F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
May 8, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 04-3010
MERRILL W. ANDREWS, a/k/a
Kamanda Kamangeni,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 02-CR-10073-01-JTM)
Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender for the District of Kansas
(David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Wichita,
Kansas for the Defendant-Appellant.
Brent I. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, (Eric F. Melgren, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas for the Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Merrill Andrews appeals his sentence for bank robbery imposed by a
district court on remand from this court. At Andrews’ initial sentencing hearing,
the district court granted a downward departure on grounds of aberrant behavior
and community ties. The government appealed this sentence and we reversed.
On remand, the district court imposed a higher sentence. Andrews now
challenges our application of a de novo standard of review in the prior appeal and
claims that the district court resentenced him in violation of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Because the district court’s non-constitutional
Booker error constitutes plain error, we REVERSE and REMAND for
resentencing.
I
Arrested three times before the age of eighteen and convicted of murder at
twenty-two, Andrews was released on parole after twenty-one years’
imprisonment. He returned to his hometown, joined a church, taught young men
about the errors of his ways, and cared for a handicapped nephew. However, his
efforts to reintegrate himself into the community were not wholly successful, and
three years after his parole, Andrews reverted to his old ways. Donning a mask
and packing an air pistol, he drove to downtown Wichita and robbed a credit
union.
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Andrews was arrested and pled guilty to one count of bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). With an adjusted offense level of 29 and a
criminal history category of VI, Andrews faced a sentence of 151 to 188 months’
imprisonment under the then-mandatory guidelines. At the sentencing hearing,
pastors and friends testified to Andrews’ good deeds and involvement with church
and family. On the basis of this testimony, the court granted a downward
departure for exceptional community support and aberrant behavior and sentenced
Andrews to a term of 120 months in prison.
The government appealed the sentence, arguing that Andrews did not meet
the guidelines’ requirements for departures based on aberrant behavior, and that
any evidence of community support was not sufficient to warrant a departure.
United States v. Andrews, 353 F.3d 1154, 1155 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Andrews I”).
A panel of this court agreed, and reversed and remanded with instructions to
impose a sentence within the guidelines range. Id. That decision applied the de
novo standard of review established by the PROTECT Act. See Prosecutorial
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(“PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. On remand, the district
court stated that Andrews I “says to sentence him within the guideline range. I
think that pretty much forecloses anything that I can do outside the guideline
range.” The court also stated:
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Mr. Andrews, I regret that I do not see anything that I can really do to
assist you. Right now I’m giving you, I think, every break that I can, but as
you know . . . we get an instruction like this back from the Court of
Appeals . . . they gave me pretty clear directions in terms of what I’m to do
in your case. . . . Obviously if things change down the road, I certainly
would not be at all unhappy to see you back in here again, see what we can
do for you.
The court then sentenced Andrews to 151 months in prison, the lowest possible
sentence within the guidelines range.
Andrews now appeals his new sentence and argues that by applying the
PROTECT Act’s de novo standard of review, this court’s prior judgment violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Andrews also submitted an unopposed motion to file a
supplemental opening brief addressing the impact of Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004), to his sentence. At the request of this court, the parties have
since submitted supplemental briefing on the application of Booker to Andrews’
sentence.
The government moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that this
court cannot provide relief on the Ex Post Facto claim, and therefore that the case
is moot. 1 However, Andrews also presents claims under Booker. The Supreme
1
Andrews suggests that the government’s motion be dismissed as untimely
because it was not filed within the 15-day time period required by 10th Cir. R.
27.2(a)(3). Dismissing the motion would be inappropriate because it presents
jurisdictional issues. Even if the filing was untimely, we may not ignore
challenges to our jurisdiction. Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 981
n.3 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Court stated that Booker’s constitutional and non-constitutional holdings apply
“to all cases on direct review.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 268. Andrews’ appeal was
on direct review at the time Booker was published. Thus, his case is not moot and
we have jurisdiction under Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
Andrews raises three issues on appeal. He asserts that this court
improperly applied the PROTECT Act’s de novo standard of review in the
previous appeal, that application of the career offender enhancement violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that the district court
committed reversible constitutional and non-constitutional Booker error at his
second sentencing hearing.
A
While Andrews’ first appeal was pending before this court, Congress
passed the PROTECT Act, changing the standard of review for sentencing
decisions from an abuse of discretion standard to de novo review. Pub. L. No.
108-21, 117 Stat. 650. Andrews argues that because his appeal was pending when
the Act was passed, application of the de novo standard violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
An Ex Post Facto violation occurs only when a law “retroactively alter[s]
the definition of crimes or increase[s] the punishment for criminal acts.”
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Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir. 2005). In general,
congressional enactments do not have retroactive effect unless the statutory
language requires this result. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264
(1994). However, changes in procedural rules may often be applied to suits
arising before their enactment without raising retroactivity concerns. Id. at 275.
