Pub Ctzn Hlth Rsrch v. FDA

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

        Argued May 11, 1999       Decided August 6, 1999 

                           No. 98-5161

              Public Citizen Health Research Group, 
                             Appellee

                                v.

                   Food & Drug Administration, 
                       Appellant in 98-5161

                      Schering Corporation, 
                       Appellant in 98-5162

                        Consolidated with 
                             98-5162

          Appeals from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                         (No. 94cv00018)

     Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 
the cause for appellant Food & Drug Administration.  With 

her on the briefs were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and 
R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

     Bruce N. Kuhlik argued the cause and filed the briefs for 
appellant Schering Corporation.

     Amanda Frost argued the cause for appellee.  With her on 
the brief was Brian Wolfman. Lucinda A. Sikes entered an 
appearance.

     Marjorie E. Powell was on the brief for amicus curiae 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

     Before:  Ginsburg, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit 
Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

     Opinion concurring in the result filed by Circuit Judge 
Garland.

     Ginsburg, Circuit Judge:  Pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Act, the Public Citizen Health Research Group 
asked the Food and Drug Administration for documents 
relating to drug applications that had been abandoned for 
health or safety reasons.  The FDA denied this request and 
Public Citizen sued the agency in district court, where Scher-
ing Corporation, which had submitted five investigational new 
drug applications (INDs) of the sort requested by Public 
Citizen, intervened as a defendant.  The FDA and Schering 
claimed that certain of the documents in those five INDs 
contained confidential commercial information and therefore 
could be withheld under Exemption 4 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
s 552(b)(4).  Public Citizen argued that the documents could 
not be withheld under that exemption and that in any event 
disclosure was required under 21 U.S.C. s 355(l), which it 
asserted sets a standard for nondisclosure higher than that in 
Exemption 4 of the FOIA.

     The district court ordered the release of all the disputed 
documents on the ground that, although some could be with-
held under Exemption 4, the FDA had not met the higher 

standard of s 355(l).  We affirm the judgment of the district 
court in part, albeit on a different ground, reverse it in part, 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

                          I. Background

     Before marketing a new drug in the United States a 
manufacturer must obtain the approval of the FDA contin-
gent upon clinical (i.e., human) tests showing that the drug is 
safe and effective.  See 21 U.S.C. s 355(a), (d).  Before a 
company may begin clinical testing, however, it must first 
submit an IND describing the drug, the results of laboratory 
and pre-clinical (i.e., animal) testing, and the proposed clinical 
testing.  See id. s 355(i).  An applicant may begin the pro-
posed clinical testing 30 days after submitting its IND;  the 
FDA, however, may place the testing on hold at any time.  
See 21 C.F.R. ss 312.40(b), 312.42.  During clinical testing 
the company must update its IND with safety reports, annual 
reports on the progress of the testing, any amendments to 
the testing protocols, and other information.  See id. 
ss 312.30-312.33.  After clinical testing, the company must 
file a new drug application (NDA), which must include infor-
mation about the results of both pre-clinical and clinical 
testing;  information previously submitted in the IND may be 
incorporated by reference into the NDA.  See 21 U.S.C. 
s 355(b);  21 C.F.R. s 314.50.

     This case began when Public Citizen filed a FOIA request 
with the FDA for "[a]ll documents concerning pre-clinical and 
clinical studies for all prescription drugs which had a discon-
tinuance of the clinical trials because of death or serious 
injury of patients or because of safety concerns from preclini-
cal studies ... between January 1, 1990 and [July 12, 1993]."  
When the agency denied the request Public Citizen filed suit 
in the district court seeking release of the documents.

     The FDA moved to dismiss, arguing that although a search 
of its database identified 230 INDs for which the agency had 
received safety reports and which were either withdrawn, 
terminated, or placed on hold by the FDA, it could not 

without an unduly burdensome manual search of each file 
determine which of these were discontinued "because of" 
health or safety concerns.  The district court denied the 
motion to dismiss, and the agency then determined that 14 of 
the 230 INDs were responsive to the FOIA request;  of those, 
only portions of the five filed by Schering are at issue in this 
appeal.

