FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 7, 2009
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-8033
KENNETH TODD BURKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. NO. 2:07-CR-141-02-WFD)
Patrick J. LeBrun, Casper, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant.
David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney, Casper, Wyoming (Kelly
H. Rankin, United States Attorney for the District of Wyoming with him on the
brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TACHA, O’BRIEN and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
This case involves the belated disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment
evidence required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Although we
conclude that the tardy disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment evidence can
sometimes give rise to a Brady violation and are greatly concerned by the
government’s conduct in this case, we conclude that the defendant’s objection to
the government’s belated disclosure failed to articulate any basis for finding that
he was prejudiced by the delay. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I. Background
Kenneth Todd Burke was convicted by a jury of conspiring with James
Johnston to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, methamphetamine.
He was also convicted of maintaining a drug house.
A. Events Leading to Mr. Burke’s Indictment
In October 2006, agents from the Wyoming Division of Criminal
Investigation (“WDCI”) conducted an undercover purchase of methamphetamine
from Teddy Corbett. After agreeing to cooperate with the WDCI agents, Mr.
Corbett advised them that his primary source of methamphetamine was James
Johnston, who resided in Casper, Wyoming at a home owned by Kenneth Burke’s
mother. Mr. Burke and Michael Jacobs, Mr. Burke’s former brother-in-law, also
lived at the house along with Mr. Johnston.
In December 2006, the police fitted Mr. Corbett with a wire, and sent him
to purchase methamphetamine from Mr. Johnston. Perhaps sensing a trap, Mr.
Johnston refused to sell Mr. Corbett drugs. The police, undeterred, obtained a
warrant for the Casper home and executed a search in February 2007, after Mr.
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Burke was already in jail on unrelated charges. The police uncovered
methamphetamine, digital scales, and other paraphernalia in and around the couch
in the living room on which Mr. Johnston slept. They also discovered drug
paraphernalia and a small amount of drugs in Mr. Jacobs’ bedroom. No drugs or
drug-related items were found in Mr. Burke’s bedroom.
As the police continued their investigation into Mr. Johnston’s drug
trafficking business, they quickly decided to speak to Mr. Burke. Mr. Burke
admitted to the police that Mr. Johnston both used and sold methamphetamine out
of their shared residence. Mr. Burke denied any involvement in Mr. Johnston’s
enterprise, however, and told investigators that he no longer even used
methamphetamine. Instead, he claimed that he had unsuccessfully tried to get Mr.
Johnston to leave the house and was glad that the police were getting the
methamphetamine out of his home. His protestations of innocence
notwithstanding, Mr. Burke was eventually charged with maintaining a drug-
related premises and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to
distribute, methamphetamine. Although Mr. Johnston separately pled guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Burke chose to proceed to trial.
At trial, Mr. Johnston presented a very different account of Mr. Burke’s
involvement. According to Mr. Johnston, both he and Mr. Burke sold
methamphetamine out of the shared residence. While Mr. Johnston indicated that
he and Mr. Burke sold mostly to their own customers, he noted that if either was
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running short on inventory, he might acquire drugs from the other. Mr. Johnston
also testified that he used methamphetamine around forty times with Mr. Burke.
Finally, Mr. Johnston testified that Mr. Burke had helped him deal with Mr.
Corbett after the latter attempted the controlled buy. According to Mr. Johnston,
Mr. Burke took Mr. Corbett to a carwash and threatened him about wearing a wire
against Johnston. Mr. Corbett later corroborated Johnston’s account of his
confrontation with Mr. Burke. Mr. Corbett also testified that Mr. Burke had
physically assaulted him when both were incarcerated, presumably in response to
Corbett’s involvement in the police investigation into dealings at his home.
Other witnesses at trial testified that they had purchased methamphetamine
from either Mr. Johnston or Mr. Burke at the shared residence. April Spong
testified that she generally purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Burke, but
would purchase drugs from Mr. Johnston when Mr. Burke was unavailable. Kim
Meiwes, Wendell Bray, and Joe Wilson testified that they routinely bought
methamphetamine from Mr. Johnston at the Casper home. Ms. Meiwes and Mr.
Wilson both also testified that they had seen Mr. Burke at the house during visits
to purchase drugs from Mr. Johnston.
The jury found Mr. Burke guilty of both charges.
