F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
April 23, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JUA N LU IS VALDEZ-SAN CH EZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 05-9506
ALBERTO GONZA LES,
United States A ttorney General,
Respondent.
A M ER ICAN IM M IG RA TIO N
LA W FO U N D ATIO N ,
Amicus Curiae.
PETITIO N FO R R EV IEW O F A N O RD ER OF TH E BO AR D O F
IM M IGR ATION APPEALS
(AG ENCY CASE NO . A74 440 141)
Chris Kozoll (Jeff Joseph with him on the brief), Joseph Law Firm, P.C., A urora,
Colorado, for Petitioner.
R. Alexander Goring, Attorney (David V . Bernal, Assistant Director and Jamie M .
Dowd, Trial Attorney, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
United States D epartment of Justice, W ashington D.C., for Respondent.
Trina A. Realmuto and Nadine K. W ettstein, American Immigration Law Foundation,
W ashington D.C., filed an Amicus Curiae brief in support of Petitioner.
Before O’BRIEN, B AL DOC K , and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
B ALDO C K , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Juan Luis Valdez-Sanchez seeks review of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)’s February 2005 order reinstating a 1993 order
removing him from the United States. The question presented in this appeal is
whether DHS’s application of § 241(a)(5) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) to reinstate a prior order of
removal against Petitioner was impermissibly retroactive. W e have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). W e hold that where Petitioner was ordered
excluded, reentered, married a United States citizen, and sought and was granted
an adjustment of status prior to the effective date of IIRIRA, DHS may not
retroactively apply § 241(a)(5) to reinstate a previous removal order. 1
1
Presently before us are two motions concerning the record on appeal. In
his supplemental brief, Petitioner attached a chart entitled “Review of Files,”
describing several documents he believes should have been included in the record.
Petitioner also attached several of the documents described in the “Review of
Files” chart. He asks the court to enter an order declaring the listed documents
part of the record. DHS does not oppose Petitioner’s motion to supplement the
record and, on December 27, 2006, supplemented the record with most, if not all,
the documents. DHS does, however, ask us to strike the“Review of Files” chart
attached to Petitioner’s supplemental brief. Because w e find the present record
adequate for our review, we deny both outstanding motions and proceed to the
merits.
2
I.
Petitioner, a native and citizen of M exico, was first deported from the
United States on M arch 25, 1993. Petitioner illegally reentered the United States
on M ay 8, 1993. He married a United States citizen in 1995. Petitioner’s new
wife filed an application for adjustment of status on his behalf with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now DHS. 2 INS granted the
application on February 11, 1997, making Petitioner a conditional lawful
permanent resident. As a prerequisite for removing the condition on Petitioner’s
permanent residence, INS required Petitioner and his wife to file an I-751 petition
confirming the continuation of their marriage and submitting to an interview
before February 11, 1999. Petitioner and his wife complied with the condition,
filing an I-751 joint petition to remove conditions on February 4, 1999.
IN S was slow to act on the petition and the requisite interview was delayed.
The record is unclear why the interview was delayed. INS finally scheduled an
interview on February 5, 2002. Before INS conducted the interview, Petitioner
and his wife divorced, prompting Petitioner to file an I-751 petition to remove the
condition on June 11, 2001, along with a request for waiver of the joint petition
requirement. On November 12, 2002, INS denied the I-751 petition due to
2
Effective M arch 1, 2003, the functions previously performed by the INS
were transferred to DHS. See Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1224 n.3 (10th
Cir. 2004). W e refer to the INS and DHS interchangeably.
3
“inadmissibilities”–namely, Petitioner’s return to the United States within one or
two months of being deported in 1993, and his alleged untruthfulness in his
application for adjustment of status. Consequently, INS instituted removal
proceedings.
On November 15, 2004, an immigration judge (IJ) held a hearing on
Petitioner’s “M otion to Terminate the Removal Proceedings and Restore
Permanent Resident Status.” Petitioner testified, and the court heard arguments
from counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ indicated he was “inclined”
to grant Petitioner’s M otion to Terminate. The IJ continued the hearing until
February 11, 2005, to allow DHS to present a witness and to obtain Petitioner’s
fingerprints.
