EBC, Inc. v. Clark Building System, Inc.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________

No. 09-1182
_______________

EBC, INC.; STATE STEEL SUPPLY, INC.

v.

CLARK BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.; AMERICAN
COMPOST CORPORATION;
A&M COMPOSTING, INC.; SOLID WASTE SERVICES,
INC.

State Steel Supply, Inc., Appellant
_______________

On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Civil No. 2:05-cv-1549)
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 23, 2010
________________

Before: SCIRICA and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
and RODRIGUEZ * , District Judge

(Filed: August 18, 2010)

Jennifer L. Gardner, Esq.
Margaret M. Metzinger, Esq.

*
The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, Senior Judge of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting
by designation.
Stewart D. Roll, Esq.
Climaco Law Firm
55 Public Sq., Ste. 1950
Cleveland, OH 44113

Paul R. Rosenberger, Esq.
Persky, Shapiro & Arnoff
25101 Chagrin Blvd., Ste. 350
Beachwood, OH 44122

Counsel for Appellant

Albert A. DeGennaro, Esq.
2650 Audobon Rd.
Audobon, PA 19403

William F. Fox, Jr., Esq.
J.P. Mascaro & Sons
320 Godshall Dr.
Harleysville, PA 19438

Counsel for Appellees

__________________

OPINION
__________________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

In April 2004, now-defunct Clark Building Systems, Inc.
(“Clark”) entered into a contract with appellee A&M Composting,
Inc. (“A&M”), under which Clark would fabricate and deliver
components for a large steel building to be assembled at A&M’s
facility. Clark, in turn, subcontracted with appellant State Steel
Supply, Inc. (“State Steel”) to supply raw steel for the project.
When State Steel was not paid for a significant portion of the steel
that it supplied, it brought this diversity action against A&M in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. The District Court granted A&M’s motion for

2
summary judgment in part, rejecting State Steel’s claims for breach
of contract and an account stated. It denied summary judgment on
State Steel’s claims of unjust enrichment and fraudulent
inducement, and a bench trial ensued. The District Court thereafter
granted A&M’s motion for judgment on partial findings pursuant
to Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and entered
final judgment. State Steel now appeals. We will affirm.

I.

A.

A&M operates a composting facility in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania.1 In February 2003, a severe snowstorm caused the
roof of its building to collapse, requiring replacement of the entire
structure. On April 14, 2004, A&M engaged Clark in a contract
(the “Contract”) to fabricate a 465,000-square-foot facility
composed of three steel buildings (collectively, the “Project
Buildings”) to replace the original. Joint Appendix (“JA”) 320-21.
A&M agreed to pay Clark a fixed price of $2,418,476, to be paid
according to the following schedule:

Initial Down Payment Upon
Execution of the Agreement: $90,000

Second Down Payment Seven
Days After Execution of the Agreement: $507,619

Phased Payments Upon Delivery
of Fabricated Buildings According
to Phased Delivery Schedule: $1,820,857

JA 322-23. The Contract did not itemize expenses for project

1
Defendants American Compost Corporation, Solid Waste
Services, Inc., and A&M Composting, Inc. are affiliated entities
doing business as J.P. Mascaro & Sons. We refer only to A&M
herein, although portions of the record that we cite refer to
“Mascaro.”

3
components, but the second payment was to be deposited into a
joint checking account and was specifically “to be used to pay
suppliers of the raw materials necessary for Clark to fabricate the
Project Buildings.” JA 323. Upon delivery of each segment of the
Project Buildings, Clark was to invoice A&M, and A&M was to
satisfy the invoice within seven days. JA 41, 323-24.

The Contract, under which time was of the essence, required
Clark to fabricate the steel materials at its own facility and deliver
them to A&M for assembly. Selected third parties would be
responsible for the following: erecting the buildings, galvanizing
the component steel materials, and supplying the necessary anchor
bolts. JA 40, 322. Clark also represented that it “ha[d] the ability
to secure and ha[d] made the necessary arrangements to secure the
raw materials required for the fabrication of the Project Buildings
. . . .” JA 325. To that end, Clark entered into subcontracts with,
among others, State Steel and EBC, Inc. (“EBC”) to provide the
raw materials. Pursuant to these agreements, EBC was to supply
purlins, roofing, and siding materials, and State Steel was to deliver
shipments of raw steel to Clark’s facility. JA 273, 278, 308-09.
A&M was not a party to these subcontracts.

A&M paid Clark the initial down payment ($90,000) and
thereafter deposited the second down payment ($507,619) into the
joint checking account established for Clark’s suppliers. EBC was
paid from this account a deposit of $110,000 on April 23, 2004. JA
392-93. State Steel was also paid from this account a deposit of
$100,000 on May 7, 2004. JA 337-38, 565-66.

On May 26, 2004, A&M’s General Counsel, William Fox,
sent a letter to State Steel’s President, Adrienne Chizek,2 which
read in relevant part:

Re: Your Contract with Clark Building Systems,
Inc. For Web Materials for Further Processing by
Clark

2
Chizek’s surname is now Berg. For continuity, we refer
only to the surname Chizek.

4
I am General Counsel for Solid Waste Services, Inc.
d/b/a J.P. Mascaro & Sons and its affiliated
companies (“Mascaro”)[,] one of which is A&M
Composting, Inc., the owner of the A&M
Composting facility in Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania.

Mascaro is a large regional company headquartered
in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, that engages
in the collection, recycling, processing,
transportation, disposal[,] and composting of solid
waste. Mascaro has been in business for 35 years, it
competes successfully with the national waste
companies, it has strong, long-term bonding and
banking relationships[,] and it is rated 5-A-1 by
Dunn & Bradstreet.

Mascaro has contracted with Clark Building
Systems, Inc. to provide a large fabricated steel
building (i.e. approximately 465,000 square feet)
related to the reconstruction of the A&M Compost
facility. Clark has previous experience in providing
this type of building to Mascaro, the last of which
was a 250,000 square foot fabricated building for use
at Mascaro’s Wetzel County Compost facility in
2002.

We understand that Clark has contracted with your
company to provide web materials for the A&M
reconstruction project. We also understand that the
amount of their contract with your company is
approximately $450,000 and that Clark has made a
substantial down payment to your company.

I am writing to advise you that under our contract
with Clark, we make payment to Clark within seven
days of the building material delivery for each
completed phase, without defect, to our site. With
respect to any balance that Clark may owe your

5
 company for the web materials, [our] company is
willing, with Clark’s permission, to pay you directly
or by joint check made payable to Clark and your
company within the seven day period, as long as our
payment is credited by Clark against the amount due
under our contract with Clark. It is our
understanding that Clark is agreeable to this
arrangement.

I am providing a copy of this letter to Sol Wansor
and Jeff Smith, the President and Controller of
Clark, and if you have any questions, please feel free
to contact either of them or me.

JA 308-09. Fox sent identical letters to EBC and another
subcontractor with whom Clark had entered into a supply
agreement. JA 309A-D. The letter (the “Fox Letter”) underpins
this dispute.

