United States v. Morales-Chaires

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
December 7, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 05-1190
ALFREDO MORALES-CHAIRES
a/k/a Alfredo Morales-Chairez a/k/a
Alfredo F. Morales a/k/a Alfredo
Morales a/k/a Alfredo Frank Morales,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 04-CR-475-B)

Submitted on the briefs: *

Raymond P. Moore, Federal Public Defender, Edward R. Harris, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, John T. Carlson, Research and Writing Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant.

William J. Leone, United States Attorney, Jerry N. Jones, Assistant United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK , Circuit
Judges.

ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.

Alfredo Morales-Chaires pled guilty to one count of unlawful reentry by a

previously deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). He was sentenced to seventy-seven

months’ imprisonment. He appeals that sentence. For the reasons stated below,

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Morales-Chaires was born in Mexico in 1974 and is a Mexican citizen. He

first entered the United States in 1981. In 1995, he was convicted in a Colorado

state court of two counts of possession of cocaine, each a felony, in violation of

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-405. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for

each count. Morales-Chaires was accordingly deported to Mexico in July 1997.

He illegally reentered the United States in August 1998. In September

1998, he was again convicted in a Colorado state court of one count of possession

of cocaine, a felony, again in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-405, and was

sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Morales-Chaires was again deported to

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Mexico in March 2000. In April 2000, he again illegally reentered the United

States. He was apprehended and deported for the third time in December 2002.

Morales-Chaires illegally reentered the United States yet again, in January

2003. On October 24, 2003, Morales-Chaires was convicted in a Colorado state

court of one count of possession of cocaine, a felony, in violation of Colo. Rev.

Stat. § 18-18-405, and was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. He was

incarcerated until October 21, 2004, at which time he was transferred to the

custody of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He

voluntarily admitted to the instant offense of illegally reentering the United States

in January 2003, after having been previously deported.

On November 17, 2004, a grand jury returned an indictment against

Morales-Chaires, charging him with one count of unlawful reentry by a deported

alien whose removal was subsequent to the commission of an aggravated felony,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). Morales-Chaires and the government

entered into a written plea agreement, pursuant to which Morales-Chaires pled

guilty and the government agreed to request a three-level decrease in Morales-

Chaires’ United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)

offense level, and to recommend a sentence at the bottom of the applicable

Guideline range. The plea agreement included a tentative calculation of the total

adjusted Guideline offense level of 21, a criminal history category of VI, and the

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resultant advisory Guideline range of seventy-seven to ninety-six months’

imprisonment.

The Presentence Report (“PSR”) agreed with the plea agreement’s

calculations of offense level, criminal history and Guideline range. The PSR

noted Morales-Chaires’ extensive criminal history involving multiple prior

convictions, including numerous felonies, starting when Morales-Chaires was

fourteen years old and continuing through 2003. The PSR further noted that

“[t]he severity of sanctions imposed for past criminal behavior has gradually

increased over the years, however, it does not appear it has influenced

defendant’s conduct.” PSR at ¶ 144, R. Vol. III.

Morales-Chaires filed a “Memorandum Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and

Motion for Downward Departure from Advisory Guidelines” urging the court to

“depart downward from the sentencing guideline range otherwise applicable”

because:

the offense conduct represents a significantly lower risk of harm and
lower level of moral culpability than the typical case of this type and
the punishment otherwise prescribed by the sentencing guidelines
does not reflect the seriousness of the offense conduct; and . . . a
departure serves critical goals of the sentencing guidelines.

Mem. at 2, R. Vol. I, tab 23. He argued that he had been “a productive and

contributing member of society” and that his “primary source of trouble with the

law has been drug-related.” Id. at 6. He also argued that a downward departure

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would serve the goals of the sentencing guidelines because it would avoid his

receiving different treatment from others similarly situated because, as an alien,

he would have less access to programs in prison than non-aliens. Furthermore, he

argued that the sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support a

sentence below the otherwise applicable Guideline range, in particular because, as

discussed further below, of the disparities between sentences imposed in districts

where a “fast-track” program exists for aliens accused of illegal reentry and in

districts, like Colorado, where no such “fast-track” program exists.

At his sentencing proceeding on April 8, 2005, the district court denied

Morales-Chaires’ request for a downward departure under the Guidelines, and it

rejected his argument that the sentencing factors contained in § 3553(a)

compelled a sentence different than what the Guidelines recommended, including

his argument based upon fast-track programs in other districts. The district court

went through each of the statutory sentencing factors and concluded that they

supported the recommended Guideline sentence. It also rejected his argument

based upon the lack of a fast-track program in Colorado, finding that “for the

Court to depart on this basis is in essence a violation of the doctrine of separation

of powers because of interference with a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in

charging and plea bargaining. That is the province of the executive branch.” Tr.

of Sentencing at 18, R. Vol. II. The court therefore sentenced Morales-Chaires to

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seventy-seven months’ imprisonment, declaring that advisory Guideline sentence

to be “reasoned and reasonable.” Id. at 19.

