FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 5, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN VONDRAK,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant,
v. Nos. 07-2148 and 07-2159
CITY OF LAS CRUCES; CINDY
McCANTS and NATHAN KRAUSE,
individuals and employees of the Las
Cruces Police Department,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-
Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-05-172-JB/LFG)
David P. Lutz (William L. Lutz with him on the briefs), Martin, Lutz, Roggow,
Hosford & Eubanks, P.C., Las Cruces, NM, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Barry J. Byrnes, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before TACHA, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
This is an action brought by plaintiff John Vondrak under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Officer Cindy McCants, Officer Nathan Krause, and the City of Las
Cruces, New Mexico (collectively, “Defendants”). Vondrak has alleged claims
against McCants and Krause for illegal arrest, excessive force, and inadequate
medical attention, and Vondrak has included similar claims against the City for its
failure to train its police officers adequately. The district court granted summary
judgment to all Defendants on the inadequate medical attention claim, and to
Krause on the illegal arrest claim. The district court denied summary judgment to
Defendants on Vondrak’s other claims, holding that McCants was not entitled to
qualified immunity on either the illegal arrest or the excessive force claim, and
Krause was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. All
Defendants appeal, and Vondrak has filed a cross-appeal. We have jurisdiction
over McCants’ appeal and Krause’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
reverse the denial of qualified immunity on the illegal arrest claim and affirm the
denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. We dismiss the City’s
appeal and Vondrak’s cross-appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
I.
On August 18, 2003, the Las Cruces Police Department established a
sobriety checkpoint at the corner of Valley Drive and Hayner Avenue in Las
Cruces, New Mexico. At approximately 10:10 p.m., John Vondrak approached
the checkpoint in his 1994 Mercury Cougar, and an unidentified police officer
asked Vondrak if he had consumed any alcohol that evening. Vondrak responded
2
that he bought a beer about three or four hours earlier, and consumed
approximately one-third of it. The officer directed Vondrak to pull his car over to
the side of the road.
Officer McCants approached Vondrak’s car and asked, “You’ve admitted to
drinking today?” Transcript, Def. ROA, at 56. 1
Vondrak responded, “I had one beer three hours ago.” Id.
McCants explained to Vondrak that she was going to conduct field sobriety
tests:
Officer McCants: Since you have admitted to drinking, we’re going
to give you a field sobriety test, okay?
(Indiscernible radio traffic.)
Dr. Vondrak: I can handle that.
Officer McCants: Do you want to take the test?
Dr. Vondrak: Absolutely.
Officer McCants: Okay. Let’s go over here where it’s flat. Go
ahead and stand right here facing me. Do you
have any physical ailments that cause you any
problems in walking, standing?
Dr. Vondrak: I have no problems.
Officer McCants: You’re in fairly good health?
1
The transcript of their conversation has been prepared from a tape in
Officer McCants’ belt recorder, which she activated shortly after her encounter
with Vondrak began. It is unclear what, if anything, transpired between Vondrak
and McCants before she turned on her belt recorder.
3
Dr. Vondrak: I’m in excellent health.
Id. at 56-57. 2
McCants first described the “one-legged stand test” to Vondrak, which
required him to lift one of his legs six inches above the ground, point his toe, and
count to thirty. Vondrak responded that he “probably couldn’t even do that if
[he’d] never had a drink.” Transcript, Def. ROA, at 57. McCants believed that
Vondrak’s statement was a preemptive attempt to justify failing the test. During
the test, Vondrak swayed and put his foot down several times. McCants
concluded that Vondrak had failed the test.
