United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 5, 2001 Decided August 17, 2001
No. 00-1132
Tourus Records, Inc.,
Petitioner
v.
Drug Enforcement Administration,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration
Pleasant S. Brodnax, III argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner.
Laurel Loomis, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, ar-
gued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was
Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was
filed.
Before: Randolph, Rogers, and Garland, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.
Garland, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Tourus Records, Inc.
seeks review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's
(DEA's) denial of its application to proceed in forma pauperis
in a forfeiture proceeding. We find the DEA's decision to be
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and we
therefore affirm its denial of Tourus' application.
I
In October 1999, an officer of the Richmond Hill, Georgia
police department stopped a van occupied by three men. The
men told the officer that they were traveling to local colleges,
selling music recorded on compact discs. After searching the
van, the officer confiscated more than $50,000 in cash, as well
as a quantity of compact discs.
Beyond these core facts, the parties dispute the circum-
stances of the search and seizure. According to the officer's
report, he stopped the van because it had swerved onto the
highway's shoulder several times, and he searched the van
because his dog alerted to the rear of the vehicle. The officer
reported that he discovered burnt marijuana residue and
stems in the van's rear ashtray, a bag containing $50,860 in
cash bundled in increments of $1000, and 50 compact discs.
According to Tourus, the officer stopped the van without
cause, found no contraband, and seized $50,860 in cash plus
additional money taken from the pockets of the occupants
that was not reported to the DEA. Tourus also states that
the officer seized 700, rather than 50, discs. It asserts that
the three men were distributing compact discs for the compa-
ny, and that the $50,860 in cash were the proceeds of disc
sales.
The Richmond Hill police transferred the $50,860 to the
DEA, which in December 1999 initiated administrative forfei-
ture proceedings pursuant to 21 U.S.C. s 881(d).1 On Janu-
__________
1 Section 881(a)(6) of Title 21 provides that proceeds of drug
offenses are subject to forfeiture to the United States. Section
ary 20, 2000, in order to have the opportunity to contest the
forfeiture in court, Tourus filed a claim of ownership. It also
completed an affidavit of indigency to support its request that
the DEA waive the $5000 cost bond ordinarily required to
contest a forfeiture, and permit the company to proceed in
forma pauperis.2 The affidavit filed by Tourus showed that
the company had no monthly income, no assets, no liabilities,
and no expenses. In support of the waiver application, the
president of Tourus, Paul Dowe, Jr., also filed an affidavit
setting forth his personal finances. The affidavit stated that
Dowe and his spouse had a combined monthly income of
$4855, savings of $950, a computer worth $5000, recording
gear valued at $3000, a home valued at $157,000, and two
motor vehicles valued at $13,000 and $17,400 respectively.
The Dowe affidavit further stated that the couple had two
dependent children and monthly expenses totaling $3670.
On March 7, 2000, the DEA sent Dowe a letter, informing
him that it had denied the application to waive the bond and
proceed in forma pauperis. The letter stated, in relevant
part:
Your claim for the above-referenced seized property is
being returned to you because the deciding authority
found that the Affidavit of Indigency you submitted in
lieu of a cost bond is not adequately supported. As a
result, your petition to proceed In Forma Pauperis is
denied.
Resp't App. at 18. On March 23, 2000, Tourus filed a petition
in this court, seeking review of the DEA's denial of its
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
__________
881(d) makes the provisions of the customs laws regarding adminis-
trative forfeiture applicable to forfeitures under s 881.
2 Congress abolished the bond requirement for forfeiture pro-
ceedings commenced after August 23, 2000. See Civil Asset Forfei-
ture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, ss 2(a), 21, 114 Stat.
202, 204, 225 (2000) (section 2(a) codified at 18 U.S.C.
s 983(a)(2)(E)). This opinion describes the law as applicable to the
forfeiture proceedings in Tourus' case, which commenced in Decem-
ber 1999.
II
Both Tourus and the government agree that we have
jurisdiction to consider Tourus' petition pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
s 877. We agree as well. Section 877 grants this court
jurisdiction to review "[a]ll final determinations, findings, and
conclusions of the Attorney General under this subchapter."