From May through November of 2004, State Steel delivered
to Clark’s facility a series of steel shipments, and it invoiced Clark
accordingly. JA 42-43, 267. On August 4, 2004, Clark sent a
request to A&M to forward a payment of $90,000 directly to State
Steel for materials for which Clark had not yet paid. JA 568-70.
A&M did so the following day. JA 49, 567. On September 24,
2004, Clark again requested that A&M forward $90,000 to State
Steel for steel that had yet to be paid for, and A&M forwarded the
payment to State Steel on September 27, 2004. JA 49-50, 571-72.
These direct payments did not come from the joint checking
account, and A&M made them with the understanding that its
balance to Clark would be deducted accordingly. JA 49-50, 290.
In all, A&M paid State Steel $280,000. JA 48.

Clark fell behind schedule in delivering the fabricated steel
components to A&M. On September 2, 2004, Fox wrote to Clark’s
President, Sol Wansor, detailing Clark’s “serious failure to adhere
to the delivery and completion schedule” set forth by the Contract.
Supplemental Appendix (“SA”) 8. He explained that A&M was
unable to operate without the new buildings, and that Clark’s delay
jeopardized a $200 million composting contract with a

6
governmental entity. Id. A&M ultimately hired mitigation
subcontractors to complete the work for which Clark had been
responsible under the Contract. JA 335-36; SA 11-15. This
mitigation cost increased the total purchase price by $119,459.22,
and was reflected in a Change Order form. JA 53, 336; SA 15. In
a letter to Wansor dated October 7, 2004, Fox stated: “As a follow
up to earlier correspondences, I have executed your form Change
Order regarding the subcontractors that are now performing a
portion of your work under the above-referenced contract. As
indicated in my earlier letters, we have agreed to pay the
subcontractors directly for the work they do.” JA 335.

Delivery of the fabricated steel components was completed
in January 2005, and the buildings were assembled by March 2005.
JA 55. On July 11, 2005, Wansor wrote to Mascaro about
outstanding balances that A&M purportedly owed to Clark’s
subcontractors. Wansor attached an earlier memorandum written
by Jefferey Smith (Clark’s Controller) indicating that A&M owed
State Steel an additional $214,958.20 and EBC an additional
$117,781.95. JA 347. A&M vigorously denied that it owed
anything more to either of these subcontractors. JA 56-57. Though
it had invoiced Clark for steel materials valued at $489,902.15, it
is undisputed that State Steel received only three payments totaling
$280,000. JA 55. EBC, too, never received full compensation for
the materials that it had supplied. Clark ultimately went out of
business and its assets were sold at a sheriff’s sale. JA 7 n.2.

B.

State Steel and EBC filed this action against A&M and
3
Clark on November 7, 2005, asserting four claims against A&M:

3
Though Wansor and Smith testified at trial, Clark did not
respond to the complaint or attempt to defend itself, and the
District Court entered default judgment against it on December 16,
2008. JA 7 n.2, 29-30 & nn.3-4, 78. Additionally, EBC
voluntarily dismissed its claims against the defendants before the
District Court granted summary judgment, leaving State Steel as
the only remaining plaintiff. JA 6 n.1, 29 n.2. Accordingly, we

7
(1) breach of contract; (2) fraudulent inducement; (3) unjust
enrichment; and (4) an account stated. State Steel alleged that the
Fox Letter constituted an enforceable agreement requiring A&M
to pay directly the outstanding balance on the invoices for the steel
supplied to Clark. Alternatively, it asserted that A&M, via the Fox
Letter, fraudulently induced it to deliver the steel without any intent
to provide full payment. Finally, State Steel claimed that A&M
had been unjustly enriched by accepting the Project Buildings and
that it had an unpaid and overdue account in the amount of
$214,958.20.4

A&M moved for summary judgment on all counts, which
the District Court granted in part and denied in part. With respect
to the breach of contract claim, the District Court determined that
it was “not unreasonable for a person in [State Steel’s] position to
view the letter . . . as an enforceable agreement.” JA 14. However,
the court concluded as a matter of undisputed material fact that
State Steel had not regarded the Fox Letter as an offer to enter into
a binding agreement. Relying on Chizek’s deposition testimony,
the District Court held that State Steel’s outward and objective
manifestations undermined any contractual agreement between
A&M and State Steel. JA 15-16. The District Court also rejected
State Steel’s claim for an account stated because such a claim
requires both parties to have agreed that a sum certain is owed, an
element not satisfied under the undisputed facts. JA 22-23. But
the District Court found genuine issues of material fact underlying
the claims for fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment, and it
denied summary judgment on those two causes of action. JA 16-
22.

State Steel moved the District Court to reconsider its
disposition of the breach of contract claim. It relied upon an errata
sheet to Chizek’s deposition testimony that had been included as an
exhibit to its original papers opposing A&M’s motion for summary

review only State Steel’s claims against A&M.
4
Evidently $5,056.05 of this sum had actually been paid.
Accordingly, State Steel seeks payment for $209,902.15. See State
Steel Br. at 41 & n.5.

8
judgment. The errata sheet purported to clarify the answers upon
which the District Court had relied in rejecting the claim. JA 282.
Finding it untimely and otherwise noncompliant with Rule 30(e),
the District Court refused to consider the errata sheet and denied
the motion for reconsideration. EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., No.
05-1549, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3728, at *2-6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16,
2008). State Steel filed a second motion for reconsideration, which
the District Court denied in a summary order.5

The District Court held a two-day bench trial on the
remaining claims, during which State Steel presented the testimony
of four witnesses: Wansor, Smith, Fox (as an adverse witness), and
Chizek. JA 33-34. During its case-in-chief, State Steel stipulated
to A&M’s offer of two key exhibits into evidence: (1) Joint
Exhibit 25, a spreadsheet summarizing A&M’s total disbursements
to Clark and its subcontractors; and (2) Defendants’ Exhibit 1, a
voluminous set of business records submitted to substantiate Joint
Exhibit 25. JA 64, 246. After State Steel rested its case, A&M
moved for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52(c), and
State Steel again moved for reconsideration of the breach of
contract claim. On November 13, 2008, the District Court issued
a comprehensive memorandum opinion: (1) denying State Steel’s
motion for reconsideration for the reasons it had previously stated;
and (2) granting A&M’s Rule 52(c) motion in toto. Rejecting the
unjust enrichment claim, the court found that A&M had paid more
than the adjusted Contract price, and therefore held that it would be
inequitable to force A&M to pay, in effect, for the same raw
materials again. JA 60-68. The court also rejected the fraudulent
inducement claim, concluding that State Steel had not proven any
material misrepresentations. JA 68-74. State Steel timely

5
Shortly before trial, State Steel filed alternative motions
pursuant to Rule 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), requesting that the
District Court either direct the entry of final judgment on the
breach of contract claim or certify an interlocutory appeal. JA 33.
It also requested permission to question Chizek at trial regarding
the breach of contract claim. Id. The District Court denied these
requests as well. EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., No. 05-1549, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21018 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2008).

9
appealed.6
II.

State Steel argues first that the District Court erred by
granting A&M’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of
contract claim.7 It asserts that by offering to tender direct payments
to it (instead of Clark) upon delivery of the steel, A&M incurred an
unqualified legal obligation to make such payments. A&M,
conversely, argues that the letter was a mere accommodation to pay
the subcontractor in a more convenient manner, but in no way
constituted a binding legal obligation to make direct payments.