2
As the district court noted, the police report states that Officer McCants
“could smell a strong [sic] of an alcoholic beverage.” Police Report, Def. ROA,
at 53. The district court declined to consider this statement because it “was not
included in the parties’ briefing, in either parties’ statement of facts, or at oral
argument.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 3 n.2. Because the district court did not consider this
fact, we may not now consider it:
Individual defendants . . . may interlocutorily appeal the denial of
qualified immunity. However, [Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 312-
13 (1995),] provides that the scope of such appeals is limited to
“purely legal” challenges to the district court’s ruling on whether a
plaintiff’s legal rights were clearly established, and cannot include
attacks on the court’s “evidence sufficiency” determinations about
whether there are genuine disputes of fact. That is, we can only
review whether the district court “mistakenly identified clearly
established law . . . given [ ] the facts that the district court assumed
when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason.” Id.
at 319.
Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 700 (10th Cir. 1995) (some citations
omitted). For similar reasons, we will also refrain from considering the
deposition testimony of Sergeant Kerry Clements that Defendants reference in
their brief.
4
McCants next described the “walk and turn test” to Vondrak, which
required him to walk nine steps, heel to toe, down an imaginary line, and then
turn around and walk nine steps back. Vondrak had trouble with the test, and
McCants concluded that he had failed it. Vondrak claims that he did not
understand McCants’ instructions.
Finally, McCants administered the “horizontal gaze nystagmus test,” which
required Vondrak to follow a pen with his eyes without moving his head.
McCants concluded that Vondrak had failed this test as well.
Because Vondrak had admitted consuming alcohol and had failed the field
sobriety tests, McCants believed that Vondrak had committed the crime of
Driving While Under the Influence. McCants placed him under arrest and
handcuffed him. Pursuant to police department policy, McCants double-locked
the handcuffs.
Officer Nathan Krause observed McCants administer the field sobriety
tests. After McCants placed Vondrak in handcuffs, Krause performed a pat-down
search of Vondrak and inventoried Vondrak’s car. Vondrak requested that the
officers take him to a hospital immediately, so that he could “take . . . an alcohol
test.” Transcript, Def. ROA, at 62.
According to McCants, Vondrak did not complain about the handcuffs
when she first placed them on him. McCants also claims that “[n]othing that
occurred over the course of the evening would have led me to believe that Dr.
5
Vondrak would suffer injury from the handcuffs.” McCants Aff., Def. ROA, at
51, ¶ 11. Likewise, Krause claims that Vondrak never complained about the
handcuffs during the pat-down search or while Krause was on the scene. Vondrak
claims, in contrast, that he told the officers “[a] half dozen times” that the
handcuffs were too tight and that his wrists were hurting and going numb.
Vondrak Dep., Pl. ROA, at 57. He claims that, although he did not “cry out,” he
told McCants “that [his] wrists hurt immediately when she put [the handcuffs] on
. . . , when she clamped down hard on both of them.” Id. at 58-59. 3 He also
claims that he told McCants in the patrol car on the way to the police station that
“the handcuffs were too tight, and that they . . . felt like . . . they were bleeding,
that they were too tight, cutting into my wrists.” Id. at 58.
McCants drove Vondrak to the police station. After they arrived, McCants
administered two IR-5000 tests on Vondrak, both of which produced a blood-
alcohol content reading of 0.00. She then asked another officer to perform an
RBT test, which produced a blood-alcohol content reading of 0.00. After the
officers tested Vondrak, they held him for another one-and-a-half hours. During
this time, Vondrak made several requests for someone to loosen his handcuffs
because his wrists were hurting; all requests were ignored. At some point, a
police department employee photographed Vondrak’s wrists. In the photographs,
3
The transcript covers this time period, but it does not clarify whether
Vondrak complained about the handcuffs.
6
Vondrak’s wrists appear red, but they do not appear cut or scraped. Eventually,
the officers charged Vondrak with Driving While Under the Influence to the
Slightest Degree, and they released him on his own recognizance. The charge
against Vondrak was later dropped.
Following his release, Vondrak went to the emergency room at Mountain
View Regional Medical Center. According to a toxicology screening report,
Vondrak tested negative for drugs or alcohol. Dr. Scot Martin, who treated
Vondrak, observed “multiple superficial abrasions and ecchymosis” on both
wrists. Martin Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at 143. He diagnosed Vondrak with
neurapraxia in both wrists, and a soft tissue sprain of the right wrist.
