Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify
the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made
before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued October 23, 2003 Decided December 16, 2003
No. 02-7138
WILLIE TROY SINGLETARY,
APPELLANT
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 94cv00419)
Barbara Kraft argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Corporation Coun-
sel, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief
was Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel at the
time the brief was filed. Edward E. Schwab, Assistant
Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
2
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
GARLAND, Circuit Judge: At issue on this appeal are plain-
tiff Willie Troy Singletary’s allegations of employment dis-
crimination and retaliation by the Rehabilitation Services
Administration (RSA), a District of Columbia agency, and two
of its officials. We conclude that the district court erred in
rejecting three of Singletary’s claims, and therefore affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I
Plaintiff Singletary, an albino African–American male who
is legally blind, was hired by RSA on October 4, 1971.
Singletary v. District of Columbia, 225 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50–55
(D.D.C. 2002).1 RSA is an agency within the District of
Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS) that pro-
vides job training and placement for persons with disabilities.
From 1972 to December 1987, Singletary worked as a voca-
tional rehabilitation specialist, a job that required him to
place disabled individuals — particularly blind and visually
impaired persons — in jobs with local employers. Id. at 50.
In March 1986, Singletary applied for a supervisor position
in RSA’s Visual Impairment Section, a job for which he was
rated as highly qualified and that paid a higher salary. After
RSA failed to select him for the position, Singletary filed an
internal discrimination complaint with DHS. DHS rejected
Singletary’s complaint on March 5, 1987. Singletary then
filed a discrimination complaint with the D.C. Office of Hu-
man Rights (OHR); OHR denied Singletary’s complaint as
well. On October 28, 1987, however, the plaintiff filed an
appeal with the Office of the City Administrator that led to a
partial victory: Two months later, the City Administrator
concluded that DHS had discriminated against Singletary in
denying him an opportunity to serve as an acting supervisor,
1 The facts described in this Part are taken primarily from the
findings of fact made by the district court.
3
ordered DHS to ‘‘cease and desist from further discriminato-
ry conduct against the Complainant,’’ and remanded Single-
tary’s complaint to OHR for additional investigation regard-
ing his March 1986 non-selection for the supervisor position.
Id. at 51.
On November 17, 1987, three weeks after Singletary filed
his appeal with the City Administrator, defendant Katherine
Williams transferred the plaintiff and sixteen other employees
to RSA’s Vending Facility Program. Unlike the other trans-
ferees, who were given regular offices, Singletary was as-
signed to work in a storage room. The district court de-
scribed the plaintiff’s workspace as follows:
The storage room was dirty, dusty and without heat,
ventilation or adequate lighting. Access to the storage
room was through a clinic to which plaintiff did not have
keys. As a result, he could not enter the room at will,
and he and colleagues visiting him in the room risked
being locked in the room. The phone in the room often
did not work, and plaintiff’s colleagues often could not
get hold of him. No other employee used the storage
room as an office space before defendants assigned the
room to plaintiff. None of the other employees assigned
to the Vending Facility Program at that time were placed
in workplaces similar to plaintiff’s officeTTTT RSA had
vacant offices available in the same buildingTTTT
Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted). Singletary was not given a
regular office until 1990. Id. at 51.
Despite his repeated requests, during the six years he
worked in the Vending Facility Program ‘‘plaintiff had no
position description and no official job duties.’’ Id. at 54.
Without an official job description, ‘‘it was possible that in the
event of on-the-job injury or death, compensation from the
D.C. Government might not be available.’’ Id. During the
same period, the ‘‘plaintiff received no annual reviews except
for a ‘non-review’ in 1992 and a ‘satisfactory’ in 1993.’’ Id.
The non-review stated that, ‘‘because there is no job descrip-
tion, there is nothing to evaluate this employee on.’’ Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4
In October 1989, the position of acting supervisor in the
Visual Impairment Section again became available. Single-
tary applied for, and was again denied, the position. On May
15, 1990, he filed a second discrimination complaint with
OHR, alleging that this most recent non-promotion was in
retaliation for his 1987 OHR complaint. Nine days later —
on a separate appeal from the remand of the 1987 com-
plaint — the City Administrator found there was probable
cause to believe that RSA’s failure to select Singletary for the
supervisor position in 1986 was discriminatory. The Adminis-
trator ordered RSA to give Singletary priority consideration
for the next available position for which he was qualified. Id.
at 52.
