that the co-
defendant’s out-of-court statement had referred to the defendant. See n.3, infra.
3
It is apparent that redaction to satisfy Bruton would have been very
difficult at best and probably impossible under the circumstances. Redactions
which leave it obvious to whom the co-defendant’s statement refers do not suffice
to cure the problem. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998). With three
statements all describing the same events, redactions would no doubt have left it
obvious that each defendant’s statement referred to the other two. Additionally,
Manuelito asserts that redacted statements should not remove potentially
exculpatory evidence. Apparently this is a reference to the fact that all three
statements here described the victim as the aggressor and were consistent in other
respects as well.
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introduced at trial, citing United States v. Sauza-Martinez, 217 F.3d 754, 759 (9th
Cir. 2000), and United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1067-8 (5th Cir. 1996).
Manuelito’s reply brief does not address this contention. Thus, neither side has cited
controlling precedent from our court, and our research has not uncovered a
precedential case either. In United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.3d 1237, 1243-44 (10th
Cir. 1983), we held that the issue was forfeited when no objection had been made
upon the introduction of the evidence subject to Bruton. But in that case there had
been no motion to sever and so no opportunity at all for the trial court to consider the
issues. We do not believe that Kaatz requires us to treat the severance issue as
forfeited and to apply plain error review in its disposition.
While this question is close here, we feel that the alleged severance error was
sufficiently preserved. However, as we will explain, we do not believe that Mr.
Manuelito can prevail even with the less deferential standard of review which applies
where an issue is preserved, rather than the stricter plain error standard we follow
where an issue is not preserved.
2
Bruton v. United States
We proceed to an overview of the relevant law. In Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court held that the admission in evidence of a co-
defendant’s confession inculpating the defendant at a joint trial at which the co-
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defendant does not testify violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him. In so holding, the Court created an exception to the
rule that jurors are presumed to follow all instructions. At trial in that case, the jury
had been instructed that the co-defendant’s out-of-court statements were admissible
in evidence only against the co-defendant and could not be considered in determining
Mr. Bruton’s guilt or innocence. Such limiting instructions are routinely used with
respect to many kinds of evidence. But the Court held that the impact of a
confession that incriminates another is likely to be too great for the jurors to be able
to put the matter out of their minds in considering the case against the other:
“[W]hen the admissible confession of one defendant inculpates another
defendant, the confession is never deleted from the case[,] and the jury
is expected to perform the overwhelming task of considering it in
determining the guilt or innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring
it in determining the guilt or innocence of any codefendants of the
declarant. A jury cannot ‘segregate evidence into separate intellectual
boxes.’”
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131 (quoting People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 (Cal.
1965)).
We have noted, however, that the exception created by Bruton is a narrow one.
“Bruton applies only in those few contexts where the statement is so inculpatory as
to the defendant that the ‘practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot
be ignored.’” United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1267, 1277 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135). In Rahseparian, we cited Richardson v. Marsh,
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481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987), in holding that the Bruton rule does not apply to
“statements that are not directly inculpatory but only inferentially incriminating.”
Id. at 1277. See also United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1039 (1988).
The Supreme Court has indicated that it also reads Richardson as “plac[ing] outside
the scope of Bruton’s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.” Gray v.
Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 (1998).
On the other hand, we have held that Bruton does apply, even if the co-
defendant’s statement is not facially or directly inculpatory, when the statement is
evidence of a fact critical to the prosecution’s case. United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d
1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing the second and third of three statements
admitted in violation of Bruton).
3
Manuelito focuses on three specific segments of the out-of-court statements
by his co-defendants. One is a statement that Cherosposy reportedly made about
Manuelito losing control and having to be pulled off the victim. When asked in
cross-examination by the prosecution if he had made such a statement, Cherosposy
denied it. As part of its rebuttal case, the government called the father of
Cherosposy’s girlfriend, Mr. Delores, who testified that Cherosposy had made the
statement, apparently after Manuelito had told Cherosposy on the telephone that
police were in the village and that the scene of the fight had been marked off as a
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crime scene. This statement was not admissible against Manuelito, only against
Cherosposy. The second was Sarracino’s October 30 statement that he heard the
victim make a “gargling” sound when he was being helped or put in the back of the
car before Manuelito and Cherosposy drove off with the victim. The third was
Cherosposy’s October 30 statement to the investigator, Brown, that Cherosposy and
Manuelito picked the victim up and put him in the car, indicating that he wasn’t able
to get in by himself, contrary to other accounts by the three defendants (that is,
contrary to Manuelito’s and Sarracino’s statements to the investigators and contrary
to Manuelito’s and Cherosposy’s trial testimony).
Because Mr. Cherosposy testified at trial, the rule of Bruton applies only to the
pre-trial statement of Mr. Sarracino, who did not testify. 4 We will consider the
arguments directed to Mr. Cherosposy’s statements infra, after dealing with the
Bruton issue.
We must first consider whether this is an inculpatory statement within the
Bruton rule. We conclude that it is. Although the defendants no doubt intended their
statements to the investigators to be exculpatory accounts of self-defense against an
armed aggressor, Sarracino’s statement – like those of the other defendants –
admitted their involvement in the fracas and included points that were damaging to
their defense. On appeal, Mr. Manuelito emphasizes the fact that the prosecution at
4
See Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d
1387, 1396 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988).
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trial seized on discrepancies in the statements of the three defendants and also
repeatedly referred to portions of the statements that it contended were particularly
damning. And one such statement was Mr. Sarracino’s description of the victim
having made a “gargling” sound at the time the other defendants departed in the
victim’s car with the victim in the backseat. Although this detail might have
appeared innocuous, the prosecution used it repeatedly in the trial. The
government’s expert witness, Dr. Aronica-Pollak, said that the victim had aspirated
blood and that as a result, he might have made such a noise as he breathed.
We conclude that the admission of co-defendant Sarracino’s statement violated
Manuelito’s confrontation right and the rule of Bruton.
4
Harmless error
Although the rule of Bruton is a narrow one, when evidence has been admitted
in violation of the rule, as in this case, the defendant’s right of confrontation has
been violated, and we must reverse unless we can conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the constitutional error was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967); United States v. Hill, 901 F.2d 880, 884 (10th Cir. 1990). As we have
further explained this standard:
To hold an error of constitutional dimension harmless, we must
conclude “the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming,
and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant’s admission is so
insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
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that the improper use of the admission was harmless error.” We review
the record de novo, and our judgment is informed by the context in
which the statement was admitted, how it was used at trial, and how it
compares to the properly admitted evidence.
United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1403 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972) (citation omitted)). In addition, we consider
whether and how the confession was used in argument as we gauge its effect. Id.
(citing Bond v. Oklahoma, 546 F.2d 1369, 1376 (10th Cir. 1976)). “Our judgment
must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have
been the probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.”
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). See also Chase v. Crisp, 523
F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1975).
It is true, as noted, that the prosecution made several references to Sarracino’s
description of the victim making a “gargling” sound, including in closing argument.
