IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-30605
Summary Calendar
In The Matter Of: JEFFREY DALE COLLINS, also known as Jeff Collins
Debtor
______________________
JOHN W LUSTER, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Jeffrey Dale
Collins also known as Jeff Collins
Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY DALE COLLINS, also known as Jeff Collins
Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
April 5, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The trustee of Jeffrey Dale Collins’s bankruptcy estate
appeals an exemption Collins received for anticipated Earned Income
Tax Credit payments under 26 U.S.C. § 32. The bankruptcy court and
the district court rejected the trustee’s objections to the
exemption. Both courts relied on other lower court opinions,
acknowledging that some bankruptcy courts have construed the
relevant provision of Louisiana law differently. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and review the issue de novo.
A bankruptcy estate ordinarily includes “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The debtor,
however, may claim exemptions provided by law. Congress offered a
detailed scheme of exemptions in § 522(d), but allowed states to
opt out in favor of their own exemptions. See id. § 522(b).
Louisiana has exercised this option and has provided, “All
assistance shall be inalienable by any assignment or transfer and
shall be exempt from levy or execution under the laws of this
state.” La. Rev. Stat. § 46:111. “Assistance” is defined by a
statute in the same title of the code as “money payments under this
Title.” Id. § 46:1(6).
Collins would be entitled to the exemption only if the EITC is
part of the “all assistance” referred to in § 46:111. It is
plainly not, because the federal credit is not a “money payment
under this Title.” Collins presses that “all assistance” would be
redundant if it simply meant “money payments under this Title,” and
that the legislature used the word “all” to make clear that any
kind of assistance would be covered. This is a weak argument.
Substituting the definition into the provision allows an exemption
for “all money payments under this Title.” This is not redundant,
because it forecloses the possibility that a court might read the
2
statute as covering some or most but not all “money payments under
this Title.”
The canons of interpretation are suspicious of surplussage.
But we cannot allow these canons to produce absurd results when a
legislature has sought to make a statute crystal clear rather than
just clear. Louisiana defines the “assistance” that it allows
debtors to exempt. The word “all” does not reveal that the
legislature intended to bypass the definition it had crafted in
favor of a broader one left undefined. The most basic rule of
construction is that when a statute is unambiguous, it means what
it says. We cannot invent ambiguities where linguistically there
are none.
The bankruptcy and district courts thus erred in granting the
exemption. The trustee’s objections should be sustained.
REVERSED.
3