We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, using the same standard that it was required to apply.
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2009). A court
reviewing a summary judgment motion must evaluate the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Brewer v. Quaker State
Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary
judgment is appropriate “only when the record ‘shows that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Giles v. Kearney, 571
F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
“Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material facts,’ and
disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational
person could conclude that the position of the person with the
burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” Clark v. Modern
Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “In determining whether the
dispute is genuine, the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence
or to determine the truth of the matter . . . .” Am. Eagle Outfitters
v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).

6
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
7
State Steel does not challenge the District Court’s rejection
of the claim for an account stated and we do not discuss it further.

10
 It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law applies. The District
Court focused its analysis on State Steel’s outward manifestations
with respect to the Fox Letter, and so shall we. The relevant test
under Pennsylvania law “for [the] enforceability of an agreement
is whether both parties have manifested an intention to be bound by
its terms and whether the terms are sufficiently definite to be
specifically enforced.” Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d
291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Lombardo v. Gasparini
Excavating Co., 123 A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. 1956); Linnet v.
Hitchcock, 471 A.2d 537, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). It is well
established in Pennsylvania that “[i]n ascertaining the intent of the
parties to a contract, it is their outward and objective
manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and
subjective intentions, that matter.” Espenshade v. Espenshade, 729
A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citation omitted). State
Steel argues that it “understood the [Fox Letter] to be a promise[]
by [A&M] to pay State Steel for steel which it delivered,” and that
because A&M had a contrary understanding, a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the parties’ intent remains. State Steel Br.
at 24.8

It is true that “when the record contains conflicting evidence
regarding intent, the question of whether the parties formed a
completed contract is one for the trier of fact.” Channel Home
Ctrs., 795 F.2d at 300 n.9 (citing Field v. Golden Triangle Broad.,
Inc., 305 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa. 1973); Yellow Run Coal Co. v.

8
Throughout its appellate brief, State Steel cites testimony
later adduced at trial to support its challenge to the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment. That evidence, of course, was not
before the District Court at the time it addressed the summary
judgment motion, and we may not consider it when reviewing the
court’s decision. See Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res., 347
F.3d 1014, 1040 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In evaluating the propriety of
summary judgment on appeal, we are limited to reviewing what the
district court had before it at the time it granted summary
judgment; such evidence does not include trial testimony.” (citing
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 242
(4th Cir. 2002))).

11
Alma-Elly-Yv Mines, Ltd., 426 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981)). The District Court specifically recognized as much, JA 14,
but concluded – based on Chizek’s deposition testimony – that
there was no evidence supporting State Steel’s supposed belief that
the Fox Letter constituted a legally binding agreement. That
deposition testimony, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

Q. Do you know why [the Fox Letter] was sent?

A. Honestly I don’t.

Q. [D]id you indicate or have any conversations
with Clark about your concern about them
paying invoices?

A. I don’t remember that part. We knew that it
had to be up front, so I don’t remember what
– why it came to this, that [A&M] sent it.

...

Q. What was your understanding of that letter?

A. That Mascaro – between Mascaro and Clark,
we would be taken care of and they were
doing the building for a good company.

Q. Did you ever think that as a result of that
letter, that you would be billing any of the
Mascaro entities?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever think from that letter that any of
the Mascaro entities were . . . guaranteeing
payment of your invoices?

A. I don’t know that I really thought about it, it’s
just it was going to come from Clark and they
had a sound contract with Mascaro and

12
 everything would be okay.

...

Q. [B]ased upon getting that letter, what was
your understanding of how your invoices
would be paid if and when A&M . . . had paid
the 2.4 million and you still had invoices
outstanding?

A. I never thought about it.

Q. Would you think if [A&M] had a contract
with Clark to pay them 2.4 million for the
whole nine yards, which included your
materials, and that they paid Clark the 2.4
million, that they would be paying you
additional monies for the materials[?]

A. No, I don’t think I would have expected that.

JA 274-75.

We agree with the District Court that “[i]f State Steel
believed that no contract existed as a result of the [Fox Letter] and
its manifested intent to . . . A&M did not demonstrate a belief to
the contrary, then no contract . . . exist[ed].” JA 15-16. We further
agree that Chizek’s testimony removes any genuine issue of
material fact concerning the Fox Letter’s legal import. Chizek
twice admitted at her deposition that she did not know why Fox
wrote the letter, and also conceded that she had never considered
whether the letter was a guarantee. Critically, she admitted that she
would not have expected A&M to be responsible for paying State
Steel if A&M made payments equaling the final Contract price.
Chizek’s admissions regarding her beliefs – and her company’s
failure to conduct itself in a manner inconsistent with those beliefs
– evidence beyond repudiation that State Steel did not objectively
regard the Fox Letter to constitute a binding contract.

State Steel does not seriously dispute that Chizek’s original

13
deposition testimony undermines the existence of a binding
agreement, but argues that the District Court improperly refused to
consider the errata sheet that Chizek executed four months after her
deposition. The errata sheet, the substance of which we reproduce
below, altered the deposition testimony upon which the District
Court relied in granting summary judgment. We will assume,
arguendo, that the propriety of summary judgment on the breach of
contract claim rests on the propriety of refusing to consider
Chizek’s submitted errata.

The District Court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is a legal issue that we review de novo, but
assuming it has correctly interpreted the rules, its ultimate decision
to ignore the errata sheet is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
United Auto. Workers Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dep’t v. Metro Auto
Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2007); Hambleton Bros. Lumber
Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1224 nn.4-5 (9th Cir.
2005). This Court has not spoken previously regarding: (1) the
extent to which a party may establish a genuine issue of material
fact by using a deposition errata sheet; and (2) whether and when
a District Court may ignore a noncompliant errata sheet.
Accordingly, we first take the opportunity to address the contours
of the rule governing errata sheets. We then apply the standards we
enunciate.

A.

Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:

(e) Review by the Witness; Changes.

(1) Review; Statement of Changes. On request by
the deponent or a party before the deposition is
completed, the deponent must be allowed 30 days
after being notified by the officer that the transcript

14
 or recording [9] is available in which:

(A) to review the transcript or
recording; and

(B) if there are changes in form or
substance, to sign a statement listing
the changes and the reasons for
making them.

(2) Changes Indicated in the Office’s Certificate.
The officer must note in the certificate prescribed by
Rule 30(f)(1)[10] whether a review was requested and,
if so, must attach any changes the deponent makes
during the 30-day period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e). The rule contemplates a number of
procedural requirements to be satisfied by both the party/deponent
and the “officer” – assumed herein to be the court reporter, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 28 – before changes to deposition testimony may be
permitted. Upon satisfaction of these procedural hurdles, the rule
then envisions “changes in form or substance.” We address the
procedural and substantive aspects of the rule in turn.11

9
For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the
“transcript or recording” as the “deposition transcript.”
10
Rule 30(f)(1) governs the certification and delivery of the
deposition transcript by the court reporter. Relevant here, the rule
requires the court reporter to certify in writing that the deponent
was duly sworn and that the transcript accurately depicts the
deponent’s testimony. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1). Further, the court
reporter’s certification must accompany the deposition transcript,
and the transcript must be delivered promptly to the attorney who
arranged for the transcript’s production. Id.
11
Rule 30 was amended in 2007 as part of the general
restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “These changes
[we]re intended to be stylistic only.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory
committee’s note. Accordingly, the pre-amendment cases cited

15
 1.

