Carmen v. Surface Transportation Board

                        United States Court of Appeals


                     FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT


                             Filed April 2, 1999


                                 No. 98-1466


                               Elkins Carmen, 

                                 Petitioners


                                      v.


                        Surface Transportation Board 

                        and United States of America, 

                                 Respondents


                          CSX Transportation, Inc., 

                                  Intervenor


                                                          On Motion to Dismiss

     Jeffrey Stephen Berlin was on the motion to dismiss on 
behalf of intervenor CSX Transportation, Inc.

     Paul Joseph Harris was on the opposition on behalf of 
petitioners.



     Before:  Wald, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

                   Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.


     Per Curiam:  This is a petition for judicial review of an 
order of the Surface Transportation Board.  The petition is 
filed in the name of "Elkins Carmen."  CSX Transportation, 
Inc., an intervenor, moves to dismiss on the ground that 
petitioners failed to identify themselves, as Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 15(a) requires.

     Rule 15(a) states:  "The petition for review must name each 
party seeking review either in the caption or in the body of 
the petition.  Use of such terms as 'et al.,' or 'petitioners,' or 
'respondents' is not effective to name the parties."  Before its 
amendment in 1993, Rule 15(a)'s naming-of-petitioners re-
quirement corresponded with the one contained in Fed. R. 
App. P. 3(c) for notices of appeals from judgments of district 
courts.  In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 
(1988), the Supreme Court held that a notice of appeal not 
naming a party taking the appeal, as Rule 3(c) required, 
deprived the court of appeals of jurisdiction over the un-
named party.  Responding to Torres, the 1993 amendment to 
Rule 3(c) allowed appellants more leeway, see Cleveland v. 
Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 1994);  Fed. R. App. P. 
3(c), advisory committee notes.  Rule 15(a), in contrast, was 
changed to clarify that each petitioner seeking judicial review 
had to be specifically named.  The note accompanying the 
Rule 15(a) amendment stated:

     Both Rule 3(c) and Rule 15(a) state that a notice of 
     appeal or a petition for review must name the parties 
     seeking appellate review.  Rule 3(c), however, provides 
     an attorney who represents more than one party on 
     appeal the flexibility to describe the parties in general 
     terms rather than naming them individually.  Rule 15(a) 
     does not allow that flexibility;  each petitioner must be 
     named.  A petition for review of an agency decision is 



     the first filing in any court and, therefore, is analogous to 
     a complaint in which all parties must be named.

Fed. R. App. P. 15(a), advisory committee note.

     Until 1981, petitioners were employed as freight car repair-
men in Elkins, West Virginia, by Western Maryland Railway 
Company, the corporate predecessor of CSX.  In 1993, 
prompted by CSX's application for permission to abandon the 
Elkins line, petitioners (represented by a single counsel) filed 
a claim for severance benefits with the National Railroad 
Adjustment Board.  In the claim, petitioners identified them-
selves as "Elkins Carmen" and attached a list of their individ-
ual names.  The Adjustment Board denied petitioners' claim, 
and in 1996, the Surface Transportation Board permitted 
CSX to abandon the Elkins line.

     Petitioners then filed an action for injunctive relief in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
West Virginia.  In the complaint and other documents filed in 
that court, petitioners again called themselves "Elkins Car-
men" and referred to an attachment containing their names.  
The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and directed the parties to submit the 
issue to arbitration.

     In May 1998, CSX obtained a favorable arbitration ruling.  
Petitioners appealed to the Surface Transportation Board.  
The Board affirmed in a decision issued July 31, 1998.  Peti-
tioners then filed this instant petition for review, which refers 
to them as "Elkins Carmen" and does not attach or reference 
any list of the individuals involved.  The petition attaches a 
copy of the Surface Transportation Board's decision, but that 
document also lacks any list of the individuals involved.

     The petition here neither specifies any individual petitioner 
by name nor does it refer to a listing of names.  The "Elkins 
Carmen," in opposing the motion to dismiss, tell us that it is 
an "unincorporated association" of 41 individuals, previously 
employed at the Elkins, West Virginia freight car shop of 
CSX's predecessor, and now united together for the common 
purpose of seeking severance pay and other benefits.  Yet 



nothing in the petition, or in the attachments to it, suggests 
that Elkins Carmen is an association.  There is no reference 
to meetings, bylaws, members, officers, publications, dues or 
property.  Compare State of Georgia v. National Democratic 
Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1273 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  Each 
document "petitioners" filed in this court, and in all other 
proceedings, has used "Elkins Carmen" as a collective term, a 
plural.  The caption of the petition for judicial review reads 
"Elkins Carmen, Petitioners."  This designation is inconsis-
tent with the claim that it is a single entity.

     Because the petition for judicial review does not comply 
with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a), the motion to 
dismiss is granted.

                                                                         So ordered.