Luster v. Collins (In Re Collins)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-30605

Summary Calendar

In The Matter Of: JEFFREY DALE COLLINS, also known as Jeff Collins

Debtor

______________________

JOHN W LUSTER, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Jeffrey Dale
Collins also known as Jeff Collins

Appellant,

JEFFREY DALE COLLINS, also known as Jeff Collins
Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

April 5, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The trustee of Jeffrey Dale Collins’s bankruptcy estate

appeals an exemption Collins received for anticipated Earned Income

Tax Credit payments under 26 U.S.C. § 32. The bankruptcy court and

the district court rejected the trustee’s objections to the

exemption. Both courts relied on other lower court opinions,
acknowledging that some bankruptcy courts have construed the

relevant provision of Louisiana law differently. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and review the issue de novo.

A bankruptcy estate ordinarily includes “all legal or

equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the

commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The debtor,

however, may claim exemptions provided by law. Congress offered a

detailed scheme of exemptions in § 522(d), but allowed states to

opt out in favor of their own exemptions. See id. § 522(b).

Louisiana has exercised this option and has provided, “All

assistance shall be inalienable by any assignment or transfer and

shall be exempt from levy or execution under the laws of this

state.” La. Rev. Stat. § 46:111. “Assistance” is defined by a

statute in the same title of the code as “money payments under this

Title.” Id. § 46:1(6).

Collins would be entitled to the exemption only if the EITC is

part of the “all assistance” referred to in § 46:111. It is

plainly not, because the federal credit is not a “money payment

under this Title.” Collins presses that “all assistance” would be

redundant if it simply meant “money payments under this Title,” and

that the legislature used the word “all” to make clear that any

kind of assistance would be covered. This is a weak argument.

Substituting the definition into the provision allows an exemption

for “all money payments under this Title.” This is not redundant,

because it forecloses the possibility that a court might read the

2
statute as covering some or most but not all “money payments under

this Title.”

The canons of interpretation are suspicious of surplussage.

But we cannot allow these canons to produce absurd results when a

legislature has sought to make a statute crystal clear rather than

just clear. Louisiana defines the “assistance” that it allows

debtors to exempt. The word “all” does not reveal that the

legislature intended to bypass the definition it had crafted in

favor of a broader one left undefined. The most basic rule of

construction is that when a statute is unambiguous, it means what

it says. We cannot invent ambiguities where linguistically there

are none.

The bankruptcy and district courts thus erred in granting the

exemption. The trustee’s objections should be sustained.

REVERSED.

Luster v. Collins (In Re Collins)

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