The procedural requirements of Rule 30(e) are clear and
mandatory. As a threshold, Rule 30(e)(1) requires the party or
deponent to request review of the deposition before the deposition
itself is completed. See Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1226
(“[Rule] 30(e) . . . requires the deponent or the interested party to
request review of the deposition in order to make corrections.”);
Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543, 1551-52 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Under the
plain language of Rule 30(e) . . . the deponent or party must request
review of the deposition before its completion. . . . [This procedure
is] an absolute prerequisite to amending or correcting a deposition
under Rule 30(e).”); Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 232
F.R.D. 491, 494 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (barring witness from changing
deposition transcript for failure to request review before
completion of the deposition). Rule 30(e)(2) also requires the court
reporter to certify that review was in fact requested. Without such
a certification, a court cannot determine whether the threshold
requirement has been satisfied. See Rios, 67 F.3d at 1552;
Blackthorne v. Posner, 883 F. Supp. 1443, 1454 n.16 (D. Or.
1995).

“If the party or deponent [has] properly request[ed] review,
[he or she] may submit changes to [the] deposition within thirty
days after being notified by the officer that the transcript is
available for review.” Rios, 67 F.3d at 1552; accord Agrizap, 232
F.R.D. at 492-94; Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp.
718, 722 (N.D. Ohio 1997). We emphasize that Rule 30(e)’s
thirty-day clock begins to run when the party is notified by the
court reporter that transcript is available for review, not when the
party or deponent physically receives the transcript from the court
reporter. See Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1224 (“[Rule] 30(e)
states that the thirty-day correction clock begins upon notification
of availability, not possession.”); Welsh v. R.W. Bradford Transp.,
231 F.R.D. 297, 298-99 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“At least part of Rule 30
could not be more straightforward: a deponent has 30 days after
notification by the court reporter to review the deposition transcript

herein apply with equal force to the amended rule.

16
and to sign a statement setting forth any changes and the reasons
for those changes.” (emphasis in original)); Holland v. Cedar Creek
Mining, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 651, 653 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (“[T]he 30
day period begins on the date that the deponent receives notice of
the availability of the transcript from the court reporter.”). Courts
are entitled to enforce Rule 30(e)’s time limit strictly and strike
untimely errata. See Holland, 198 F.R.D. at 653 (“This court, like
most courts, will insist on strict adherence to the technical
requirements of Rule 30(e).”).12

Rule 30(e)’s final procedural hurdle requires the party or
deponent seeking to change a deposition transcript to include with
the proposed changes a statement of reasons for making them. As
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has explained:

A statement of reasons explaining corrections is an
important component of errata submitted pursuant to
[Rule] 30(e), because the statement permits an
assessment concerning whether the alterations have
a legitimate purpose. . . . The absence of any stated
reasons for the changes supports the magistrate
judge’s concern that the “corrections” were not
corrections at all, but rather purposeful rewrites
tailored to manufacture an issue of material fact . . .
and to avoid a summary judgment in [the
defendant’s] favor.

12
Note, however, the phrasing of the rule – it provides that
a party or deponent “must be allowed 30 days” to submit errata (the
rule formerly stated that the party or deponent “shall have 30
days”). Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e)(1). The natural language of the rule,
then, does not preclude courts from allowing more time upon a
prior request or forgiving minor untimeliness after the fact.
Instead, the rule grants courts discretion to do so under appropriate
circumstances. While courts retain the authority to enforce the
amendment window strictly, we leave the matter to their sound
discretion to determine if and when extension of the time limit is
appropriate.

17
Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1224-25; see also Hawthorne
Partners v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1406 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (“[Rule] 30(e) allows a witness to make . . . ‘changes in form
or substance’ to a deposition transcript but requires a statement of
reasons for making them.”).

Courts have found that the failure to provide a statement of
reasons alone suffices to strike a proposed change. See, e.g.,
Holland, 198 F.R.D. at 653 (“The witness is also plainly bound by
the rule to state specific reasons for each change.”); Duff v.
Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 804 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(“The rule is not onerous . . . but there must be a reason for every
change.” (quotation marks omitted)). We agree with these courts.
If the party or deponent proffering changes in the form or
substance of a deposition transcript fails to state the reasons for the
changes, the reviewing court may appropriately strike the errata
sheet.13

2.

Upon procedural compliance with Rule 30(e), the court will
determine the effect of the errata sheet on the deposition transcript.
The courts are divided on the extent to which a party or deponent
may change substantively the deposition transcript after review.
Some courts have determined that the rule places no limitation on
changes. Therefore, according to these courts, substantive changes
must be permitted, even if they contradict the original answers or
the reasons for making the changes are unpersuasive.14 To protect

13
While a party need only provide some reason to clear Rule
30(e)’s procedural hurdle, courts – as discussed infra – may
consider unsatisfactory or conclusory reasons when addressing
whether contradictory errata should be permitted as a substantive
matter.
14
See, e.g., Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 F.3d
98, 103 (2d Cir. 1997); Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 489-
92 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Foutz v. Town of Vinton, 211 F.R.D. 293,
295 (W.D. Va. 2002); DeLoach v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 206
F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (M.D.N.C. 2002);; Elwell v. Conair, Inc., 145

18
against abuse, these courts emphasize that the earlier testimony is
not expunged from the record, thus subjecting the deponent to
cross-examination and impeachment at trial with respect to the
contradictory testimony. See, e.g., Reilly, 230 F.R.D. at 490-91;
Foutz, 211 F.R.D. at 295, Elwell, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 87. Some
courts also permit the deposing party to reopen the deposition (with
costs to be borne by the amending party) to question the deponent
on the alteration. See Reilly, 230 F.R.D. at 490.

Other courts have read Rule 30(e) more narrowly. These
courts have determined that the rule permits changes of substance
only to the extent that the proposed alteration is consistent with the
deponent’s testimony. The champion of this view is Greenway v.
International Paper Co., in which the court explained:

The purpose of Rule 30(e) is obvious. Should the
reporter make a substantive error, i.e., he reported
“yes” but I said “no,” or a formal error, i.e., he
reported the name to be “Lawrence Smith” but the
proper name is “Laurence Smith,” then corrections
by the deponent would be in order. The Rule cannot
be interpreted to allow one to alter what was said
under oath. If that were the case, one could merely
answer the questions with no thought at all then
return home and plan artful responses. Depositions
differ from interrogatories in that regard. A
deposition is not a take home examination.