The pain and discomfort in Vondrak’s wrists did not subside, and it
interfered with his ability to practice as an orthodontist and play golf. Dr. Pawan
Jain, a neurologist, diagnosed Vondrak with a permanent radial nerve injury in his
wrists, and Dr. Jain concluded that the “handcuffing was the competent producing
cause of his right radial and bilateral median nerve injuries.” Jain Diagnosis, Def.
ROA, at 146. Dr. Wayne Lindsey, an orthopedist, concluded that Vondrak had
“[s]uperficial radial nerve palsy” in his right wrist, and “[b]ilateral mild carpal
tunnel syndrome.” Lindsey Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at 160. Dr. Lindsey stated that
Vondrak had “reached maximum medical improvement” and had “sustained
permanent impairment” with regard to these injuries. Id. He concluded that the
injuries “seem to be the direct result of constriction of the superficial radial nerve
7
and median nerve of the wrists secondary to prolonged constriction by handcuffs
placed during [the arrest].” Id.
In his complaint filed in this action, Vondrak alleged that McCants and
Krause were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for illegal arrest, excessive force, and
inadequate medical attention. He alleged that the City was liable under § 1983
because of its failure to train its police officers adequately. Vondrak also alleged
claims under New Mexico law for intentional tort and negligence, which are not
at issue on appeal.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued, inter alia,
that (1) qualified immunity protected McCants and Krause on all of Vondrak’s
federal claims; (2) alternatively, Krause was not liable because he neither arrested
Vondrak nor applied the handcuffs; and (3) because McCants and Krause were
entitled to qualified immunity, the City could not be liable.
The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The district court first explained that, “because the initial
stop at the checkpoint was legal and because the failure of three field-sobriety
tests would give an arresting officer probable cause to arrest an individual for
DUI, whether Vondrak’s arrest was illegal hinges on whether McCants possessed
reasonable suspicion to administer field-sobriety tests to Vondrak.” Dist. Ct. Op.
at 23. The district court then held that Vondrak’s statement—“I had one beer
three hours ago”—was not, by itself, “enough to provide McCants, as a matter of
8
law, with an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that Vondrak had
driven or was driving under the influence of alcohol.” Id. at 25. The district
court also held that the question of whether McCants had “arguable reasonable
suspicion”—such that she would be entitled to qualified immunity—was
“factual,” thus precluding summary judgment in her favor. Id. at 26.
Next, the district court held that, assuming Vondrak supplied adequately
authenticated medical records, “Vondrak ha[d] established that his constitutional
right to be free from excessive force was violated—he was handcuffed in a
manner that caused an actual, non-deminimis [sic] injury—and that the right to be
free from excessive force under objective reasonableness standards was clearly
established at the time of the alleged incident . . . .” Id. at 29. McCants,
therefore, was “not entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive use of
force claim.” Id. On the other hand, McCants was entitled to qualified immunity
on Vondrak’s inadequate medical attention claim, because Vondrak had failed to
present facts demonstrating that McCants was deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs.
The district court granted Krause summary judgment on both the illegal
arrest and inadequate medical attention claims. The court reasoned that, on the
illegal arrest claim, “Krause did not begin to observe the McCants/Vondrak
encounter until after McCants had determined that she had reasonable suspicion
to conduct field-sobriety tests,” so Krause lacked “the capability to intercede to
9
prevent the harm that Vondrak may have suffered as a result of McCants’
actions.” Id. at 32. Vondrak’s inadequate medical attention claim against Krause
failed for the same reasons as his claim against McCants. The district court
denied Krause summary judgment on the excessive force claim, however, holding
that a reasonable jury could conclude that Krause could have effectively
intervened to prevent the use of excessive force on Vondrak.