In January 1991, RSA posted five supervisory vacancies,
including one in the Visual Impairment Section. The selec-
tion process for these positions took place during April–May
1991. Although he interviewed for all of the positions, Single-
tary was not chosen for any. Id. at 53, 63.
OHR closed Singletary’s discrimination case in August
1991. A few weeks later, Singletary appealed the closure to
the City Administrator. On March 5, 1993, Singletary’s
counsel wrote a letter to the City Administrator to inquire
about the status of his appeal. The Administrator responded
that Singletary did not have grounds for appeal because
OHR’s closing of the case was not a final decision. Single-
tary’s counsel sent a second letter seeking reconsideration,
which the City Administrator denied on April 21, 1993. In
the denial letter, the City Administrator erroneously advised
that Singletary had a right to appeal to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. at 54. On May 21, 1993,
Singletary filed an appeal with that court. Pl.’s Ex. 133.2
In June 1993, Singletary applied for another acting supervi-
sor position, this time within RSA’s Client Services Division.
Again, he was not selected. Then, in August 1993, defendant
Ruth Royal Hill transferred Singletary out of the Vending
Facility Program and into the Marketing and Placement Unit,
2 Singletary later withdrew that appeal after being advised that
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over
his claim. See Appellant’s Br. at 13.
5
where he returned to the placement work that he had per-
formed at the beginning of his tenure at RSA. Shortly after
returning to the Placement Unit, Singletary requested cleri-
cal help, a computer, and computer training as an accommo-
dation for his disability. Singletary’s supervisor initially told
him that he was asking for too much, and that he would have
to wait until the National Rehabilitation Hospital evaluated
his job and his need for accommodation. Singletary, 225 F.
Supp. 2d at 54–55.3
On September 17, 1993, Singletary filed a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleg-
ing discrimination and retaliation. On March 3, 1994, Single-
tary filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, alleging that the District, DHS, and two
RSA officials had discriminated against him on the basis of
his skin color and disability, and had retaliated against him
for complaining of that discrimination, in violation of: Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.; and Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At trial, Singletary’s case was
based on five theories: ‘‘(1) retaliation in violation of Title
VII; (2) hostile work environment in violation of Title VII;
(3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) failure to accommodate
plaintiff’s disability in violation of the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act; and (5) intentional disability discrimination in
violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.’’ Singletary,
225 F. Supp. 2d at 55. After a nine-day bench trial, the court
entered judgment against Singletary on all of his claims.
With respect to the plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the court
held that Singletary had proven that three of RSA’s employ-
ment actions constituted unlawful retaliation in violation of
Title VII: the 1987 transfer of Singletary to the Vending
Facility Program; the 1987 failure to give Singletary an
3Singletary ultimately received clerical help in March 1994 and a
computer with the proper software in December of that year.
Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
6
official job description; and the 1991 failure to grant Single-
tary priority consideration and to select him for a supervisory
position. Id. at 57–60. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
Title VII’s 300–day statute of limitations for filing an EEOC
complaint barred recovery for any of those violations. Id. at
61.4 The plaintiff does not challenge the denial of those three
claims on appeal. He does, however, challenge the denial of a
fourth Title VII retaliation claim — that the defendants
retaliated against him in 1993 by failing to promote him to a
supervisory position and transferring him back to the Place-
ment Unit. The district court denied that claim, not because
of the statute of limitations, but because it concluded that
Singletary had failed to show a causal connection between the
defendants’ 1993 actions and the protected activity for which
the plaintiff claimed those actions constituted retaliation. Id.
at 57.
The district court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the
defendants intentionally created a hostile work environment
in violation of Title VII. That claim was denied on statute of
limitations grounds, and is a subject of this appeal. Id. at 62.