144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992).15

F. Supp. 2d 79, 86-87 (D. Me. 2001); Holland, 198 F.R.D. at 653;
Titanium Metals Corp. v. Elkem Mgmt., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 468, 472
(W.D. Pa. 1998); United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng’g, Inc.,
152 F.R.D. 565, 566-67 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Sanford v. CBS, Inc.,
594 F. Supp. 713, 714-15 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89
F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Allen & Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
15
See also Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1225; Garcia v.
Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002);

19
 We are called upon to interpret Rule 30(e) in the summary
judgment context. We believe that a flexible approach – consistent
with our prior analogous jurisprudence – is appropriate. As a
general proposition, a party may not generate from whole cloth a
genuine issue of material fact (or eliminate the same) simply by re-
tailoring sworn deposition testimony to his or her satisfaction. See
Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1225 (“While the language of [Rule]
30(e) permits corrections ‘in form or substance,’ this permission
does not properly include changes offered solely to create a
material factual dispute in a tactical attempt to evade an
unfavorable summary judgment.” (citing Combs v. Rockwell Int’l
Corp., 927 F.2d 486, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1991))); Garcia v. Pueblo
Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding
summary judgment inappropriate and rejecting defense counsel’s
attempt to eliminate genuine issues of material fact through
changes in a deposition transcript, admonishing “[w]e do not
condone counsel’s allowing for material changes to deposition
testimony and certainly do not approve of the use of such altered
testimony that is controverted by the original testimony.”); Thorn
v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000)
(affirming the grant of summary judgment, and concluding that “a
change of substance which actually contradicts the transcript is
impermissible unless it can plausibly be represented as the
correction of an error in transcription, such as dropping a ‘not’”).

Where proposed changes squarely contradict earlier
testimony materially bearing on the case, preserving the original
testimony or reopening the deposition may often prove to be

Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir.
2000); Wyeth v. Lupin Ltd., 252 F.R.D. 295, 297 (D. Md. 2008);
Adams v. Allied Sec. Holdings, 236 F.R.D. 651, 652 (C.D. Cal.
2006); Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1084,
1090-91 (D.S.D. 2003); Summerhouse v. HCA Health Servs. of
Kan., 216 F.R.D. 502, 504-08 (D. Kan. 2003); Coleman v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 997 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (D. Ariz. 1998); S.E.C. v.
Parkersburg Wireless LLC, 156 F.R.D. 529, 535-36 (D.D.C. 1994);
Rios v. Welch, 856 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (D. Kan. 1994); Barlow v.
Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 111 F.R.D. 404, 406 (M.D.N.C. 1986).

20
insufficient remedies. Moreover, requiring trial judges in all cases
to permit contradictory alterations could risk the defeat of summary
judgment in a large swath of cases for which a Rule 56 disposition
otherwise would be appropriate. Preservation of the original
testimony for impeachment at trial serves as cold comfort to the
party that should have prevailed at summary judgment. And
reopening the deposition before disposition might not be a
sufficient remedy, for the deponent who has reviewed his original
testimony and settled on an opposite answer may prove
unimpeachable.

We therefore hold that when reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, a district court does not abuse its discretion
under Rule 30(e) when it refuses to consider proposed substantive
changes that materially contradict prior deposition testimony, if the
party proffering the changes fails to provide sufficient justification.
At the same time, we emphasize that courts may, in their discretion,
choose to allow contradictory changes (and implement the remedial
measures discussed above) as the circumstances may warrant.

Our “sham affidavit” cases – which permit courts to ignore
affidavits that contradict earlier deposition testimony without
adequate explanation – provide useful guidance. See Hambleton
Bros., 397 F.3d at 1225 (applying sham affidavit cases in analyzing
Rule 30(e) issue); Burns v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 330 F.3d
1275, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Thorn, 207 F.3d at 389
(same). In Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., we
affirmed a district court’s refusal to consider a “squarely
contradict[ory]” affidavit filed after a summary judgment motion
had been filed. 851 F.2d 703, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1988). We
explained:

We recognize that there are situations in which
sworn testimony can quite properly be corrected by
a subsequent affidavit. Where the witness was
confused at the earlier deposition or for some other
reason misspoke, the subsequent correcting or
clarifying affidavit may be sufficient to create a
material dispute of fact. The case before us,
however, does not present such a situation. . . .

21
 Plaintiff’s affidavit, submitted only after she faced
almost certain defeat in summary judgment, flatly
contradicted no less than eight of her prior sworn
statements[.] . . . [T]he objectives of summary
judgment would be seriously impaired if the district
court were not free to disregard the conflicting
affidavit. . . . When, as in the present case, the
affiant was carefully questioned on the issue, had
access to the relevant information at that time, and
provided no satisfactory explanation for the later
contradiction, the courts of appeals are in agreement
that the subsequent affidavit does not create a
genuine issue of material fact.

Id. (emphasis in original)16 ; see also Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609,
624 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A] party may not create a material issue of
fact to defeat summary judgment by filing an affidavit disputing his
or her own sworn testimony without demonstrating a plausible
explanation for the conflict.” (citing Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932
F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991))); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230,
1237 (10th Cir. 1986); Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co.,
410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969). Also pertinent to our analysis in
Martin was the importance of the questioning on which the plaintiff
had altered her testimony and the questionable timing of the
affidavit. 851 F.2d at 705. These considerations, of course, must
be taken into account with all of the surrounding circumstances.
See Baer, 392 F.3d at 624.

Recently, in Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., we

16
While we emphasized the absence of any explanation for
the change in testimony, we did not purport to allow in all cases the
simple expedient of claiming confusion to legitimate a proposed
change. Indeed, we stated that the affiant must provide a
“satisfactory explanation for the later contradiction.” Martin, 851
F.2d at 706 (emphasis added). Thus, courts are free to, and should,
review the sufficiency of the stated reasons for submitting an errata
sheet, as well as the surrounding circumstances, in determining
whether contradictory changes should be permitted.

22
reaffirmed the sham affidavit doctrine’s “continued vitality and
importance”:

A sham affidavit is a contradictory affidavit that
indicates only that the affiant cannot maintain a
consistent story or is willing to offer a statement
solely for the purpose of defeating summary
judgment. A sham affidavit cannot raise a genuine
issue of fact because it is merely a variance from
earlier deposition testimony, and therefore no
reasonable jury could rely on it to find for the
nonmovant. . . . [I]f it is clear that an affidavit is
offered solely for the purpose of defeating summary
judgment, it is proper for the trial judge to conclude
that no reasonable jury could accord that affidavit
evidentiary weight and that summary judgment is
appropriate.

503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). We explained
that while some courts have prescribed a formulaic application to
the sham affidavit doctrine, we “have adopted a more flexible
approach.” Id. at 254 (citing Baer, 392 F.3d at 624; Hackman, 932
F.2d at 241; Martin, 851 F.2d at 705-06). In other words, “not all
contradictory affidavits are necessarily shams,” and “‘when there
is independent evidence in the record to bolster an otherwise
questionable affidavit, courts generally have refused to disregard
the affidavit.’” Id. (quoting Baer, 392 F.3d at 625).17

17
Moreover, we have gone so far as to reverse a district
court, in part for refusing to consider an affidavit that did not in
fact contradict the earlier deposition testimony. See Farrell v.
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 276 n.3, 284 (3d Cir. 2000);
see also Baer, 392 F.3d at 624 (“[I]t is clear that merely because
there is a discrepancy between deposition testimony and the
deponent’s later affidavit a district court is not required in all cases
to disregard the affidavit.”); Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622
F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] district court . . . cannot
disregard a party’s affidavit merely because it conflicts to some
degree with an earlier deposition.”).