Morales-Chaires appeals his sentence, arguing the court erred in sentencing

him to a longer sentence than he would have received had he been prosecuted in a

fast-track jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

Fast-track sentencing programs originated with federal prosecutors in states

bordering Mexico, who were faced with increasing numbers of illegal reentry and

other immigration cases. They accordingly designed programs whereby

defendants accused of certain immigration offenses would plead guilty early in

the process and waive their rights to file certain motions and to appeal, in

exchange for a shorter sentence. The shorter sentence was accomplished either by

charge-bargaining or by promising to recommend a downward departure at

sentencing. See generally United States v. Martinez-Flores , No. 04-2681, 2005

WL 2877779 (1st Cir. Oct. 28, 2005); United States v. Perez-Chavez , No. 2:05-

CR-00003PGC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9252 (D. Utah May 16, 2005); Erin T.

Middleton, Note, Fast-Track to Disparity: How Federal Sentencing Policies

Along the Southwest Border Are Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines and

Violating Equal Protection , 2004 Utah L. Rev. 827.

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 “In 2003, Congress endorsed the fast-track concept in a provision of the

Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children

Today Act (“PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified

in scattered Sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).” Martines-Flores , 2005 WL

2877779, at *__. A provision of the PROTECT Act directed the United States

Sentencing Commission to “promulgate . . . a policy statement authorizing a

downward departure of not more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion

for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the

Attorney General and the United States Attorney.” Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m),

117 Stat. at 675. The Sentencing Commission accordingly added a new

Guidelines section, effective October 27, 2003, authorizing such four-level

departures. See USSG §5K3.1, p.s.

In jurisdictions where fast-track programs have been authorized by the

Attorney General, defendants must “agree to the factual basis [of the criminal

charge] and waive the rights to file pretrial motions, to appeal, and to seek

collateral relief (except for ineffective assistance of counsel).” United States v.

Melendez-Torres , 420 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2005). At the time Morales-Chaires

pled guilty and was sentenced, fast-track programs were in effect in a number of

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jurisdictions, but not in Colorado. 1
Morales-Chaires argues that he could have

received a sentence as low as thirty months were he to have been apprehended in

one of the districts where the fast-track program is available.

During the time period when the Sentencing Guidelines were viewed and

applied as mandatory, several circuits, including our own, held that “the existence

of sentencing disparities as to illegal reentry cases among the various federal

districts, where such disparities arise from varying charging and plea-bargaining

policies of the individual United States Attorneys, [does not] provide an

appropriate basis for a downward departure at sentencing[.]” United States v.

Armenta-Castro , 227 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.

Banuelos-Rodriguez , 215 F.3d 969, 972-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same);

United States v. Bonnet-Grullon , 212 F.3d 692, 697-710 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).

In particular, we held that “the Sentencing Guidelines categorically proscribe the

consideration of sentencing disparities flowing from the exercise of prosecutorial

discretion in charging and plea bargaining practices.” Armenta-Castro , 227 F.3d

at 1258.

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005), however, rendered the Guidelines advisory, not mandatory. “As a result

Among the districts with fast-track programs are the districts of Texas,
1

California, Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, the Northern
District of Georgia, and the Western District of Washington.

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of this change in the law governing sentencing, the pre- Booker decisions . . . that

rejected departures from the then-mandatory Guideline range on the ground the

Guidelines precluded such departures certainly cannot be ignored, but they can no

longer be considered controlling law.” United States v. Medrano-Duran , 386 F.

Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also Martinez-Flores , 2005 WL 2877779,

at * __ (noting that “[t]he question is different post- Booker ”). Under Booker ,

when sentencing defendants, courts must refer to the list of factors contained in

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including (a)(6) which provides that courts must consider

“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(6). 2
Morales-Chaires focuses on that provision, arguing that the district

2
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.–The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of
this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to
be imposed, shall consider–

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed–
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further
(continued...)

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court’s failure to sentence him below the suggested Guideline range amounted to

permitting an “unwarranted sentence disparit[y]” between himself and other

illegal reentrants “with similar records who have been found guilty of similar

conduct,” and who are able to take advantage of a fast-track program.

