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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 21, 2002 Decided February 7, 2003
No. 01-5320
GLENN P. LACEDRA,
APPELLANT
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FORUNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 99cv00273)
Elaine J. Goldenberg, appointed by the court, argued the
cause as amicus curiae on the side of appellant. With her on
the briefs were Deanne E. Maynard and David W. DeBruin.
Glenn P. LaCedra filed pro se briefs.
Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. On the brief were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, and Jane M. Lyons,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,
and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.
GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Glenn LaCedra wrote a letter to
the Executive Office for United States Attorneys requesting
documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. He
first asked generally for ‘‘all documents pertaining to’’ the
criminal case against him; he then enumerated certain specif-
ically requested items. The EOUSA construed the letter to
request only the specifically enumerated items and therefore
produced only 14 of the approximately 6,000 pages of docu-
ments it had concerning LaCedra. The district court, deter-
mining that the EOUSA adequately responded to LaCedra’s
request, granted summary judgment for the Agency. We
hold the EOUSA’s interpretation of LaCedra’s request was
not reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of,
and remand the case to, the district court for further proceed-
ings.
I. Background
LaCedra was convicted in 1996 in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts. In 1998 he sent
a pro se FOIA request to the U.S. Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts. The request read in pertinent part as fol-
lows:
I wish to obtain a copy of all documents pertaining to
my case that was prosecuted by your office, entitled
United States vs. Glenn P. LaCedra, 96–10074 RCL,
Specifically I am requesting the following below; Docu-
ments and Information on
1. Any and all inducements, and rewards offered to the
chief government witnesses Susan Yodlin and Jenni-
fer Brown, including Government provided beeper
service, cellular phone service and fees paid in my
case for any, and all information or for testifying
against me.
3
2. All scientific fingerprinting results from the inside of
the black electrical tape, that was attached to the
device, and any documents concerning the known or
unknown identities of such.
Having waited almost a year without receiving any docu-
ments, LaCedra filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
LaCedra asked the court to compel the EOUSA to produce
‘‘[a]ll information in [the EOUSA’s] files from 1995 to present
concerning [him] in any criminal investigation which includes
Case No. 96–10074–RCL entitled the United States vs. Glenn
P. LaCedra (District of Massachusetts) and all the other
requested information sought.’’ Shortly thereafter the
EOUSA provided LaCedra with 14 pages of documents,
including one it had redacted pursuant to Exemption 7(C) of
the FOIA.
The EOUSA then twice moved for and the district court
twice denied summary judgment. When the Agency filed a
third such motion, it attached the declaration of Maryellen
Barrett, a FOIA official in the office of the U.S. Attorney for
the District of Massachusetts. In her declaration Barrett
described LaCedra’s letter as requesting only the specifically
enumerated items. She also described in detail the steps she
had taken to locate documents responsive to that request.
Along the way she stated that LaCedra’s criminal case file
consisted of ‘‘three boxes of material,’’ of which only the 14
pages already produced were responsive to LaCedra’s re-
quest. This LaCedra took as an admission that the EOUSA
had not produced all the documents he had requested.
Responding to the district court’s concern that LaCedra
had ‘‘raise[d] valid questions about the contents of [the] three
boxes of documents,’’ the EOUSA argued that ‘‘the plaintiff’s
original request for information did not include all of the
documents contained in TTT his criminal case file,’’ and ac-
cused LaCedra of trying to ‘‘expand his request.’’ According
to the EOUSA, LaCedra’s general request for ‘‘all documents
pertaining to my case that was prosecuted by your office’’
merely ‘‘identif[ies] the location where the documents re-
4
quested TTT will be found,’’ whereas his enumeration of
specific items ‘‘describe[s] exactly what is being requested.’’
The district court concluded that the EOUSA’s understand-
ing of LaCedra’s letter as requesting only the specifically
enumerated items was ‘‘not unreasonable.’’ Accordingly, the
court granted the EOUSA’s third motion for summary judg-
ment.
LaCedra timely appealed pro se to this court, and we
appointed an amicus curiae to present arguments in support
of his position. We review the decision of the Agency de
novo. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (district court reviews
agency de novo); Petroleum Info. Corp. v. Dep’t of the
Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (circuit court
reviews summary judgment de novo in FOIA as in other
cases).
