FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
September 11, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 06-3239
DEIONE M . SM ITH, also known as
Deione M . Burt, also known as Deione
M . Burt-Smith,
Defendant - Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D. Ct. No. 03-CR-20036-JW L)
Justin W . Howard, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City, M issouri,
appearing for Defendant-Appellant.
Brent I. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States
Attorney for the District of Kansas, W ichita, Kansas (Eric F. M elgren, United
States Attorney, and Terra D. M orehead, Assistant United States Attorney, Office
of the United States Attorney for the District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, on
the brief), appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, BALDOCK , and TYM KOVICH, Circuit
Judges.
TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant-Appellant Deione Smith pleaded
guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of
crack cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). In her plea
agreement, M s. Smith waived her right to appeal her sentence. The D istrict Court
sentenced M s. Smith to 151 months’ imprisonment after (1) rejecting her request
for safety valve consideration under § 5C1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines M anual (“Guidelines” or “U .S.S.G.”), (2) applying upward
adjustments to her offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a
firearm and under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice, and (3) refusing to
reduce her offense level under U .S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility.
M s. Smith timely appeals her sentence. W e exercise jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 3742(a). See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (“[T]his court has both statutory and constitutional subject matter
jurisdiction over appeals w hen a criminal defendant has w aived his appellate
rights in an enforceable plea agreement.”). Because we conclude that the plea
agreement constitutes an enforceable waiver of appellate rights, we dismiss M s.
Smith’s appeal without addressing the District Court’s application of the
Guidelines adjustments.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 4, 2006, the Government filed a superseding indictment
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charging M s. Smith with six drug-related offenses. M s. Smith agreed to plead
guilty to one charge of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in
exchange for a dismissal of the remaining counts. The Government agreed to
recommend that M s. Smith receive a two-level reduction in the applicable offense
level under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, contingent upon her
continuing manifestation of such acceptance. The plea agreement states that M s.
Smith “knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal or collaterally attack
any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction and sentence.” It
further provides that “the defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence
imposed in this case except, to the extent, if any, the court departs upwards from
the applicable sentencing guideline range determined by the court.”
Following acceptance of M s. Smith’s guilty plea, the District Court ordered
preparation of a presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR recommended a two-level
upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of firearms in
connection with the offense and a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a). The PSR determined M s. Smith was not
eligible for safety valve consideration under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2)— which
renders the statutory minimum sentence for certain offenses inapplicable if the
defendant did not possess a firearm in connection with the offense— due to her
possession of firearms. W ith a resulting offense level of 30 and a criminal history
category of I, the PSR provided for a range of imprisonment of 97 to 121 months.
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In response to the PSR, M s. Smith filed a “Sentencing M emorandum”
arguing that she should receive safety valve consideration because there was no
proof that firearms found in her home were used “in connection with” the drug
offense for which she was convicted. The Government argued that M s. Smith
possessed one firearm in connection with the drug transaction because the gun
was recovered from a bedroom where officers also recovered thousands of dollars
in cash. But M s. Smith insisted that the cash was from the recent sale of her car.
To support this contention, M s. Smith submitted an “Affidavit of Bill of Sale,”
representing that M s. Smith sold the car for a specific sum to the buyer.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court determined that the
“affidavit” w as fraudulent. Consequently, the court concluded that M s. Smith
was not eligible for the safety valve adjustment. It also determined that, because
of her fraudulent submission, she was not eligible for the downward adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility and that a two-level upward adjustment under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice was warranted. This resulted in an
offense level of 34, a criminal history category of I, and a sentencing range of 151
to 188 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced M s. Smith to 151 months.
M s. Smith appeals her sentence, arguing that the plea agreement is not
enforceable. First, she argues that she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive
the right to appeal her sentence and therefore she can appeal the D istrict Court’s
application of the Guidelines adjustments to her offense level. Second, in the
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alternative, she insists that the District Court rejected the plea agreement by
imposing an offense level adjustment not contemplated therein— the obstruction
of justice enhancement— and she must therefore have the opportunity to withdraw
her plea.