Also rejected on limitations grounds were certain of Single-
tary’s section 1983 claims against the individual defendants in
their personal capacities. Id. at 63. Singletary has appealed
only one of those — his claim that the 1991 failure to promote
was unlawfully discriminatory. Finally, the district court
denied the balance of Singletary’s claims, including additional
4 Where, as here, an aggrieved person ‘‘initially instituted pro-
ceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or
seek relief from such practice,’’ Title VII requires such person to
file a charge with the EEOC ‘‘within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.’’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–5(e)(1). This requirement is one of ‘‘the prerequisites that
a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit.’’ National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); see Currier v. Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1366 & n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Singletary filed his EEOC charge on September 17,
1993. Accordingly, the district court found that only claims based
on events that occurred within 300 days of that date were timely.
Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
7
section 1983 claims against both individual defendants and the
District of Columbia, and failure-to-accommodate and disabili-
ty discrimination claims under the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act. See id. at 63–66. Singletary does not challenge the
denial of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims here. See
Appellant’s Br. at 15 n.14.
II
We review a district court’s factual findings following a
bench trial, including findings regarding intentional discrimi-
nation, for clear error only. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a);
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). We
review the court’s legal analysis, however, de novo. While we
may not set aside the court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous, we owe no such deference to ‘‘findings
[that] rest on an erroneous view of the law.’’ Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982); see Barnes v.
Small, 840 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In the following sections, we consider Singletary’s chal-
lenges to the district court’s denial of three of his claims: (1)
the Title VII retaliation claim regarding the 1993 failure to
promote and subsequent transfer; (2) the Title VII hostile
work environment claim; and (3) the section 1983 claim
regarding the 1991 failure to promote. The remaining deter-
minations from which Singletary appeals are affirmed for the
reasons stated by the district court.
A
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it ‘‘an
unlawful employment practice for an employer TTT to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race [or] color.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
Although this provision applies only to private employers,
Title VII contains a separate provision that applies to federal
agencies and the District of Columbia. See id. § 2000e–16(a)
(‘‘All personnel actions affecting employees TTT in executive
agencies TTT [and] the Government of the District of Colum-
8
bia TTT shall be made free from any discrimination based on
race [or] colorTTTT’’). ‘‘ ‘Despite the differences in language
TTT we have held that Title VII places the same restrictions
on federal and District of Columbia agencies as it does on
private employers, and so we may construe the latter provi-
sion in terms of the former.’ ’’ Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251,
255 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
It is also unlawful under Title VII ‘‘for an employer to
discriminate against any of [its] employees TTT because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge
TTT or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–3(a). To establish a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation, the plaintiff must show: ‘‘ ‘1) that [he] engaged in
a statutorily protected activity; 2) that the employer took an
adverse personnel action; and 3) that a causal connection
existed between the two.’ ’’ Morgan v. Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).5 In
this Part, we are concerned with the first and third require-
ments.
Singletary contends that the district court erred in denying
his claim that the defendants unlawfully retaliated against
him when they failed to promote him to an acting supervisor
position in June 1993 and then transferred him back to the
Placement Unit. The court based that finding solely on the
conclusion that the ‘‘plaintiff has failed to show a causal
5 Where the alleged retaliation took the form of a failure to
promote, as it did here, the plaintiff must also show that he applied
for an available job and that he was qualified for that position. See
Morgan, 328 F.3d at 651. Once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, ‘‘the employer must articulate a legitimate non-
retaliatory reason for its action; finally, the plaintiff has the ulti-
mate burden of establishing that the reason asserted by the em-
ployer is pretext for retaliation.’’ Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512,
520 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
9
connection with respect to defendants’ 1993 conduct.’’ Sin-
gletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 57. And it based that conclusion,
in turn, on the fact that ‘‘a significant period of time elapsed
between’’ the 1993 employment actions ‘‘and the original
protected activity in 1987 and 1990.’’ Id. The ‘‘original
protected activity’’ to which the court referred was Single-
tary’s filing of complaints of discrimination and retaliation
with OHR in 1987 and 1990, as well as his immediate pursuit
of those complaints before OHR and the City Administrator.
Id. at 56.