Finally, the district court held that the City was entitled to summary
judgment on the inadequate medical attention claim because Vondrak had not
established that anyone violated his right to adequate medical attention. The
district court denied the City’s motion on the illegal arrest and excessive force
claims, though, because Vondrak had introduced evidence showing constitutional
violations on these claims, and the City had not contested “any of the other
elements necessary to hold a municipality liable.” Id. at 33.
Defendants argue that the district court erred in (1) denying qualified
immunity to McCants on Vondrak’s illegal arrest claim, and (2) denying qualified
immunity to McCants and Krause on Vondrak’s excessive force claim. 4 Vondrak
has filed a cross-appeal, contending that the district court erred in (1) dismissing
4
The City is listed as an appellant, but Defendants spend only one sentence
in their brief on appeal, in a footnote, discussing the City’s liability. This is
insufficient to invoke appellate review. See Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244,
1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (“On appeal, however, parties must do more than offer
vague and unexplained complaints of error. Perfunctory complaints that fail to
frame and develop an issue are not sufficient to invoke appellate review.”
(citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
10
his illegal arrest claim against Krause, (2) dismissing his inadequate medical
attention claim against all Defendants, and (3) concluding that the sobriety
checkpoint satisfied the Fourth Amendment.
II.
Recently, we explained our standard of review for an appeal from a denial
of qualified immunity:
“Because of the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, we
review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity
questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.”
Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). When a
defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff, who must first establish that the defendant violated a
constitutional right. Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th
Cir. 2004). “If no constitutional right would have been violated were
the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001). If, on the other hand, a violation has been shown, the
plaintiff must then show that the constitutional right was clearly
established. See id. “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition . . . .” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation . . . .” Id. at 202. Summary judgment based on qualified
immunity is appropriate if the law did not put the officer on notice
that his conduct would be clearly unlawful. Id. (citing Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
We have held that, for a right to be clearly established, “there must
be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly
established weight of authority from other courts must have found
the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Medina v. City of Denver,
960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has
explained that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope
11
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
The district court’s denial of qualified immunity is a question of law
which we review de novo. Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1099 (10th
Cir. 1994). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id. at 1100. Summary judgment is appropriate
only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c) (2007).
Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Before
we reach the merits of the individual claims, however, we must first determine the
extent of our appellate jurisdiction.
Appellate jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States.” As this statutory limitation
indicates, “interlocutory appeals are the exception and not the rule.” Myers v.
Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 80 F.3d 421, 424 (10th Cir. 1996). “One
well recognized exception allows public officials asserting a defense of qualified
immunity to appeal a district court’s denial of summary judgment on that defense
if the issue on appeal is whether the constitutional right that was allegedly
violated was ‘clearly established.’” Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
530 (1985)); see also Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1112. Under this exception, we have
appellate jurisdiction over McCants’ appeal and Krause’s appeal from the district
court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
12
Our appellate jurisdiction does not extend to Vondrak’s cross-appeal.
“[T]his court has discretion to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over
nonappealable issues once we have asserted jurisdiction over other appealable
issues in the same case.” Roska ex rel. Roska v. Sneddon, 437 F.3d 964, 970
(10th Cir. 2006). Our exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction, though, “is
generally disfavored,” and is only appropriate “where the otherwise
nonappealable decision is inextricably intertwined with the appealable decision,
or where review of the nonappealable decision is necessary to ensure meaningful
review of the appealable one.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “[A] pendent appellate claim can be regarded as inextricably
intertwined with a properly reviewable claim on collateral appeal only if the
pendent claim is coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on
interlocutory appeal—that is, when the appellate resolution of the collateral
appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim as well.” Moore v. City of
Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 1995).
Resolution of the properly appealable issues will not necessarily resolve the
issues in Vondrak’s cross-appeal. Krause was not present when McCants decided
to subject Vondrak to the field sobriety tests, and, as a result, Vondrak’s illegal
arrest claim against Krause is not “inextricably intertwined” with Vondrak’s
claim against McCants. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423-24 (10th Cir.