II. D ISC USSIO N
A. W aiver of the Right to Appeal the Sentence
A defendant may not appeal her sentence if she has w aived her appellate
rights in an enforceable plea agreement. 1 This Court employs a three-pronged
analysis to determine whether to enforce a waiver of appellate rights. Hahn, 359
F.3d at 1325. W e examine “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope
of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id.
1. Scope of the W aiver
The plea agreement provides: “[T]he defendant waives the right to appeal
the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs
1
M s. Smith argues that the waiver is unenforceable because the Government
failed to file a “M otion for Enforcement of the Plea Agreement” as required by
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1328. W e have made clear, however, that the government
preserves its right to enforce a plea agreement when it files a motion to enforce
the agreement or seeks enforcement in its brief. United States v. Contreras-
Ramos, 457 F.3d 1144, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The preferred procedure for
invocation of an appeal waiver is for the government to file a motion under Tenth
Circuit Rule 27.2(A)(1), or to argue the waiver issue in its brief.”).
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upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range determined by the court.”
This waiver encompasses all appellate challenges to the sentence other than those
falling within the explicit exception for challenges to upward departures. The
District Court sentenced M s. Smith within the advisory Guidelines range it
calculated; it did not depart upward. Thus, M s. Smith’s challenges to the District
Court’s application of the offense-level adjustments clearly fall within the scope
of the waiver.
M s. Smith insists, however, that her appeal falls outside the scope of the
waiver because the District Court relied on facts derived from the sentencing
hearing to determine the applicability of the offense-level adjustments.
According to M s. Smith, the court should have relied solely on the stipulated facts
in the plea agreement— those facts w ithin the “scope” of the agreement. There is
no basis in the law for this argument. A sentencing court may find facts for
sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v.
M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684–85 (10th Cir. 2005), and the plea agreement
explicitly provides that “[t]he defendant . . . agrees that facts that determine the
offense level will be found by the Court at sentencing by a preponderance of the
evidence and agrees that the Court may consider any reliable evidence, including
hearsay.”
2. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver
The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that her waiver was not
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knowing and voluntary. United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 872–73 (10th Cir.
2003). Under Hahn, this Court looks primarily to two factors to assess the
voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver. W e “examine whether the language of the
plea agreement states that the defendant entered the plea agreement knowingly
and voluntarily.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1324. There is no dispute that this condition
is satisfied here. W e also “look for an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 colloquy.” Id. at 1325. The District Court questioned M s. Smith
extensively at the plea hearing, establishing that she was competent to enter the
plea and understood all of the terms of the agreement. The court specifically
discussed the wavier of her appellate rights, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N), and
M s. Smith affirmatively acknowledged that she understood that waiver.
Yet M s. Smith argues that her waiver was not knowing and voluntary
because, at the end of the plea hearing, the District Court indicated that she
retained her appellate rights. Indeed, after completing the Rule 11 colloquy and
accepting M s. Smith’s guilty plea, the court stated: “[P]ursuant to Rule 32(j) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant has the right to appeal the
sentence.” But a district court’s statement that a defendant has the right to appeal
does not necessarily negate a waiver-of-appeal provision contained in a plea
agreement when the defendant enters into that agreement prior to the court’s
statement. See U nited States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that a district court’s oral advisement of appellate rights following a
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defendant’s written w aiver “do[es] not affect a defendant’s prior decision to plead
guilty and waive appellate rights” (emphasis added)). This is especially true
when, after informing the defendant that he has appellate rights, the court does
not ask defendant whether he understands the description of those rights. See id.
(explaining that sentencing court’s statement that the parties could appeal the
sentence did not invalidate defendant’s w aiver of appellate rights because, in part,
“the court did not query the defendant as to whether he understood its description
of his appeal rights”).