On February 11, 2005, Petitioner again appeared before the IJ. At the
hearing, DHS also sought termination of the proceedings, stating Petitioner was
not properly before the court due to the prior removal. Although not entirely
clear from the record, DHS w as apparently operating under the assumption that
removal proceedings w ere unnecessary if Petitioner was subject to automatic
reinstatement of his 1993 removal order pursuant to IIRIRA § 241(a)(5). The IJ
terminated the proceedings, but did not state on what basis he was terminating
them. On the same day, DHS issued a “Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate
Prior Order” against Petitioner, pursuant to § 241(a)(5). On February 17, 2005,
DHS issued its reinstatement decision, reinstating Petitioner’s M arch 25, 1993
4
deportation order. Petitioner timely filed a petition for review of the
reinstatement order. 3
II.
Congress enacted the IIRIRA on September 30, 1996. The IIRIRA
amended several parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), including
provisions related to reinstatement orders of deportation for those who illegally
reenter the United States. Relevant to our discussion, IIRIRA § 241(a)(5), which
replaced INA § 242(f), 8 U .S.C. § 1252(f) (repealed 1996), reads:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United
States illegally after having been removed or having departed
voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is
reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened
or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief
under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). These changes became effective on April 1, 1997.
W hile the law for some time had provided for reinstatement of removal
orders, IIRIRA enlarged the class of aliens whose previous removal orders may be
reinstated after such aliens leave the United States and unlawfully return.
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2425 (2006). The IIRIRA
3
Petitioner originally filed a Petition for W rit of Habeas Corpus in district
court. Consistent with this court’s directive in Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390
F.3d 1158, 1162-64 (10th Cir. 2004), and the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(5), the district court transferred the case to this court. After the case was
transferred, Petitioner filed an A mended Petition for Review.
5
generally forecloses discretionary relief to aliens subject to such removal orders.
Id. Petitioner claims on appeal that DHS impermissibly applied § 241(a)(5) of
IIRIRA to reinstate his 1993 removal order. He claims his marriage to a United
States citizen, application for adjustment of status, and subsequent adjustment of
status, all before IIRIRA became effective, renders the Government’s application
of § 241(a)(5) impermissibly retroactive.
The retroactivity of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. Hem
v. M aurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2006). In deciding whether the D HS’s
application of § 241(a)(5) was impermissibly retroactive we are guided by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280
(1994). In Landgraf, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for
determining whether a statute applies retroactively. First, we ask whether
Congress expressed its intentions as to the temporal reach of the statute. Id. If
we cannot ascertain congressional intent, we move to the second step of the
Landgraf analysis and consider w hether the statute has a retroactive effect. Id. A
statutory provision has a “retroactive effect” when its application impairs rights a
party possessed when he acted, increases a party’s liability for past conduct, or
imposes new duties or new disabilities with respect to transactions already
completed. Id.; see also Hem, 458 F.3d at 1190-91. If application of the statute
creates a retroactive effect, “our traditional presumption teaches that it does not
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.” Id.
6
A.
The Supreme Court recently shed light on the Landgraf analysis as it
applies to § 241(a)(5). In Fernandez-Vargas, the Supreme Court addressed the
retroactive effect of IIRIRA. Petitioner Fernandez-Vargas was a M exican
national who, after being deported several times in the 1970s, illegally re-entered
the United States in 1982. After his reentry in 1982, Fernandez-Vargas started a
trucking business, fathered a son, and remained undetected for approximately
twenty years. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct at 2427. In 2001, Fernandez-Vargas
married his son’s mother who was a United States citizen. His new wife filed an
application to adjust her husband’s status to that of law ful permanent resident,
which apparently drew attention to his illegal presence in the United States. Id.