1997). Similarly, our resolution of the excessive force claim will not necessarily
13
resolve the inadequate medical attention claim. We analyze claims for excessive
force under an objective reasonableness standard, without regard to the officer’s
state of mind, see Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005),
whereas claims for inadequate medical attention have both an objective and a
subjective component, see Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005).
Vondrak’s cross-appeal is not sufficiently related to the claims properly before us,
and we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over it.
Reasonable suspicion and the field sobriety tests
The district court erred in denying qualified immunity to McCants on
Vondrak’s illegal arrest claim. On appeal, the sole issue regarding the illegal
arrest claim is whether McCants had reasonable suspicion—or, for qualified
immunity purposes, “arguable reasonable suspicion”—to subject Vondrak to the
field sobriety tests.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-55
(1990), the Supreme Court upheld certain types of sobriety checkpoints as
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, “[e]ven in the absence of
individualized suspicion, a brief seizure at a checkpoint may be reasonable if
conducted in a neutral manner for the purpose of effectuating important
governmental purposes.” United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217,
1221 (10th Cir. 1998). The situation changes, though, when a police officer
subjects a driver to field sobriety tests, and in such instances, the officer must
14
have reasonable suspicion. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“A field sobriety test is a minor intrusion on a driver only requiring a reasonable
suspicion of intoxication and an easy opportunity to end a detention before it
matures into an arrest.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-51; Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir.
1998). As we explained in Galindo-Gonzales:
Requiring an individualized, reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to
expanding the scope of detentions at fixed checkpoints protects
motorists and passengers from random stops involving the kind of
standardless and unconstrained discretion that is the evil the Court
has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the
discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to
some extent.
Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d at 1221 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Under the reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer “must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). A
reasonable suspicion analysis is based upon the “totality of the circumstances,”
and “officers [may] draw on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available
to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Although
an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the
15
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard.” Id. at 274 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of a § 1983 action, moreover, the officer “is entitled to qualified
immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that [reasonable suspicion]
existed to . . . detain the plaintiff”—i.e., if the officer had “arguable reasonable
suspicion.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1120, 1123.
Vondrak’s statement that he “had one beer three hours ago” provided
McCants with reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests, or at the
very least provided her with “arguable reasonable suspicion” entitling her to
qualified immunity. See United States v. Slater, 411 F.3d 1003, 1004, 1006 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“Jones’s admission that he had been drinking [“a couple drinks”]
earlier that evening gave Officer Perry reasonable suspicion to extend the stop
while Jones completed the sobriety tests.”); see also Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d
1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen Officer Harget smelled alcohol coming
from the vehicle Mr. Miller had been driving, he had reasonable suspicion to
detain Mr. Miller in order to investigate.”); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d
753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The detection of alcohol on Neumann’s breath
provided Kayras with a reasonable suspicion to further detain Neumann and
expand the scope of the investigation.”); United States v. Caine, 517 F. Supp. 2d
586, 589 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding reasonable suspicion where the defendant’s
16
eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and she had admitted drinking earlier that night);
Griffin v. City of Clanton, 932 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (finding
reasonable suspicion where “Officer Bearden smelled alcohol on Griffin’s breath”
and “Griffin admitted that he had consumed a few drinks”). Admittedly, this is a
close case. McCants’ only factual basis for conducting the field sobriety tests
was Vondrak’s admission to drinking one beer several hours earlier, and the
specificity of Vondrak’s statement makes it less suspicious than in many of the
cases cited above. Nevertheless, given that Vondrak admitted consuming alcohol,
McCants had the reasonable suspicion necessary to perform the field sobriety
tests—or, at the very least, the arguable reasonable suspicion entitling her to
qualified immunity.