Here, the District Court conducted a complete Rule 11 colloquy,
specifically explaining to M s. Smith that she would be waiving her right to appeal
and to collaterally attack her conviction and sentence if she accepted the plea
agreement. M s. Smith said that she understood these terms. The prosecutor also
outlined the provisions of the plea agreement in court, stating: “[M s. Smith] also
waives any appeal rights or collateral attack rights except those as specified in the
plea agreement.” M s. Smith, her attorney, and the prosecutor then signed the
agreement. It was not until the next day, at the very end of the sentencing
hearing— following the Rule 11 colloquy, her acceptance of the plea agreement,
and a full evidentiary hearing regarding application of the safety valve
provision— that the D istrict Court judge informed M s. Smith, apparently as a
matter of routine, that she had a right to appeal the sentence. The court did not
ask M s. Smith whether she understood this statement, as it had done previously
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for the waiver of her appellate rights. For these reasons, the court’s statement did
not negate M s. Smith’s prior written w aiver of her appellate rights. 2
In addition, the court’s statement may even have been consistent with the
plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, M s. Smith retained the right to appeal
her sentence if the District Court sentenced her outside the advisory Guidelines
range or if the United States exercised its right to appeal the sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3742(b). Thus, the District Court’s comm ent may only have been
intended to inform M s. Smith of her right to appeal as limited by the waiver. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(j) (requiring sentencing court to inform defendant of “any
right to appeal the sentence” (emphasis added)); Atterberry, 144 F.3d at 1301
(noting that a court’s general advisement of a right to appeal may be consistent
with a plea agreement’s conditional w aiver of direct appeal).
Although, in this case, the District Court’s routine recitation of appellate
rights does not render M s. Smith’s waiver invalid, we acknowledge that such
instructions may have the potential to render appellate waivers invalid under
different circumstances, such as when the instructions are inconsistent with the
defendant’s rights or when the district court’s statement has the serious potential
2
Also for these reasons, our recent opinion in United States v. Wilken, —
F.3d — , 2007 W L 2372381 (10th Cir. 2007), is distinguishable. See id. at *5–6
(holding defendant’s waiver of appellate rights was not knowing and voluntary
because sentencing court’s mischaracterization of defendant’s appellate waiver
during plea colloquy, prior to signing of plea agreement, created a material
ambiguity as to otherw ise unambiguous written waiver in the plea agreement).
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to confuse the defendant. W e therefore provide the following guidance regarding
a district court’s obligation to inform the defendant of his appellate rights after
accepting a plea agreement containing a waiver of appellate rights.
Rule 32(j) provides that “[a]fter sentencing— regardless of the defendant’s
plea— the court must advise the defendant of any right to appeal the sentence.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(j)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The clear import of this rule is
that advice as to a right to appeal a sentence need be given only when such a right
exists. See also United States v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 368–71 (2d Cir. 2000)
(interpreting prior version of Rule 32). W hen a defendant waives certain
appellate rights in a plea agreement, the district court need not, and should not,
inform him that he retains such rights by, for example, making a blanket
statement that the defendant has a right to appeal. Instead, the district court
should inform the defendant that he has a right to appeal the sentence only to the
extent that the defendant has not waived that right in the plea agreement. Such a
statement, in conjunction, of course, with the court’s confirmation that the
defendant entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily through a
complete Rule 11 colloquy, should ensure both that the defendant understands his
rights and that the waiver is enforceable.
3. M iscarriage of Justice
The third prong of the enforcement analysis requires the court to determine
whether enforcing the waiver w ill result in a miscarriage of justice. A
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miscarriage of justice occurs “[1] where the district court relied on an
impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3]
where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001)). M s. Smith argues
only that the waiver is “otherwise unlawful.” To be “otherwise unlawful,” an
error must “‘seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
M s. Smith argues that the District Court “unjustifiably” concluded that she
obstructed justice, and that this erroneous ruling resulted in an upward adjustment
to her sentence and the court’s improper refusal to apply the acceptance of
responsibility adjustment. These errors, she claims, affect the fairness of the
proceedings, as well as the integrity and public reputation of the judicial system.