Because the provision under which the DEA initiated admin-
istrative forfeiture proceedings, 21 U.S.C. s 881(d), is part of
the same subchapter of the United States Code as s 877,3 we
have jurisdiction to review final determinations of the Attor-
ney General under that provision. See Yskamp v. DEA, 163
F.3d 767, 770 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that s 877 provides
courts of appeals with jurisdiction to review DEA forfeiture
proceedings); Scarabin v. DEA, 925 F.2d 100, 100-01 (5th
Cir. 1991) (same). And by delegation from the Attorney
General, the DEA's decision to deny Tourus' in forma pauper-
is application became such a final determination, following its
approval by the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture and
Money Laundering Section.4 Cf. Roberts v. United States
__________
3 Both are in subchapter I ("Control and Enforcement") of Chap-
ter 13 ("Drug Abuse Prevention and Control") of Title 21 ("Food
and Drugs") of the United States Code.
4 Except where delegated to another Department of Justice offi-
cial, the Attorney General has delegated to the DEA certain
"functions vested in the Attorney General" by the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (as amended),
which includes ss 877 and 881. 28 C.F.R. s 0.100(b) (2000). The
Attorney General has also delegated supervision of civil and crimi-
nal forfeiture actions to the Criminal Division of the Justice Depart-
ment. See 28 C.F.R. s 0.55(c), (d) (2000). And the Department's
U.S. Attorneys' Manual provides that "[i]n cases where the seizing
agency believes there are clear and articulable reasons for denial"
of an in forma pauperis petition, "the request for waiver shall be
referred ... for final determination" to the Asset Forfeiture and
Money Laundering Section of the Criminal Division. U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual,
ss 9-112.220, 9-119.112. As discussed infra Part IV, the Asset
Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section made the final determi-
nation with respect to Tourus' application.
Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950) (holding that "denial by
a District Judge of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
an appealable order"); Arango v. United States Dep't of the
Treasury, 115 F.3d 922 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing a Customs
Service denial of an in forma pauperis petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. s 1331).
Although the parties agree about our jurisdiction, they
disagree about the applicable standard of review. Tourus
contends that we should review the denial of its petition
under the familiar standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), and overturn the DEA's decision if we find it to be
arbitrary or capricious. See 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A). The gov-
ernment contends that our review is "strictly limited to
consideration of whether the appropriate procedural safe-
guards were made available to Petitioner," Gov't Br. at 5, and
that we lack authority to review the merits of the DEA's
decision, even under the APA's deferential standard.
Tourus' view is the correct one. The cases the government
cites as supporting extraordinarily limited review do not
involve denials of in forma pauperis status. Rather, those
cases involve review of a quite different kind of denial: the
denial of a request for the mitigation or remission of an
administrative forfeiture. See Yskamp, 163 F.3d at 770;
Scarabin v. DEA, 919 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g
denied, 925 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1991); In re $67,470.00, 901
F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Arango, 115 F.3d at
925; United States v. One 1987 Jeep Wrangler, 972 F.2d 472,
480 (2d Cir. 1992). To clarify the distinction, we briefly
review the procedural landscape.
Section 881 makes the provisions of the United States Code
that govern forfeitures for violations of the customs laws
applicable to forfeitures for violations of the drug laws. 21
U.S.C. s 881(d); see Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334,
1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under those provisions and the appli-
cable regulations, the DEA is authorized to subject seized
property to administrative forfeiture by sending written no-
tice of its intent to forfeit to each party who appears to have
an interest in the property, and by publishing such notice in a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for three suc-
cessive weeks.5 If, within twenty days after the first publica-
tion, a claimant submits a claim of ownership and posts a cost
bond of the lower of $5000 or 10% of the value of the
property, or successfully petitions to waive the bond and
proceed in forma pauperis, the administrative proceedings are
terminated and the government must proceed by filing a
claim for judicial forfeiture in a federal district court.6
If a claimant fails to submit a claim and post bond (or
successfully obtain a waiver), however, the property is admin-
istratively forfeited by default.7 Once property has been
administratively forfeited, the only option available to one
with an interest in the property is to file a petition for
remission or mitigation with the seizing agency.8 Treating an
agency's decision to grant such a petition as an "act of grace,"
the cases cited by the government hold that the courts may
not review the merits of an agency's decision to deny mitiga-
tion or remission, but may only determine whether the agen-
cy followed the applicable procedural requirements prior to
forfeiting the property. In re $67,470.00, 901 F.2d at 1543;
Scarabin, 919 F.2d at 338-39; see Yskamp v. DEA, 163 F.3d
at 770; Arango, 115 F.3d at 925; One 1987 Jeep Wrangler,
972 F.2d at 480; see also Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d
472, 475 (4th Cir. 1997). In so holding, these cases appear to
treat the decision to mitigate or remit as an "agency action
... committed to agency discretion by law," a category of
administrative decisions to which the judicial review provi-
sions of the APA are inapplicable. 5 U.S.C. s 701(a)(2); see
__________
5 See 19 U.S.C. s 1607; 21 C.F.R. s 1316.75 (2000).
6 See 19 U.S.C. s 1608; 19 C.F.R. s 162.47 (2000); 21 C.F.R.
ss 1316.76(b), 1316.78 (2000); see also Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997); Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301, 304 (2d
Cir. 1997). But see supra note 2 (noting that Congress abolished
the bond requirement for forfeitures commenced after August 23,
2000).