However, our de novo review is of the entire record. Considering the totality of the
evidence, we conclude that here the Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Mr. Manuelito’s own statement and his trial testimony established that the
three defendants had beaten and kicked the victim. The issues at trial were whether
the defendants had acted only in self defense or whether they went beyond what was
necessary to defend themselves. The jury was instructed that a person may use “as
much force as was reasonably necessary to protect himself from bodily harm,” but
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is not entitled to use “any greater force than he had reasonable grounds to believe
and actually did believe to be necessary to save his or another’s life or to avert
serious bodily harm.” (Instruction 11.) If the jurors decided that the defendants had
exceeded the limits of self defense, then they were to determine, as to each defendant
individually, whether the crime committed was involuntary manslaughter, voluntary
manslaughter, or second degree murder. (Instructions 8-10.) The distinguishing
element among these three crimes is the defendant’s mental state, with the jury
verdict of guilty on the second degree murder charge requiring a finding of malice.
The court gave the jurors substantial guidance on the meaning of “malice” as
an element of murder in the second degree. We believe it is helpful to quote
extensively from the court’s instruction, to which there were no objections:
“Malice aforethought” is a condition of a person’s mind. As stated
above, you must decide whether the defendants had malice
aforethought. Because no one can look into the mind of another, the
only way to decide this issue is to examine the defendants’ actions and
the circumstances surrounding defendants’ actions. Malice
aforethought is an extreme mental state evincing a wanton or reckless
disregard for human life. If you find that the defendants intended to kill
or seriously injure the victim, then the second degree murder
requirement of malice aforethought is satisfied.
The malice aforethought requirement is also satisfied if you find the
defendants were indifferent to the life of the victim or had ill will,
hatred, or evil intent without regard to the consequences. In other
words, you must assess whether the acts of defendants were done in an
extreme mental state of recklessness that display[ed] such an extreme
and wanton disregard for human life as to constitute “malice.” Thus,
you may also find malice aforethought if defendants’ disregard for
human life is so extreme that it approaches but does not equal a mental
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state comparable to that of a person who deliberately and intentionally
kills another.
You also are permitted to find malice aforethought within the
meaning of these instructions if you find that a person, while aware of
a serious risk of death, failed to act after having put another human
being in a position of danger and creating for himself a duty to rescue
or to safeguard that other human being.
Instruction 8.
The last quoted paragraph of this portion of the instruction is particularly
important here as the prosecution emphasized in closing argument that the defendants
failed to act to help the victim after the fighting concluded. For example, in closing
argument one of the prosecutors said:
Malice aforethought is a fancy phrase that means, in part, that if a
person, while aware of a serious risk of death, failed to act after having
put another human being in a position of danger and creating for
himself a duty to rescue or to safeguard that other human being. It’s an
extreme mental state of recklessness where the defendants are aware of
a serious risk that somebody might die.
Now, that’s exactly what happened here. These defendants created
for themselves a duty to save this man. And the way that they did that
is by going too far and beating him. After they beat him, their duty was
to help him. That’s what the law says. . . . . And instead of complying
with that duty, instead of helping the man, instead of once calling 911,
making an anonymous call to the police, calling an ambulance, what
they did was leave him to his own devices to die.
XI R. 1009-10.
We must assess whether the admission of evidence in violation of Bruton can
be held to have been harmless in consideration of the other evidence that supported
the finding of malice. The improperly admitted evidence (improperly admitted as to
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Manuelito, that is) that the victim had made a gargling sound was, the prosecution
argued, evidence of the victim’s severe injuries and thus of the defendants’ extreme
recklessness in failing to act to protect the victim after the beating had put him in a
position of danger.
The medical evidence and photographic evidence of the severity of the beating
inflicted on the victim could have alone supported the malice finding. For example,
Dr. Aronica-Pollak testified that the victim had sustained numerous lacerations,
abrasions, and contusions to the face and head that were externally visible. VIII R.
128-39. Internally, there was evidence of hemorrhaging and contusion in the area
immediately under the scalp, and below that there was subdural hemorrhaging. Id.
at 140-42. “Significant force” was required to inflict these injuries. Id. at 143. Two
of the victim’s ribs had been broken. Id. at 160. The autopsy revealed also that the
victim had received a blow to the abdomen which had caused a tear in the layer of
fat over the transverse colon, an injury that also required a “significant amount of
force.” Id. at 161-62. There had been significant bleeding from the face and scalp.
Mr. Laducer testified that there was a quantity of blood in the floor and seat
of the car where the victim was found and that the blood had dripped out of the car
door onto the ground. Id. at 269-70. Officer Otero, who first found the body,
described it as a “pool of blood” on the ground outside the car. IX R. 494.
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Next we turn to the defendants’ explanation of transporting the victim to the
old dump site where he was abandoned. The defendants’ tale strains credulity. Their
evidence was that Manuelito and Cherosposy set out to take the victim home, and
only after having begun the trip did it occur to them that they themselves would be
stranded when they reached the victim’s home. It was then that the victim himself
suggested that the two just leave him. But rather than leave him where they were at
that time, the two decided to go off on the side road to the dump out of concern for
the possibility that the victim might be found by the police – a concern which they
said was on behalf of the victim because they did not want him to get in trouble for
being drunk.
All parts of this story seem difficult to believe, but incredulity is heightened
still more when we realize that the jury probably did not believe that the victim was
conscious, much less responsive to the defendants’ concern about how they would
eventually get back to their homes. Not only were the victim’s injuries severe, but
the position in which the body was found was described as very unnatural. The
victim was lying face down, with his head off the car seat, and his legs “were folded
up, propped up, up against the door, crossed.” IX R. 492. If the victim had been
sitting up, as defendants claimed, he could have slumped over into a position where
he was facing down, but that would not explain how the legs came to be positioned
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as they were. This evidence strongly suggests that the victim was unconscious when
the defendants put him in the car.
The evidence overwhelmingly points to the conclusion that the defendants
knew that the victim was severely hurt, that the victim was in fact unconscious when
the beating finally ended, and that all three defendants consciously decided to
remove the victim from the scene in hopes of avoiding detection of the crime. In the
context of the entire record, the admission of the statement by Mr. Sarracino that the
victim had made a gargling sound, even as that statement was repeatedly used by the
prosecution, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming
evidence against the defendants. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254
(1969). As the Supreme Court has said in holding a Bruton error to have been
harmless: “In this case, we conclude that the ‘minds of an average jury’ would not
have found the [prosecution’s] case significantly less persuasive had the testimony
as to [the co-defendant’s] admission been excluded.” Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S.
427, 432 (1972) (quoting Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254).
5
Other severance issues
As we have noted, Manuelito also contends that it was error to deny his
motions to sever because of the prejudicial effect of two other pieces of evidence.
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We have alluded to these statements earlier, but now will describe them more fully
before reaching the legal arguments raised concerning them.
One of the statements that Manuelito argues was unfairly prejudicial was Mr.
Cherosposy’s statement to the investigator, Brown, that Cherosposy and Manuelito
had to pick the victim up and put him in the car. This statement was admissible
against Cherosposy under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) as an admission by a party-
opponent, but not admissible against Manuelito. But because Cherosposy testified,
admission of the out of court statement did not violate Bruton. See n.4, supra. We
quote the part of the statement at issue:
JB 5: How did he oet [sic] into the car?
BC: We picked him up.
JB: You picked him up. You had to pick him up?
BC: Yeah.
Govt. Ex. 20A.