23
 We see no principled reason to distinguish between
affidavits and errata sheets in this context, and we conclude that the
proper analysis for each is the same. Requiring consideration of
contradictory errata in all cases, no less so than contradictory
affidavits, “would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment
as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.” Perma
Research, 410 F.2d at 578. But nothing in the foregoing requires
courts to strike contradictory errata if sufficiently persuasive
reasons are given, if the proposed amendments truly reflect the
deponent’s original testimony, or if other circumstances satisfy the
court that amendment should be permitted. Each case will present
fact-sensitive circumstances, and we are disinclined to prescribe a
one-size-fits-all rule. Our discussion above, however, along with
our existing sham-affidavit jurisprudence, should provide needed
guidance for district courts to use hereafter.

B.

We now apply these standards to Chizek’s handwritten
errata sheet. It is undisputed that State Steel adequately requested
review before the close of the deposition. In addition, the court
reporter certified “that the inspection, reading[,] and signing of
[the] deposition were NOT waived by counsel for the respective
parties and by the witness.” JA 281 (capitalization in original).
Finally, we note that Chizek provided a reason, although
perfunctory, for the errata: “After reading the transcript, I realized
that I was confused and misunderstood some of the questions.” JA
282.

Chizek and State Steel’s compliance with Rule 30(e),
however, terminates there. The District Court held that the errata
sheet was untimely. We agree, and we therefore find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s refusal to consider it. Chizek was deposed
on December 13, 2006. The court reporter certified the original
transcript and provided notice of its availability to State Steel’s
counsel on January 15, 2007. JA 281, 283. Thus, the deadline to
amend was February 14, 2007.

Chizek purportedly executed the errata sheet on March 12,
2007, twenty-six days after the deadline, and defense counsel never

24
received it for attachment to the original transcript. JA 282; SA 2-
3. State Steel revealed the errata sheet for the first time as an
exhibit to its opposition to A&M’s motion for summary judgment,
three months after the amendment window had closed.18

State Steel argues that it did not receive the original
transcript until February 20 or 21, 2007 due to a payment issue with
the transcription company. State Steel Reply Br. at 5. But as we
have explained, the thirty-day time limit runs from the date the
court reporter provides notice of the transcript’s availability, not
from the date when the transcript is physically received. The
District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring strict
adherence to the time limit, payment issues notwithstanding. See
Del. Valley Floral Group, Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d
1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[The appellant] did not attempt
to submit an errata sheet to make substantive changes to his
unequivocal testimony until after the thirty days permitted under
Rule 30(e) . . . . Under the circumstances here, [he] has failed to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding his errata sheet.”).

Even if State Steel had complied with the procedural
requirements of Rule 30(e), we would still find no error in the

18
The District Court also rejected the errata sheet because
it was not properly filed with the court, provided to the court
reporter, or disclosed to A&M’s counsel. See EBC, Inc. v. Clark
Bldg. Sys., No. 05-1549, Dkt. Entry # 81 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2008).
State Steel argues, however, that Chizek did indeed return the
errata sheet to the court reporter, but that the court reporter never
attached it to the original transcript. State Steel filed an affidavit
of counsel attesting to that fact in its second motion for
reconsideration. A&M, in response, filed an affidavit of the court
reporter attesting that neither she nor her company ever received
the errata sheet. We are left to wonder why State Steel waited to
submit counsel’s affidavit until its second reconsideration motion.
In any event, even according to counsel’s own affidavit, Chizek
forwarded the errata sheet to the court reporter after the thirty-day
amendment window had closed, making it untimely still.

25
District Court’s refusal to consider the errata sheet. When asked in
her deposition whether she knew why the Fox Letter had been sent,
Chizek answered, “Honestly I don’t.” JA 274. The errata sheet
stated quite the opposite: “Yes – because State Steel Supply, Inc.
was not comfortable with extending that much credit to Clark Bldg.
That is why we required the $100,000 check up front. We
discussed that with Clark from the beginning.” JA 282. When
asked whether she thought the Fox Letter was guaranteeing
payment of State Steel’s invoices, Chizek answered, “I don’t know
that I really thought about it . . . .” JA 274. The errata sheet,
however, tells a different story: “Yes – I would take the letter to be
a guarantee of payment.” JA 282.19

These contradictory amendments cannot establish a genuine
issue of material fact where the original testimony did not.
Chizek’s answers were central to the contractual analysis, and were
in response to careful and repeated questioning. We also find no
record support for Chizek’s conclusory explanation that she
realized, upon review, that she had been confused by the questions.
The only corroborative evidence to which State Steel points is
Chizek’s later trial testimony, which was consistent with her
amended answers. We do not consider this evidence, see supra
note 8, but find it unsurprising that after review of her damaging
deposition testimony, Chizek settled on consistent and,
incidentally, helpful answers. Given all of the circumstances under
which the errata sheet was revealed, the District Court could have
excluded the contradictory errata as a substantive matter.

* * *

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to consider Chizek’s untimely and
contradictory errata sheet. On the evidence before it, therefore, the
District Court correctly granted summary judgment on the breach
of contract claim and denied State Steel’s motions for

19
Chizek’s other two amended answers are fairly consistent
with her original testimony, but do refer to a “guarantee” that did
not appear in her original testimony.

26
reconsideration.

III.

We turn to the claims for unjust enrichment and fraudulent
inducement, the subjects of the bench trial. State Steel argues that
the District Court erred by granting A&M’s motion for judgment
on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52(c). That rule provides:

If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a
nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on
that issue, the court may enter judgment against the
party on a claim or defense that, under the
controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only
with a favorable finding on that issue. The court
may, however, decline to render any judgment until
the close of the evidence. A judgment on partial
findings must be supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). The rule’s objective is to “conserve[] time
and resources by making it unnecessary for the court to hear
evidence on additional facts when the result would not be different
even if those additional facts were established.” 9 James Wm.
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 52.50[2] (3d ed. 2010).20

A court may grant a Rule 52(c) motion made by either party
or may grant judgment sua sponte at any time during a bench trial,

20
Subdivision (c) was added to Rule 52 in 1991. It replaced
a portion of Rule 41(b), which previously permitted a court to enter
judgment against a plaintiff at the close of his or her case-in-chief
if he or she failed to meet the applicable burden of proof. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(c) advisory committee’s note. Thus, Rule 52(c)
operates more broadly than did its predecessor, because courts may
now make partial findings on any claim or defense, of any party, at
any time. Nonetheless, pre-1991 cases interpreting Rule 41(b)
continue to provide guidance. See Fechter v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 800 F. Supp. 182, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

27
so long as the party against whom judgment is to be rendered has
been “fully heard” with respect to an issue essential to that party’s
case. As a result, the court need not wait until that party rests its
case-in-chief to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 52(c). See N.Y.
Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 246 n.6
(3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . allow
judgment after partial findings against a party that has been fully
heard on the relevant issue.”); Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42, 59
(1st Cir. 2004) (“When a party has finished presenting evidence [as
to a particular issue] and that evidence is deemed by the trier
insufficient to sustain the party’s position, the court need not waste
time, but, rather, may call a halt to the proceedings and enter
judgment accordingly.”); Granite States Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular
Techs., Inc., 76 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he rule
‘authorizes the court to enter judgment at any time that it can
appropriately make a dispositive finding of fact on the evidence.’”
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) advisory committee’s note)).21 Of
course, the court may opt to reserve judgment until all the evidence
is in or until the close of the non-movant’s case-in-chief. See Int’l
Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union 103 v. Ind. Constr. Corp.,
13 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is within the trial court’s
sound discretion to decline rendering judgment until hearing all of
the evidence.”).