Changes in such rules may be characterized as procedural rather than substantive
if they do not “increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the offence
or the ultimate acts necessary to establish guilt.” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,
433 (1987) (internal quotation omitted).
Every court that has addressed this issue has applied the de novo standard
of review to cases where the defendant’s appeal was pending at the time the
PROTECT Act was passed. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 71-
72 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Bell, 351 F.3d 672, 674-75 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Willey, 350 F.3d 736, 738-39 (8th Cir. 2003). Two courts have
specifically held that application of the PROTECT Act does not implicate the Ex
Post Facto Clause because the Act made only a procedural, and not a substantive,
change in the law. United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 764 n.4 (4th Cir.
2003); United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2003). We see no
reason to disagree with these holdings. Andrews suffered no Ex Post Facto
violation by application of the de novo standard of review.
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Andrews also claims that even if application of the PROTECT Act’s
standard of review does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause, it should not be
applied in his case. In Bell, the Fifth Circuit held that “if a district court departs
based on a factor that . . . advance[s] the objectives set forth in [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a)(2),” the PROTECT Act’s standard of review is not triggered and courts
should revert to an abuse of discretion standard. Bell, 351 F.3d at 676. Andrews
asks that we invoke the reasoning in Bell and review for abuse of discretion.
Even if we agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, Booker prevents us from
following Bell’s dictates. As we noted in United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886,
912 (10th Cir. 2005), Booker excised the PROTECT Act’s provision requiring
courts to review sentences de novo, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and “its
narrow prescription for when departures are warranted.” Instead, this court must
review sentences for “unreasonableness.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
B
Andrews claims that the career offender enhancement imposed pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected double jeopardy challenges to
recidivism statutes, stating that “the enhanced punishment imposed for the later
offense is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the
earlier crimes but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is
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considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.” Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (quotation omitted); see also United States v.
Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating double jeopardy is not
implicated when fact of a prior conviction is used in sentencing). Consideration
of prior crimes under the sentencing guidelines does not change this analysis, as
“[a] defendant has not been ‘punished’ . . . for double jeopardy purposes when
relevant conduct is included in the calculation of his offense level under the
Guidelines.” Witte, 515 U.S. at 402. Because the career offender enhancement
merely increases Andrews’ penalty for his current crime, it does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
Moreover, “where the legislature has authorized . . . a particular
punishment range for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range
constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the
double jeopardy inquiry.” Id. at 403-04. The bank robbery statute at issue
authorizes a sentence of not more than twenty years. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
Andrews’ sentence of 151 months was within the statutory range sanctioned by
Congress. Thus, application of the career offender enhancement did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C
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In his final claim, Andrews argues that the district court committed both
reversible constitutional and non-constitutional error at his resentencing hearing.
See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2005).
His claim that the district court committed constitutional Booker error by
applying the career offender sentence enhancement based on facts not found by a
jury has no merit. This enhancement applies when a defendant is convicted of a
crime of violence and has at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of
violence. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Andrews argues that he did not admit to any prior
convictions, and that he did not admit that these crimes were “crimes of violence”
for the purposes of § 4B1.1. In United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.
2005), we held that neither the fact of a prior conviction nor its characterization
as a “violent felony” need be proven to a jury or admitted by a defendant. As
such, we hold that the district court did not commit constitutional Booker error by
applying the § 4B1.1 enhancement.
Andrews’ sentence does suffer from non-constitutional error. Such error
occurs when a district court applies the guidelines in a mandatory fashion.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731. Because Andrews did not object to mandatory
application of the guidelines at the initial sentencing hearing, we review for plain
error. Id. at 732. To establish plain error, a defendant must show that the district
court “(1) committed error, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the plain error
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affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174
(10th Cir. 2005). If plain error occurred, this court has discretion to correct that
error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id.
On resentencing, the district court committed non-constitutional error by
treating the guidelines as mandatory. Moreover, that error is plain as it is “clear
or obvious at the time of the appeal.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732. Thus,
Andrews meets the first two prongs of the plain error standard.
To establish that his substantial rights were affected, Andrews must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 733. A defendant may meet
this standard by establishing “a reasonable probability that, under the specific
facts of his case as analyzed under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
the district court judge would reasonably impose a sentence outside the
Guidelines range.” Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175.
There can be no stronger evidence that the result of the sentencing hearing
would have been different than the fact that the district court tried to impose a
lower sentence, was reversed by this court, and expressed dismay at having to
impose a mandatory guidelines sentence. Further, when viewed in light of
Booker, the district court’s decision to impose a sentence outside the guidelines
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range was not unreasonable. In Andrews I, we reversed the district court’s
decision to depart downward for reasons of aberrant behavior and community ties.
