Case: 09-10803 Document: 00511224995 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/03/2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 3, 2010
No. 09-10803 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
RAYMOND KEITH SONGER; CROX ALVARADO; VICTOR ARRINGTON;
GEORGE E. EATON, JR.; DANIEL GARCIA, JR.; DEBRA SUE GARRISON;
JOSE RAMON GUILAMO; LARRY HAZELTON; ANTRONE HENDERSON;
SANDRA K. HENDERSON; DANIEL CLINTON HENLEY; JOHNNY
ROBERT JARVIS; EDDIE JONES; ERIC C. MATTHEWS; BRIAN ALAN
MCGLOTHIN; KAREN SUE PARENT; MONICA LENISE PERVIS; BOBBY
JOE SCHRODER; COURTLAND DALE WALLACE; PERRY SCOTT
WIGGINS, Individually and on behalf of other Employees similarly situated;
FELIX VASQUEZ, Per Consent pursuant to 29 USC § 216(b),
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
DILLON RESOURCES, INC.; SUNSET LOGISTICS, INC.; SUNSET ENNIS,
INC., doing business as Sunset Waxahaxie, Inc.,
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
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Plaintiffs-Appellants, truck drivers who operate commercial trucks, sued
Defendants-Appellees Dillon Resources, Inc., Sunset Logistics, and Sunset Ennis
in Texas state court for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Both sides moved for summary judgment as to
whether the FLSA motor carrier exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b), applies to
Defendants. The district court granted Defendants’ motion, denied Plaintiffs’
motion, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs-Appellants are truck drivers who operate commercial trucks to
haul materials to and from mines and quarries. Defendant-Appellee Dillon
Resources, Inc. is a licensed staff leasing company who hires truck drivers and
assigns them to work for trucking company clients. Defendant-Appellee Sunset
Ennis is an interstate trucking company based in Waxahachie, Texas.
Defendant-Appellee Sunset Logistics, based in Fort Worth, Texas, is a logistical
support company to other third-party trucking companies, including Sunset
Ennis, and engages in some trucking operations.
1. The Relationship Between the Defendants
Dillon maintains staff leasing agreements with Sunset Logistics and
Sunset Ennis (collectively, “the Sunset companies”). Under the agreements’
terms, Dillon and the trucking companies share responsibility for the truck
drivers and consider themselves joint employers of the drivers. The Sunset
companies are responsible for the day-to-day supervision of and liability for the
drivers and for recruiting, qualifying, training, disciplining, and terminating
drivers assigned to them. Dillon reserves the right of direction and control over
drivers assigned to the Sunset companies. It is responsible primarily for the
payment of wages and payroll taxes and retains the right to hire, fire, discipline,
2
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and reassign drivers. Dillon is compensated by clients such as the Sunset
companies for recruiting and providing qualified drivers.
2. Defendants’ Trucking Operations
Sunset Logistics and Sunset Ennis are authorized by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration as common
carriers of property by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce. Sunset
Logistics, on its own behalf and on behalf of Sunset Ennis, solicited and received
interstate work from its customers.
Dillon hired Plaintiffs as truck drivers and assigned them to drive
commercial trucks for Sunset Logistics and Sunset Ennis.1 The drivers
transported construction materials within the state of Texas. Some drivers also
transported aggregate (i.e., sand, gravel, and crushed rock materials used in
construction) across state lines into other states, such as Oklahoma, and from
other states into Texas. Truck drivers for Sunset Logistics and Sunset Ennis
also transported construction materials for the Sunset companies’ customer,
TXI, Inc. TXI owns and operates aggregate plants in Oklahoma and “ready-mix”
concrete plants in Texas. TXI orders aggregate from its Oklahoma plants and
ships them via rail from Oklahoma to the Dallas and Celina rail terminals. TXI
hires third-party trucking companies, like the Sunset companies, to transport
the aggregate from the rail terminals to its Texas ready-mix plants.
3. Plaintiffs’ Employment as Drivers
As drivers, Plaintiffs must meet DOT and Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSR) requirements prior to assuming their driving duties.
1
Plaintiffs hired before January 19, 2007 were assigned to drive for Sunset Logistics.
In January 2007, Sunset Logistics converted to logistical support as its primary business;
Dillon then reassigned drivers from Sunset Logistics to Sunset Ennis. Accordingly, during the
relevant time period, some plaintiffs worked for Sunset Logistics and Sunset Ennis, while
some only worked for Sunset Ennis. At the time the lawsuit was filed, all the Plaintiffs were
assigned to work as truck drivers for Sunset Ennis.