In considering whether to grant judgment under Rule 52(c),
the district court applies the same standard of proof and weighs the
evidence as it would at the conclusion of the trial. See Emerson
Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 427 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1970); Falter
v. Veterans Admin., 632 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.N.J. 1986).

21
The requirement that a party must first be “fully heard”
does not, however, “amount to a right to introduce every shred of
evidence that a party wishes, without regard to the probative value
of that evidence.” First Va. Banks, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil,
Inc., 206 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2000). In this respect, it is within
the discretion of the trial court to enter a judgment on partial
findings even though a party has represented that it can adduce
further evidence, if under the circumstances, the court determines
that the evidence will have little or no probative value. See id.

28
Accordingly, the court does not view the evidence through a
particular lens or draw inferences favorable to either party. See
Ritchie v. United States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2006);
Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 979, 982 (W.D. Pa.
1995). The district court should also make determinations of
witness credibility where appropriate.22 See Parker v. Long Beach
Mortgage Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Falter,
632 F. Supp. at 200. Finally, if the court enters judgment under
Rule 52(c), it must make findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant to Rule 52(a).

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. See Rego, 181 F.3d at 400. For
a finding to be clearly erroneous, we must be left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Gordon v.
Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir. 2005). We will not
reverse “[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety” even if we would have
weighed that evidence differently. Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). “[W]hen a trial judge’s finding
is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or
more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially
plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that
finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear
error.” Id. at 575; accord MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin.,
Inc., 157 F.3d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1998).

A.

State Steel argues that A&M was unjustly enriched by
accepting assembly of the Project Buildings (containing the raw
steel) without providing full compensation. To prevail on an unjust

22
In these respects, judgments on partial findings differ
qualitatively from judgments as a matter of law under Rule 50(a).
See Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pa., 181 F.3d 396, 400
(3d Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) advisory committee’s note
(“The standards that govern judgment as a matter of law in a jury
case have no bearing on a decision under Rule 52(c).”).

29
enrichment claim in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
following elements: (1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the
plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefit by the defendant; and (3)
acceptance and retention of such benefit under circumstances such
that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
without payment to the plaintiff. AmeriPro Search, Inc. v. Fleming
Steel Co., 787 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); see also
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 447 (3d
Cir. 2000). “The most significant element of the doctrine is
whether the enrichment of the defendant is unjust; the doctrine
does not apply simply because the defendant may have benefited
as a result of the actions of the plaintiff.” AmeriPro, 787 A.2d at
991. Instead, “a claimant must show that the party against whom
recovery is sought either wrongfully secured or passively received
a benefit that . . . would be unconscionable for her to retain.”
Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 180
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Torchia v. Torchia, 499 A.2d 581, 582 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985)). In this case, A&M argues only that the third
element has not been satisfied, and we proceed directly to it.

Relying on Joint Exhibit 25 and Defendants’ Exhibit 1, the
District Court found as fact that A&M had disbursed a total of
$2,752,329.00 to the various parties providing services and
materials under the Contract. JA 54, 63-64. Comparing that figure
to the adjusted Contract price of $2,537,935.22, the District Court
found that A&M had made payment in excess of its contractual
obligation. JA 64-65. Citing Meyers Plumbing & Heating Supply
Co. v. West End Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 498 A.2d 966 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985), the court then held that since A&M had made
such excess payments, it could not have been “unjustly” enriched.
In the District Court’s words, requiring A&M to “pick up Clark’s
tab and pay twice for the same goods” would itself be an
inequitable result. JA 68.

In Meyers, a subcontractor brought suit against two owners
and their general contractor when the owners discontinued payment
to the general contractor due to a contractual dispute. 498 A.2d at
967. As is relevant here, the subcontractor had sold to the general
contractor, but had not yet been paid for, certain plumbing and
heating materials that were then provided to the owners. Id. The

30
Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment with respect to the subcontractor’s unjust enrichment
claim against the owners, because the owners had already disbursed
payments totaling 96.5% of the original Contract price. Id. at 969.
Under these circumstances, the Superior Court held that the benefit
conferred was not unjust: “[T]o require [the owners] to pay [the
subcontractor] in this action would obligate them to pay for the
same items twice. As a result of the money having already been
paid once, it can hardly be said that the owners’ ‘enrichment’ from
the plumbing and heating materials is unjust.” Id.

State Steel does not challenge the District Court’s legal
analysis or its reliance on Meyers, with which we entirely agree.
It instead attacks the key factual finding underlying the analysis:
that A&M paid in the aggregate more than the adjusted Contract
price. State Steel complains that by granting the Rule 52(c)
motion, the District Court did not afford it an opportunity to
challenge Defendants’ Exhibit 1. Specifically, State Steel claims
that it acquiesced to the exhibit’s admission “only as to
authenticity,” but that due to the Rule 52(c) motion, it never had the
opportunity to cross-examine A&M’s witnesses on the accuracy of
that evidence. State Steel Reply Br. at 8. Because Defendants’
Exhibit 1 “does not contain copies of cancelled checks or bank
records,” it says, “the documents which purport to represent
payment are nothing more than unsubstantiated records of
[A&M].” State Steel Br. at 34. Accordingly, State Steel argues
that “the District Court committed reversible error when it granted
[A&M’s Rule 52(c) motion] and did not require [A&M] to present
evidence or testimony regarding State Steel’s claims . . . .” State
Steel Reply Br. at 1-2. We disagree.

We do not understand State Steel to argue that it was not
“fully heard” on its claim for unjust enrichment, rendering a Rule
52(c) disposition unavailable.23 Instead, we understand it to

23
If that is its contention, we reject it. Having rested its
case, State Steel was heard fully on its two remaining causes of
action. State Steel’s tactical decision to permit the admission of
A&M’s exhibits without objection, and its failure to adduce

31
challenge the District Court’s key factual finding as clearly
erroneous because A&M did not present testimony corroborating
Joint Exhibit 25 and Defendant’s Exhibit 1. This, it says,
precluded it from cross-examining A&M’s witnesses in the hopes
of undermining the reliability of the exhibits. Unapparent to us,
however, is any reason why A&M would shoulder an affirmative
burden to introduce testimony for the sole purpose of allowing
State Steel an opportunity to deconstruct the documentary
evidence. To the contrary, Rule 52 and the Supreme Court instruct
us to review factual findings for clear error, no matter the character
of the evidence cited in support:

If the district court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,
the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact,
it would have weighed the evidence differently. . . .
This is so even when the district court’s findings do
not rest on credibility determinations, but are based
instead on physical or documentary evidence or
inferences from other facts. . . . Rule 52(a) does not
make exceptions or purport to exclude certain
categories of factual findings from the obligation of
a court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings
unless clearly erroneous.