B. The Factual Basis of Mr. Burke’s Appeal
Before trial, Mr. Burke filed a motion seeking the disclosure of any
immunity agreements between the Government and any informants that it planned
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to call to the stand. The district court ordered the release of this information, and
the government acknowledged its responsibility to comply. The government
failed to disclose, however, that Teddy Corbett was testifying pursuant to an
“informal” plea agreement reached before trial. Under the accommodation
reached between the government and Mr. Corbett, the government agreed not to
charge Mr. Corbett with any federal crimes in exchange for his cooperation. See
Aplt. Br. 17. The government’s failure to divulge the immunity agreement was
compounded by the fact that the prosecutor, Kenneth Marken, even initially
affirmatively elicited testimony at trial that there was no such agreement. Mr.
Marken asked Corbett: “Are you here pursuant to any kind of plea agreement?”
Mr. Corbett responded: “No.” R. V 410. The prosecutor made no attempt to
correct this misstatement, even though he was the one who had negotiated the
agreement with Mr. Corbett.
Later during Mr. Corbett’s direct testimony, however, the existence of his
plea agreement was brought to light.
MR. MARKEN: Okay. Now, you gave an interview as part of your plea
agreement –
MR. CORBETT: Uh-huh.
R. V 421–22. Defense counsel immediately objected and moved that the witness
be excluded and his testimony disregarded by the jury on the basis that the
defense had not been informed that the witness had a plea agreement. R. V 423.
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When the government acknowledged that there was, in fact, an informal
understanding that Mr. Corbett would receive federal immunity for his
cooperation, defense counsel responded only by arguing that the existence of the
immunity agreement suggested Mr. Corbett’s “strong bias.” Id. The judge
refused to strike the witness on this basis and instead directed Mr. Burke to “deal
with this issue on cross-examination.” Id.
Mr. Burke’s second claim of error follows from the court’s suppression of
his line of questioning against Joe Wilson. Mr. Wilson testified that Mr. Burke
was present at the residence on occasions when he purchased methamphetamine
from Mr. Johnston. Mr. Burke attempted to impeach Mr. Wilson’s testimony on
cross-examination by revealing that Mr. Wilson was presently under federal
indictment. See Aplt. Br. 26. In particular, he attempted to show that the same
prosecutor now questioning him in Mr. Burke’s case had previously prosecuted
Mr. Wilson in a previous state matter and bore responsibility for his current
federal indictment. Id. The government raised an objection under Fed. R. Evid.
609, claiming that the questioning constituted “[i]mproper impeachment.” R. V
444. The court sustained the objection. Mr. Burke now argues that this violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
II. The Government’s Belated Disclosure of Brady Material
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
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where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is
“material” within the meaning of Brady “only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1408 (10th
Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
“Impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the Brady
rule.” Young, 45 F.3d at 1408 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972)).
In a typical case involving an alleged Brady violation, where the purported
Brady material is not disclosed until after trial, a defendant can establish a
violation of due process by showing “1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence;
2) that the evidence was favorable to the accused; and 3) that the evidence was
material.” Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir.
1995). Here, however, the impeachment evidence was disclosed during trial, in
time for Mr. Burke to use the information during cross-examination.
We have never explicitly decided whether, and under what circumstances,
such a belated disclosure of Brady material would violate due process. In Young,
we stated that “[t]o the extent Brady applies where an allegation is made that the
government’s belated disclosure of material during the trial resulted in prejudice
to the defense, the materiality inquiry focuses on whether earlier disclosure would
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have created a reasonable doubt of guilt.” 45 F.3d at 1408, citing United States v.
Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1511 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d
1412 (11th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 777 (10th
Cir. 1984) (due process is satisfied if Brady material is disclosed before it is too
late for the defendant to make use of the benefits of it).