     On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 
first held that the disputed documents in the five INDs could 
be withheld under Exemption 4, because they contain "com-
mercial or financial information obtained from a person [that 
is] privileged or confidential."  5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(4).  Scher-
ing's affidavits demonstrated to the court that disclosure 
would "cause substantial harm to [its] competitive position."  
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton ("National 
Parks I"), 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  The district 
court then held that under 21 U.S.C. s 355(l)(1) the FDA 
must nonetheless disclose the same documents absent "ex-
traordinary circumstances."  Finding no such circumstances 
here, the court granted summary judgment for Public Citizen 
and ordered the agency to release the disputed documents.  
Both the FDA and Schering appealed to this court.

                           II. Analysis

     The FDA and Schering argue that the agency may under 
s 355(l) withhold any data pertaining to the safety and effec-
tiveness of an abandoned drug that it may withhold under 
Exemption 4 of the FOIA--in other words, that the standards 
in the two statutes are the same.  Public Citizen contends 
that s 355(l) imposes a more stringent standard for nondis-
closure than that in Exemption 4.  We need not resolve this 
dispute over the relationship between the two statutes, how-
ever, because we hold that s 355(l) does not apply to INDs.  
Viewing the documents solely through the lens of Exemption 
4, we conclude that the FDA has justified withholding at least 
some information in four of the five INDs.

A.   Section 355(l)

     Section 355(l) requires the FDA, upon request, to disclose 
"[s]afety and effectiveness data and information which has 

been submitted in an application under subsection (b) [of 
s 355] for a drug" that subsequently was abandoned by its 
sponsor, "unless extraordinary circumstances are shown."  21 
U.S.C. s 355(l)(1).  No one disputes that an "application 
under subsection (b)" is an NDA.  Schering argues that 
s 355(l), therefore, simply does not apply to information in an 
IND, which is submitted under subsection (i), not subsection 
(b).  That is indeed the plain meaning of the provision, and 
we cannot understand how "submitted in an application under 
subsection (b)" could include anything other than information 
submitted in an NDA.  Public Citizen's arguments to the 
contrary are not convincing.

     First, Public Citizen contends that the agency applies 
s 355(l) to the disclosure of material submitted in an IND 
and that we should accord "substantial weight" to the FDA's 
view of its regulatory structure.  As Schering notes, however, 
the FDA has never promulgated a regulation--nor are we 
apprised of any FDA decision or other document--so inter-
preting s 355(l).  More important, it is apparent that the 
Congress has spoken to "the precise question at issue" here, 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9 
(1984):  s 355(l) by its terms applies only to "safety and 
effectiveness data and information" submitted in an NDA.  
Therefore, even if the agency had interpreted the phrase 
"subsection (b)" in s 355 to include information submitted in 
an IND, we could not defer to that interpretation.

     Second, Public Citizen argues that to read s 355(l) as 
applying only to NDAs is erroneous because "the IND and 
NDA are not two distinct stages" in the drug approval 
process.  In support of this view, Public Citizen points out 
that the FDA stores information related to the approval of a 
drug in its IND file even after an NDA is submitted.  The 
fact remains, however, that NDAs and INDs are the subject 
of separate subsections of s 355 and the Congress referred 
only to one of them in s 355(l).  We cannot help but conclude, 
therefore, that the statute treats the submission of an NDA 
as a discrete event in the drug approval process, regardless 
how the FDA maintains its files.

     Third, Public Citizen contends that a plain meaning ap-
proach to s 355(l) leads to an illogical result:  data and 
information submitted in an IND which later, rather than 
being resubmitted in an NDA, are incorporated by reference 
into the NDA would not be "submitted in an application 
under subsection (b)," that is, an NDA.  The FDA and 
Schering offer a more sensible view, however:  to incorporate 
IND materials by reference into an NDA is indeed to submit 
those materials as part of the NDA.  By the same token, once 
those materials are incorporated by reference into an NDA, 
their disclosure is subject to the standard in s 355(l) even if 
the FDA keeps them in an IND file.

     Finally, Public Citizen argues that "[i]t makes no sense to 
assume Congress enacted a statute mandating disclosure of 
safety and effectiveness data only when the sponsor had filed 
an NDA ..., but not when the sponsor had abandoned the 
drug earlier in the process."  In this regard Public Citizen 
points out that the FDA accords the same treatment to such 
data regardless whether they were submitted in an NDA or 
an IND.  Specifically, the FDA by regulation (21 C.F.R. 
s 312.130(b)) provides that disclosure of information in an 
IND "will be handled in accordance with" the regulation 
governing disclosure of information in an NDA (21 C.F.R. 
s 314.430(f)).