The second part of the evidence addressed in this contention is the rebuttal
testimony of Mr. Delores, the father of Cherosposy’s girlfriend, that Cherosposy had
said that Manuelito “lost it,” or became enraged, after being hit in the face with the
rifle by Mr. Martinez, and that the other two men, Cherosposy and Sarracino, then
had to pull Manuelito off of the victim. This again was evidence which was properly
admitted against Cherosposy but was inadmissible as to Manuelito.
The initials are those of the investigator who interviewed defendant
5
Cherosposy, Laguna Pueblo Officer Jeremy Brown, and of Brandon Cherosposy.
-22-
The standard of review for denial of a motion to sever is abuse of discretion.
United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 1997). A severance should
be granted when “there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific
trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539
(1993). This may occur when the government presents evidence, as it did here,
which is “probative of a defendant’s guilt but technically admissible only against a
co-defendant.” Id. However, severance is not required even if prejudice is shown;
“tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, [is left] to the district court’s sound
discretion.” Id. Serious risk of prejudice, from the jury considering evidence against
a defendant which is only admissible against a co-defendant and would not be
admitted against the defendant in a separate trial, is increased when many defendants
are tried together “in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of
culpability . . . .” Id. Here, the case is not complex and the defendants do not have
markedly different degrees of culpability. We assess the issues with that in mind.
As to Cherosposy’s account of how the victim was picked up and put in the
car, we think that this was not so prejudicial as to require a severance. This evidence
was not that dramatically different from Mr. Manuelito’s own testimony on that
point. Manuelito testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Okay. What did you do then?
-23-
A. Well, then I asked Brandon [Cherosposy] – because I figure
Brandon knew where he lived – I asked Brandon, I said, “Hey, where
does he live?” He said Acoma. I was like, all right. So then I offered
to help Mr. Martinez up from the ground. I kind of like bended [sic]
over him and grabbed his right arm. He kind of lifted his right arm, and
I grabbed it and pulled him up.
Q. Was his right arm just laying on the ground?
A. Not really, he was kind of like –
Q. Did he reach up to you?
A. I don’t know if he was reaching up to me or like trying to like feel
his body or something, but I remember I grabbed his hand, and I helped
him get up.
Q. Okay. What happened then?
A. Then right now I pulled Mr. Martinez up, and I kind of like help
him up, and Brandon comes over, and we both help Mr. Martinez up.
We both kind of walk him to the car, to his car.
Q. How far were you from his car?
A. Right now, we’re like about eight feet away from his car.
Q. Okay. And what happened then?
A. By this time I could see David coming out or just coming to the car,
and he opens the back passenger door. He opens it up, and we kind of
sit [sic] Mr. Martinez down in the back seat.
X R. 740-41.
We do not believe that the discrepancy between Cherosposy’s statement, which
was inadmissible hearsay against Manuelito, and Manuelito’s own trial testimony is
enough to have “prevent[ed] the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence,” the standard set out in Zafiro, supra.
We turn then to the testimony of Mr. Delores. Mr. Cherosposy had gone to the
Delores home on the afternoon of October 30 (i.e., within a few hours of his return
from leaving the victim at the dump site) to see his girlfriend. While there he
received two telephone calls. Mr. Delores testified about statements Cherosposy had
-24-
made to him after receiving the second call. As related above, Mr. Delores testified
that Cherosposy had said that Mr. Manuelito had “lost it” during the fight and that
Cherosposy and Sarracino had to pull Manuelito off of the victim. This testimony
was admissible against Cherosposy as an admission against interest, but was not
admissible against Manuelito. 6 This testimony came in the government’s rebuttal
after Mr. Cherosposy had denied having made any such statements during his cross-
examination by the prosecution. XI R. 1101-02.
Mr. Manuelito’s counsel did not object to this evidence at trial, nor did
counsel renew the motion to sever. Accordingly, our review is only for plain error.
Before an appellant in a criminal case is entitled to relief under the plain error
doctrine, he must clear several hurdles. We have described these as follows:
[T]he error must (1) be an actual error that was forfeited; (2) be plain
or obvious; and (3) affect substantial rights, in other words, in most
cases the error must be prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the
outcome of the trial. . . . . Given plain error that affects substantial
rights, an appellate court should exercise its discretion and notice such
error where it either (a) results in the conviction of one actually
innocent, or (b) “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Keeling, 235 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)) (internal citations omitted). We do not think
The trial judge rejected the government’s argument that the statement was
6
admissible as an excited utterance, which would have made it admissible against
Manuelito as well as Cherosposy.
-25-
that this issue rises to the level of seriously affecting the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of the proceedings.
Although this “lost it” statement certainly could have been damaging to
Manuelito’s defense, the overall evidence shows that Martinez was injured much
more severely than any of the three other participants in the melee. Moreover, by his
own testimony Manuelito struck more blows than Cherosposy and quite likely more
than Sarracino, who at one point left the fight and ran around to the other side of the
house to dispose of the victim’s rifle. We therefore conclude that the prejudice
suffered from this evidence was not so great as to permit us to reverse the judgment
under the plain error rule.
Manuelito also contends that it was plain error for the court not to have given,
immediately and sua sponte, a limiting instruction telling the jurors that the evidence
about the “lost it” statement was to be considered only against Cherosposy and not
against Manuelito.
Ordinarily, a party desiring a limiting instruction must request it. Fed. R.
Evid. 105. Mr. Manuelito cites United States v. Sauza-Martinez, 217 F.3d 754, 758-
61 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the court held that it was plain error for the trial judge
not to sua sponte give a limiting instruction immediately on the admission of
damaging testimony which was inadmissible against one of the defendants. We are
unpersuaded by Sauza. No doubt it would have been prudent for the trial judge to
-26-
give the instruction sua sponte because this part of Mr. Delores’ testimony was
obviously more pointed at Manuelito, against whom it was not admissible, than
against Cherosposy, against whom it was admissible. But considering the record as
a whole, we do not think that the failure to do so was plain error, nor that it
determined the outcome of the trial.
B
Limits on cross-examination of a lead investigator
Mr. Darrell Laducer was an investigator for the Bureau of Indian Affairs when
he was called to investigate the discovery of the victim’s body. Laducer testified at
trial in the government’s case in chief and also in rebuttal. Sometime after the death
of Mr. Martinez, Laducer had gotten in trouble with his employer and had resigned
while under investigation for misuse of a government computer. Counsel for Mr.
Manuelito wished to cross-examine Mr. Laducer on this matter. Counsel argued that
Mr. Laducer might be biased in favor of the government because he could possibly
have faced criminal charges over the improper computer use. The district court
rejected counsel’s argument and ruled that Mr. Laducer could only be asked if he was
still employed as a government investigator. Manuelito now argues that he was
denied his right of confrontation by this limitation on the cross-examination of
Laducer.
-27-
Our review is de novo as to whether the limitation on cross-examination
infringed the constitutional right of confrontation. United States v. Sinclair, 109
F.3d 1527, 1537 (10th Cir. 1997). But, the district court has wide latitude to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination. Id. This court is to determine whether the
jury had sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’s
motives and bias. Id. (citation and quotation marks deleted).