7 See 19 U.S.C. s 1609; 19 C.F.R. s 162.46 (2000); 21 C.F.R.
s 1316.77 (2000); Small, 136 F.3d at 1335; Boero, 111 F.3d at 304.
8 See 19 U.S.C. s 1618; 21 C.F.R. s 1316.79 (2000); 28 C.F.R.
ss 9.1-9.9 (2000); Ibarra, 120 F.3d at 475.
28 C.F.R. s 9.7(a)(1) (2000) ("Whether the property or a
monetary equivalent will be remitted to an owner shall be
determined at the discretion of the Ruling Official.").
But whatever the appropriate standard may be for review-
ing denials of petitions to mitigate or remit, the denial of an
application for in forma pauperis status is a fundamentally
different kind of decision--one that plainly is not committed
to the DEA's unreviewable discretion. The applicable regula-
tion states: "Upon satisfactory proof of financial inability to
post the bond, [the deciding official] shall waive the bond
requirement for any person who claims an interest in the
seized property." 19 C.F.R. s 162.47(e) (2000) (emphasis
added).9 Nothing suggests that the question of "satisfactory
proof" under this regulation was intended to be determined at
the caprice of the agency. See Arango, 115 F.3d at 929 ("The
indigency exception ... is an important means of affording
equal access to [judicial forfeiture] hearings and the right to
proceed as an indigent must not be arbitrarily denied.");
United States v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
waiver of the bond is mandatory if the claimant is in fact a
pauper."). To the contrary, the regulation was adopted in
response to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Wiren v. Eide that
"application of the bond requirement ... [is] unconstitutional
with respect to indigent persons on due process and equal
protection grounds," because it has the effect of "depriving an
individual whose property has been seized of an opportunity
for a hearing solely because of inability to post a bond." 45
Fed. Reg. 84,993, 84,993 (Dec. 24, 1980) (citing Wiren v. Eide,
542 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976)). The concerns expressed in
__________
9 Neither the governing statutes nor the DEA forfeiture regula-
tions provide for proceeding in forma pauperis in lieu of posting a
bond. Section 881(d) of Title 21, however, makes relevant U.S.
Customs Service regulations, like 19 C.F.R. s 162.47(e), applicable
to DEA forfeiture proceedings. See Clymore v. United States, 164
F.3d 569, 572 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); Small, 136 F.3d at 1335; see also
Jones v. DEA, 801 F. Supp. 15, 23 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); Resp't App.
at 2 (DEA notice form advising petitioner of the availability of
waiver on grounds of indigency).
Wiren would hardly be ameliorated if, although the govern-
ment permitted the filing of a waiver application, it retained
unreviewable authority to determine whether proof of indi-
gency has been satisfactorily made. As Judge Posner put it
in Evans, "it would be anomalous if the government could
pauperize you by seizing all your property and then prevent
you from challenging the seizure by denying you pauper
status, thus requiring you to post a bond with money that you
don't have." Evans, 92 F.3d at 542-43.
The DEA's proposed standard of review is also inconsistent
with the statute the agency concedes grants us jurisdiction to
review this case, 21 U.S.C. s 877. Under that statute,
"[f]indings of fact by the Attorney General" are conclusive
upon the court, but only "if supported by substantial evi-
dence." That provision necessarily requires the reviewing
court to determine whether the agency's findings have factual
support, and hence eliminates any claim to nonreviewability.
And while s 877 does not specify a standard for reviewing the
Attorney General's reasoning as distinguished from his fact-
finding, the APA provides the appropriate default standard:
A court must set aside agency action it finds to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law," 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A).10 At a minimum, that
standard requires the agency to "examine the relevant data
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action includ-
ing a 'rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.' " Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). We now proceed to determine whether
the agency has done so here.
__________
10 See Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting
that the APA provides the standard of review where none is
mentioned by the statute); Arango, 115 F.3d at 925, 928 (holding
that the APA's arbitrary or capricious standard applies to the denial
of in forma pauperis status in forfeiture proceedings); Evans, 92
F.3d at 542 (same).