     Nonetheless, when the Congress enacted s 355(l) it did not 
mandate disclosure of information in an IND.  Moreover, 
Schering offers a perfectly sensible explanation why the 
Congress did not do so.  The Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585, of which s 355(l) was a part, established an 
abbreviated process through which a company could obtain 
approval to market the generic equivalent of a drug that the 
FDA had previously approved on the basis of an NDA.  See 
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1063-65 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (describing abbreviated new drug application pro-
cess).  The statute, Schering continues, does "not deal with 
INDs at all, and Congress had no reason in this legislative 
context to extend [s 355(l)] to them."  Even if, as Public 
Citizen contends, it would be more wise not to treat informa-

tion submitted in an IND differently from information sub-
mitted in an NDA, a matter about which we express no 
opinion, the Congress may, of course, approach matters one 
step at a time.  See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 
U.S. 307, 316 (1993)

     In view of the above analysis, we hold that s 355(l) does 
not apply to data and information submitted solely in an IND;  
such information may be withheld if the agency carries its 
burden under Exemption 4 of the FOIA.  Schering did not 
file an NDA for four of the five INDs at issue in this case 
(which four we consider in Part II.B.1), but concedes that it 
filed two NDAs relating to the drug at issue in IND No. 
18113.  We need not determine the import of Schering's 
concession, however, for we conclude (in Part II.B.2) that 
documents in that IND cannot be withheld under the alleged-
ly more lenient standard in Exemption 4.

B.   Exemption 4

     Exemption 4 of the FOIA permits an agency to withhold 
"commercial or financial information [that was] obtained from 
a person [and is] privileged or confidential."  5 U.S.C. 
s 552(b)(4).  Information that a person is required to submit 
to the Government is considered confidential only if its disclo-
sure is likely either "(1) to impair the Government's ability to 
obtain necessary information in the future;  or (2) to cause 
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person 
from whom the information was obtained."  National Parks 
I, 498 F.2d at 770.  In the present case the FDA and 
Schering invoke only the latter standard.  Meanwhile, Public 
Citizen claims disclosure would prevent other drug companies 
"from repeating Schering's mistakes, thereby avoiding risk to 
human health," and relies upon dicta in several district court 
opinions in arguing that under Exemption 4 the court should 
gauge whether the competitive harm done to the sponsor of 
an IND by the public disclosure of confidential information 
"is outweighed by the strong public interest in safeguarding 
the health of human trial participants."*  See Public Citizen 

__________
     * Our concurring colleague is of the opinion that Public Citizen 
has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Health Research Group v. FDA, 964 F. Supp. 413, 415 
(D.D.C. 1997);  see also Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 253 
(D.D.C. 1990);  AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. v. General Servs. Ad-
min., 627 F.Supp. 1396, 1403 (D.D.C. 1986).

     We reject Public Citizen's proposal because a consequen-
tialist approach to the public interest in disclosure is inconsis-
tent with the "[b]alanc[e of] private and public interests" the 
__________
disclosure is necessary to safeguard participants in clinical trials, 
and therefore that it has not done enough to prevent summary 
judgment from being entered against it, even if its view of the law 
were correct.  See Concur. at 2 & n.1.  The record, however, makes 
clear that Public Citizen has more than met its burden of raising a 
dispute over this fact.  The affidavit it submitted to the district 
court states:

     Defendants' arguments of substantial competitive harm are 
     disturbing from a public health standpoint because the data we 
     seek involve experimental drugs that were determined to pose 
     such serious health or safety risks that clinical testing of the 
     drug was stopped.  ...[B]ecause the safety and effectiveness 
     data for this experimental drug is being withheld, we cannot 
     determine whether the FDA adequately protected human sub-
     jects in these clinical trials.  Defendants will not be competi-
     tively harmed from the release of [this information] because 
     tests that reveal the hazards of a drug are simply not the type 
     of studies that competitors would want to copy.  On the other 
     hand, the public will benefit significantly from their release.  
     Indeed, if these studies are kept secret, other drug companies 
     may unknowingly conduct similarly hazardous studies, poten-
     tially placing many patients needlessly at risk.
     
Similarly, Public Citizen's affiant states:  "disclosure ... serves the 
public interest in two independent ways.  First, it allows the public 
to scrutinize FDA's decisions concerning human testing of investi-
gational drugs....  Second, disclosure of safety and effectiveness 
data decreases the likelihood that other drug companies will repli-
cate potentially hazardous human testing."