Some limitation on disclosure delay is necessary to protect the principles
articulated in Brady v. Maryland. The government’s duty to disclose material
evidence favorable to the accused is rooted in the premise that the sovereign’s
ultimate interest in criminal prosecution is not to maximize convictions for their
own sake, but to ensure that “justice shall be done.” United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 111 (1976). This goal entails a commitment to the principle that every
defendant shall receive a fair trial. When exculpatory or impeachment evidence
might make the difference between conviction and acquittal, the failure to
disclose that evidence to the defense “deprive[s] the defendant of a fair trial.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
It would eviscerate the purpose of the Brady rule and encourage
gamesmanship were we to allow the government to postpone disclosures to the
last minute, during trial. As the Second Circuit noted in Leka v. Portuondo, 257
F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2001), the belated disclosure of Brady material “tend[s] to
throw existing strategies and [trial] preparation into disarray.” It becomes
“difficult [to] assimilate new information, however favorable, when a trial already
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has been prepared on the basis of the best opportunities and choices then
available.” Id. See also United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 290 (1st Cir. 1990)
(explaining that a Brady violation would occur if delayed disclosure altered
defense strategy and timely disclosure would likely have resulted in a more
effective strategy). If a defendant could never make out a Brady violation on the
basis of the effect of delay on his trial preparation and strategy, this would create
dangerous incentives for prosecutors to withhold impeachment or exculpatory
information until after the defense has committed itself to a particular strategy
during opening statements or until it is too late for the defense to effectively use
the disclosed information. It is not hard to imagine the many circumstances in
which the belated revelation of Brady material might meaningfully alter a
defendant’s choices before and during trial: how to apportion time and resources
to various theories when investigating the case, whether the defendant should
testify, whether to focus the jury’s attention on this or that defense, and so on. To
force the defendant to bear these costs without recourse would offend the notion
of fair trial that underlies the Brady principle.
At a minimum, therefore, we adopt as a holding this court’s statement in
Young that the belated disclosure of impeachment or exculpatory information
favorable to the accused violates due process when an “earlier disclosure would
have created a reasonable doubt of guilt.” 45 F.3d at 1408. See also United
States v. Fallon, 348 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2003) (key inquiry is “whether
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earlier disclosure would have created a reasonable doubt of guilt”). 1 Where the
district court concludes that the government was dilatory in its compliance with
Brady, to the prejudice of the defendant, the district court has discretion to
determine an appropriate remedy, whether it be exclusion of the witness,
limitations on the scope of permitted testimony, instructions to the jury, or even
mistrial. The choice of remedy is in the sound discretion of the district court.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) authorizes the district court in cases of non-compliance
with discovery obligations to “permit the discovery or inspection,” “grant a
continuance,” “prohibit the party from introducing the evidence not disclosed,” or
“enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.” See also United
States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 391 (5th Cir. 1997) (district court has “real
latitude” to fashion appropriate remedy for alleged Brady errors following from
delayed disclosure); United States v. Joselyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1196 (1st Cir. 1996)
(“The district court has broad discretion to redress discovery violations in light of
their seriousness and any prejudice occasioned the defendant.”).
It is true that several older cases from this circuit contain broad language
suggesting that delays in disclosure cannot violate due process so long as they
were made during trial. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 218
(10th Cir. 1989) (“Brady is not violated when the Brady material is available to
1
The Appellant has not argued that the burden should shift to the
government to show the lack of prejudice where the government’s delay lacks any
legitimate justification, and we therefore do not consider that argument.
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defendants during trial”), quoting United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 158
(10th Cir. 1982), and citing United States v. George, 778 F.2d 556, 561 (10th Cir.
1985); United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1979). This
court explained those earlier decisions in Young:
We have stated on several occasions that Brady is not violated when the
material requested is made available during the trial. [citing cases] Despite
our seemingly unequivocal statements on this question, we have generally
proceeded to examine whether the circumstances of disclosure during a trial
were such as to prejudice the defense. See e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 1511.
In this case, we need not decide whether there are some circumstances
where the disclosure of impeaching evidence during trial would constitute a
violation of Brady because we find that the evidence disclosed here was not
material and the delay resulted in no prejudice to the defendant.