3
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Plaintiffs must have a valid Class A commercial drivers license and meet the
driver qualification requirements of FMCSR Parts 382 and 391.2 Upon hire,
Plaintiffs are issued the FMCSR Pocketbook, a compilation of relevant
regulatory information. The drivers also participate in New Hire Safety
Orientation to review the FMCSR and the difference between interstate and
intrastate hours of service regulations. After being hired, Plaintiffs must record
their hours of service and complete driver vehicle inspection reports pursuant
to the FMCSR.
During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs received their assignments
from a dispatch service before the start of their shifts. The dispatch notified the
drivers regarding the number of loads they had been assigned and the loads’
pick-up and delivery locations. No driver had a dedicated route. The
assignments were based on various factors, including the driver’s available
hours (i.e., whether the driver has sufficient available hours to complete the load
assignment and still remain within regulatory requirements regarding
maximum hours driven) and customer requirements. Based on these factors,
the loads for each truck driver were distributed indiscriminately—i.e., any driver
could be called upon at any time to make an interstate or intrastate trip. The
drivers’ employment could be terminated if they refused an assignment.
B. Procedural Background
In April 2008, Plaintiffs3 sued Dillon, Sunset Logistics, and Sunset Ennis
in Texas state court for unpaid overtime under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
2
The requirements included: (1) meeting the general qualification for commercial truck
drivers, 49 C.F.R. § 391.11–.15; (2) submitting to required background and character
investigations, id. § 391.21–.27; (3) submitting to a road test or its equivalent, id. § 391.31–.33;
and (4) submitting to physical qualifications and examinations including drug-testing
requirements, id. § 391.41–.49.
3
The lawsuit originated with 26 plaintiffs. At the time of the district court’s order, 21
plaintiffs remained part of the action.
4
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Defendants timely removed to the district court for the Northern District of
Texas.
In June 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for notice to putative class members
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the FLSA collective action provision,4 and a
motion to toll the FLSA statute of limitations5 pending the outcome of the
motion. Plaintiffs argued that Defendants failed to pay overtime and that
company policy encouraged working unpaid overtime by imposing financial
penalties—e.g., failure to pay bonuses or a flat rate when there was no
work—when drivers failed to complete all assigned deliveries on time. In July
2008, the district court denied both motions. The district court agreed with
Defendants that Plaintiffs’ affidavits only offered conclusory allegations that did
not state personal knowledge of company-wide discrimination and did not
demonstrate whether other putative class members wanted to opt in to the
lawsuit. However, the district court declined to consider Defendants’ remaining
arguments.
In March 2009, Plaintiffs filed their first amended collective action
petition. In April 2009, Defendants filed an answer in which they asserted,
among other defenses, that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because the work they
performed fell within the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption to the FLSA.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the
MCA exemption applied to Defendants. In June 2009, the district court
concluded that the MCA exemption applied to Sunset Logistics and Sunset
Ennis, but that Dillon had not provided sufficient evidence to prove its
4
The FLSA collective action provision states, in relevant part, “An action . . . may be
maintained against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
5
The FLSA provides for a two-year statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging
unpaid overtime, and a three-year statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging willful
failure to pay overtime. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
5
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entitlement to the exemption. The district court also concluded that the drivers’
duties fell within the Secretary of Transportation’s (“Secretary”) power, and
therefore the exemption applied, but only to the four-month period in which each
driver was engaged or could have been called to engage in interstate commerce.
Accordingly, the district court held the motions in abeyance and ordered
additional briefing regarding: (1) the MCA’s exemption’s applicability to each
plaintiff, including competent summary judgment evidence; and (2) whether
Dillon qualifies as a motor carrier.6
After the supplemental briefing was completed, the court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion on July
15, 2009. The district court held that: (1) the MCA exemption applied to Dillon
because it is a joint employer with the Sunset companies, both of whom are
subject to the exemption; and (2) Defendants’ summary judgment evidence was
sufficient to prove that the exemption applied to all Plaintiffs. The district court
also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standards as the district court. Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449,
452 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
discloses that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party has the burden of
demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.
Allen, 593 F.3d at 452. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
6
The district court also ordered additional briefing on the 2008 amendments to the
definition of “motor carrier” in the MCA, 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14), but ultimately held that the
definition is not material to this case.
6
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nonmovant, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. See id.
(citation omitted).
B. The FLSA and the Motor Carrier Act Exemption
The FLSA requires employers to compensate employees engaged in
commerce for all hours worked over forty each week at the rate of one and
one-half times their regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The statute also
specifically exempts certain employers and/or employees from its overtime
requirements. Id. § 213. Exemptions under the FLSA are construed narrowly
against the employer, and the employer bears the burden to establish a claimed
exemption. Barefoot v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., No. 93-1684, 1994 WL
57686, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 1994) (per curiam) (citing Levinson v. Spector
Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 678 (1947)).