     That the FDA claims it has another, more direct, way to prevent 
exposure of human beings to this risk, see Op. at 11, merely joins 
the dispute on the factual question;  it does not resolve it.  See 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. DOE, 169 F.3d 16, 18-19 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999).

Congress struck in Exemption 4.  Critical Mass Energy 
Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (in banc);  
see also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982) (although 
FOIA implements policy of broad disclosure, the Congress 
also realized "that legitimate governmental and private inter-
ests could be harmed by release of certain types of informa-
tion and provided nine specific exemptions under which dis-
closure could be refused");  see also National Parks I, 498 
F.2d at 770 (legislative history of FOIA "firmly supports the 
inference that [Exemption 4] is intended for the benefit of 
persons who supply information").  That balance is accurately 
reflected in the test of confidentiality set forth in National 
Parks I, which was "known to and acquiesced in by Con-
gress" when it enacted 5 U.S.C. s 552b(c)(4), an exemption to 
the Government in the Sunshine Act that is identical to 
Exemption 4 of the FOIA.  CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 
F.2d 1132, 1153 n.146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing legislative 
history of s 552b(c)(4)).

     In other words, the Congress has already determined the 
relevant public interest:  if through disclosure "the public 
would learn something directly about the workings of the 
Government," then the information should be disclosed unless 
it comes within a specific exemption.  National Ass'n of 
Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original).  Indeed, Public Citizen's 
main reason for seeking this information is to "review wheth-
er the FDA is adequately safeguarding the health of people 
who participate in drug trials";  the information sought, in 
other words, would reveal "what the[ ] government is up to."  
DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
773 (1989).  It is not open to Public Citizen, however, to 
bolster the case for disclosure by claiming an additional public 
benefit in that, if the information is disclosed, then other drug 
companies will not conduct risky clinical trials of the drugs 
that Schering has abandoned.  That is not related to "what 
the[ ] government is up to" and the Court has clearly stated 
that "whether disclosure of a ... document ... is warranted 
must turn on the nature of the requested document and its 
relationship to the basic purpose of the Freedom of Informa-

tion Act to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny 
... rather than on the particular purpose for which the 
document is being requested."  Id. at 772.  In other words, 
the public interest side of the balance is not a function of the 
identity of the requester, see id. at 771, or of any potential 
negative consequences disclosure may have for the public, 
Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 865 F.2d 320, 327-28 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), nor likewise of any collateral benefits of disclosure.

     In litigation seeking the release of information under the 
FOIA, "the agency has the burden of showing that requested 
information comes within a FOIA exemption."  Niagara Mo-
hawk Power Corp. v. DOE, 169 F.3d 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
Even when the requester files a motion for summary judg-
ment, the Government "ultimately [has] the onus of proving 
that the [documents] are exempt from disclosure."  National 
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023, 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 1978).  The burden upon the requester is merely 
"to establish the absence of material factual issues before a 
summary disposition of the case could permissibly occur."  
Id. Accordingly, in order to obtain a summary judgment 
Public Citizen need not demonstrate that Schering would 
suffer no competitive harm from the release of this informa-
tion;  rather, its task is to show that there is no dispute about 
an issue of fact material to the FDA's burden of demonstrat-
ing that Schering would suffer substantial competitive harm 
from the disclosure of its INDs.  See National Parks I, 498 
F.2d at 770.

1.   IND Nos. 35757, 34465, 31911, and 30647

     For the reasons stated in the opinion of the district court, 
997 F. Supp. at 63-64, we agree with the FDA and Schering 
that under Exemption 4 the agency may withhold information 
in the four INDs listed above.  Release of that information 
would cause substantial harm to Schering's competitive posi-
tion.

     With respect to the first three INDs, Public Citizen con-
tends that releasing health and safety information would only 
"save Schering's competitors the time Schering spent devel-
oping and testing a dangerous drug, and thus save human 

trial participants from being exposed to a dangerous drug."  
According to Public Citizen, that "cannot be considered the 
type of 'competitive harm' justifying withholding of the docu-
ments under Exemption 4."