Our reasonable suspicion analysis is buttressed by New Mexico law, which
proscribes driving while impaired to the slightest degree. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §
66-8-102(A) (“It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of
intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle within this state.”); see also State v. Neal,
176 P.3d 330, 336-38 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). The New Mexico Supreme Court
has explained:
It was the intention of the legislature . . . to prohibit any person
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, however slight, from
operating an automobile on any highway in New Mexico. A person
who has taken a drink of intoxicating liquor is not necessarily under
its influence; but if it affects him so that, to the slightest degree, he is
less able, either mentally or physically or both, to exercise the clear
judgment and steady hand necessary to handle as powerful and
17
dangerous a mechanism as a modern automobile with safety to
himself and the public, he is under the “influence of intoxicating
liquor” within the meaning of the statute.
State v. Sisneros, 82 P.2d 274, 278 (N.M. 1938) (citation and some internal
quotation marks omitted); 5 see also Neal, 176 P.3d at 338 (“The statute gives
notice, according to the plain meaning of the word ‘influence,’ that the
Legislature intends to criminalize a condition less than intoxication, but
‘influenced’ to any degree by alcohol, no matter how slight.”). The sheer breadth
of § 66-8-102(A)—as compared to, for instance, the statute proscribing a person
from driving with a blood-alcohol content of greater than 0.08, see § 66-8-
102(C)—provides support for McCants’ argument that she had reasonable
suspicion that Vondrak violated New Mexico law. Cf. Blackstone v. Quirino, 309
F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D. Me. 2004) (concluding that the officers had reasonable
suspicion, and relying in part on the breadth of a similar statute under Maine
law). McCants was entitled to qualified immunity on the illegal arrest claim, and
the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
The handcuffs and excessive force
The district court was correct in denying qualified immunity to McCants
and Krause on Vondrak’s claim for excessive force. “[T]he right to make an
5
In Sisneros, the court was construing § 66-8-102(A)’s predecessor. The
statute provided: “It shall be unlawful . . . for . . . any person who is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive any vehicle upon a
highway within this state.” State v. Sisneros, 82 P.2d 274, 276 (N.M. 1938)
(quoting N.M. Stat. § 11-802 (1929)).
18
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree
of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it,” and “[d]etermining whether the
force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)
(citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). Each case “requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances . . . , including the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.” Id. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We have consistently rejected a bright-line rule requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate physical injury when bringing excessive force claims. See Holland
ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that “[p]hysical injury may be the most obvious injury that flows from the use of
excessive force,” but “declin[ing] to adopt a ‘bright-line’ standard dictating that
force cannot be ‘excessive’ unless it leaves visible cuts, bruises, abrasions or
scars”). Nevertheless, when an excessive force claim relies upon unduly tight
handcuffing, we have held that the plaintiff must show “some actual injury”:
19
In some circumstances, unduly tight handcuffing can constitute
excessive force where a plaintiff alleges some actual injury from the
handcuffing and alleges that an officer ignored a plaintiff’s timely
complaints (or was otherwise made aware) that the handcuffs were
too tight. . . . We believe that a claim of excessive force requires
some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional.
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129.
The district court correctly concluded that McCants and Krause were not
entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive force claim for unduly
tight handcuffing. Although the officers claim to have been unaware that
Vondrak’s handcuffs were tight, Vondrak has presented evidence that the officers
“ignored [his] timely complaints (or [were] otherwise made aware) that the
handcuffs were too tight.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. For instance, Vondrak
asserts that he told the officers “[a] half dozen times” that the handcuffs were too
tight, and that his wrists were hurting and going numb. Vondrak Dep., Pl. ROA,
at 57. He also claims that he told McCants “that [his] wrists hurt immediately
when she put [the handcuffs] on . . . , when she clamped down hard on both of
them.” Id. at 57-59. He claims that he told McCants on the way to the police
station that “the handcuffs were too tight, and that they . . . felt like . . . they were
bleeding, that they were too tight, cutting into my wrists.” Id. at 58. Finally,
Vondrak asserts that he made several requests at the police station for someone to
loosen his handcuffs because his wrists were hurting, but the officers ignored
him.