In this case, Defendants assert the MCA exemption, which states that the
FLSA’s overtime requirement “shall not apply . . . to . . . any employee with
respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish
qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of
section 31502 of Title 49 [of the MCA.]”7 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). According to the
Department of Labor (DOL) regulations enforcing the FLSA, the application of
the MCA exemption to an employee “depends both on the class to which his
employer belongs and on the class of work involved in the employee’s job.” 29
C.F.R. § 782.2(a). Accordingly:
The power of the Secretary of Transportation to establish maximum
hours and qualifications of service of employees, on which
exemption depends, extends to those classes of employees and those
only who: (1) Are employed by carriers whose transportation of
7
Under section 31502, the Secretary “may prescribe requirements for . . . qualifications
and maximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a
motor carrier[.]” 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(1).
7
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passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to his jurisdiction
under section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act [codified at 49 U.S.C. §
31502] . . . , and (2) engage in activities of a character directly
affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the
transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in
interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor
Carrier Act.
Id. Further, we have stated that “[t]he Secretary . . . need only possess the
power to regulate the employees at issue; it need not actually exercise that
power for the [MCA] exemption to apply.” Barefoot, 1994 WL 57686, at *2 (citing
Levinson, 330 U.S. at 678).
C. Application of the Motor Carrier Exemption
1. Employed By Carriers Subject to the Secretary’s Power
The first inquiry is whether Plaintiffs “are employed by carriers whose
transportation of property by motor vehicle is subject to” the Secretary’s
jurisdiction. 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a)(1). To be subject to the Secretary of
Transportation’s jurisdiction pursuant to the MCA, a motor carrier 8 must be
engaged in interstate commerce:
Although the MCA defines interstate commerce as commerce
“between a place in a state and a place in another state,” it has not
been applied literally by the courts. In fact, we have defined it as the
actual transport of goods across state lines or the intrastate
transport of goods in the flow of interstate commerce.
Siller v. L & F Distributors, Ltd., No. 96-40549, 1997 WL 114907, at *1 (5th Cir.
1997) (per curiam) (citing Merchant’s Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 528 F.2d
1042, 1044 (5th Cir. 1976)).
8
Motor carriers are defined as persons “providing motor vehicle transportation for
compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14).
8
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Plaintiffs do not dispute that Sunset Ennis and Sunset Logistics, two
trucking companies, are motor carriers subject to the Secretary’s power.
Instead, they argue that Dillon, a staff leasing agency, is not a motor carrier
within the meaning of the MCA. Defendants assert that because the Sunset
companies are motor carriers and the Sunset companies are joint employers with
Dillon, Dillon is also a motor carrier within the meaning of the MCA.
While Fifth Circuit precedent is limited on this issue, other courts have
held that a staff leasing company who provides employees for a motor carrier
and operates as a joint employer with the carrier meets the requirements of 29
C.F.R. § 782.2(a)(1). See, e.g., Moore v. Universal Coordinators, Inc., 423 F.2d
96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that truck drivers were employees of both
noncarrier truck driver leasing company and private motor carrier and therefore
MCA exemption extended to leasing company). The Moore court analyzed the
MCA and the FLSA, and determined that Congress intended to regulate
employees of carriers in the interest of safety. Id. at 99. Therefore, the
Secretary’s power had to extend to leased drivers and to the leasing company
that employed them. Id. at 99–100.
In a more recent case, the district court cited Congressional safety
concerns as the rationale for extending the exemption:
The [MCA] exemption, as explained in Moore, safeguards the
Secretary[’s] authority to regulate the qualifications and maximum
hours of employees whose work affects the “safety of operation” of
a motor carrier. . . . Refusing to extend the [MCA] exemption to the
staffing agency defendants would therefore facilitate what Congress
sought to prohibit—circumvention of the Secretary’s regulatory
authority.
Tidd v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 07-11214-GAO, 2010 WL 996769, at *2 (D. Mass.
Mar. 16, 2010) (citing Moore, 423 F.2d at 98–99).
9
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Applying Moore and Tidd, the evidence supports a finding that Dillon, as
joint employer with Sunset Logistics and Sunset Ennis, is a carrier subject to the
Secretary’s jurisdiction. Dillon is a staff leasing company who provides drivers
to Sunset Logistics and Sunset Ennis to fulfill interstate work orders from
clients for compensation. Our review of the record reflects the following
evidence: Dillon hires and trains the drivers and is responsible for their payroll,
the Sunset companies are responsible for control of the drivers’ day-to-day
operations, and Dillon is reimbursed for wages and benefits paid to the drivers
and receives a fee when the drivers are assigned. These facts are similar to
Tidd, in which the staffing agency defendants were held as joint employers to
FedEx, a motor carrier, and, therefore, subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction.