     Having already rejected Public Citizen's argument that any 
collateral benefit from the disclosure of information--that is, 
any benefit beyond learning "what the[ ] government is up 
to"--must be weighed against the competitive harm that 
would result from disclosure, we do not consider Public 
Citizen's assertion that disclosure would in fact prevent the 
exposure of human beings to a health risk.  In any event, as 
both the FDA and Schering point out, were a competitor to 
submit an IND involving a risk known to the FDA because of 
its experiences with Schering's INDs, the agency could and 
presumably would refuse to permit that company to begin 
clinical testing.

     We turn therefore to Schering's evidence of competitive 
harm from disclosure of these three INDs, all of which relate 
to the same antifungal drug.  According to the affidavit of its 
Dr. George H. Miller, the Company "has just commenced 
clinical testing on a successor [drug] which was designed 
based on information learned during development of [the 
drugs described in those INDs]."  Further, Dr. Miller states 
that "Schering's basic research revealed that the particular 
type of fungal infection for which this product was designed 
was not one that was relatively well-controlled by existing 
products."  He also states that "[t]he development and mar-
keting of new antifungal products is ... being actively en-
gaged in by a number of other drug companies," which could 
make use of the information in the INDs in order to eliminate 
much of the time and effort that would otherwise be required 
to bring to market a product competitive with the product for 
which Schering filed its most recent IND.  This is clearly the 
type of competitive harm envisioned in Exemption 4, as our 
case law makes clear.  See, e.g., National Parks & Conserva-
tion Ass'n v. Kleppe ("National Parks II"), 547 F.2d 673, 684 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Disclosure would provide competitors with 
valuable insights into the operational strengths and weak-
nesses of a [company], while [its competitors] could continue 

in the customary manner of 'playing their cards close to their 
chest' ");  cf. Webb v. HHS, 696 F.2d 101, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
("If a manufacturer's competitor could obtain all the data in 
the manufacturer's NDA, it could utilize them in its own NDA 
without incurring the time, labor, risk, and expense involved 
in developing them independently").

     The fourth IND listed above concerned a drug "designed to 
suppress allergic inflammations and subsequent symptoms of 
asthma."  Public Citizen concedes that Schering is now test-
ing compounds related to the abandoned drug.  Nonetheless, 
Public Citizen complains that the Company does not "explain 
with any specificity how the pre-clinical and clinical studies on 
the old compound would lead its competitors to the new 
compounds that Schering has subsequently identified."

     In the affidavit Schering filed to support withholding the 
documents in this IND, Dr. Francis Cuss recounts that the 
Company initially believed the drug was a "leukotrine inhibi-
tor," but that its "scientists observed certain unanticipated 
effects during toxicity and clinical testing .... suggest[ing] 
that the drug may have achieved its anti-inflammatory effects 
through a [different] mechanism."  Therefore, states the affi-
ant, the "toxicity and clinical data together could direct a 
competitor of Schering .... to pursue the the same avenues 
of research and development" that Schering has pursued 
since abandoning this IND.  We think this explanation suffi-
ciently specific to support Schering's argument that disclo-
sure of information in this IND would cause it substantial 
competitive harm.

     Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the district court's 
order requiring the agency to release the documents in these 
four INDs.  See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880.

2.   IND No. 18113

     We turn now to the documents in the fifth IND, which 
involved "one of four isomers making up a prescription medi-
cine currently marketed by Schering and indicated for use in 
controlling blood pressure in cases of severe hypertension."  
We find that Schering's affidavit professing the extent of 

competitive injury it would suffer from disclosure of the 
information in this IND is not sufficient to support its motion 
for summary judgment;  indeed, it fails to raise a dispute as 
to any material issue of fact.  Summary judgment for Public 
Citizen is therefore indicated.

     The affidavit of Schering's Dr. Ronald J. Garutti contains 
only conclusory assertions that disclosure would cause sub-
stantial competitive harm.  For example, the affiant states 
that disclosure "would reveal substantial basic research" as 
well as "disease models ... that have been developed by 
Schering at a great expense," and that "[t]oxicology data ... 
have significant value beyond the compound under investiga-
tion .... [and would be applicable] to any drug product any 
of whose metabolites were identical or similar to those of 
IND 18113 .... [and] other drugs [of] a similar chemical 
type."  Dr. Garutti attests that the clinical protocols also 
"have applicability beyond the specific drug being tested" and 
that disclosure "would have substantial commercial value to 
any company attempting to develop cardiovascular therapies 
generally."  The arguments in Schering's brief are even more 
general:  disclosure would reveal its "assessment of regulato-
ry requirements and its experience with FDA in this area, as 
well as [its] judgment as to what requirements will be neces-
sary in order to establish the drug's safety and effectiveness."

