F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
January 30, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN DOBBS; NAOMI DOBBS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 05-1319
ANTHEM BLUE CROSS & BLUE
SHIELD, a Colorado Insurance Company,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 04-CV-2283 LTB)
Shawn D. Mitchell, Broomfield, Colorado, appearing for Appellants.
John R. Mann (Dean A. McConnell and Tatiana Taylor, on the briefs), Kennedy Childs &
Fogg, P.C., Denver, Colorado, appearing for Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Steven and Naomi Dobbs appeal from the District Court’s
order dismissing their state-law claims against Defendant-Appellee Anthem Blue Cross
and Blue Shield (“Anthem”). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we vacate the District Court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. and Mrs. Dobbs are beneficiaries of a group health insurance policy sold and
underwritten by Anthem and purchased through Mr. Dobbs’ employer, the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe. They originally filed suit against Anthem in Colorado state court, asserting
five state-law causes of action. Invoking federal question jurisdiction, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1441 & 1446, Anthem subsequently removed the case to federal district court on the
ground that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461, preempts the Dobbses’ state-law claims.
After removal, Anthem requested that the District Court dismiss all claims based
on ERISA preemption. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144. The Dobbses argued that ERISA does not
preempt their state-law claims because the statute does not apply to employee benefit
plans established or maintained by tribes for their employees. The District Court
concluded that ERISA does apply to plans established or maintained by a tribe and
therefore granted Anthem’s motion in part, dismissing all but one of the Dobbses’ claims.
After Anthem moved for reconsideration of the court’s refusal to dismiss the final claim,
the court entered an order dismissing this claim as preempted by ERISA as well. The
Dobbses now appeal the District Court’s dismissal of all claims, arguing that their state-
law claims against Anthem are not preempted by federal law.
-2-
II. DISCUSSION
Whether federal law preempts the Dobbses’ state-law claims is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Garley v. Sandia Corp., 236 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir.
2001); see also Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Servs., 28 F.3d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir.
1994). In addition, we review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a legally cognizable claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Garley, 236 F.3d
at 1206.
The threshold question in this case is whether federal or state law applies to an
employee benefit plan established and maintained by a tribe for the benefit of its
employees. If federal law applies, the next question is whether it preempts the state-law
causes of action in this case. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (specifying that ERISA provisions
“supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan”).1 We do not reach the second issue concerning preemption
because we remand the case so that the District Court can consider the first question in
light of a recent change in federal law.
In deciding that ERISA applies to employee benefit plans established by tribes, the
district court reasoned that a plan established by a tribe is not exempt from ERISA
coverage as a “governmental plan” under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). Under § 1003(b)(1)
and § 1144(a), ERISA’s provisions do not preempt state laws that relate to governmental
1
Neither party disputes the District Court’s determination that the benefit plan at
issue in this case meets ERISA’s definition of an “employee welfare benefit plan” under
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
-3-
plans. At the time of the District Court’s decision, the definition of governmental plan
under ERISA included plans established or maintained by federal and state governments,
but did not explicitly include tribal governments. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(32), 88
Stat. 829, 837 (1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)). In August 2006, after the
District Court entered its order, Congress amended the definition of governmental plan
under ERISA to include plans established and maintained by tribes. The amended
definition expressly includes some benefit plans established and maintained by tribes:
The term “governmental plan” includes a plan which is established and
maintained by an Indian tribal government (as defined in section
7701(a)(40) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), a subdivision of an
Indian tribal government (determined in accordance with section 7871(d) of
such Code), or an agency or instrumentality of either, and all of the
participants of which are employees of such entity substantially all of
whose services as such an employee are in the performance of essential
governmental functions but not in the performance of commercial activities
(whether or not an essential government function).
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280,§ 906(a)(2)(A), 120 Stat. 780
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)).
The amendment’s legislative history suggests that Congress expanded the
definition to clarify the legal ambiguity regarding the status of employee benefit plans
established and maintained by tribal governments. See 150 Cong. Rec. S9526, 9533
(describing the senate bill as a “bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify that federally recognized
Indian tribal governments are to be regulated under the same government employer rules
-4-
and procedures that apply to Federal, State, and other local government employers with
regard to the establishment and maintenance of employee benefit plans”). Prior to the
amendment, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that ERISA applies to plans established
and maintained by tribes. Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods.
Indus., 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1991); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.
1989). The new definition of governmental plan undercuts the courts’ reasoning, but not
necessarily their conclusions, in these two cases. Because the amended provision makes
a distinction between “essential governmental functions” and “commercial activities,” not
all plans established and maintained by tribes will fall under the governmental plan
exemption. The determination of whether a tribal plan qualifies as a governmental plan
under § 1002(32) requires a fact-specific analysis of the plan at issue and the nature of its
participants’ activities.
Based on the Dobbses’ complaint, we do not have enough information to
determine whether the benefit plan meets the requirements of § 1002(32) and therefore
remand the case to the District Court for consideration in light of the amended definition.2
See Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1990) (remanding case to district
court for further proceedings under federal statute enacted while appeal was pending). If
the Dobbses’ benefit plan meets the new definition of governmental plan under
2
We need not rule on the Dobbses’ motion for leave to file a corrected reply brief.
Although the Dobbses filed their motion and corrected reply brief after the change in law
in August, the corrected brief contains the same legal arguments as the deficient brief
filed in March. Consequently, the reply brief would not assist this panel in reaching a
decision regarding the effect of the amended statute on the present case.
-5-
§ 1002(32), ERISA will not preempt their state-law causes of action against Anthem.
One final note to the parties: Congress passed the Pension Protection Act, which
amended ERISA’s governmental plan definition, while this appeal was pending, but
before oral argument in this case. Although more than three months have passed since
Congress passed the Act, neither party has filed a notice of supplemental authority under
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) to inform the panel of this change in law. Although notice is not
required under Rule 28(j), good advocates nevertheless file such notice out of respect for
this Court and a commitment to resolving disputes in an expeditious manner. Particularly
when a legal development is controlling, as it is here, we admonish counsel to bring the
relevant authority to the Court’s attention.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the amended definition of “governmental plan” under ERISA, we
VACATE the District Court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Appellants’ motion to file a corrected Reply Brief is granted.
-6-