See Tidd, 2010 WL 996769, at *2–3. Accordingly, we hold that the first
requirement for jurisdiction under the MCA—i.e., that Plaintiffs work for
carriers engaged in interstate commerce—is met. See Barefoot, 1994 WL 57686,
at *2.
2. Engaged in Activities That Directly Affect Operational Safety of
Motor Vehicles In Transport of Property In Interstate Commerce
The second part of the MCA exemption inquiry is whether the Plaintiffs
“engage in activities that directly affect the operational safety of motor vehicles
in the transport of property in interstate commerce” as defined by the MCA. 29
C.F.R. § 782.2(a)(2). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs, as truck drivers subject to
DOT requirements, are employed in positions that “affect the operational safety
of motor vehicles.” See Barefoot v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 826 F. Supp.
1046, 1050 (N.D. Tex. 1993), aff’d, 1994 WL 57686 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 1994) (per
curiam) (“Truck drivers are engaged in activities of a character affecting safety
that subject them to the power of the Secretary . . . if the drivers are required to
. . . complet[e] [DOT] logs recording the time spent driving, pass[] DOT written
10
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and driving tests, complet[e] various DOT forms, and pass [] a DOT physical
drug test.”).9
We therefore determine whether Plaintiffs’ activities directly affected
motor vehicle safety “in the transport of property in interstate commerce.” 29
C.F.R. § 782.2(a)(2). We have stated “‘it is the character of the activities, rather
than the proportion of the employee’s time or activities’” that determines the
Secretary’s jurisdiction to regulate employees under the MCA (and therefore
determines whether the MCA exemption of the FLSA applies). Barefoot, 1994
WL 57686, at *3 (citing Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 431 (1947)).
Plaintiffs assert that the Secretary’s jurisdiction only applies to
transportation across state lines, and therefore that Defendants must
demonstrate that each driver personally transported property by motor vehicle
across state lines. But the Supreme Court held in Morris that the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), the predecessor to the DOT, had jurisdiction to
regulate all of defendant carrier’s drivers, even though two of the 42 drivers had
not engaged in interstate trips during the relevant period, and that the drivers
were not entitled to overtime under the FLSA. Morris, 332 U.S. at 434–36. In
that case, the carrier’s few interstate trips (4% of all trips during the relevant
period) were distributed indiscriminately to all drivers. Id. at 433. The
Supreme Court noted that, in practical terms, the safety concerns facing a
carrier who sent every driver on an interstate trip would be the same if the
carrier sent only some or most of its drivers on interstate trips. See id. at 434.
Therefore, the ICC had the power to regulate all of defendant’s drivers, and the
existence—rather than the exercise—of that power was the test as to whether the
employees were entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. Id. at 434. See also
9
Plaintiffs argue that being subject to DOT regulations is not per se sufficient to
subject drivers to the Secretary’s jurisdiction. However, they do not contest that as drivers,
they engage in activities affecting safety operations of motor vehicles.
11
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Barefoot, 1994 WL 57686, at *2 (“The Secretary . . . need only possess the power
to regulate the employees at issue; it need not actually exercise that power for
the [MCA] exemption to apply.”) (citing Levinson, 330 U.S. at 678).
Additionally, the FLSA regulations promulgated by the DOL and the
DOT’s notice of interpretation have clarified that if drivers can be reasonably
expected to perform interstate transport, the MCA exemption applies. The
FLSA regulations state that generally, if the employee’s job duties are “such that
he is (or . . . is likely to be) called upon in the ordinary course of his work to
perform, either regularly or from time to time, safety-affecting activities” of a
driver, he comes within the MCA exemption “in all workweeks when he is
employed at such job.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3).
This general rule assumes that the activities involved in the
continuing duties of the job in all such workweeks will include
activities which have been determined to affect directly the safety
of operation of motor vehicles on the public highways in
transportation in interstate commerce. Where this is the case, the
rule applies regardless of the proportion of the employee’s time or of
his activities which is actually devoted to such safety-affecting work
in the particular workweek, and the exemption will be applicable
even in a workweek when the employee happens to perform no work
directly affecting “safety of operation.”