Securing the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is the essential purpose
of the constitutional right to confront witnesses. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 678 (1986) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)). The Court
in Van Arsdall and Davis recognized that showing a witness’s motivation or bias is
an important function of cross-examination. In each of those cases, the Court held
that the right of confrontation was infringed when the trial judge excluded an entire
area of possible bias of a government witness from inquiry by defense counsel. We
have applied the teachings of Van Arsdall and Davis. See Jones v. Gibson, 206 F.3d
946, 955-57 (10th Cir. 2000). Further, as Manuelito points out, we have implicitly
found a violation of the right of confrontation in circumstances where, like the
instant case, the impeachment material concerned possible, not pending, criminal
charges. Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2000). 7
7
We say implicitly because Nuckols turned on a violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but it is clear that the holding rested on the fact
that the information withheld in violation of Brady was evidence that could have
(continued...)
-28-
In light of these authorities, we hold that the ruling forbidding the defense
from inquiring into the reason for the termination of Laducer’s employment with the
BIA was constitutional error. We must determine, then, if the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman. Our framework for analysis is clear:
The factors bearing on the effect of the excluded testimony include “the
importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether
the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material
points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of
course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”
United States v. Ellzey, 936 F.2d 492, 497 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684). In our view, it is clear that most of these factors
support the government and that the error was harmless.
The government points out that most of Laducer’s testimony was corroborated
by other evidence. Manuelito, however, focuses on one point in the testimony which
was not corroborated. In his trial testimony, Manuelito sought to explain why he had
left out some details of the events when he gave his statement to Laducer on the day
of the fight. He testified that he had not learned of the victim’s death until Laducer
told him after the taped interview. X R. 750. As for the brevity of his statements in
the taped interview, he said that he was inexperienced in talking with investigators
7
(...continued)
been used to impeach a critical government witness. Thus, we said that the
habeas petitioner had been prejudiced “[b]ecause impeachment of the witness who
held the key to successful prosecution was denied to the defense . . . .” 233 F.3d
at 1267.
-29-
and suggested that he did not realize the importance of the matter because he did not
know that the victim had died. Id. at 728, 770-71. The prosecution recalled
Laducer in its rebuttal case and elicited testimony that Laducer had never told
Manuelito that the victim had died. The prosecution then argued in closing that this
somehow showed that Manuelito had known that the victim had died, or at least that
he likely had died, because of the severity of the beating. XI R. 1003-04.
The logic of the argument used at trial that this discrepancy indicated that
Manuelito knew without being told that the severe beating likely had resulted in the
victim’s death is less than compelling. We believe, therefore, that it was unlikely to
have had any impact on the verdict. Considering the overall strength of the
government’s evidence, we have no doubt that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
C
Admission of gruesome photographs of the victim
Mr. Manuelito contends that he was prejudiced by the admission in evidence
of photos of the deceased which were, he says, gruesome and were used in a
misleading way.
There are two photos at issue here. One is a photo that was taken in the
autopsy room. Manuelito’s primary complaint about this photo is that the towels
around the victim’s head make it look as if the victim had been decapitated.
-30-
However, the government’s pathologist, Dr. Aronica-Pollak, told the jurors that the
towels were there to cover blood and make the photo less gruesome; she assured the
jurors that the head had not been severed. VIII R. 149-50. We agree with the trial
judge that this photo, although somewhat gruesome, was not unduly so and was
admitted for a proper purpose of assisting the government’s medical expert in her
description of the injuries the victim had sustained.
The other photo at issue was taken before the body was removed from the car
and showed the condition of the body when it was found. All that had been done was
to set the victim up so his face could be seen. The problem is that the prosecution
argued that this was evidence of the appearance of the victim when the defendants
left him. This was not supported by the government’s evidence. The prosecution’s
expert testified that the discoloration and swelling would have increased during the
interval before the body was found, especially so because the victim had been lying
face down. Indeed, Dr. Aronica-Pollack testified on cross-examination that she had
no idea how the victim would have “presented” if he had been taken to an emergency
room right after the beating. VIII R. 183, 191.
Although this testimony by the government’s witness could have been
effective to counter any suggestion that the photo accurately portrayed the condition
of the victim when the defendants abandoned him, the prosecution in closing
argument pointedly made the argument to the contrary – that the photo did show that
-31-
the defendants had to have known that the victim was badly injured and needed
immediate medical attention. XI R. 1007. But no objection was made at that point.
We believe that the photos had significant probative value. The bloodied head
and face of the victim gives an indication, although admittedly an imperfect one, of
how the victim must have appeared to the defendants at the end of the fight. Without
these photos, the prosecution would have been handicapped in its ability to convey
the nature and extent of the beating to the jurors. We have already noted that the
depiction is not exact; his appearance no doubt was worse after he had been lying
face down for some hours. The jurors were told that from the government’s own
medical witness, however.
We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the photos because
their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice. Fed.
R. Evid. 403.
D
Cumulative error
We have two errors, the admission of defendant Sarracino’s out-of-court
statement, which we found to have been in violation of Bruton v. United States, and
the limitation on cross-examination for bias of one government witness. In
considering Manuelito’s claim of cumulative error, our process is like that employed
already in assessing the impact of each error by itself:
-32-
A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that
individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not
reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the
outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be
determined to be harmless. Unless an aggregate harmlessness
determination can be made, collective error will mandate reversal, just
as surely as will individual error that cannot be considered harmless.
The harmlessness of cumulative error is determined by conducting the
same inquiry as for individual error – courts look to see whether the
defendant’s substantial rights were affected.
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Because
the errors here were constitutional, the Chapman v. California standard of harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt also applies in the cumulative error analysis. Id. at 1470,
n.6.
Considering the likely impact of both identified errors, we are convinced that
they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt collectively as well as individually.
Mr. Manuelito received a fair trial, although not a perfect one.
E
In sum, in Manuelito’s appeal we find no reversible error as to the conviction
or the sentence, and we affirm both the judgment of conviction and the sentence.
III
No. 01-2310: Mr. Cherosposy’s Appeal
The general facts of these appeals have been detailed in the discussion of the
appeal of Manuelito. Therefore in this portion of the opinion which treats
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Cherosposy only we will deal with facts related to Cherosposy’s specific claims of
error.
A
Exclusion of Dr. Griest’s testimony
Cherosposy asserts that the district court committed reversible error that was
prejudicial in excluding the testimony of the defendants’ expert witness, Dr. Karen
Griest, as a sanction for violating discovery rules. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13.
We do not agree.
This court reviews the district court’s exclusion of an expert’s proposed
testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Diaz, 189 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1031 (2000). Rule 16(b)(1)(C) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a “defendant must, at the government’s
request, give to the government a written summary of any testimony that the
defendant intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as evidence at trial, if – . . . the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(1)(G) and the government complies.” 8 In other words, so “long as
the government complies with its own disclosure obligations, Rule 16(b)(1)(C) . . .
requires that the defendant disclose to the government a written summary of an
Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that at
8
“the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written
summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702,
703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief.”
-34-
expert witness’s proposed testimony.” Appellee’s Answer Brief at 30. The
government points out that “none of the defendants claimed that the government’s
disclosure of its expert testimony was inadequate.” Id. at 31.