Our decision was based on a determination that Andrews did not qualify for an
aberrant behavior departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20 and that his community ties
were not so exceptional that a downward departure was warranted. Andrews I,
353 F.3d at 1157, 1158. Our decision that Andrews’ community ties were not
sufficiently exceptional to justify a downward departure was based in part on the
fact that community support is a discouraged factor to be relied on only if the
district court finds it “is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case
from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the guidelines.” Andrews I at 1156
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0). That decision was issued pre-Booker. “After
Booker, district courts now have more discretion to tailor sentences to the
individual circumstances of a defendant.” 2 United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas,
405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2005). While the guidelines discourage
consideration of certain factors for downward departures, Booker frees courts to
consider those factors as part of their analysis under § 3553(a). Booker, 543 U.S.
2
Without basing our decision on this fact, we also note that the current
version of the sentencing guidelines no longer discourages consideration of
community ties for defendants in Andrews’ situation. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6.
However, on resentencing a district court must look to the version of the
sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of his first sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(g)(1).
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at 246 (district court is required “to consider Guidelines ranges” but is permitted
to “tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well”). 3
When the district court granted the initial downward departure, it
considered factors similar to those in § 3553(a). Specifically, the court addressed
the history and characteristics of the defendant – both his significant criminal
history and his efforts to integrate himself into the community, to provide service
to his family by caring for a handicapped nephew and to mentor local youth by
discussing his own childhood experiences. Because the district court already
imposed a sentence outside the guidelines range, Andrews has easily
demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would receive a lower sentence on
remand. Given the discretion that Booker provides to the district court to
consider under § 3553(a) factors previously discouraged by the sentencing
guidelines, we cannot say that a district court would be unreasonable in imposing
a lower sentence in this case.
3
Other circuits have instructed district courts to consider circumstances
which the guidelines deem disfavored factors for downward departures. See
United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 83 (1st Cir. 2005) (defendant may
present claim that lower sentence was appropriate based on his position as
caretaker for a brain damaged son); United States v. Haidley, 400 F.3d 642, 645
(8th Cir. 2005) (family circumstances, including two young children at home, may
be considered under § 3553(a)); United States v. Spigner, 416 F.3d 708, 711-13,
n.1 (8th Cir. 2005) (remanding for consideration of defendant’s medical needs as
required by § 3553(a)).
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Under the fourth prong of the plain error test, this court may provide relief
to Andrews only if he demonstrates that the error “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1178.
The standard for meeting this fourth prong is “demanding,” id. at 737, and will be
satisfied only when a defendant can “establish[] the error is particularly egregious
and that our failure to correct it would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
Thomas, 410 F.3d at 1249 (internal quotation omitted).
In this unusual case, the error is egregious and our failure to correct it
would result in a miscarriage of justice. The court below imposed a significantly
higher sentence on remand under a direct order from this court to stay within the
then-mandatory guidelines. Those same guidelines are now discretionary. While
non-constitutional error is “‘error’ only in the sense that [it] violate[s] the
remedial reconstruction of the Sentencing Reform Act performed by the Booker
Court,” Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1174, this is the rare case where that error must be
remedied. When a court exercises its judgment that a downward departure is
appropriate, changes that decision only on a direct order from this court to
sentence within the then-mandatory guidelines, and analysis of the § 3553(a)
factors indicates that a lower sentence is not unreasonable under the new
sentencing regime, our failure to permit the court to exercise the reasonable
discretion it now has is unwarranted.
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When determining whether the fourth prong is met, this court looks to
several non-exclusive factors, including:
a showing that the district court would likely impose a significantly lighter
sentence on remand, a substantial lack of evidence to support the sentence
the Guidelines required the district court to impose, and/or a showing that
objective consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors warrants a
departure from the sentence suggested by the Guidelines.
Thomas, 410 F.3d at 1249. The presence of the first factor takes precedence, as
“the key concern [when reviewing sentencing decisions for plain error] has been
whether correct application of the sentencing laws would likely significantly
reduce the length of the sentence.” United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1161
(10th Cir. 2003). We have repeatedly held that where a defendant demonstrates a
strong possibility of receiving a significantly lower sentence, the fourth prong is
met. See United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2005)
(fourth prong satisfied when court stated its dissatisfaction with duration of
sentence); United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2005)
(district court stated displeasure with mandatory sentence and analysis of
§ 3553(a) indicated lower sentence was appropriate). Andrews’ initial sentence
was 120 months; on remand he was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The
difference between these two sentences is significant. To permit such a sentence
– imposed in error on the order of this court – would be a miscarriage of justice.
III
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Because Andrews has demonstrated that it was plain error for the court to
sentence him under a mandatory application of the guidelines, we REVERSE the
district court’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
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