III
Tourus contends that the DEA's denial of its application for
in forma pauperis treatment, as embodied in the agency's
March 7, 2000 letter, was arbitrary and capricious, and that
the DEA's decision must therefore be vacated. Were that
letter the only record evidence of the agency's decisionmaking
process, we would agree. A "fundamental" requirement of
administrative law is that an agency "set forth its reasons"
for decision; an agency's failure to do so constitutes arbitrary
and capricious agency action. Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 628 F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see State Farm,
463 U.S. at 43. That fundamental requirement is codified in
section 6(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. s 555(e). Section 6(d)
mandates that whenever an agency denies "a written applica-
tion, petition, or other request of an interested person made
in connection with any agency proceeding," the agency must
provide "a brief statement of the grounds for denial," unless
the denial is "self-explanatory." This requirement not only
ensures the agency's careful consideration of such requests,
but also gives parties the opportunity to apprise the agency of
any errors it may have made and, if the agency persists in its
decision, facilitates judicial review.11 Although nothing more
than a "brief statement" is necessary, the core requirement is
that the agency explain "why it chose to do what it did."
Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Rever-
sal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L.J.
199, 222.
The DEA's letter denying Tourus' petition to proceed in
forma pauperis does not meet the APA standard. The letter
says nothing other than that the "Affidavit of Indigency you
submitted in lieu of a cost bond is not adequately supported."
Resp't App. at 18. That is not a statement of reasoning, but
of conclusion. It does not "articulate a satisfactory explana-
tion" for the agency's action, State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43,
__________
11 See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Burlington
Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 167-69; Roelofs, 628 F.2d at 599-600;
Tabor v. Joint Bd. for the Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705,
711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
because it does not explain "why" the DEA regarded Tourus'
affidavit as unsupported, Friendly, supra, at 222.12 Nor are
the grounds for denying Tourus' application for indigent
status "self-explanatory," 5 U.S.C. s 555(e), since the compa-
ny's affidavit is in the form required by the DEA and lists
zero assets and zero income. The letter thus provides no
basis upon which we could conclude that it was the product of
reasoned decisionmaking.
Ordinarily, the discovery of this kind of error would end
appellate consideration. When an agency provides a state-
ment of reasons insufficient to permit a court to discern its
rationale, or states no reasons at all, the usual remedy is a
"remand to the agency for additional investigation or explana-
tion." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,
744 (1985).
In this case, however, the DEA's March 2000 letter does
not stand as the sole "explanation" of the agency's decision-
making rationale. On appeal, the DEA submitted internal
agency memoranda, dated February 2000, that specify the
grounds upon which the DEA denied Tourus' petition. Al-
though it is true that "courts may not accept appellate
counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action," Bur-
lington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, the memoranda submit-
ted by the DEA are not post hoc rationalizations of counsel.
Rather, they represent the "contemporaneous explanation of
the agency decision," and are therefore appropriate subjects
for our consideration. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143
__________
12 See Jones, 801 F. Supp. at 24-25 (reaching the same conclusion
with respect to the same form denial of waiver by the DEA); cf.
Philadelphia Gas Works v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
989 F.2d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that FERC's approval
of a pipeline charge, on the ground of "unique facts and circum-
stances" and "equity," "leaves regulated parties and a reviewing
court completely in the dark as to the core of FERC's reasoning");
Washington v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 856 F.2d
1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an agency denial of a
hearing on the ground that "the substantial expense and inconve-
nience ... is not warranted" was not " 'a brief statement of the
grounds for denial' as required under Section 555(e)").
(1973); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (directing lower court to
examine the record that was before the agency at the time of
decision, in order to determine whether it "disclose[d] the
factors that were considered"). We now turn to an examina-
tion of these memoranda.
IV
The first memorandum submitted by the government, dat-
ed February 2, 2000, is from the DEA to the Justice Depart-
ment's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, and
explains the DEA's decision to deny Tourus' application to
proceed in forma pauperis. Resp't App. at 16. The memo-
randum states that "it appears that Tourus Records, Inc. is a
mere shell corporation," because the corporation's affidavit
discloses that it has "no assets, no expenses, no liabilities, and
no income." The "true claimant," the memorandum contin-
ues, "appears to be its President, Paul Dowe, Jr., who ap-
pears to have sufficient assets to post the required bond of
$5,000." The memorandum notes that "[i]n his affidavit, Mr.
Dowe states that he and his spouse have an average income
of $4,855.00 per month and have $950.00 in a savings ac-
count," and that Dowe also has "two (2) vehicles worth a total
of $30,400.00, a computer worth $5,000.00, and recording gear
worth $3,000.00." Id.
