F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 12, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-1222
C ARLO S V A LEN ZU ELA ,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UN ITED STATES DISTRICT CO URT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 05-CR-00463-LTB)
M artha A. Paluch, Assistant Unites States Attorney (Troy A. Eid, United States
Attorney with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Lynn C. Hartfield, Assistant Federal Public Defendant (Raymond P. M oore,
Federal Public D efender with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for D efendant-
Appellant.
Before M CCO NNELL, BALDO CK , and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
B ALDO C K , Circuit Judge.
After a Greeley, Colorado police officer discovered a sawed-off shotgun in
Defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop, a grand jury indicted Defendant on one
count of possession of an unregistered saw ed-off shotgun in violation of 26 U .S.C .
§ 5861. Defendant moved to suppress the shotgun. According to Defendant, the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, or, in the alternative,
the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop by asking him questions outside
the scope of the traffic violation. The district court concluded the officer acted
reasonably throughout the course of the stop and denied Defendant’s motion to
suppress. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the
right to appeal the district court’s order. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Defendant
now appeals. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. W e review the
district court’s reasonableness determination de novo, see United States v. Rice, 483
F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir. 2007), and affirm.
I.
The parties stipulated to the all of the following facts: On October 8, 2005, at
approximately 11:59 p.m., Detective Shad Baxter of the Greeley, Colorado Police
Department observed a Lincoln Town Car traveling westbound in the left through
lane, directly ahead of his patrol car. B axter watched as the Lincoln crossed the
white painted lane divider into the right westbound through lane. The Lincoln
drifted approximately three to four feet into the right lane, and continued in this
m anner for several seconds before pulling back into the left lane. The driver of the
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Lincoln displayed no signal before crossing into the right lane or back into the
left lane.
D etective Baxter activated his emergency lights. Defendant pulled over and
stopped the Lincoln next to the curb. Detective Baxter w alked to the driver’s side
window. Inside the vehicle he saw four young males. Detective Baxter told
Defendant why he had stopped him, and asked him for his driver’s license,
registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant informed D etective Baxter he did not
have his driver’s license with him but identified himself by name. Defendant then
handed Detective Baxter a plastic sleeve with registration and insurance information
for the Lincoln.
Detective Baxter asked D efendant whether he would be willing to get out of
the car and speak with him . Defendant agreed, got out of the car, and walked with
Baxter to the rear of the Lincoln. Very shortly into their conversation, Detective
Baxter asked Defendant whether he or any of the others in the car had any type of
weapons or illegal items. Defendant answered by saying “not that I know of,” or
words to that effect. Detective Baxter then asked whether it would be “O.K.” to
search the vehicle for w eapons or any other illegal items. D efendant answ ered this
question by telling the detective a shotgun was in the back seat area. Detective
Baxter promptly handcuffed Defendant and placed him in the backseat of another
officer’s patrol car which had recently arrived as backup. To ensure everyone’s
safety, the detective removed the remaining occupants from the car and handcuffed
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them as w ell.
Detective Baxter then looked into the Lincoln through the rear window of the
driver’s side. On the floorboard behind the driver’s seat, the detective could see the
butt stock of a sawed-off shotgun, which was partially wrapped in a white t-shirt.
The firearm was situated so that the barrel-end of the shotgun was pointing toward
the front of the car, under the driver’s seat. Detective B axter retrieved the shotgun
and the indictment followed.
II.
A traffic stop is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, the propriety of
which w e measure under the standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998). W e consider
the detention as a whole, “and the touchstone of our inquiry is reasonableness.”
United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 776 (10th Cir. 2006). W e conduct a
tw o-step inquiry w hen determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop. First w e
ask w hether the officer’s action was justified at its inception. If so, we then ask
whether the resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified the stop in the first place. See United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132,
1136 (10th Cir. 2005). “The validity of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment
turns on whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular
motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment
regulations of the jurisdiction.” Id. at 1137 (internal quotations omitted). The
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government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the officer’s
suspicion. United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 1998). The
detention arising from a traffic stop does not become unreasonable merely because
the officer asks questions unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop, provided those
questions do not unreasonably extend the amount of time the subject is delayed. See
United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
A.
Defendant first argues D etective Baxter did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop his vehicle. As noted above, Detective Baxter stopped Defendant’s car because
Defendant, without signaling, crossed three or four feet into the right westbound lane
and stayed in that position for several seconds before crossing back into the left
westbound lane. Detective Baxter believed D efendant’s actions violated Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 42-4-1007(1)(a), which provides “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until
the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”
Relying on United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996), Defendant
argues his several second drift into the right lane did not justify Detective Baxter’s
stop. In Gregory, we interpreted a Utah statute very similar to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-
4-1007(1)(a) and held, under the circumstances of that case, a driver’s brief drift
outside his lane of traffic into an emergency lane did not amount to a violation of
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Utah law sufficient to effectuate a traffic stop. 1 Id. at 978. Since that time, our cases
have clarified that Gregory does not “stand[] for the proposition that a single
instance of drifting onto the shoulder can never be a violation of a traffic statute like
section [41-6-61(1)].” U nited States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003).
Rather, we must analyze objectively all the surrounding facts and circumstances to
determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation of the
applicable statute had occurred. See United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198
(10th Cir. 1999).
Defendant asserts this case falls “squarely within the bounds of Gregory.” W e
disagree. Several facts distinguish this case from Gregory. First, in Gregory, the
defendant was traveling in a moving truck where the road was winding, the terrain
was mountainous and the weather condition was windy. Gregory, 79 F.3d at 975.