If a party fails to comply with Rule 16, the court may order that party to permit
the discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other
just terms and conditions; grant a continuance; prohibit that party from introducing
the undisclosed evidence; or enter any other order that is just under the
circumstances. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)(A)-(D). This court has held that it would
be “a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should exclude evidence
rather than continue the proceedings.” United States v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245,
1249 (10th Cir. 2002). We have noted that the sanction of exclusion of a witness’s
expert testimony is “almost never imposed ‘in the absence of a constitutional
violation or statutory authority for such exclusion.’” United States v. Charley, 189
F.3d 1251, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285,
1292 (10th Cir. 1999)).
Cherosposy asserts that there was no rational justification for the district
court’s ruling in this case and its action was an abuse of discretion. He points out
that the court never examined the reasons for the defense’s delay in producing the
material. Prejudice to the government, if there was any, was not explored. Finally,
-35-
the district court never considered an alternative remedy besides exclusion of the
expert evidence. Appellant Cherosposy’s Opening Brief at 16-17.
After reviewing the transcript of the proceedings of November 9, 2000, we
agree with Cherosposy that the district judge erred in excluding the expert’s
evidence. The district judge did not develop a sufficient record of the reasons for
his decision to exclude this evidence. Following his decision to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Griest, the district judge requested that counsel approach the bench
again and stated the reason for his ruling: “[T]he prosecution has not had an
opportunity to review, nor has the prosecution’s witness had an opportunity to review
the opinion and the basis for the opinions of the defense expert prior to the
prosecution witness’ testimony. And . . . in my view, that is critical to the fair
application of Rule 16.” VIII R. 120 (Transcript of 11/09/00 proceeding). The
district judge erred by imposing the extreme sanction of excluding an expert witness’
testimony without making a record of following the three-pronged approach that this
court has set out for selecting a proper sanction for a violation of Rule 16. See
Golyansky, 291 F.3d at 1249 (holding that the district court should consider (1) the
reasons the government delayed producing requested materials, including whether
the government acted in bad faith; (2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a
result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing any prejudice with a
continuance.)
-36-
However, we hold that this error was harmless. Once we determine that the
district “court erred in its decision concerning the admission or exclusion” of
evidence, we consider whether the error was harmless. United States v. Howell, 285
F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2002). A non-constitutional error whether to admit or
exclude evidence is “considered harmless ‘unless a substantial right of [a] party is
affected.’” Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)). An error
affecting a substantial right of a party is an error which had a “substantial influence”
or which leaves one in “grave doubt” as to whether it had such an effect on the
outcome. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). When conducting
our “harmless error analysis, we review the record as a whole.” Charley, 189 F.3d
at 1270 (citation omitted). Harmless error analysis is “not the same as sufficiency
of the evidence analysis.” Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270 (citing United States v. Tome,
61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[t]he question is not whether,
omitting the inadmissible statements, the record contains sufficient evidence for a
jury to convict the defendant”)). The burden of proving that an error is harmless
falls on the government. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270 (citation omitted).
Cherosposy claims that Dr. Griest’s testimony would have served to rebut the
prosecution’s allegations that the defendants’ conduct in leaving Martinez in his car
was wanton and reckless conduct that supported a finding of malice aforethought and
allowed a verdict of second degree murder. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18 (citing
-37-
United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1057
(2001)). The government’s expert, Dr. Aronica-Pollak, testified that Martinez “could
have had a chance to survive” if he had gotten immediate emergency medical
attention.” VIII R. 171. Cherosposy states that Dr. Griest “would have served to
rebut these allegations,” thus implying that Dr. Griest would have testified that
Martinez would not have had a chance to survive. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18.
Cherosposy argues that if the jury had accepted Dr. Griest’s “testimony or found that
the conflicting expert opinions meant the government failed in its burden of proof,”
he “could have been convicted of the less serious charge, voluntary manslaughter,
and received a significantly lower sentence.” Id.
However, Dr. Griest’s testimony is a two-edged sword which could have as
easily hurt Cherosposy as it might have benefitted him. On the one hand, Dr.
Griest’s testimony might 9 have led the jury to convict Cherosposy of voluntary
manslaughter because the jury might have found the defendants’ conduct in leaving
Martinez was not wanton and reckless since Martinez would have died no matter
what the defendants had done with him after the beating. On the other hand, the
defendants’ strategy in calling Dr. Griest was extremely risky. If Dr. Griest testified
that the defendants beat Martinez so severely that he had no chance of survival, the
jury would have had a basis for determining that the defendants’ conduct in beating
9
It should be noted that the record does not indicate what Dr. Griest would
have specifically testified to as an expert witness.
-38-
Martinez was wanton and reckless and suggested a finding of malice aforethought,
leading to a verdict of second degree murder. 10 In sum, we believe that the district
judge’s error in excluding Dr. Griest’s testimony was harmless. Kotteakos, 328 U.S.
at 764-65.
B
Sentencing
1
Obstruction of justice
Cherosposy states that the district court erred in imposing an adjustment for
obstruction of justice based on a finding of perjury because there was no proof that
his trial testimony was false and not the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty
memory. We disagree.
This court reviews the district court’s legal interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo. United States v. Gardiner, 931 F.2d 33, 34 (10th Cir. 1991).
We review factual findings in support of an enhancement for obstruction of justice
for clear error. See id.
The district court must enhance a defendant’s base offense level by two levels
if it finds that:
10
Dr. Griest’s testimony would have added to the image of a severe beating
that had already been created by Dr. Aronica-Pollak’s description of Martinez’s
cause of death being “blunt trauma to the head, the neck, the chest and the
abdomen.” VIII R. 173.
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[T]he defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede the administration of justice during the course of the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the
obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and
any relevant conduct; . . .
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1(A)-(B). A section 3C1.1 enhancement predicated upon perjury is
appropriate when the sentencing court finds that the defendant has given “‘[i] false
testimony [ii] on a material matter [iii] with the willful intent to provide false
testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.’” See
United States v. Mounkes, 204 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1230 (2000). “‘Material’
evidence . . ., as used in . . . section [3C1.1], means evidence . . . that, if believed,
would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
comment. (n.6).
The mere fact that a defendant testifies to his innocence and is later found
guilty does not automatically warrant a finding of perjury. United States v. Markum,
4 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1993). To make a finding of perjury every time the
defendant testifies and is convicted “would impinge upon the constitutional right to
testify on one’s own behalf.” Id. Mere disagreement “between the defendant’s
testimony and the jury’s verdict is insufficient to support a finding of perjury.”
United States v. Weller, 238 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001).
-40-
The sentencing court is required to “carefully review the evidence and make
findings independent of the jury verdict which specifically identify the testimony at
issue and establish that it, in fact, constitutes perjury.” Id. The required findings
must cover all the factual criteria of perjury. United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d
1201, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999).
At sentencing, the trial judge explained his decision to grant the two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice as follows:
A major issue in the case was whether the defendants had taken the
victim to the place where he was found and left him without assistance to die.
At the end of the government’s case, I stated on the record, and I have not
changed my mind, that there was adequate evidence that defendants knew or
should have known that the deceased, the victim, had suffered life-threatening
injuries and that without some medical care he would or could perish as a
result of the injuries that he received.