Id. The DOT has also stated that “a driver will remain under the [Secretary’s]
jurisdiction . . . for as long as the driver is in a position to be called upon to drive
in interstate commerce as part of the driver’s regular duties.” Application of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,902, 37,903 (Dep’t of
Transp. July 23, 1981) (notice of interpretation) (“DOT Notice”).10
10
We note that “interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are
‘entitled to respect’, but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to
persuade.’” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (distinguishing judicial
deference to agency regulations under Chevron from deference to agency notices of
interpretation and opinion letters) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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The summary judgment evidence supports the district court’s finding that
the drivers could have been called upon to drive in interstate commerce during
their employment. In their deposition testimony, several drivers testified that
they understood when they were hired by the Sunset companies that they might
have to make out-of-state trips during their employment. Upon employment, the
drivers were assigned routes via dispatcher, and the type and number of routes
changed on a daily basis. In addition, the pick-up location, specific route, load,
and destination were assigned indiscriminately based on various factors, and no
drivers had a dedicated route. In other words, any driver could have been
assigned to an interstate trip and, if they were, would be subject to DOT safety
regulations affecting the operation of trucks. Therefore, the Secretary could
retain jurisdiction over their activities, and they are exempt from receiving
overtime pay.
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants cannot meet their burden with
respect to plaintiffs Henderson, Henley, Matthews, and Pervis because the
record reflects no evidence that any of these plaintiffs ever traveled interstate
or within Texas during their employment. Plaintiffs cite section 782.3(b) of the
DOL regulations, applicable specifically to drivers, which states that a driver’s
work affects “‘safety of operation’ . . . whenever he drives a motor vehicle in
interstate or foreign commerce,” but the MCA exemption does not apply “if his
job never involves transportation in interstate commerce within the meaning of
the [MCA].” 29 C.F.R. § 782.3(b).
Plaintiffs’ argument, however, ignores the general MCA exemption
requirements of section 782.2(b)(3), which states that the exemption will be
applicable “even in a workweek when the employee happens to perform no work
directly affecting ‘safety of operation,’” so long as the employee’s continuing
duties involve activities that affect motor vehicle safety in interstate transport.
13
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29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3). Here, all the drivers, including Henderson, Henley,
Matthews, and Pervis, were hired to drive trucks for the Sunset companies and
their clients. Their continuing duties were to accept assignments for
transporting materials to, from, and within Texas and to expect termination if
they refused an assignment. The drivers are always required to perform these
duties. But there were occasionally weeks (for all the drivers) where they were
not assigned to transport property in interstate commerce. Plaintiffs cannot and
do not claim that the drivers were required to perform other duties which would
not affect the safety of motor vehicles in transport—for example, the drivers did
not load or unload trucks. At all times, Plaintiffs were employed to perform the
continuing duties of a driver—i.e., “individuals whose driving duties are
concerned with transportation some of which is in intrastate commerce and some
of which is in interstate . . . commerce within the meaning of the [MCA].” 29
C.F.R. § 782.3(a).
Moreover, the DOT Notice states that if the Secretary claims jurisdiction
over a driver who has not driven in interstate commerce, evidence must be
presented that the carrier has engaged in interstate commerce and that the
driver could reasonably have been expected to make one of the carrier’s
interstate runs. DOT Notice, 49 Fed. Reg. at 37903. Defendants’ summary
judgment evidence demonstrates that the Sunset companies were engaged in the
transport of property in interstate commerce during the relevant time period:
in 2006, drivers for Sunset Logistics transported approximately 222,000 total
loads of aggregate, of which approximately 5,980 were transported across state
lines; in 2007, drivers for Sunset Ennis transported approximately 60,000 total
loads of aggregate, of which approximately 2,000 loads were transported across
state lines; and in 2008, drivers for Sunset Ennis hauled approximately 44,000
total loads of aggregate, of which approximately 1,000 were transported across
state lines. And as stated, the evidence further demonstrates that all the
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drivers—including the four Plaintiffs who did not drive any interstate
routes—could reasonably have been expected to drive in interstate commerce
consistent with their job duties. Accordingly, we hold that the MCA exemption
bars Plaintiffs’ claims.11
III. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.12
AFFIRMED.
11
Because we determine that Plaintiffs engaged in “[h]ighway transportation by motor
vehicle from one State to another,” we do not address whether Plaintiffs also met the MCA
exemption when they transported materials from the Dallas rail terminals to points within
Texas. See 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) (defining interstate commerce as: (i) “[h]ighway
transportation by motor vehicle from one State to another,” or (ii) “[t]ransportation within a
single [s]tate . . . [that] forms a part of a practical continuity of movement across [s]tate lines
from the point of origin to the point of destination”).
12
Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of
all claims with prejudice, we do not address the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for
conditional certification and notice to putative class members under the FLSA collective action
provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
15