“We retain ‘the same jurisdiction to review guidelines sentences as [we]

had before the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker .’” United States v. Serrata ,

425 F.3d 886, 906 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Sierra-Castillo , 405

F.3d 932, 936 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005)). We now review sentences imposed after

Booker for reasonableness. See Booker , 125 S. Ct. at 766 (noting that the

§ 3553(a) factors “will guide appellate courts . . . in determining whether a

sentence is unreasonable”); Serrata , 425 F.3d at 911. Accordingly, we examine

whether Morales-Chaires’ seventy-seven month sentence was reasonable.

2
(...continued)
crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
...
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission . . .;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.

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 As indicated above, the district court carefully examined all the § 3553(a)

factors before deciding on the sentence imposed. It considered the “nature and

circumstances of the offense as committed by this defendant.” Tr. of Sentencing

at 12, R. Vol. II. It concluded that

the way in which this offense was committed is exacerbated because
of a history of committing a drug offense, felony, being deported,
illegal reentry, committing a drug offense, being deported, illegal
reentry, committing a drug offense, being deported and illegal
reentry.

And that is a serious violation of the law compounded by its
repetition over this time and compounded by the fact that despite
being imprisoned for these drug offenses and despite being deported,
that has had no deterrent effect whatsoever on continued violation of
the law.

Id. at 13. Considering the need to promote respect for the law, the court stated

that an insufficiently severe sentence would undermine respect for the law, in

light of the serious criminal history just outlined. With respect to deterrence, the

court stated “[f]or the same reasons . . . , a sentence that is too lenient in this case

would not deter similar criminal repeated violation[s], but would encourage

[them].” Id. at 14. The court then explained why the various reasons Morales-

Chaires presented as justifying a more lenient sentence—his desire to spend time

with and be the primary support for his ailing 85-year-old father, his claim to be a

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productive and contributing member of society, and his cultural assimilation in

the United States—were not credible. 3

The court then turned to Morales-Chaires’ argument concerning the

difference between sentences in fast-track jurisdictions and jurisdictions without

fast-track programs, and held:

[F]or the Court to depart on this basis is in essence a violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers because of interference with a
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in charging and plea bargaining.
That is the province of the executive branch.
So if courts were to buy into the idea that where there are fast-
track programs, principally in the border states like New Mexico, for
a reduction of sentence in order to achieve proportionality of a vast
majority of the districts with a small minority of the districts that in
essence would require prosecutors to stand this system of justice on
its head and require all districts to provide reduction in sentence not
taking into account a defendant’s status as an aggravated felon for all
illegal reentry cases regardless of the particular case or the
appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
. . . [Morales-Chaires’ argument] invites judicial legislation, . .
. and I decline to go there for good reason. Not the job of the Court
to legislate under our tripartite form of constitutional government.
And it undermines the will of Congress.

3
With respect to Morales-Chaires’ desire to care for his father, the court
asked “why is it that at this point in this defendant’s life he is now very concerned
about his 85-year-old father?” Tr. of Sentencing at 15, R. Vol. II. Regarding
Morales-Chaires’ claim to have been a productive and contributing member of
society, the court bluntly observed that “when one looks at his employment
history and . . . his criminal history, that’s just simply not the reality here. He has
not been a productive and contributing member of society. . . . [H]e has been a
drain on this society, which is contrary to the policy of Congress.” Id. at 16. The
court then noted that while there “has been some cultural assimilation in this
country, . . . it has been in a criminal milieu.” Id. at 17.

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Id. at 18. The court therefore concluded that the Guideline range of seventy-

seven to ninety-six months was “reasoned and reasonable” and sentenced

Morales-Chaires to the low end. The court noted that “application of the statutory

factors in light of the advice of the Guidelines could call, frankly, for an upward

departure. Could well provide a reasoned and reasonable judgment and sentence

at the high end of the Guideline range here.” Id. at 19.

The only argument Morales-Chaires pursues on appeal is the fast-track

argument. This is an issue of first impression, since Booker , in this circuit. The

First Circuit has suggested in dicta that it rejects the argument Morales-Chaires

makes to us. See Martinez-Flores , 2005 WL 2877779, at *__ n.3 (“It is arguable

that even post- Booker , it would never be reasonable to depart downward based on

disparities between fast-track and non-fast-track jurisdictions given Congress’

clear (if implied) statement in the PROTECT Act provision that such disparities

are acceptable. Because we resolve the question in this case on Booker plain-

error grounds, we need not reach that or any other issue of reasonableness.”

(citation omitted)). This issue has divided district courts. Compare United States

v. Peralta-Espinoza , 383 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1108 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (holding

“under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), courts may reduce sentences to remedy . . .

disparity” caused by fast-track programs) and United States v. Ramirez-Ramirez ,

365 F. Supp. 2d 728, 732 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“In some cases, under Booker and 18

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U.S.C. § 3553(a), it may be appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion in

order to minimize the sentencing disparities that exist in cases involving illegal

re-entry.”) and United States v. Galvez-Barrios , 355 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (E.D.