     Although a party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
is entitled to every favorable inference that may fairly be 
drawn from its affidavits, see Greenberg v. FDA, 803 F.2d 
1213, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1986), such "[c]onclusory and general-
ized allegations of substantial competitive harm ... cannot 
support an agency's decision to withhold requested docu-
ments."  Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 
F.2d 1280, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Accordingly, we hold that 
the agency may not withhold the disputed documents in IND 
No. 18113 under Exemption 4.  We therefore affirm that 
portion of the district court's order requiring the agency to 
release them to Public Citizen, albeit for a different reason.

C.   Segregability

     In view of our holding that the agency may, under Exemp-
tion 4, withhold information in four of the INDs, we turn to 

Public Citizen's alternative request that we remand the case 
for the district court to determine whether any non-exempt 
portions of the documents that the agency may withhold can 
be segregated and disclosed.  Public Citizen contends that 
the district court did not have occasion to make this determi-
nation because it required disclosure of all the records.  
Schering responds that the district court did not do so 
because Public Citizen never asked for, and therefore waived, 
such relief, and that segregation would in any event be 
"unreasonable" in this case.

     From the record we see that Public Citizen did raise this 
issue before the district court in its Reply in Support of its 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.  In any event, on 
remand it would be incumbent upon the district court on its 
own initiative to address the issue of segregability.  See 
Trans-Pacific Policing Agreement v. United States Customs 
Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  One should 
normally presume that a request for information under the 
FOIA is a request for all or any, not for all or none, of the 
information described.  Cf. National Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt, 
172 F.3d 906, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (factual presumption is 
reasonable when "the circumstances giving rise to the pre-
sumption ... make it more likely than not that the presumed 
fact exists").

     In view of the district court's disposition of this case, of 
course, it had no need to address the issue of segregability 
the first time around and we do not fault it for passing over 
the issue then.  We have now held, however, that information 
in four of the five INDs at issue may be withheld.  Because 
"[t]he focus in the FOIA is information, not documents, and 
an agency cannot justify withholding an entire document 
simply by showing that it contains some exempt material," we 
remand this case for the district court to determine whether 
the documents the agency has withheld contain information 
that can be segregated and disclosed.  Schiller v. NLRB, 964 
F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  In so doing, we express 
no opinion upon Schering's claim that segregation is impracti-
cable in this case.

                   III. Summary and Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, we hold first that s 355(l) 
applies only to information submitted in an NDA.  In addi-
tion we hold that the FDA has not met its burden under 
Exemption 4 with respect to, and therefore must disclose, the 
information contained in IND No. 18113;  and that the agency 
has met its burden under Exemption 4 with respect to, and 
therefore need not disclose, confidential information contained 
in IND Nos. 35757, 34465, 31911, and 30647.  As to the latter 
four INDs, we remand the case for the district court to 
determine in the first instance whether there is any non-
confidential information that can be segregated and disclosed.

                                                      So ordered.

     Garland, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result:  Today 
the court exercises appropriate discretion in declining to 
decide whether section 355(l) and FOIA Exemption 4 are 
congruent, because it is unnecessary to do so to resolve the 
dispute before us.  I believe the court errs, however, in not 
exercising similar restraint with respect to an issue regarding 
the meaning of Exemption 4 itself.

     My colleagues hold that in determining whether a docu-
ment comes within Exemption 4, the court may not "gauge 
whether the competitive harm" disclosure would cause to the 
company that submitted the document "is outweighed by the 
public interest in safeguarding" human health.  Op. at 7-8.  
This means that even if disclosure were the only way to 
prevent the loss of human life, that would count for nothing 
as against a showing by the company that disclosure would 
cause substantial harm to its competitive position.  See id. at 
11 ("[W]e do not consider Public Citizen's assertion that 
disclosure would in fact prevent the exposure of human 
beings to a health risk.").  This is an important issue, and the 
kind that should be decided only after full briefing and 
argument.  See, e.g., Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 
(D.C. Cir. 1983).