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573-74 (quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (prescribing clear-error
review “whether based on oral or other evidence”).

The burdens of production and persuasion rested entirely
with State Steel to establish its claim, see Torchia, 499 A.2d at 582,
and therefore A&M need not have presented any evidence at all.
If State Steel desired to examine A&M’s employees with respect
to payments allegedly made, it should have called those witnesses

additional testimony enabling it to challenge that evidence, cannot
be ascribed as the failure of the District Court to ensure that it had
been “fully heard.”

32
during its case-in-chief (as it did with Fox 24 ). Alternatively, if it
was ill-prepared to challenge the documentary evidence using the
testimony of the witnesses that it did call, it should not have
stipulated to admission of the documents during its case-in-chief.
Either way, State Steel cannot now attack the District Court’s
factual findings as a product of the court’s “failure” to force A&M
to proffer unnecessary testimony. We find neither an abuse of
discretion in the District Court’s reliance on the documents nor
clear error in its finding that A&M disbursed more than the
Contract price. We will affirm its rejection of the unjust
enrichment claim.25

B.

Finally, State Steel challenges the District Court’s judgment,
again made on partial findings, against its claim for fraudulent
inducement. In Pennsylvania, fraud-based claims of this sort
require proof of the following elements by clear and convincing
evidence:

24
Contrary to State Steel’s claim that “the record is devoid
of any testimony concerning the invoices and payment records
submitted by” A&M, State Steel Br. at 33, Fox did indeed testify
that Joint Exhibit 25 was “a summary of all of the payments that
were made in connection with the reconstruction of the A&M
compost building . . . .” JA 246. This testimony, which the District
Court found credible, supports reliance on the documentary
evidence despite State Steel’s claim that no such testimony exists.
25
An unjust enrichment claim in Pennsylvania is still viable
in this context if the owner misled the subcontractor into providing
a benefit. See D.A. Hill Co. v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 573
A.2d 1005, 1009 (Pa. 1990); Limbach Co., LLC v. City of Phila.,
905 A.2d 567, 577 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). The District Court
correctly went on to examine whether State Steel proved that A&M
misled it into providing the raw steel to Clark, and concluded that
it had not. JA 65-67. Specifically as to the claim for unjust
enrichment, State Steel makes no mention to us of this additional
finding, and we do not address it.

33
 (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the
transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with
knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether
it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading
another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on
the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury
was proximately caused by the reliance.

Skurnowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(quoting Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. 1999)); see also
Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir.
2009); Overall v. Univ. of Pa., 412 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2005).
“Matters of misrepresentation, knowledge, reliance, causation, and
scienter are questions of fact” subject to clear-error review. Healey
v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a)); accord Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG,
502 F.3d 212, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Healey).

State Steel argues that the following statement in the Fox
Letter was a material misrepresentation, and induced it to continue
delivering steel to Clark: “With respect to any balance that Clark
may owe your company . . . , [our] company is willing, with
Clark’s permission, to pay you directly or by joint check made
payable to Clark and your company . . . .” JA 308-09. Though a
material representation, the District Court found that this statement
was not a misrepresentation. Absent such a false statement, the
court also found lacking an intent to mislead, justifiable reliance,
and proximate causation of damages. JA 71-74. Reviewing the
District Court’s evaluation of the factual evidence and its
credibility determinations 26 underlying its conclusion, we find no

26
The District Court found Wansor’s testimony to be
generally not credible, and Smith’s testimony to be contradicted by
the evidence on several key points. JA 37-38. It also found Fox to
be credible despite an inconsistent statement he had made in his
deposition. JA 38 & n.7. Finally, the court found Chizek’s
testimony to be credible generally, but noted an “important
discrepancy” and also stated that she had an “inherent bias” against
A&M given her role with State Steel. JA 38-39. State Steel

34
clear error.

Chizek testified at trial that she understood the Fox Letter
to be a guarantee that A&M “would take care of our invoices.” JA
266. Additionally, Fox admitted that his letter did not refer to the
balance in the joint checking account (perhaps tending to
demonstrate that A&M’s payments to State Steel would not be
limited by the funds in that account), or state specifically that A&M
would not pay State Steel once it had fully paid the Contract price.
JA 248-49. State Steel emphasizes these points, and argues that the
trial testimony, along with Fox’s October 7, 2004 letter (indicating
to Wansor that A&M would pay the subcontractors as discussed in
his “earlier letters”) established a material misrepresentation.
Though a plausible conclusion, we do not agree that it is the only
permissible one.

The District Court took these considerations into account,
but found that the Fox Letter did not misrepresent that A&M
guaranteed to satisfy State Steel’s invoices if Clark failed to do so.
The court believed Chizek’s earlier deposition testimony – that she
would not have expected A&M to pay more than the Contract price
(despite the letter’s failure to say so) – to be a reliable indicator of
the true meaning of the Fox Letter. JA 72. Chizek’s earlier belief
is corroborated by Fox’s trial testimony that A&M would “make
direct payments as long as [it] c[ould] deduct them against what [it]
owe[d] Clark,” but that “by definition, we are not going to make
payments if we don’t owe Clark any more money.” JA 249. The
court also credited Fox’s testimony that he drafted the letter at
Clark’s request, that A&M never received an invoice from State
Steel, that he had no prior dealings with State Steel, and that he

challenges this last point as clear error because the District Court
did not make a corresponding finding with respect to Fox’s
position at A&M. State Steel Br. at 30. We take the District Court
at its word, however, and review its analysis keeping in mind that
it found Chizek’s testimony to be credible except where it
specifically noted otherwise. We find no internal inconsistency
with the court’s credibility determinations, and we credit them
accordingly.

35
“wouldn’t know State Steel from the man on the moon.” JA 72-73,
250. This lack of a historical relationship between Fox and State
Steel undercuts an interpretation that the Fox Letter contained an
unqualified and false promise to guarantee payment.

Further, the District Court found that the “earlier letters”
that Fox had referenced in his October 7 correspondence did not
reference the Fox Letter or guarantee direct payment to all
subcontractors, but only did so as to the mitigation subcontractors
retained after Clark fell behind schedule. JA 72 n.16. This reading
is not clearly erroneous. At bottom, the District Court read the Fox
Letter as merely “seek[ing] to establish a process by which
payment could be made,” rather than “obligat[ing] [A&M] as a
guarantor of the agreement between Clark and [State Steel].” JA
73. Since this is precisely the manner in which A&M conducted
itself, the court found no misrepresentation in the Fox Letter.

Under all of these circumstances, we conclude that the
record evidence supported the District Court’s interpretation of the
Fox Letter as an administrative proposal to streamline payments,
and nothing more. The District Court did not clearly err in finding
that State Steel had failed to prove a material misrepresentation by
clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, it did not err in
rendering judgment under Rule 52(c) on the claim for fraudulent
inducement.

IV.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court in all respects.

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