In concluding that there was insufficient temporal proximi-
ty between the defendants’ alleged retaliatory actions and
Singletary’s protected activity, the district court failed to take
account of protected activity that Singletary undertook long
after ‘‘the original protected activity in 1987 and 1990’’ and
well into 1993. There was, for example, the letter that
Singletary’s counsel submitted to the City Administrator on
March 4, 1993, asking about the status of his appeal of OHR’s
dismissal of his discrimination complaint and proposing a
meeting to discuss a remedy that would ‘‘achieve closure.’’
J.A. 51. There was also the letter his counsel sent to the
Administrator on March 9, 1993, requesting ‘‘reconsideration
of [the] decision not to entertain Mr. Singletary’s appeal.’’
J.A. 53–55. That letter provided a detailed account of RSA’s
failure to comply with the Administrator’s May 1990 order
that Singletary be given priority consideration for the next
available supervisor position and that the discrimination
against him cease. And it made plain Singletary’s ongoing
pursuit of his discrimination claims and continued opposition
to RSA’s conduct:
The May 24, 1990 order required that all discrimination
against Mr. Singletary cease immediately. Contrary to
that order, DHS/RSA has continued to retaliate against
Mr. Singletary. The Department has retaliated in a way
designed to most effectively humiliate and quiet Mr.
Singletary and to rob him of his dignity—that is, by not
assigning him a positionTTTT DHS’ failure to place Mr.
Singletary in a real job is insidious retaliation of the
10
worst sortTTTT It is undisputed that Mr. Singletary
continues to be retaliated againstTTTT We ask that you
reconsider your conclusions TTT and order DHS/RSA to
assign Mr. Singletary to a bona fide position consistent
with his qualifications [and] otherwise cease retaliating
against him.
J.A. 55. Finally, there was Singletary’s attempt to litigate his
claim by filing an appeal in the D.C. Court of Appeals on May
21, 1993. Pl.’s Ex. 133.
There is no doubt that the 1993 letters from Singletary’s
attorney constituted protected conduct under Title VII. See
Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also
Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 31
(D.C. Cir. 1997). So, too, did the appeal that Singletary filed
with the D.C. Court of Appeals that same year. See Clark
County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271–73 (2001);
Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001). We do not
know what conclusion the district court, as factfinder, would
have reached regarding causation had it taken this protected
1993 activity into account. Although the court found that
there was no other evidence of causation that could make up
for the temporal proximity that it thought was absent, Single-
tary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 57, this circuit has held that a close
temporal relationship may alone establish the required causal
connection.6 And here the temporal proximity was quite
close: Singletary was denied promotion to the acting supervi-
sor position in June 1993, the month after he filed his appeal
with the D.C. Court of Appeals. Whether such proximity was
enough in this case is, in the first instance, a question for the
6 See Cones, 199 F.3d at 521 (‘‘[G]iven the circumstances of this
case, the close temporal proximity of [the plaintiff’s] discrimination
complaints to the refusal to consider him for the TTT position is
sufficient to establish a causal connection.’’); Mitchell, 759 F.2d at
86 (‘‘The causal connection component of the prima facie case may
be established by showing that the employer had knowledge of the
employee’s protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action
took place shortly after that activity.’’); accord O’Neal v. Ferguson
Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2001).
11
finder of fact rather than the appellate court. We therefore
remand for the district court to determine whether the close
temporal relationship between the 1993 protected activity and
the 1993 adverse employment action, in the context of other
evidence offered by both the plaintiff and the defendants,
persuades the court that the defendants unlawfully retaliated
against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII.7
B
We turn next to Singletary’s claim that the defendants
intentionally subjected him to a hostile work environment, on
account of his skin color and in retaliation for his filing of
discrimination complaints, in violation of Title VII. Under
Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice to ‘‘requir[e]
people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive envi-
ronment.’’ Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. at 21 (1993).
As the Supreme Court has explained: ‘‘When the workplace
is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment,’ Title VII is violated.’’ Id. (quoting
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67
(1986)) (citations omitted). Singletary’s hostile work environ-
ment claim charged that:
Defendants have subjected plaintiff to demeaning and
humiliating working conditions, including an uncomforta-
ble physical environment, no professional work assign-
ments and an absence of professional colleagues, training
7 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (remanding a Title VII action because the
district court’s factual findings in favor of the defendant may have
been ‘‘influenced by its mistaken view of the law’’); Pullman-
Standard, 456 U.S. at 291 (‘‘When an appellate court discerns that a
district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous
view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for
further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing
findings.’’).