In 2003, the INS initiated proceedings under the new § 241(a)(5), and thus
reinstated Fernandez-Vargas’s 1981 deportation order. Id. Fernandez-Vargas
protested the application of the new law , arguing it would be impermissibly
retroactive as applied to him. According to Fernandez-Vargas, because his illegal
reentry was before IIRIRA’s effective date, he was entitled to the benefit of the
terms of the former reinstatement provision under which he would have been
allowed to apply for adjustment of status. Id. The Supreme Court rejected
Fernandez-Vargas’s claims. Applying the Landgraf analysis, the Supreme Court
concluded Congress had not expressly prescribed § 241(a)(5)’s proper temporal
reach. Id. The Court then considered Landgraf’s second step–whether
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application of § 241(a)(5) to Fernandez-Vargas w ould have an impermissible
retroactive effect. The Court concluded it would not, holding Fernandez-Vargas’s
illegal reentry did not trigger application of the new law . Rather, his choice to
continue his illegal presence, after illegal reentry and after the effective date of
the new law, subjected him to the new and less generous legal regime. Id. at
2432.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that an individual
like Petitioner before us may succeed in arguing against IIRIRA’s retroactivity.
The Court noted Fernandez-Vargas had ample time between the date Congress
passed IIRIRA, September 30, 1996, and its effective date, April 1, 1997, to seek
to change his status and thus end his exposure to the less favorable law. By way
of example, the Court explained, “he could have married the mother of his son
and applied for adjustment of status during that period, in which case he would at
least have a claim (about which we express no opinion) that proven reliance on
the old law should be honored by applying the presumption against retroactivity.”
Id. at 2433. These are precisely the steps Petitioner took in our case. Relying on
pre-IIRIRA law, Petitioner married a United States citizen, and applied for and
received an adjustment of status. W hen IIRIRA became effective, Petitioner,
unlike Fernandez-Vargas, was legally present in the United States as a conditional
permanent resident.
8
B.
Although the Supreme Court “express[ed] no opinion” about how it might
rule under our circumstances, three of our sister circuits have ruled on similar
facts that DHS may not use the new provisions of IIRIRA to reinstate deportation
orders for aliens who take certain steps to change their status prior to IIRIRA’s
enactment. 4 In Faiz-M ohammed v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799, 810 (7th Cir. 2005),
the Seventh Circuit ruled DHS’s use of IIRIRA to reinstate an alien’s 1988
removal order was impermissibly retroactive where the alien applied for
discretionary relief, i.e., adjustment of status, prior to IIRIRA’s enactment. The
court, consistent with Landgraf, first determined IIRIRA’s reinstatement
provision contains no clear indication of Congress’s intent regarding the
provision’s retroactive effect. Id. at 804. M oving to the second Landgraf inquiry,
the court determined that where application of IIRIRA § 241(a)(5) would affect
substantive relief previously available to the alien, retroactive application is
impermissible. The court explained:
4
Compare Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2002).
In Alvarez-Portillo, the Eighth Circuit held retroactive application of § 241(a)(5)
was unlawful where an alien illegally reentered the United States and married a
United States citizen prior to IIRIRA’s effective date. U nlike Petitioner in this
case, Alvarez-Portillo did not apply for adjustment of status until 2001, well after
IIRIRA’s effective date. Subsequently, in Gonzalez v. Chertoff, 454 F.3d 813,
818 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit recognized that “[t]o the extent” Alvarez-
Portillo is inconsistent with Fernandez-Vargas, it is overruled.
9
M r. Faiz-M ohammad both reentered the United States and applied for
adjustment of status prior to IIRIRA’s effective date. At the time
that he made his application, M r. Faiz-M ohamm ad, therefore, had the
right to have his adjustment of status adjudicated, including the
waivers of inadmissibility necessary to his application. Although he
had no guarantee of a favorable decision, the second step of Landgraf
does not address only the “taking away or impairing of vested
rights”; it also asks whether retroactive application would “create[] a
new obligation, impose[] a new duty, or attach[] a new disability.”
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. Section [241](a)(5) prevents aliens who
previously have been deported from applying for discretionary relief.
This change constitutes a “new disability” that did not exist prior to
IIRIRA’s passage. . . . Consequently, because § [241](a)(5) operates
to “impair rights [M r. Faiz-M ohammad] possessed when he acted,”
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, namely his ability to apply for
discretionary relief, § [241](a)(5) may not be applied retroactively to
M r. Faiz-M ohammad.