Young, 45 F.3d at 1408 n.2. A close analysis of the decisions cited by the
government confirms this explanation. In Bishop, the government failed to
disclose until trial that the teller in a bank robbery case had identified someone
other than the defendant in a photographic line-up. Although the defense made a
“tactical decision” not to recall the teller herself, the court noted that the defense
elicited the exculpatory information from another witness, making “[t]he jury []
fully aware of the teller’s failure to identify the defendant as the robber.” 890
F.2d at 218–19. The court concluded: “to the extent that a materiality inquiry
under Agurs is feasible in a situation where defendant was in receipt of Brady
materials during trial, we do not believe that earlier disclosure of the information
would have given rise to a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new
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trial.” Id. We interpret this as at least leaving open the question of whether the
defendant is entitled to relief for belated Brady disclosures where prejudice is
established. To similar effect, see Behrens, 689 F.2d at 158 (rejecting claim that
belated Brady disclosure violated due process on the ground that “defendants
have not demonstrated that the delayed disclosure of evidence deprived them of a
fair trial”); George, 778 F.2d at 561 (rejecting claim that belated Brady disclosure
violated due process where “[t]he defendant-appellant had the information in
sufficient time to cross-examine each government witness, use it in the
presentation of his own case, introduce expert testimony concerning the purpose
and use of the nunchaku and effectively weave this evidence into his closing
statement in support of reasonable doubt.”); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 1511 (“The fact
that the documents were received on the last day of the trial does not, in itself,
indicate that he did not receive a fair trial.”). 2
The majority of our sister circuits have held that while the untimely
disclosure of Brady material does not constitute a constitutional violation in
itself, it may violate due process if the defendant can show he was prejudiced by
the delay. See Powell v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2008) (“when
the claim is untimely disclosure of Brady material, we have looked ‘to whether
2
We also note that each of these cases arose in the context of an argument
on appeal that the delay in disclosure necessitated reversal and retrial—not, as in
this case, a claim that the trial court erroneously held that there had been no
prejudice from the delay and thus abused its discretion in its choice of remedy.
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the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure’”) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 132 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Patrick, 965
F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Delay [in disclosure] only violates Brady when
the delay itself causes prejudice.”); United States v. Fallon, 348 F.3d 248, 252
(7th Cir. 2003); Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 101–04 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 290 (1st Cir. 1990). See also United States v.
Tyndall, 521 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A mid-trial disclosure violates Brady
only if it comes too late for the defense to make use of it.”); United States v.
Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1993) (disclosure of Brady material “must be
made when it is still of substantial value to the accused”); United States v. Higgs,
713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (“No denial of due process occurs if Brady
material is disclosed to appellees in time for its effective use at trial.”).
As these decisions recognize, not every delay in disclosure of Brady
material is necessarily prejudicial to the defense. See United States v. Warren,
454 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Late disclosure does not itself constitute a
Brady violation.”). As the Eleventh Circuit said in United States v. Kubiak, 704
F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1983), the focus of due process violation is “not upon
the fact of nondisclosure, but upon the impact of nondisclosure on the jury's
verdict.” To justify imposition of a remedy, the defense must articulate to the
district court the reasons why the delay should be regarded as materially
prejudicial. That was the problem here. Although Mr. Burke alleged a Brady
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violation, he failed to present the trial court with any credible reason why the
delayed disclosure of Mr. Corbett’s plea agreement had resulted in prejudice
requiring the remedy he sought—the exclusion of all testimony by the witness
about whom impeachment evidence was withheld. When making his motion, Mr.
Burke argued only that the plea agreement suggested that Mr. Corbett’s testimony
was the product of “strong bias.” R. V 423. But the district court reasonably
concluded that the issue of bias could be dealt with on cross-examination. See
id.; cf. United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 698 (6th Cir. 2008) (no Brady
violation where disclosure of impeachment evidence occurred in time to impeach
witness on the stand). And indeed, on cross-examination, Mr. Burke questioned
Mr. Corbett in detail about his plea agreement, exposing to the jury that Mr.
Corbett was promised that “there would be no federal charges filed against [him]
as long as [he] cooperated fully . . . .” R. V 430–31. As a result, Mr. Burke was
able to apprise the jury of his theory that Mr. Corbett’s testimony was biased by
his self-interest in cooperating with the government. The district court, therefore,
did not err in concluding that the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Corbett would
allow Mr. Burke to fully develop his theory of bias.
On appeal, however, Mr. Burke argues that the delayed disclosure of Mr.
Corbett’s immunity agreement caused a different kind of prejudice—disrupting
and altering his trial strategy. Mr. Burke now suggests that had he been aware in
advance “that Mr. Corbett was subject to extremely persuasive bias cross-
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examination,” Aplt. Br. 22–23 his strategy during opening statements would have
been different. Instead of conceding that Mr. Burke had met with Mr. Corbett
after the controlled buy and had physically assaulted him at the jail, while
offering a more innocuous explanation for both events, Mr. Burke argues that he
would have “held the Government to its burden on this issue and insisted that the
Government rely upon its impeachable witness Mr. Corbett.” Aplt. Br. 23.
We have no need to determine whether this claim of prejudice is sufficient.