M s. Smith misunderstands the miscarriage of justice exception to enforcement of
a waiver of appellate rights. This exception looks to whether “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful,” id. (emphasis added), not to whether another aspect of the
proceeding may have involved legal error. M s. Smith’s argument that alleged
errors in the court’s determination of her sentence should invalidate her appellate
waiver illustrates what Hahn called “the logical failing[ ] of focusing on the result
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of the proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an
appeal waiver is [valid].” Id. at 1326 n.12 (discussing whether an appeal waiver
was knowing and voluntary); see also, e.g., United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d
1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A waiver of the right to appeal . . . includes a
waiver of the right to appeal blatant error.”). To allow alleged errors in
computing a defendant’s sentence to render a waiver unlawful would nullify the
waiver based on the very sort of claim it w as intended to waive.
In sum, because M s. Smith knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea
agreement containing a w aiver of appellate rights, because the alleged errors are
within the scope of the waiver, and because enforcement of the waiver would not
result in a miscarriage of justice, we conclude that M s. Smith’s plea agreement,
and the appellate waiver contained therein, is enforceable.
B. District Court’s Acceptance of the Plea Agreement
M s. Smith argues that the District Court “constructively rejected” the plea
agreement when it imposed the two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of
justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because the plea agreement did not provide notice
that she may be subject to the adjustment. Consequently, she argues, the court
was required to give her an opportunity to withdraw the plea before sentencing;
because the court did not, the plea agreement is unenforceable. M s. Smith’s
argum ent is inapposite. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure draw a
distinction between those plea agreements that state that a specific sentence or
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sentencing range is appropriate or that certain provisions of the Guidelines will or
will not apply, and those agreements that do not. Specifically, a statement in a
plea agreement “that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines . . . does
or does not apply” binds the court once it accepts the plea agreement. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). In contrast, a plea agreement that does not so specify does
not bind the district court to any particular sentencing range or recommendation.
United States v. Herula, 464 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B)).
The plea agreement here does not specify a particular sentencing range, nor
does it specify that certain G uidelines adjustments are or are not applicable. In
fact, the plea agreement specifically recognizes that “the sentence to be imposed
will be determined solely by the United States District Judge” and that “[t]he
defendant understands that if the court accepts this plea agreement but imposes a
sentence with which the defendant does not agree, the defendant will not be
permitted to withdraw this plea of guilty.” A s such, the D istrict Court’s
application of the obstruction of justice adjustment does not operate as a rejection
of the plea agreement, nor was the court required to give M s. Smith an
opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea because it applied an adjustment not
specifically contemplated by the plea agreement. 3
3
W e note that the District Court did not expressly state on the record that it
was “accepting” or “rejecting” the plea agreement. The court did, however,
(continued...)
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M oreover, M s. Smith’s argument assumes the plea agreement must provide
notice of every potential sentencing outcome before it can be enforceable. But w e
have explicitly rejected the “notion that a defendant must know with specificity
what result he forfeits before his waiver is valid.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326–27
(citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629–30 (2002)); see also United
States v. M ontano, 472 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing cases and
expressly declining to adopt a rule that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when
defendant did not know at the time she entered the plea agreement what her
sentencing range would be and that the resulting sentence was greater than
anticipated).
III. C ON CLU SIO N
For the foregoing reasons, we ENFORCE M s. Smith’s w aiver of appellate
rights and DISM ISS her appeal.
3
(...continued)
operate w ithin the terms of the plea agreement, questioning M s. Smith with
respect to its terms during the Rule 11 colloquy and dismissing, as provided in the
plea agreement, the five other counts set forth in the superseding indictment.
These actions amount to constructive acceptance of the plea agreement. See
United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
district court’s failure to expressly accept or reject a plea agreement amounted to
acceptance of the agreement if the court accepts the guilty plea).
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