     But we have not had that here.  As the argument heading 
of Public Citizen's brief makes clear, its core Exemption 4 
argument was that the requested records "Do Not Constitute 
Confidential Commercial Information."  Public Citizen Br. at 
31.  In a single clause in a single sentence of that brief, 
Public Citizen also said:  "Any disadvantage to Schering is 
minimal, and is outweighed by the strong public interest in 
safeguarding the health of human trial participants."  Id. at 
34 (emphasis added).  Schering replied in kind.  In a single 
clause in a single sentence of its reply brief (and without 
citation), Schering said:  "This enterprise [pharmaceutical re-
search] has well-served the public health through the discov-
ery and development of new medicines and should not, in 
effect, be reorganized to suit Public Citizen's views through 
an unprecedented and strained reading of exemption 4." 
Schering Reply Br. at 6 (emphasis added).  The italicized 
phrases are the full extent of the argument we have heard on 

this issue.  The FDA did not mention the point at all;  the 
parties did not discuss it at oral argument;  and the district 
judge did not refer to it in his opinion.

     Nor is this an issue we must decide in order to dispose of 
this case.  Even if a balancing of the public safety interest in 
disclosure were an element of Exemption 4, and even if Public 
Citizen had intended to raise the point, the conclusory asser-
tion the court cites is insufficient to prevent the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the FDA.  As we have said 
many times before, "[i]t is well settled that [c]onclusory 
allegations unsupported by factual data will not create a 
triable issue of fact."  Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120, 
126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation omitted);  see 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 313-14 
(D.C. Cir. 1988);  Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982);  Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 749 
(D.C. Cir. 1981).1

     Nor is this a case where the legal conclusion the court has 
reached is indisputable.  To the contrary, although no party 
cited the relevant precedent on this point, we have twice held 
that Exemption 4 requires a balancing of the interest in 
nondisclosure "against the public interest in disclosure."  See 
Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 690 F.2d 252, 269 (D.C. Cir. 

__________
     1  The court notes that in addition to the single conclusory 
statement in its brief, Public Citizen also mentioned the point in an 
affidavit filed in district court.  Op. at 8 n.*.  But as my colleagues' 
recitation of statements from the affidavit makes clear, that mention 
is confined to a total of three sentences in that 12-page document.  
See JA 312 (opining that "the public will benefit significantly from 
their release" and that "if these studies are kept secret, other drug 
companies may unknowingly conduct similarly hazardous studies, 
potentially placing many patients needlessly at risk") (emphasis 
added);  id. at 309 (alleging that disclosure "decreases the likelihood 
that other drug companies will replicate potentially hazardous hu-
man testing").  As the cases cited in the text above indicate, these 
conclusory statements of affiant opinion are insufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.  See also 10B Wright, Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure s 2738, at 346-56 (3d ed. 
1998).

1982) (Washington Post I);  Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 865 
F.2d 320, 326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Washington Post II).  
Washington Post I involved an analysis of Exemption 4 under 
the "impairment" prong of the National Parks test for confi-
dential information.2  We held that "[t]his inquiry necessarily 
involves a rough balancing of the extent of impairment and 
the importance of the information against the public interest 
in disclosure."  Washington Post I, 690 F.2d at 269.  Rather 
than decide "the details of the balancing process," we re-
manded the case to the district court.  Id.  When the case 
later returned to us, we concluded that the interest the 
government asserted in nondisclosure--impairment of its 
information-gathering ability--had not been appropriately re-
solved.  We therefore remanded the case again, instructing 
that "if the district court ultimately finds that disclosure will 
impair the government's information-gathering, it will once 
again be required to conduct the 'rough balancing of the 
extent of impairment and the importance of the information 
against the public interest in disclosure.' "  Washington Post 
II, 865 F.2d at 326-27 (quoting Washington Post I, 690 F.2d 
at 269).  And we made clear that "the only inquiry properly 
before the district court was the question whether disclosure 
of the financial information ... would be likely to impair the 
government's ability to gather this information in the future, 
and if so whether this risk outweighed the public's interest in 
disclosure."  Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).3

__________
     2  Under the test employed in National Parks & Conservation 
Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974), "commercial or 
financial matter is 'confidential' for purposes of the exemption if 
disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the following 
effects:  (1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary 
information in the future;  or (2) to cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person from whom the information was 
obtained."  Nothing in the reasoning of Washington Post I sug-
gests that the public interest balancing it requires for prong (1) is 
not also required for prong (2).