I cite just a few acts, and they are not intended to be all inclusive. He
was gurgling. This sounds to me that it would at least lend the inference that
the victim was choking on his own blood. His position, as shown by the
photographs, is in a position that he wouldn’t have chosen had he been getting
into the car by himself. He was likely, from the position of the body in the
vehicle, probably either unconscious or unable to move from the position
where he was placed in the vehicle by one or more of the defendants. He was
still mumbling or saying things that the defendants weren’t quite clear about,
yet those two defendants, Mr. Cherosposy and Mr. Manuelito, tried to
convince the jury in court that this man didn’t need to be carried and placed
in the vehicle. He wouldn’t have been able to get into that position, in my
judgment, by himself. It appeared from the photographs as if they were
disposing of a body in the back of the car, and he was gurgling, they said.
Wouldn’t that tell somebody that something serious was going on for Mr.
Martinez? Yet they play it down as if he was just a happy-go-lucky drunk.
Well, I conclude that they were lying about a very material aspect of the case.
I adopt the conclusions made by the government on that issue.
XIII R. at 39-40 (transcript of 09/11/01 proceedings).
-41-
This court defers to the district court “when reviewing the credibility of the
witness on whose testimony it relies in making its factual findings.” United States
v. Nieto, 60 F.3d 1464, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1081 (1996).
The district court made every finding that is required by this court’s case law: the
testimony was false, it concerned a material matter, and it was willfully false. We
hold that these findings are not clearly erroneous.
2
Acceptance of Responsibility
Cherosposy argues that the district court erred in denying a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility because he admitted his culpability and guilt to an
officer prior to trial, through his trial testimony, and to the probation officer during
the presentence investigation. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 23. We disagree.
This court reviews the district court’s decision to deny an adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility for clear error. See United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d
682, 689 (10th Cir. 1996). The sentencing court’s determination that a defendant is
not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility “is entitled to great
deference on review,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5), and should not be disturbed
unless it is without foundation. United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1143 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 981 (1999).
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A defendant is entitled to a reduction in offense level if he or she “clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his [or her] offense.” U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1(a). A defendant who requires the government to prove his or her guilt at trial
may qualify for acceptance of responsibility only in rare situations. Id. at comment.
(n.2). A defendant has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of
responsibility adjustment if he or she “falsely denies . . . relevant conduct . . . .” Id.
at comment. (n.1(a)). Although a defendant who is convicted at trial is not precluded
automatically from receiving an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, a defendant
who goes to trial only to require the government to prove his or her factual guilt
generally would not be entitled to the adjustment. Id. at comment. (n.2). In addition,
false testimony that results in an enhancement for obstruction of justice generally is
inconsistent with an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at comment.
(n.4).
At sentencing, the trial court observed:
With respect to the objections for the failure of the probation office to
award two points for acceptance of responsibility, these young men didn’t
accept responsibility for this, not in the manner in which the Sentencing
Guidelines intend that conclusion to be. They avoided responsibility, and even
today their attorneys are attempting to place the responsibility from one to the
other of the defendants. To hear counsels’ (sic) explanations here today and
the testimony here in this courtroom during the trial, you would think that poor
Mr. Martinez had nothing more than a bloody nose. He was mercilessly
beaten to death.
I think it was the police chief at Laguna that had known this man since
they went to school together, and he couldn’t recognize him. Somebody did
that, and there were three of them involved. For them to come in here today
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and say, “Well, we didn’t know he was hurt. We accept responsibility for
giving him a bloody nose and accept responsibility for leaving him out in a
place where it was unlikely he would ever be discovered, at least within a
reasonable period of time,”. . . left no question in my mind that they had not
accepted responsibility and still haven’t . . . .
XIII R. at 40-41 (Transcript of 09/11/01 proceedings).
As we discussed in the previous section of our opinion, we feel that the district
judge was correct in finding that Cherosposy lied during the trial to attempt to negate
the malice aforethought necessary to prove second degree murder. By lying in this
way, Cherosposy forced the government to prove his guilt at trial. Forcing “the
government to prove its case at trial,” then expressing remorse does not constitute
“a timely acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Gallegos, 129 F.3d 1140,
1147 (10th Cir. 1997).
This court should defer to the district court’s determination concerning
whether a defendant has made a timely acceptance of responsibility unless it is
without foundation. Lindsay, 184 F.3d at 1143. The district court’s denial of the
reduction was “not clearly erroneous and is supported by the record.” United States
v. Janusz, 135 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence as to Cherosposy.
IV
No. 01-2308: Mr. Sarracino’s Appeal
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Mr. Sarracino raises a number of issues in his appeal, some of which have
been raised by his co-defendants and some of which are raised only by him.
A
Severance issues
Like Mr. Manuelito, Mr. Sarracino argues that he should have been tried
separately from the other defendants. The government contends that this issue has
been waived. We find that it has not.
In a hearing on motions prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Sarracino indicated a
desire for severance. The government responded by pointing out that no written
motion had been filed on behalf of Sarracino. Although the record is less than clear,
it appears that the trial judge treated counsel’s remarks as an oral motion, without
giving any indication that the failure to file a written motion had any bearing on his
view of the issues. VI R. 4 (referring to motion for severance of “the defendants”),
30, 33.
We also note, as a preliminary matter, that because both of Mr. Sarracino’s co-
defendants testified at trial, his severance argument does not involve the holding of
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, as Mr. Manuelito’s argument did. See n.4,
supra. We also are mindful of the principle that “defendants are not entitled to
severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate
trials.” United States v. Zafiro, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993).
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Mr. Sarracino’s argument is based largely on the assertion that this is a case
of antagonistic defenses. But this is simply not so. Instead, the three defendants
relied on the theory of self-defense. Sarracino also complains that evidence was
admitted against him that would not have been admissible in a separate trial. As to
the out-of-court statements of his co-defendants to the investigators, however,
counsel for Sarracino at trial vigorously opposed any redactions to those statements
on the ground that the theme of self-defense was consistent throughout. Moreover,
the out-of-court statements of the co-defendants was mostly cumulative to their trial
testimony, which would have been admissible against Sarracino in a separate trial.
In view of these factors, plus the court’s instruction to the jury not to consider the
out-of court statements of any defendant in evaluating the case against any other
defendant, we find there was no error in denial of the motion for severance.
Sarracino also argues that the evidence concerning his co-defendants leaving
the victim at the old dump site as they did was unfairly prejudicial to him. We agree
with counsel that, to a large extent, his argument in this regard is closely connected
to his sufficiency of the evidence argument. For reasons discussed below in
connection with that issue, we find no merit in the argument that Sarracino was
unfairly prejudiced by this evidence, which we hold was properly admissible against
him and would have been even had he been tried separately.
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B
Gruesome photographs of the victim
This issue has been discussed above in the appeal of Mr. Manuelito, and no
further discussion is necessary.
C
Sufficiency of the evidence of murder in the second degree
At the outset of this discussion, we note that Mr. Sarracino in the briefs also
asserts that the trial court should have limited the instruction on second degree
murder by specifying that the instruction was applicable only to the other defendants,
not to Mr. Sarracino. That argument logically merges with the sufficiency of the
evidence argument in our view.
