F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 24, 2006
PU BL ISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U TA H ASSO CIA TIO N O F
COUNTIES, on behalf of its members,
Plaintiff,
M O U N TAIN STA TES LEG A L
FOUNDATION, on behalf of its
members,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GEORGE W . BUSH , in his official
capacity as President of the United
States, UN ITED STA TES O F
AM ERICA , JAM ES L.
CONNAUGHTON, in his official No. 04-4132
capacity as Chair of the Council on
Environmental Quality, GA LE
NORTON, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Interior, and
KATHLEEN CLARKE, Director of
the Bureau of Land M anagement,
Defendants-Appellees,
SOUTH ERN UTA H W ILD ERNESS
ALLIANCE, TH E W ILD ERNESS
SO CIETY , G RA N D CA N Y O N
TR UST, ESC ALA N TE C AN Y ON
OUTFITTERS, ESCALANTE’S
GRAND STAIRCASE B& B INN, and
BO ULD ER M OU NTA IN LO DG E,
Defendants-Intervenors-
Appellees,
-------------------------
STA TE O F U TA H ,
Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. Nos. 2:97-CV-479 and 2:97-CV-863)
Jayme Ritchie (W illiam Perry Pendley and S. Amanda Koehler, with her on the
briefs), M ountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Todd S. Kim, United States Department of Justice, W ashington, D.C. (Thomas L.
Sansonetti, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M . W arner, United States Attorney
and Carlie Christensen, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Utah,
M ichael A. Gheleta and Ellen Durkee, Attorneys, United States Department of
Justice, W ashington, D.C., with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Stephen H.M . Bloch, Southern Utah W ilderness Alliance, Salt Lake City, Utah
(Heidi J. M cIntosh, Southern Utah W ilderness Alliance, Salt Lake City, Utah,
Richard A. Duncan, Craig S. Coleman and Sarah I. W heelock, Faegre & Benson,
M inneapolis, M innesota, with him on the brief), for Defendants-Intervenors-
Appellees.
J. M ark W ard, Assistant Attorney General and M ark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney
General, filed a brief for amicus curiae State of Utah on behalf of appellant.
Before KELLY, SE YM OU R, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
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EBEL, Circuit Judge.
In this case, M ountain States Legal Foundation (“M SLF”) challenges the
legality of the 1996 creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National M onument
in southern Utah. Because we conclude that M SLF lacked standing to bring this
claim, we dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The M onument
On September 18, 1996, in the midst of his 1996 re-election campaign,
President Clinton issued a Presidential Proclamation establishing the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National M onument (the “M onument”), a set-aside of
approximately 1.7 million acres of federal land in southern Utah. See
Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 18, 1996). The Proclamation
described the M onument area as a “geologic treasure” and an “outstanding
biological resource” that includes “world class paleontological sites” and is “rich
in human history.” Id. at 50,223–224. Among the items to be protected in the
M onument are “arches and natural bridges”; “remarkable specimens of petrified
wood”; numerous types of “[e]xtremely significant fossils”; ancient Native
American “rock art” and occupation sites; “trails, inscriptions, [and] ghost tow ns”
from M ormon pioneers; “[f]ragile cryptobiotic crusts”; and “[o]ver 200 species of
birds, including bald eagles and peregrine falcons.” Id. at 50,223–225.
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The proclamation claimed the authority to establish the M onument based on
the A ntiquities Act of 1906 (“Antiquities Act”), which provides:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest
that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government
of the United States to be national monuments, and m ay reserve as a
part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected.
Antiquities Act of 1906 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000); see Proclamation No. 6920,
61 Fed. Reg. at 50,225 (the President’s declaration that the M onument is set aside
“by the authority vested in me by section 2 of the [Antiquities Act]”).
Establishment of the M onument generated intense criticism, including in
some Congressional circles. Notably, the majority staff of the House Committee
on Resources produced two reports critical of President Clinton’s decision. See
“Behind Closed Doors: The Abuse of Trust and Discretion in the Establishment of
the G rand Staircase-Escalante N ational M onument.” H .R. Rep. No. 105-D
(Comm. Print 1997); “M onumental Abuse: The Clinton Administration’s
Campaign of M isinformation in the Establishment of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National M onument.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-824 (Comm. Print
1998). 1
1
The view expressed in M onumental Abuse was not unanimous; the
minority Democratic Party members of the Committee on Resources issued a
(continued...)