Wis. 2005) (holding “under Booker and § 3553(a)(6), it may be appropriate in

some cases for courts to exercise their discretion to minimize the sentencing

disparity that fast-track programs create”) with Perez-Chavez , 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 9252, at *23 (holding, in light of the PROTECT Act provision, that

“Congress has concluded that the advantages stemming from fast-track programs

outweigh their disadvantages, and that any disparity that results from fast-track

programs is not ‘unwarranted’”).

Yet another district court examined the two different types of fast-track

programs—“those which, consistent with [USSG] §5K3.1 and the Congressional

directive, rely on downward departures of up to four levels, and those which rely

on charge-bargaining, in other words, where the defendant is permitted to plead

guilty to a reduced charge.” Medrano-Duran , 386 F. Supp. 2d at 946. The court

further observed that “[t]he fast track districts that rely on charge-bargaining use

methodologies that permit far greater sentence reductions than contemplated by

Congress’ directive in the PROTECT Act and the Sentencing Commission’s

policy statement in § 5K3.1” Id. While the court concluded that sentence

disparities resulting from the application of the Sentencing Commission’s policy

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statement in §5K3.1 were not “unwarranted” under 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a)(6), 4
it

determined that sentencing disparities caused by “prosecutorial charging

decisions” may be unwarranted. Medrano-Duran , 386 F. Supp. 2d at 947. As the

court stated, “[t]here is nothing in § 3553, Booker , or any other existing authority

to support a construction of § 3553(a)(6) that allows Congress and prosecutors to

determine what sentence disparities are warranted and unwarranted but prevents a

court from doing so.” Id. Accordingly, the court “determined that the disparity

between Medrano-Duran and illegal re-entry defendants in districts with early

disposition programs was an unwarranted disparity among similarly situated

defendants within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6).” Id. at 948.

By contrast, the court in Perez-Chavez held that sentencing disparities

caused by the existence of fast-track programs were not unwarranted. First, it

observed that Armenta-Castro remained persuasive Tenth Circuit authority for

that proposition: “ Armenta-Castro ’s holding rested on the fact that the Guidelines

implicitly rendered prosecutorial discretion an irrelevant factor for purposes of

downward departures. That reasoning is, of course, much more powerful in the

context of the PROTECT Act, which now explicitly considers the fast-track issue

As the court stated, “[t]he Court seriously questions whether a sentencing
4

disparity among defendants in different districts that results from application of a
policy statement adopted by the Sentencing Commission, pursuant to an express
Congressional directive, could appropriately be considered ‘unwarranted’ within
the meaning of § 3553(a)(6).” Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 946.

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and spells out how such questions are to be handled.” Perez-Chavez , 2005 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 9252, at *19-20 (footnotes omitted). Second, it concluded that

Booker did not cause any meaningful change because “even after Booker the

court must still ‘consider’ the Guidelines.” Id. at *21. “In short, Congress has

concluded that the advantages stemming from fast-track programs outweigh their

disadvantages, and that any disparity that results from fast-track programs is not

‘unwarranted.’” Id. at *23.

We conclude that, in this particular case, we need not resolve whether

sentencing disparities caused by the existence of fast-track programs in some

jurisdictions are or are not, or may be in certain circumstances, considered

unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6). Section 3553(a)(6)’s directive to sentencing

courts to avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendant with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct” is but one of several

factors for a court to consider in determining a reasonable sentence. As indicated,

the court in this case carefully reviewed all the factors listed in § 3553(a),

including § 3553(a)(6), and concluded that they fully supported the sentence

imposed. Even one of the courts which recognized that sentencing disparities

caused by fast-track programs could justify a lower sentence concluded that the

other factors in § 3553(a) may preclude such a result: “I would have imposed a

below-guideline sentence based in part on fast-track disparity if the other

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§ 3553(a) factors had not weighed against such a sentence.” Peralta-Espinoza ,

383 F. Supp. 2d at 1112; cf. Medrano-Duran , 386 F. Supp. 2d at 948-49 (court

reduced defendant’s advisory Guideline range by three levels, in part because of

unwarranted disparity caused by fast track programs but also because other

factors—defendant’s “youth, the fact that he had no prior illegal re-entry

offenses, and the fact that he committed no other crimes following his return to

this country”—suggested leniency). We therefore conclude that Morales-Chaires’

seventy-seven month sentence is reasonable.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Morales-Chaires’ sentence is AFFIRMED.

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