12
and development for almost six years, from December
1987 through August 1993. No other employee is or has
been so treated.
Am. Compl. ¶ 27 (J.A. 34).
The district court rejected Singletary’s hostile work envi-
ronment claim on the ground that it was barred by the
statute of limitations. The claim was barred, the court said,
because Singletary had failed to prove that any discrete
‘‘retaliatory act occurred within 300 days of September 17,
1993, the date he filed his EEOC complaint.’’ Singletary, 225
F. Supp. 2d at 62; see supra note 4. In so holding, the
district court rejected the application of what it described as
the ‘‘continuing violation theory’’ to a hostile work environ-
ment claim. Under that rejected theory, ‘‘if the alleged acts
constitute one similar pattern or practice and at least one
illegal act took place within the filing period, then the com-
plaint of discrimination is not time-barred and acts outside
the statutory period may be considered for purposes of
liability.’’ 225 F. Supp. 2d at 61; see id. at 62. See generally
2 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW 1351–1362 (3d ed. 1996).
The district court’s analysis of Title VII’s limitations peri-
od, as applied to hostile work environment claims, was wrong
as a matter of law. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court clarified the
appropriate limitations analysis as follows. The Court first
set out the rule for ‘‘discrete discriminatory acts,’’ such as
terminations and failures to promote: They ‘‘are not action-
able if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged
in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act
starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.’’ Id. at
113. But ‘‘[h]ostile environment claims,’’ the Court continued,
‘‘are different in kind from discrete acts’’ because ‘‘[t]heir
very nature involves repeated conduct.’’ Id. at 115. Such a
claim, the Court said, ‘‘is comprised of a series of separate
acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment
practice.’’ Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, hostile work environment claims are subject to a
different limitations rule and, indeed, to the very rule rejected
13
by the district court here: ‘‘Provided that an act contributing
to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time
period of the hostile environment may be considered by a
court for the purposes of determining liabilityTTTT In order
for the charge to be timely, the employee need only file a
charge within TTT 300 days of any act that is part of the
hostile work environment.’’ Id. at 117–18 (emphasis added).8
As part of his hostile work environment claim, Singletary
plainly did allege acts that took place within 300 days of the
filing of his EEOC charge — that is, after November 21,
1992. Those acts included the defendants’ intentional and
persistent failure to provide him with an official job descrip-
tion, which continued through at least August 1993. Single-
tary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 54. They also included Singletary’s
claim that the defendants unlawfully retaliated against him
when they failed to promote him to a supervisory position in
June 1993 and then transferred him back to the Placement
Unit—the claim that we remanded for further consideration
in Part II.A. And they further included the plaintiff’s claim
that, after his 1993 transfer, the defendants refused for over a
year to provide him with the clerical assistance, computer,
and computer training that he needed to accomplish his
assignments. Id. at 64.9
8 See also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122 (‘‘A charge alleging a hostile
work environment claim TTT will not be time barred so long as all
acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful
employment practice and at least one act falls within the time
period.’’). In a footnote, the district court appeared to recognize
the applicability of this rule, citing Morgan as holding that, al-
though ‘‘not appropriate for claims of discrete discriminatory or
retaliatory acts,’’ the ‘‘continuing violation theory’’ remains ‘‘applica-
ble to charges alleging a hostile work environment.’’ Singletary,
225 F. Supp. 2d at 61 n.2. The contrary conclusion in the body of
the district court’s opinion may be due to the fact that the Supreme
Court did not decide Morgan until shortly before the district court
issued its opinion.
9 The district court addressed those refusals as part of Single-
tary’s failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, and declined to
consider them on the ground that Singletary had failed to exhaust
14
In rejecting the timeliness of Singletary’s hostile work
environment claim, the district court emphasized its finding
that no discrete, unlawful retaliatory act occurred within the
statutory period. Id. at 62. But whether or not the court
reaffirms that finding on remand, see supra Part II.A, the
timeliness of Singletary’s hostile work environment claim
does not depend on whether the acts that he alleged were
discriminatory are actionable standing alone. As the Court
said in Morgan, ‘‘in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single
act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.’’ 536
U.S. at 115 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Rather, all
Singletary need demonstrate is that ‘‘the acts about which
[he] complains are part of the same actionable hostile work
environment practice.’’ Id. at 120.