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Despite these and other criticisms of the M onument, since 1996 Congress
has passed several pieces of legislation that relate to the M onument. For
example, in the Automobile National Heritage Area Act, Pub. L. No. 105-355,
112 Stat. 3247 (1998), Congress modified the boundaries of the M onument to
exclude certain Utah towns and to take in the “East Clark Bench” area. Id.
§§ 201–02. Congress has also appropriated funds both for acquiring mineral
rights within the M onument, see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, app. C, § 601, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999), and for construction and the
development of programs at the M onument. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 106-99, at
14–15 (1999); S. Rep. No. 105-227, at 10, 13–14 (1998); H.R. Rep. No. 105-609,
at 12 (1998).
B. Procedural Background
In June 1997, about nine months after the M onument was established, the
Utah Association of Counties (“UAC”) and the Utah Schools and Institutional
Trust Lands Administration (“SITLA”) each filed a complaint in Utah federal
district court asserting that the creation of the M onument was illegal. See Utah
Ass’n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (D. Utah 2004). The
1
(...continued)
rebuttal response, supporting President Clinton’s action. Dissenting Views: Staff
Report on Grand Staircase-Escalante N M , at 1–3 (Oct. 9, 1998).
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Appellant in this case, M SLF, filed a similar complaint in November 1997. 2 Id.
The complaints named as defendants the President, the United States, and several
federal officials and agencies (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiffs
challenged the creation of the M onument on numerous grounds, claiming that:
(1) the Antiquities Act is unconstitutional because it violates the delegation
doctrine; (2) in designating the M onument, President Clinton acted ultra vires and
in violation of the Property and Spending Clauses of the United States
Constitution; (3) President Clinton violated the Antiquities A ct by failing to
designate “objects of historic or scientific interest” and failing to confine the
M onument “to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management
of the objects to be protected”; (4) President Clinton violated the W ilderness Act
by creating de facto wilderness, a power reserved to Congress; (5) President
C linton violated Executive O rder 10355, which requires that land be withdrawn
by the Secretary of the Interior, not the President; and (6) the Defendants violated
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Land Policy and M anagement
Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the Anti-Deficiency Act in the
creation of the M onument. See id. at 1176–77. Given the relatedness of the
complaints, the actions by UAC, SITLA, and M SLF w ere soon consolidated;
2
The M SLF describes itself as “a voluntary, non-profit, public interest
corporation . . . [that] is dedicated to individual liberty, the right to own and use
property, limited government, and the free enterprise system.”
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however, SITLA eventually reached a settlement with Defendants and was
dismissed as a plaintiff. See id. at 1176; The Utah Schools and Land Exchange
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-335, 112 Stat. 3139 (1998) (Congress’s ratification
of the settlement). In a prior related appeal, we allowed several environmental
groups and businesses located near the M onument to intervene as defendants in
the consolidated action. See Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246,
1256 (10th Cir. 2001).
In July 1998, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for
summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Utah Ass’n of Counties, 316 F. Supp. 2d at
1177. Specifically, Defendants claimed that the case was not ripe, that the court
had no judicial authority to review the President’s action, and that M SLF lacked
standing to challenge the M onument. Id. Both remaining plaintiffs (UAC and
M SLF) opposed Defendants’ motion and filed their ow n motions for sum mary
judgment. Id.
In an April 19, 2004 order, the district court granted summary judgment for
Defendants and denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motions. Id. at
1200–01. As for Defendants’ claim that M SLF lacked standing, the court stated:
the United States concedes that UA C has standing, but insists M SLF
does not. . . . Given th[e] relatively light burden [to show standing] at
the present stage of the instant case and recognizing that many of the
claims of UAC and M SLF are identical or similar, and in the interest of
judicial economy the Court will not further address the standing
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question in this Opinion. W hile not expressly finding that M SL F has
standing to sue, the Court will address all of the parties’ claims,
including those advanced solely by M SLF.
Id. at 1185 n.6. Proceeding to the merits, the district court rejected all of U AC’s
and M SLF’s challenges to the creation of the M onument. Id. at 1190–1200.
M SLF timely filed a notice of appeal; however, UAC — the only other
remaining plaintiff — did not appeal the district court’s decision.
II. D ISC USSIO N
On appeal, M SLF asserts both that it had standing to bring its challenge and
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on the
merits of its claims. 3 W e conclude that M SLF lacked standing to bring its action;
therefore, we need not address its arguments on the merits. 4
3
Although the plaintiffs’ complaints asserted numerous challenges, on
appeal M SLF challenges only the district court’s conclusion that the M onument
designation did not violate the Antiquities A ct or the W ilderness Act.