395 F.3d at 809-10.
Similarly, the First Circuit in A revalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.
2003), concluded IIRIRA § 241(a)(5) would have an unfair retroactive effect on
an alien who applied for legal permanent residence in M arch of 1996, over a year
prior to IIRIRA’s effective date. Notably, on her application for adjustment of
status, Arevalo falsely sw ore she had never been deported from the United States.
INS discovered the falsity and in January 2002, denied her application for
adjustment of status. Pursuant to § 241(a)(5), INS reinstated Arevalo’s previous
order of deportation. Id. at 6. The court noted that even though Arevalo’s
fabrication may “come back to haunt her,” “[d]iscarding her application [for legal
permanent residence] now would deprive her both of a right that she once had and
10
of the reasonable expectation that she would have the opportunity to convince the
Attorney General to grant her relief.” Id. at 15.
Finally, in Cisneros v. United States Attorney General, 381 F.3d 1277,
1284 (11th Cir. 2004), under circumstances most similar to our case, the court
held the retroactive application of § 241(a)(5) would attach a new disability to a
completed transaction. In that case, Cisnernos reentered the United States
illegally, married an American citizen, and applied for an adjustment of status
before IIRIRA’s effective date. INS adjusted Cisneros’s status to lawful
perm anent resident on a conditional basis, but later reversed course. INS
subsequently notified Cisneros he was ineligible for permanent resident status and
eventually reinstated Cisneros’s previous deportation order in accordance with §
241(a)(5). Id. at 1278. Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), 5 the court held retroactive application of § 241(a)(5) to
Cisneros would attach a new disability, i.e., the elimination of the possibility of
5
St. Cyr involved the retroactive application of IIRIRA § 304(b), the
portion of the statute withdrawing the possibility of discretionary relief for any
individual previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.” See 8 U.S.C. §
1229b. The Supreme Court held the elimination of discretionary relief by IIRIRA
had an impermissible retroactive effect on St. Cyr and other defendants who had
entered plea agreements before the amendment of that section by IIRIRA. The
Supreme Court reasoned “IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of
[discretionary] relief for people who entered into plea agreements with the
expectation that they would be eligible for such relief clearly attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” St Cyr, 533
U.S. at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
11
discretionary relief, to a completed transaction, i.e., Cisneros’s application for
discretionary relief. Id. at 1284.
C.
W e need not engage in a lengthy analysis to resolve this case. Suffice it to
say, we agree with our sister circuits that when application of IIRIRA § 241(a)(5)
disturbs an alien’s substantive rights or expectations, such as the substantive
relief available to the Petitioner in this case, DHS may not apply it retroactively.
Like the aliens in the cases from the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,
Petitioner applied for discretionary relief in the form of an adjustment of status
prior to IIRIRA’s enactment, relief that was available to him at the time. Section
241(a)(5) eliminates the possibility of such relief and thus, retroactive application
of § 241(a)(5) attached a new disability. See id. at 1283. The new disability
attached to a completed transaction because Petitioner had applied for relief prior
to IIRIRA’s enactment. W hen such a retroactive effect exists, Landgraf requires
us to apply our traditional presumption against retroactive application of the
statute. 511 U.S. at 280. Accordingly, we find DHS’s application of § 241(a)(5)
to reinstate Petitioner’s 1993 removal order constitutes an impermissible
retroactive application of the statute.
Because application of § 241(a)(5) revoked Petitioner’s eligibility to seek
relief after he had sought such relief and subjected him to automatic reinstatement
of his order of removal, we GR ANT the petition for review, VAC ATE the order
12
of removal, and R EM A N D for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 6
6
W e note Petitioner asks us to order him readmitted to the United States
w ith the status of law ful permanent resident. Despite Petitioner’s request, we
grant him no further relief. Consequently, we deny American Immigration Law
Foundation’s M otion for Leave to File Supplemental Post-Argument Brief as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner.
13