As we explained: “Under these conditions any vehicle could be subject to an
isolated incident of moving into the right shoulder of the roadway, without giving
rise to suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. In this case, nothing in the record
suggests any outside factors contributed to Defendant’s lane drift. See United States
v. Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting the lack of any objective
factor w hich might have made it impractical for the defendant to remain in a single
1
The U tah statute at issue in G regory, Utah C ode A nn. § 41-6-61(1),
required that a vehicle be operated “as nearly as practical entirely within a single
lane . . . .”
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lane). Instead, the record is clear Defendant was traveling along a four-lane city
street.
Additionally, the movement of the vehicle in Gregory occurred toward the
right shoulder of the road, so other traffic was in no danger of collision. In this case,
Defendant moved his vehicle three to four feet into another lane of traffic, essentially
straddling the lane divider for several seconds. This movem ent is more significant
than the brief two-feet lane drift under windy conditions described in Gregory. See
Gregory, 79 F.3d at 975-76. Detective Baxter could have reasonably believed
D efendant’s actions in this case posed a serious risk of collision. Accordingly, w e
conclude Detective Baxter had reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant violated
the Colorado Traffic Code, thus justifying the initial stop of D efendant’s vehicle.
See id. (upholding the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress where the
defendant drifted approximately one foot out of his lane for several seconds).
B.
Defendant also argues Detective Baxter’s questioning regarding the presence
of weapons “or other illegal items” and his request to search Defendant’s vehicle
unreasonably extended the detention in violation of his Fourth A mendment rights.
W e begin our analysis of Defendant’s alternative argument with Detective Baxter’s
first question: “Do you have any w eapons or other illegal items in your vehicle?”
For several years the rule in this circuit has been police officers are free to question
individuals regarding the presence of w eapons. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d
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1215 (10th C ir. 2001) (en banc). The justification for this rule is rooted in officer
safety. See id. at 1226 (noting “the government’s interest in officer safety outweighs
a motorist’s interest in not being asked about the presence of loaded weapons.”).
Thus, the first part of D etective Baxter’s question regarding the presence of weapons
was permissible, if not advisable.
Recent precedent informs us that the second portion of D etective Baxter’s first
question, i.e., whether “other illegal items” were in the car, was also permissible.
In Alcaraz-Arellano, we ruled that officers may ask questions outside the scope of
the traffic stop so long as the questions do not appreciably prolong the length of the
stop. See Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1259. Defendant argues D etective Baxter’s
questioning prolonged the length of the stop because Detective Baxter allegedly
abandoned investigation of the traffic offense and immediately asked D efendant
questions unrelated to the traffic infraction. In other words, according to Defendant,
Detective Baxter was only permitted to ask questions unrelated to the traffic stop
while he w as writing out a ticket, waiting for dispatch, or conducting some other
investigative procedure related to the initial purpose of the stop.
W e do not believe our precedent requires such a narrow approach. Our cases
do not focus on the order of events. Rather, our cases focus on the reasonableness
of the traffic stop in light of both the length of the detention and the manner in which
it was carried out. See id. at 1258. In this case, Detective Baxter’s question
regarding the presence of other “illegal items” did not appreciably lengthen the
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duration of the stop. The officer’s inquiry required a simple yes or no answer and
could not have taken more than two or three seconds to ask. That Detective Baxter
did not ask the question while actively processing Defendant’s traffic infraction does
not render Defendant’s momentary detention unreasonable.
D etective Baxter’s second question, “may I search,” also did not violate
Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Again, the key inquiry is w hether
Defendant’s detention was reasonable. Patterson, 472 F.3d at 776. Detective Baxter
asked for consent to search the vehicle as a follow-up question to his original
question regarding the presence of weapons or other illegal items in the vehicle.
Because Defendant answered the first question with the equivocal response of “not
that I know of,” and because the possible presence of weapons in the vehicle posed
an immediate danger, Detective Baxter reasonably asked whether he could search the
vehicle. Indeed, Defendant’s equivocal response to Detective Baxter’s first question
engenders the notion that weapons may be in the vehicle but Defendant does not
necessarily know of any.
W e have repeatedly pointed out the Government’s strong interest in officer
safety. As we noted in H olt, 264 F.3d at 1221, a motorist expects an officer to take
“reasonable measures to protect officer safety during [a traffic stop].” In Holt, w e
outlined the risk of danger faced by police officers conducting traffic stops and noted
because of this risk, officers are given “w ide latitude to discern the threat [a]
motorist may pose to officer safety.” Id. at 1223 (citations and quotations omitted).
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Given Defendant’s answ er to Detective Baxter’s first question and the importance
of officer safety, Detective Baxter’s request to search the vehicle for weapons
undoubtedly was reasonable.
The line of cases Defendant cites in his brief concerning an officer’s request
for consent to search a vehicle before the officer returns the driver’s license,
registration, and insurance information does not alter the outcome of this case. See
e.g., United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2006).
These cases simply stand for the proposition that during a “routine traffic stop, an
officer’s retention of a defendant’s documents is significant because it indicates that
the defendant, as a general rule, did not reasonably feel free to terminate the
encounter and, therefore, the government cannot rely on the defendant’s consent to
justify further detention, questioning, or a search.” Id. (citations and quotations
omitted). The validity of D efendant’s consent to search is not at issue in this case. 2
A FFIR ME D.
2
As a final note, we point out that the fact Detective Baxter asked for
consent to search the car instead of some other question is irrelevant. Alcaraz-
Arellano makes clear that the content of an officer’s questions is unimportant so
long as the questions do not unreasonably delay the stop. W e could not have been
more clear when we held that questioning “regardless of the topic” does not
violate the Fourth Amendment so long as it does not prolong the detention.
Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1259.
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