4
W e note, however, that we have various other concerns w ith M SLF’s
claims. For example, the cause of action on which M SLF relies is not clear from
its briefs. At oral argument, counsel for M SLF asserted for the first time that
M SLF was relying on an implied private right of action under the Antiquities Act.
Given our conclusion on standing, we need not decide whether such a right of
action exists, although we note the strict standard established by the Supreme
Court for implying rights of action. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,
290 (2002) (stating that Congress must provide for an implied right of action “in
clear and unambiguous terms”); id. at 286 (“[W]here the text and structure of a
statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual
rights, there is no basis for a private suit . . . under an implied right of action.”).
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A. Necessity of a Standing Analysis
Because the Defendants conceded below that UAC had standing, the district
court declined “in the interest of judicial economy” to address the question of
M SLF’s standing. Id. at 1185 n.6. Nevertheless, M SLF’s standing is a critical
issue in this appeal because only M SLF has appealed the district court decision.
The requirement that a plaintiff have standing “is grounded in Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, which restricts federal court adjudication to actual cases or
controversies.” Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998); see also
San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Article
III of the Constitution limits the power of federal courts to deciding ‘cases’ and
‘controversies.’ Standing to sue . . . is an aspect of the case-or-controversy
requirement.”) (quotations, citations omitted). W e have noted that “[s]tanding to
invoke the power of the federal courts is not a mere technical hoop through which
every plaintiff must pass, but rather is ‘a part of the basic charter promulgated by
the Framers of the Constitution.’” Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 476 (1982)). W here, as here, a plaintiff challenges an action of the
President, proper evaluation of standing is particularly important. See id.
(“Because Plaintiffs have invoked Article III jurisdiction to challenge the conduct
of the executive branch of government, the necessity of a case or controversy is
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of particular import.”). W e therefore must address whether M SLF had standing to
bring its claims against Defendants.
B. M SLF’s Standing
As w e recently noted, “[s]tanding is determined as of the time the action is
brought.” Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TO C), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 180 (2000) (“[W]e have an obligation to assure ourselves that [plaintiff] had
Article III standing at the outset of the litigation.”); Focus on the Family v.
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Article
III standing must be determined as of the time at which the plaintiff’s complaint
is filed.”); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“As w ith all questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.”)). Therefore, we must
evaluate M SLF’s standing as of the time it filed its complaint.
1. Associational standing
M SLF is relying on the doctrine of associational standing in this case and is
not asserting separate independent injury to itself. Thus, because M SLF is an
association bringing suit on behalf of its members, it could only have standing if
“(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
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individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. W ash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1977). A lthough this quotation refers to “members,”
plural, if even one member of the association would have had standing to sue in
his or her own right, that is sufficient. See W arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511
(1975) (“The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action.”)
(emphasis added).
2. Individual standing
In evaluating whether the first prong of associational standing has been
met, we ask whether any member of M SLF would have had standing individually
to bring these claims. The requirements for an individual to have standing in
federal court are threefold.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” – an invasion
of a legally protected interest that is both (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
there must be a causal connection between that injury and the
challenged action of the defendant – the injury m ust be “fairly
traceable” to the defendant, and not the result of the independent action
of some third party. Finally, it must be likely, not merely speculative,
that a favorable judgment w ill redress the plaintiff’s injury.
Nova H ealth Sys., 416 F.3d at 1154 (internal citations omitted). W e therefore
must evaluate w hether any individual M SLF members, at the time M SLF filed its
complaint, see id., had suffered a redressible injury caused by Defendants.
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3. Burden of proof
The party asserting jurisdiction — here, M SLF — has the burden of
establishing the elements of standing. Id. (“As the party seeking to invoke federal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff . . . has the burden of establishing each of the[] three
elements of Article III standing.”). Because standing was challenged in a motion
that was alternatively designated as a motion for summary judgment, M SLF “must
‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of
the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Lujan v. Defenders of
W ildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal citation omitted); see also Nova
Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1154 (“At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts that, if taken as true,
establish each of the[] elements [of standing].”); Cf. United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 743 (1995) (“W e have . . . made clear that it is the burden of the party
who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor clearly to allege facts
demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the
dispute. A nd when a case has proceeded to final judgment after a trial, as this
case has, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial to avoid dismissal on standing grounds.”) (quotations,
citations omitted). M oreover, M SLF concedes on appeal that standing in this case
should now be evaluated under summary judgment standards because it
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acknowledged it is required to “demonstrate specific facts necessary to support
the claim of injury.”