Our discussion in Part II-A-4, supra, of the overall evidence in the case in
connection with the harmless error analysis in Mr. Manuelito’s appeal is fully
applicable here, with the result that little more needs to be said. Mr. Sarracino’s
argument is implicitly based on the premises that he did not know that the victim was
severely injured and in mortal danger and that he believed that Manuelito and
Cherosposy were taking the victim home, where he presumably would have gotten
any aid that he needed. But the evidence is easily susceptible to different
interpretations, as we have already discussed. In particular, the co-defendants’
testimony that they had intended to take the victim home only to change their minds
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and decide to leave him at his own request was not likely to have been believed by
the jury. The jury could well have decided that the victim was injured so badly, and
his injuries so apparent, that the three defendants planned for Manuelito and
Cherosposy to remove the victim from the immediate area and abandon him.
Mr. Sarracino’s own statement to the investigator included incriminating
details. Sarracino said that he and Manuelito were kicking the victim in the struggle
over the gun, “and when and then [sic] we were successful [,] we were kicking him
during [sic] trying to get it away to [sic] and after.” Gov. Exhibit 18(a) at 3
(transcript of interview of Sarracino) (emphasis added). He said that they had kicked
the victim in the body and in the head, and that he did not remember how many times
they had kicked him. As discussed supra, Sarracino said that the victim afterwards
was making a “gargling” noise. Asked if he thought that the victim was hurt at that
point, Sarracino said: “Yes, I knew he was hurt and I was glad that he was hurt
because he was pointing the gum [sic] and threatening to kill us and what else were
we suppose to do but get the gun away . . . .” Id. at 5.
The severity of the beating inflicted on the victim, as described by Dr.
Aronica-Pollak, and the totality of the other evidence, including Mr. Sarracino’s out-
of-court statement to the investigator, were sufficient to establish the element of
malice. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of
murder in the second degree.
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D
Vindictive prosecution
Sarracino claims that vindictive prosecution occurred when, after he refused
to accept the final plea proposal to a manslaughter indictment, the prosecution
obtained a superseding indictment for second degree murder. We disagree.
On appeal, Sarracino raises five alleged misrepresentations by the testifying
case agent to the grand jury in support of the superseding indictment which Sarracino
contends reveal vindictive prosecution. Appellant’s Initial Brief at 29. However,
since Sarracino did not raise these issues below, we will not review them. King v.
United States, 301 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that it is a general rule
that this court will not review issues that were not raised below). Instead, we will
only review the issues Sarracino 11 raised in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Superseding Indictment.
In the Motion to Dismiss, Sarracino stated that under the initial indictment a
grand jury indicted him for voluntary manslaughter, but after the government
presented the same grand jury with the superseding indictment, he was indicted for
second-degree murder. He then raised the following issues. First, the same grand
11
Sarracino and Cherosposy submitted a joint motion. However, this court
only refers to Sarracino when discussing this motion because only Sarracino
raised the issue of vindictive prosecution on appeal.
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jury heard both prosecutorial presentations. Second, no identifiable new evidence
was presented to the later grand jury that was not already known and presented to the
first grand jury. Third, no evidence was discovered for the presentation to the
second grand jury that was not available to the first grand jury. Fourth, the
superseding indictment was sought primarily to up the ante and force the defendants
to accept the prosecution’s plea proposal. Finally, Sarracino asserted that the
“motive for the presentation of additional charges indicates a prima facie evidence
[sic] and a reasonable likelihood of vindictive prosecution, justifies further discovery
on this subject, and, if sufficient evidence is adduced, warrants dismissal of the
Superseding Indictment.” I R. (Doc. 102).
The district judge addressed these issues in his Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. I R.
(Doc. 134). The judge held that “the facts of this case appear to fall four-square
within Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see also United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).” I R. (Doc. 134). Not only is a presumption of
vindictiveness inapplicable to the “give-and-take” of plea negotiations, but even a
showing of actual vindictiveness does not necessarily warrant dismissal of the
indictment. Id. The judge stated that in “Bordenkircher the prosecutor’s threats did
not establish improper motive: prosecutors enjoy broad discretion to select the
charges against an accused, and ‘[a] charging decision does not levy an improper
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“penalty” unless it results solely from the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal
right, rather than the prosecutor’s normal assessment of the societal interest in
prosecution.’” I R. (Doc. 134) (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380, nn.11, 12). Thus,
“‘[a]n initial decision should not freeze future conduct[;] the initial charges filed by
a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual is legitimately subject
to prosecution.’” I R. (Doc. 134) (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383). Furthermore,
the judge continued, it is not clear that defendants even have identified a protected
right against which the government could have retaliated. I R. (Doc. 134). “Under
either indictment, they are entitled to and will receive a trial by jury.” Id. Cf. United
States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1994).
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings on prosecutorial
vindictiveness for clear error, and reviews de novo its legal conclusions. United
States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1448 (10th Cir. 1994). To prove prosecutorial
vindictiveness, the defendant must prove either (1) “actual vindictiveness, or (2) a
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of
vindictiveness.” United States v. Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1137 (1998). If the defendant proves either element, the
burden shifts to the government to justify its prosecutorial decision based on
“legitimate, articulable, objective reasons.” United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031,
1040 (10th Cir. 1991). If the defendant fails to prove either element, the trial court
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need not address the government’s justification for its prosecutorial decision. Id.
Merely by the appearance of vindictive motives, vindictiveness may not be presumed.
Bordenkircher v. United States, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368 (1982).
In determining whether the government has engaged in prosecutorial
vindictiveness, this court must determine whether the prosecution engaged in conduct
that would not have occurred but for the prosecution’s desire to punish the defendant
for exercising a specific legal right. United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1262
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 839 (1997). However, the Supreme Court has held
that a prosecutor may threaten to charge a greater offense if a defendant will not
plead guilty to a lesser one, as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
that the defendant committed the greater offense. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357.
On appeal, Sarracino reiterates his trial court argument that the government,
when unable to reach a plea agreement, may not create new charges on the same
evidence in order to punish the exercise of his Constitutional right to proceed to
trial. 12 Appellant’s Initial Brief at 27. He also adds the new argument that
Sarracino states that every plea proposal the government offered him
12
recognized that he had a lesser role in Martinez’s death and thus each proposed
lesser penal consequences for him than for his co-defendants. Appellant’s Initial
Brief at 26-27. He contends that he did not accept a 5K plea proposal because the
government requested testimony from him that would have to have been “either
untrue or require him to testify to events he could not have observed because he
was behind the house disposing of Martinez’s weapon when the critical events
(continued...)
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presenting misleading evidence to the grand jury is further evidence of vindictive
prosecution. Id.
We hold that the district judge properly determined that the government did
not engage in prosecutorial vindictiveness, and we uphold its judgment. The
government’s initial decision to charge voluntary manslaughter did not limit the
government’s ability to seek a superseding indictment charging second degree
murder. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382 (holding that an initial decision should not freeze
future conduct and that the initial charges filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the
extent to which an individual is legitimately subject to prosecution). We agree with
the district judge that the government did not engage in vindictive prosecution. I R.
(Doc. 134).
Further, we agree with the trial court that it is not clear that Sarracino satisfied
the vindictive prosecution threshold issue of identifying “a protected right against
which the government could have retaliated.” I R. (Doc. 134). The Supreme Court
has held that so long as the prosecutor has “probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. However, the decision
12
(...continued)
actually occurred.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 15. This unwillingness to lie,
Sarracino claims, left him no choice but to go to trial, which was his
constitutional right.