As with other legal issues that arise in the midst of trial, it is the obligation of the
parties to present their arguments to the district court, to enable the court to
fashion a remedy if the circumstances warrant it. In this case, Mr. Burke’s
motion before the district court did not encompass any claim that the
government’s delayed disclosure had altered his trial strategy. He relied solely on
the fact that the belatedly-received information revealed a source of bias on the
part of the witness, which the district court correctly ruled could be dealt with by
cross-examination. As we explained in United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d
1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2008), when a defendant pursues a particular theory or
objection, but fails to raise another closely related argument, he has forfeited the
argument and we review only for plain error. See also United States v. Blandin,
784 F.2d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1986) (reviewing delayed disclosure of exhibits
for plain error after failure to timely object). Because the district court was never
apprised of the claim of prejudice now raised, Mr. Burke forfeited this basis for
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arguing that the government’s delayed disclosure of Mr. Corbett’s immunity
materially prejudiced his defense.
Although the argument was not timely raised before the district court, we
nonetheless review for plain error. When reviewing an issue for plain error, we
will reverse the judgment below only if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which
(3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Duffield v. Jackson, 545
F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008). It is hardly plain from the record that had Mr.
Burke executed his alternative strategy—disavowing Mr. Corbett’s claims that
Mr. Burke physically assaulted him at the jail and warned him about informing
against Mr. Johnston—this would have materially affected the outcome of trial.
Perhaps so, but both Mr. Corbett and Mr. Johnson offered similar testimony that
the alleged events had occurred, enhancing their individual credibility. Moreover,
the prosecution likely had physical records that could have been introduced to
confirm Mr. Corbett and Mr. Burke’s confrontation at the jail. Finally, the force
of additional testimony from Mr. Johnson and Ms. Spong incriminating Mr. Burke
would have been unaffected by any change in strategy. Mr. Burke’s argument is
plausible, but falls short of plainly correct.
III. The Suppression of Mr. Burke’s Impeachment of Mr. Wilson
We next review Mr. Burke’s claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived
of his Sixth Amendment right to confront those witnesses testifying against him.
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We conclude that even assuming that the court improperly curtailed Mr. Burke’s
right to confront Joe Wilson, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The reversal of a conviction is not warranted merely because a litigant can
show the existence of a Confrontation Clause error. If the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Burke’s conviction need not be overturned. See
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). When determining whether a
Confrontation Clause error is harmless, we have looked to (1) the importance of
the witness’s testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was
cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of the
actual cross-examination; and (5) the overall strength of the State’s case. Jones v.
Gibson, 206 F.3d 946, 957 (10th Cir. 2000).
In this case, we are confident that any improper suppression of Mr. Burke’s
cross-examination of Mr. Wilson was harmless. Most importantly, in the scheme
of the government’s overall case against Mr. Burke, Mr. Wilson’s testimony was
of relatively minimal importance, and mostly cumulative. Mr. Wilson did not
testify that Mr. Burke sold drugs to him—only that Mr. Burke was present at the
shared residence while Mr. Johnston was selling drugs. Numerous witnesses
testified to the same or similar facts. Kim Meiwes, for instance, testified that she
saw Mr. Burke at the house when she purchased drugs from Mr. Johnston. Aple.
Br. 14. Similarly, April Sprong testified that she separately purchased drugs from
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both Johnston and Burke at the shared residence. Finally, Mr. Johnston—Mr.
Burke’s alleged conspirator—also testified in accord with the state’s general
theory.
The extent of the cross-examination actually conducted also somewhat
diminishes the risk of prejudice from any premature suppression of Mr. Burke’s
line of questioning. For instance, Mr. Burke was able to elicit explicit testimony
that Mr. Wilson had never purchased drugs from him. R. V 444–45. Mr. Burke
also impeached Mr. Wilson by presenting evidence of his extensive criminal
history, including that he had previously been convicted of providing false
information to a court. R. V 442; see Jones, 206 F.3d at 958 (finding relevant to
the harmlessness inquiry whether the witness in question was impeached through
other means).
Finally, the state’s case was not so weak that further cross-examination of
Mr. Wilson reasonably could have been expected to affect the jury’s
deliberations. Multiple witnesses had testified that drugs were sold at Mr.
Burke’s home and that Mr. Burke himself engaged in the sale of drugs. In
addition, Mr. Johnston testified that he and Mr. Burke obtained drugs from each
other on occasion to serve their customers. R. V 342. In the context of this
evidence, even the total absence of Mr. Wilson’s testimony would have done little
to diminish the government’s case. We therefore conclude that any alleged
Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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