4. Analysis
a. Affidavit of Don W ood
M SLF claims that it has established the “specific facts” necessary to show
individual standing through an M SLF member — specifically, Don W ood. It
points to the affidavit of M r. W ood, which states that he is a member of M SLF
and that his business, Southwest Stone, mined alabaster from mines on what is
now M onument land for nearly 20 years. Approximately sixty to seventy percent
of Southwest Stone’s alabaster sales came from three such mines. In 1998, the
Bureau of Land M anagement voided Southwest Stone’s three mining claims for
failure to comply with annual filing requirements. Because the M onument had
been established in the area two years earlier, Southwest Stone was unable to
refile its mining claims, the loss of which put Southwest Stone out of business in
1999. M r. W ood maintains in his affidavit that “[b]ut for the creation of the
M onument,” he and his business partner “would simply have refiled the claims
and preserved our business.” M SLF argues that this inability to refile the mining
claims by M r. W ood is the injury-in-fact and that “M r. W ood owes the loss of his
entire business and livelihood to the designation of the M onument.” 5
5
W e note that the voiding of M r. W ood’s m ining claims, although clearly
(continued...)
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b. Timing problem
There is a glaring problem with M SLF’s reliance on this alleged injury to
M r. W ood, even taking all of the facts alleged in his affidavit as true, Nova
Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1154. M SLF’s Complaint in this action was filed on
November 5, 1997, and its Amended Complaint w as filed on December 15, 1997.
M r. W ood’s mining claims, however, were not voided until 1998. Thus, M r.
W ood’s alleged injury — the inability to refile his three voided mining claims —
could not have occurred until after the “time th[is] action [wa]s brought.” Nova
Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1154. Because standing is determined as of the time of
the filing of the complaint, M r. W ood’s alleged injury cannot serve as a basis for
M SLF’s standing in this case. 6
5
(...continued)
injurious to his business, could not be used to establish standing because it was
not caused by Defendants’ actions in designating the M onument, but by M r.
W ood’s failure to comply with filing requirements. Cf. United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 107 (1985) (“The[] property loss was one appellees could have
avoided with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time--not the action of
Congress--that caused the property right to be extinguished.”).
6
Dismissal based on a statute of limitation can occur w here the complaint is
filed too long after the injury occurs. H ere, we are presented with the opposite
situation: M SLF filed its complaint before the asserted injury on which it attempts
to rely occurred. Although this basis for dismissal is arguably a peculiar one,
especially if M r. W ood’s loss was an otherwise sufficient injury-in-fact (an issue
we do not address), the peculiarity is due solely to M SLF’s post hoc reliance on
an injury that had not even occurred when M SLF filed its complaint. M r. W ood’s
loss simply could not have been part of the “legal harm” alleged in M SLF’s
complaint because it had not yet happened.
W e note that in its reply brief, M SLF argues that “M r. W ood was ‘injured’
(continued...)
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c. Conclusion
Because M SLF relies solely on M r. W ood’s declaration for the “specific
facts” necessary to support its standing allegations, 7 our conclusion that M r.
W ood’s affidavit does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact “as of the time the action
[wa]s brought” means that M SLF has not met its burden of establishing
constitutional standing to bring this action. 8
III. C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, we DISM ISS this appeal on the ground that
M SLF has not met its burden of establishing the elements of standing.
6
(...continued)
because he was deprived of his statutory right to enter upon and locate additional
mining claims within the lands withdrawn by designation of the M onument.”
Because the inability to locate new mines happened at the time the M onument
was created, this alleged injury would not seem to suffer from the same timing
problem as M r. W ood’s inability to refile his voided claims. However, we
decline to address this issue since it w as raised for the first time in a reply brief.
Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000). In any event, this claim is
not supported by the evidence.
7
Although M SLF states that the experience of M r. W ood is “but one
poignant example of the injuries suffered by M SLF members in the M onument
area and throughout Utah and the Southwest as a result of the M onument
designation,” it gives no other specifics of those injuries and we have found none
in the record.
8
Because we conclude that M SLF has not established an injury, we need not
address the second and third prongs of individual standing (causation and
redressibility). And, because M SLF has not shown “specific facts” establishing
that any of its members would have standing to bring this action, we need not
address the second and third prongs of associational standing.
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