     3  See also Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 33 (D.C. Cir.1982) ("A 
decision whether to release FOIA-exempt material ... requires a 
considered balancing of the public's interest in disclosure of particu-

     None of the cases cited by the court holds that the public 
safety interest in disclosure should not be weighed in apply-
ing FOIA Exemption 4.  Certainly Reporters Committee does 
not.  See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989).  In that 
case there was no question but that a balancing test was 
required with respect to Exemption 7(C), id. at 776;  the 
question was what interests could be weighed in the balance.  
The Supreme Court held that FOIA does not protect an 
interest in "disclosure of information about private citizens 
that is accumulated in various governmental files but that 
reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct."  Id. 
at 773.  But as my colleagues recognize, the Court also held 
that an interest in "[o]fficial information that sheds light on 
an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely 
within that statutory purpose" and may be weighed in the 
balance.  Id.

     Unlike the information sought in Reporters Committee, the 
information Public Citizen seeks may reveal much about "an 
agency's performance of its statutory duties."  All of the 
records sought pertain to clinical trials that could not have 
proceeded without FDA authorization, and that "were discon-

__________
lar material and the interests in nondisclosure acknowledged by the 
statutory exemptions.").  The Ninth Circuit has followed our ap-
proach, see GC Micro Corp. v. Defense Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 
1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We agree with the D.C. Circuit that, in 
making our determination [of competitive harm under Exemption 
4], we must balance the strong public interest in favor of disclosure 
against the right of private businesses to protect sensitive informa-
tion."), as has our own district court, see Public Citizen Health 
Research Group v. FDA, 964 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing 
Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 253 (D.D.C. 1990);  AT&T Info. 
Sys., Inc. v. General Servs. Admin., 627 F. Supp. 1396, 1403 (D.D.C. 
1986)).  See also 1 James T. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclo-
sure s 14.12, at 14-44 (2d ed. 1990) ("In some cases the public need 
for the information is factored by the court into its equation of 
substantial competitive harm....  For example, public health and 
safety factors may warrant more attention to the substantial harm 
equation....").

tinued ... because of death or serious injury of patients."  
FDA Br. at 2 (describing Public Citizen's FOIA request).  
Disclosure assertedly will reveal "whether the FDA is ade-
quately analyzing data submitted in INDs before allowing 
human testing to begin and whether safety problems uncov-
ered in clinical trials result in prompt cessation of those 
trials."  Public Citizen Br. at 5.  That would certainly permit 
the public to "learn something directly about the workings of 
the Government."  Op. at 9 (quoting National Ass'n of 
Retired Fed. Empoyees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989)).  Yet, in evaluating the government's Exemption 4 
claims, the court makes no effort to determine how important 
to the public interest learning such information would be,4 or 
to weigh it against the injury Schering would suffer from 
disclosure.  Instead, the court ends its analysis upon finding 
"that disclosure of information in this IND would cause 
[Schering] substantial competitive harm."  Id. at 12.

     I cannot dispute my colleagues' conclusion that the briefs' 
brief mention of this issue gives us the discretion to decide it.  
But that is "not to say that affirmative exercise of the 
discretion [is] wise."  Fraternal Order of Police v. United 
States, 173 F.3d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reconsidering 
Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998 
(D.C. Cir. 1998).  Deciding an issue in the absence of any 
substantive briefing may later make us wish that we had 

__________
     4  One, but only one, of the elements of the public interest 
asserted by Public Citizen is that disclosure would "save human 
trial participants from being exposed to a dangerous drug" by 
keeping other drug companies from replicating Schering's "hazard-
ous human testing."  Op. at 10-11, 8 n.* (quoting Public Citizen).  
As noted above, on the current record this is only a conclusory 
allegation.  But if in fact the FDA has not already protected human 
trial participants directly by barring authorization for such replicat-
ed studies, disclosure of Schering's studies will reveal that fact (to 
the drug companies, trial participants, their physicians, and other 
knowledgeable members of the public).  By thus revealing the 
FDA's failure to "perform[ ] its statutory duties," Reporters Com-
mittee, 489 U.S. at 773, disclosure may enable the public to protect 
itself.

waited.  See id. ("In retrospect, it may well have been 
imprudent to address the merits on so thin an argumentative 
record.").  For that reason, I would "decline to resolve this 
issue on the basis of briefing which consisted of [not even] 
three sentences in the ... brief and no discussion of the ... 
relevant case law."  Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. 
United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 749 F.2d 856, 859 n.6 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Carducci, 714 F.2d at 717);  see 
Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 
32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1997).