The second memorandum is the Justice Department's Feb-
ruary 28, 2000 reply, concurring in the DEA's view. Resp't
App. at 17. That memorandum states the Department's
agreement that Dowe is the true claimant. In assessing
Dowe's ability to post the bond, the memorandum reviews the
data cited by the DEA, and further notes that the Dowes own
real property valued at $157,000, that they have two depen-
dents, and that their combined monthly expenses total $3670.
The memorandum then compares the Dowes' overall financial
situation with the "year 2000 Department of Health and
Human Services Poverty Guidelines[, which] set the poverty
threshold for a family of four at $1,421 per month," and
concludes that the "petitioner ... has sufficient assets with
which to post the required $5,000 bond without adversely
affecting his ability to provide the necessities of life for
himself and his dependents." Id.
Unlike the DEA's March 2000 letter, the two February
memoranda adequately explain the government's rationale for
regarding Tourus Records as unqualified for in forma pauper-
is treatment. That rationale is neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious. The government found that Tourus is not itself the
true claimant, and that the true claimant--Mr. Dowe--is not
indigent. Rather, the agency found that Dowe has the finan-
cial wherewithal to post the required bond, and hence that
waiver of the bond requirement is not justified. Cf. Unifica-
tion Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(denying attorney's fees to otherwise eligible applicants be-
cause the real party in interest was ineligible for fees).
We also conclude that there is substantial evidence to
support the factual findings upon which the DEA's reasoning
is based. First, although Tourus represents itself as a com-
pany that produces and markets music recorded on compact
discs, its financial affidavit states that Tourus has no income,
no expenses, and no assets of any kind. The personal affida-
vit of Tourus' president, by contrast, states that Dowe does
have income, expenses, and assets, including the recording
gear that one might ordinarily expect a recording company to
have. While this might not require the conclusion the DEA
reached, it does adequately support the agency's determina-
tion that Tourus Records is merely a shell corporation, and
that Dowe is the real party in interest whose financial capaci-
ty should be evaluated in deciding whether to waive the bond
requirement.
Second, the evidence supports the DEA's conclusion that
Dowe himself does not qualify for in forma pauperis status.
That evidence includes family income of almost $60,000 per
year, well in excess of the family's annual expenses, plus
assets of approximately $200,000. This financial information
provides substantial evidence to support the DEA's finding
that Dowe is able to post the required $5000 bond--particu-
larly in light of the fact that the DEA permits a claimant to
post bond with either cash or sureties. See 21 C.F.R.
s 1316.76(a) (2000); Resp't App. at 2 (DEA notice form).13
V
Although the notice by which the DEA denied Tourus'
application to proceed in forma pauperis was insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the APA, the internal memoranda
upon which it was based are sufficient. Those memoranda
make clear that the DEA's rationale for denying the applica-
tion is reasonable, and that its findings are based on substan-
tial evidence. Indeed, a remand to correct the initial notice
would serve no purpose, as the agency could and no doubt
would simply retransmit its internal memoranda to petitioner.
See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
194 F.3d 72, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that "reversal and
remand is 'necessary only when the reviewing court concludes
that there is a significant chance that but for the error the
__________
13 Tourus failed to file a reply brief in this case. At oral argu-
ment, petitioner noted that it is a Virginia corporation, and contend-
ed that Virginia law does not permit "piercing the corporate veil" in
a case like this. He also contended that, because the DEA's form
affidavit (which is itself a copy of the in forma pauperis affidavit set
forth in Form 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure) asks
the applicant to list asset "value" rather than "net value," Dowe's
net worth was overstated by an unstated amount of mortgage and
other debt. Petitioner has waived these contentions by waiting
until oral argument to raise them. See Galvan v. Federal Prison
Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But even if the
arguments were not waived, neither would affect our conclusion.
The validity of the DEA's determination to treat Tourus as a shell
for purposes of its own bonding requirements is a question of
federal, not Virginia, law, and rests on whether that determination
satisfies the requirements of the APA. Cf. Chicago Sch. of Auto-
matic Transmissions, Inc. v. Accreditation Alliance of Career Schs.
& Colleges, 44 F.3d 447, 449-450 (7th Cir. 1994). And even if
Dowe's net worth were lower than that which appears on the face of
his affidavit, it would not affect our conclusion that there is substan-
tial evidence to justify the determination that he is capable of
securing a $5000 bond, particularly given the opportunity to utilize a
surety.
agency might have reached a different result' " (quoting
Friendly, supra, at 211)). Accordingly, the DEA's denial of
Tourus Records' application to proceed in forma pauperis is
Affirmed.