II. Analysis
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, requires
federal agencies to grant ‘‘any request for records which TTT
reasonably describes such records,’’ § 552(a)(3)(A), subject to
certain specified exemptions. As the EOUSA interprets
LaCedra’s request, it ‘‘reasonably describes’’ only the items
that it specifically enumerates, whereas LaCedra argues that
the EOUSA should have construed his request more broadly.
Initially we note the EOUSA’s suggestion on brief that, as
a prudential matter, we decline to hear this case because
LaCedra then had pending before it a second, related FOIA
request that might provide LaCedra with all the relief he was
seeking here. Before the oral argument in this case, howev-
er, the EOUSA had finished processing the second request
without producing any additional documents. As a result, we
express our appreciation for, but decline the Agency’s sugges-
tion.
And so to the issue. LaCedra points out that his original
letter of request plainly sought ‘‘all documents pertaining to’’
his criminal case. The EOUSA’s interpretation of his re-
quest, he claims, reads the just-quoted phrase out of the
5
letter. LaCedra maintains that his subsequent enumeration
of specific items does not limit his initial request but only
indicates a subset of the larger class of documents in which
he is especially interested. He also argues that, to the extent
the scope of his request is ambiguous, (1) the EOUSA was
obliged by our decision in Nation Magazine v. United States
Customs Service, 71 F.3d 885 (1995), to interpret the request
liberally in favor of disclosure; and (2) his petition for manda-
mus, which the EOUSA received before it began its search,
clarified the request. See Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d
540, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
For its part, the EOUSA argues that it is LaCedra’s
interpretation of the request that renders a portion of it
surplusage. Specifically, if we interpret the letter first to
seek ‘‘all documents,’’ then there is no way to give meaning to
the latter part in which LaCedra ‘‘[s]pecifically TTT re-
quest[s]’’ certain enumerated documents. On the EOUSA’s
proffered interpretation, ‘‘the first two sentences of TTT
LaCedra’s request identified the location where the requested
documents would be found, and the latter two sentences
described exactly what was being requested.’’
To be sure, LaCedra’s request is not a model of clarity.
The first portion, ‘‘I wish to obtain a copy of all documents
pertaining to my case,’’ is in considerable tension with the
second, ‘‘Specifically I am requesting the following below.’’
Nevertheless, LaCedra’s request is reasonably susceptible to
the broader reading. The drafter of a FOIA request might
reasonably seek all of a certain set of documents while
nonetheless evincing a heightened interest in a specific subset
thereof. We think it improbable, however, that a person who
wanted only the subset would draft a request that, like
LaCedra’s, first asks for the full set. The EOUSA’s interpre-
tation — that the request for ‘‘all documents pertaining to my
case that was prosecuted by your office’’ identifies the loca-
tion where the subset of documents may be found — is simply
implausible. In view of the Government’s obligation under
the law of this circuit ‘‘to construe a FOIA request liberally,’’
Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 890, we think it is also wrong.
6
Citing Maydak v. United States Department of Justice, 218
F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the amicus urges us to hold the
EOUSA’s interpretation is so unreasonable that, upon re-
mand to the district court, the Agency should not be allowed
to invoke any of the exemptions in the FOIA. In Maydak
the Agency had invoked one exemption to support non-
disclosure of certain information; on appeal it abandoned that
exemption and asked the court to remand the case to the
district court so the Agency could there advance other ex-
emptions. We held that an agency could not raise FOIA
exemptions seriatim and ordered the Agency to produce all
the relevant documents without regard to any belatedly as-
serted exemptions.
Nothing in Maydak requires an agency to invoke any
exemption applicable to a record the agency in good faith
believes has not been requested. Of course, we can imagine a
case in which the agency’s interpretation of a FOIA request is
so unreasonable as to raise the inference that the agency is
not acting in good faith. What we would do in such a case we
need not decide today. For in this case the EOUSA’s
interpretation, although erroneous, was at least colorable.
Not every error bespeaks a knave.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of the
district court. The case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.