20
Vondrak has also presented evidence that he suffered a permanent, “actual
injury” as a result of the handcuffing. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. Vondrak has
stated that the pain in his wrists has not subsided since the arrest. His
neurologist, Dr. Jain, has diagnosed him with permanent nerve injury in his
wrists, and has concluded that the “handcuffing was the competent producing
cause of his right radial and bilateral median nerve injuries.” Jain Diagnosis, Def.
ROA, at 146-47. Likewise, Vondrak’s orthopedist, Dr. Lindsey, has concluded
that Vondrak now suffers from “[s]uperficial radial nerve palsy” in his right wrist,
and “[b]ilateral mild carpal tunnel syndrome.” Lindsey Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at
160. According to Dr. Lindsey, these injuries are permanent, and they are “the
direct result of constriction of the superficial radial nerve and median nerve of the
wrists secondary to prolonged constriction by handcuffs placed during [the
arrest].” Id.
Further, at the time of Vondrak’s arrest, the right to be free from unduly
tight handcuffing was “clearly established”—as were the contours of the right.
See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129 (citing cases and implying that this framework was
“clearly established” for claims in which plaintiffs allege that “unduly tight
handcuffing . . . constitute[s] excessive force”); see also Lyons v. City of Xenia,
417 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2005); Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003,
1008 (8th Cir. 2003); Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1043-44
(7th Cir. 2002); Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2002); Palmer v.
21
Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Hannula v. City of Lakewood,
907 F.2d 129, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the excessive force claim under the
due process clause and concluding that “[t]he cases do not ‘clearly establish’ that
handcuffing a detainee too tightly constitutes excessive force, at least in the
absence of apparent physical damage to the plaintiff’s wrists”), abrogated in part
by Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95. 6
Lastly, given Krause’s close proximity to the initial handcuffing, and his
presence immediately thereafter, the district court was correct in denying
qualified immunity to Krause on the excessive force claim. It is “clearly
established”
that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to
intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from
infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence. An
officer who fails to intercede is liable for the preventable harm
caused by the actions of the other officers where that officer observes
or has reason to know: (1) that excessive force is being used, (2) that
a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional
violation has been committed by a law enforcement official. In order
for liability to attach, there must have been a realistic opportunity to
intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. Whether an officer
had sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the
6
Although Lyons and Cortez were decided after Vondrak’s arrest, both
cases suggest—either explicitly or implicitly—that the standard for unduly tight
handcuffing was already “clearly established.” See Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575; cf.
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129.
In addition, although McCants and Krause rely heavily on the Eastern
District of Michigan’s analysis in Nemeckay v. Rule, 894 F. Supp. 310, 314-18
(E.D. Mich. 1995), Nemeckay no longer appears to state the “clearly established”
law with regard to unduly tight handcuffing claims in the Sixth Circuit. See
Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575.
22
harm being caused by another officer is an issue of fact for the jury
unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not
possibly conclude otherwise.
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also
Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996). Neither McCants nor
Krause was entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive force claim.
III.
We REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on
Vondrak’s illegal arrest claim against McCants, and AFFIRM the denial of
qualified immunity on Vondrak’s excessive force claim against McCants and
Krause. We DISMISS the City’s appeal and Vondrak’s cross-appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction. The case is REMANDED to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
23
07-2148 - Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, et al.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I join all of the majority opinion except that I would affirm the denial of
qualified immunity on the illegal-arrest claim against McCants. As the majority
opinion states, Vondrak told McCants that he had “bought a beer about three or
four hours earlier, and consumed approximately one-third of it.” Op. at 2. I do
not think that Vondrak’s statement in itself (and there is nothing else to support
McCants) gave McCants reasonable suspicion, or even arguable reasonable
suspicion, to believe that Vondrak was violating the law. Perhaps McCants,
through training or experience, had come to learn (1) that a driver could be
impaired by the drinking described by Vondrak or, more likely, (2) that someone
who admitted to the drinking described by Vondrak (yet, like him, displayed no
sign of intoxication, such as alcohol on the breath or erratic driving) had likely
imbibed more than described and was impaired in driving. But there was no such
evidence in this case.