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to prosecute may not be intentionally based upon an improper criterion such as race
or religion, nor on the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
Sarracino claims that the government punished him for exercising his
constitutional right to have a trial rather than accept a plea bargain. Appellant’s
Initial Brief at 27. Sarracino made the tactical choice to reject the plea bargain and
proceed to trial. See United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a tactical decision to seek partial severance of charges cannot permit
charge of vindictiveness when government subsequently files superseding
indictments in later trials). The government had probable cause to seek the
reindictment of Sarracino for second degree murder based on the facts discussed
earlier in this opinion and did so. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. Sarracino has to
live with the consequences of his tactical choice. “A claim of vindictive prosecution
cannot insulate the defendant from the lawful consequences of his tactical choices.”
United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1042 (10th Cir. 1991).
In sum, because Sarracino cannot satisfy the threshold issue of showing that
the government violated one of his protected rights, we hold that he has not carried
his burden of proving actual vindictiveness or a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.
Additionally, Sarracino’s inability to shoulder this burden means that we do not need
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to reach his claim that the government’s presentation of allegedly misleading
evidence in its superseding indictment is further evidence of vindictive prosecution.
E
Cumulative error
This issue has been discussed above in section II, D, the appeal of Mr.
Manuelito, and so we will not restate this court’s process of determining cumulative
error, United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1470, and will instead only focus on the
grounds raised by Sarracino.
Since we have not found any errors in the issues Sarracino has raised in the
rest of his brief, we now turn to the five additional purported errors Sarracino raises
in the cumulative error section of his brief: restricting the cross-examination of
Claudia Martinez; restricting the cross-examination of Investigator Laducer;
referring to the “United States” as the party the prosecutors represent; showing
admitted evidence to Ms. Martinez which upset her; and questioning the forensic
pathologist regarding whether Mr. Martinez’s lip was ripped from his gum.
First, we have held that the trial judge impinged on the defendants’ right of
confrontation by completely excluding any inquiry into the reasons for Mr. Laducer’s
having left his employment with the BIA. See Part II-B, supra. We have also held,
however, that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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Second, we hold that the trial judge did not violate Sarracino’s right of
confrontation by properly restricting the cross-examination of Ms. Martinez from
exploring irrelevant personal issues. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20
(1985) (per curiam) (holding that the confrontation clause guarantees only “an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”) (emphasis in
original); see also Matthews v. Price, 83 F.3d 328, 333 (10th Cir. 1996).
Third, the prosecutors’ statements that they represent the United States is
correct and a familiar expression and therefore was not an error. It should be noted
that Mr. Sarracino did not object to these references. See, e.g., XI R. 1058
(Transcript of government’s argument) (“[w]e are proud to represent the United
States”).
Fourth, the government’s display of Mr. Martinez’s clothing, which had been
admitted in evidence, to Ms. Martinez was not error because the government was
required to prove that the items belonged to Mr. Martinez. The defendants stipulated
to this connection after Ms. Martinez’s emotional outburst. X R. 589 (Transcript of
11/14/00 proceedings) (“[t]he parties have reached a stipulation that the ‘Number
One Dad’ tag . . . . the glasses frame and two lenses . . . and the Nobel Sysco jacket
. . . were all owned by Raynard Martinez.”).
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Finally, the prosecutor’s question to the forensic pathologist regarding whether
Martinez’s lip had been ripped away from his gum was a fair characterization, in lay
terms, of the pathologist’s testimony. VIII R. 133-34 (Transcript of 11/9/00
proceedings) (“‘Q. So his lip is ripped from his gums?’ . . . ‘A. That little area that
connects them was torn.’”). None of the defendants objected to this question, VIII
R. 133-34, and the district judge instructed the jury that the statements and argument
of counsel were not evidence. XI R. 982 (Transcript of 11/15/00 proceedings)
(“Remember these statements are not evidence, and what the lawyers say is not
binding upon you.”).
Because we find only one error in Mr. Sarracino’s trial, which was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not conduct cumulative error analysis.
F
Sentencing issues
1
Acceptance of Responsibility
The district judge properly determined that Sarracino did not qualify for an
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because his claim of self-defense and his
refusal to take full responsibility for the offense of which he was convicted forced
the government to prove his factual guilt at trial. Because we discussed an almost
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identical issue extensively above in the appeal of Mr. Cherosposy, we feel that no
further discussion is necessary.
2
Sarracino’s motion for downward departure
This court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Sarracino’s
motion for downward departure. Issues of jurisdiction are questions of law subject
to de novo review. See United States v. Delatorre, 157 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1180 (1999).
This court has jurisdiction to review a sentence (1) “imposed in violation of
law”; (2) “imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines”; (3) imposed as a result of the granting of a motion for upward departure,
or (4) “imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and
[which] is plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). This court does not have
jurisdiction to review sentences that do not fall into one of these categories.
Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to review the district judge’s
discretionary decision to deny a motion for downward departure on the ground that
a defendant’s specific circumstances do not warrant a departure. See United States
v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998). This court only has jurisdiction to
review the district judge’s denial of a downward departure in the rare instance when
a district judge concluded that he did “not have any authority to depart from the
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sentencing guideline range for the entire class of circumstances proffered by the
defendant.” Id.; see also United States v. Fortier, 180 F.3d 1217, 1231 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing nine Tenth Circuit cases decided in each year from 1990 to 1998 which
each state the same rule).
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The trial judge’s comments at sentencing make clear that he was cognizant of
his authority to depart and decided not to do so. 13 See Castillo, 140 F.3d at 887. In
sum, this court is without jurisdiction to consider this issue on appeal. See id.
13
At sentencing, the trial judge responded in the following way to
Sarracino’s request for a downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K2.10 on the
theory that Martinez provoked the altercation that caused his death:
There was also an objection that the probation office had not
reduced the guideline sentence for the actions of Mr. Martinez. Mr.
Martinez, they claim, was responsible for the altercation. That’s what
they say. There is no one here other than these defendants that say
that. There is a significant difference in them saying that and it being
so, especially when it’s to their benefit to do so, to say so.
I have very great difficulty accepting that Mr. Martinez, who
had, for all objective evidence, two bottles of beer before he arrived
at the scene – and one of the defendants having six. I don’t know
about the second, but it was nearly unbelievable to me that Mr.
Martinez would start a fight with three people even if he had a gun.
It may be something different than what the Court heard as to how
this fight started. There is no corroboration to the statements made
by the defendants about how this occurred.
To reduce the sentences for three persons who engaged in a
battle with one person, which left him dead and didn’t leave a mark
on any one of these three defendants, all very young, strong athletic
men and say, “Oh, it was all his fault. After we battled with him for
such a long time and finally wrestled the weapon from him, he was in
such bad condition that we had to help him into the car,” to give a
reduction of sentence for the actions of the victim under such
circumstances makes no sense. And the jury agreed that the
defendants went afar in their reaction to whatever the defendant did,
if he did anything, so I will not depart downward on that.
XIII R. 41-42 (Transcript of 09/11/01 proceedings).
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V
Conclusion
For the reasons given, the convictions and sentences of all three appellants are
AFFIRMED.
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