Recognizing that the district court erred in its application
of the limitations bar to Singletary’s hostile work environment
claim, the defendants ask us to uphold the denial of Single-
tary’s claim on the alternative ground that the district court
ruled that Singletary had not been subject to a hostile work
environment. But the district court did not so rule. To be
sure, the court did state that it had ‘‘serious doubts that the
defendants’ conduct was sufficient to create an abusive work-
ing environment.’’ Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In the very next sentence, however, it concluded that
‘‘any doubts this Court holds TTT are moot’’ in light of its
holding that Singletary ‘‘failed to timely file a complaint with
the EEOC.’’ Id.
his administrative remedies. According to the court, the refusals
were not charged in and ‘‘could not have been expected to grow out
of’’ Singletary’s EEOC complaint. Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d. at
64 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Singletary raised the
same allegations as part of his hostile work environment claim. See
Am. Compl. ¶ 29 (J.A. 34). And in Morgan, the Supreme Court
held that ‘‘an unlawful employment practice has ‘occurred,’ even if it
is still occurring,’’ that ‘‘[s]ubsequent events TTT may still be part of
the one hostile work environment claim,’’ and that the ‘‘entire time
period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for
the purposes of determining liability.’’ 536 U.S. at 117, 120.
15
Nor can we accept the defendants’ further suggestion that
no reasonable factfinder could find a hostile work environ-
ment here. In addition to the alleged 1993 discriminatory
failure to promote and 1993–94 failure to provide him with the
tools necessary to accomplish his assignments — the merits
of which claims the district court must address on remand —
Singletary made a host of allegations that the court ruled did
have merit but that it erroneously thought were untimely for
a hostile work environment claim. Most significantly, the
district court determined that, notwithstanding the availabili-
ty of appropriate office space, the defendants intentionally
assigned Singletary to work in an unheated storage room for
over a year and a half as ‘‘retaliatory discrimination’’ for the
filing of a discrimination complaint. Id. at 58. As the court
found:
The room to which plaintiff was assigned was not previ-
ously used as an office space, but rather was used as a
general storage room. The storage room was without
heat or ventilation. It was poorly lit, which posed prob-
lems for plaintiff, who is visually challenged. The only
entrance to plaintiff’s office was through a clinic to which
plaintiff did not have keys. The phone in the room often
did not work. The office space contained TTT brooms
[and] boxes of debrisTTTT Defendants clearly intended
to relegate plaintiff to this sub-standard officeTTTT
[T]he record shows that there were other, more suitable,
places in which plaintiff’s office could have been located.
Id. at 58–59. The court also determined that, as another act
of intentional discrimination, the defendants failed for six
years to give Singletary an official job description — which
left him both unable ‘‘to receive performance evaluations,
thereby precluding any advancement opportunities,’’ and po-
tentially ineligible to receive unemployment compensation if
he were injured on the job. Id. at 59. And the court further
found that at least two adverse employment actions — the
1987 decision to transfer Singletary to the Vending Facility
Program and the 1991 failure to select him for a supervisory
16
position — were yet additional acts of intentional, unlawful
retaliation for the plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination.
Although ‘‘many of [the] acts upon which [the plaintiff’s]
claim depends occurred outside the 300 day filing period, we
cannot say that they are not part of the same actionable
hostile environment claim.’’ Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120–21.
That is a determination that the district court must make in
the first instance. See id. at 120 (holding that the court’s
‘‘task is to determine whether the acts about which [the
plaintiff] complains are part of the same actionable hostile
work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls
within the statutory time period’’). Similarly, we cannot
determine whether, if timely, Singletary’s allegations demon-
strate that his workplace was permeated with a pattern of
ongoing harassment that was so ‘‘severe or pervasive [as] to
alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive
working environment.’’ Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal
quotation marks omitted). That, too, is for the district court
as factfinder to decide. We therefore remand for a determi-
nation of both the timeliness and the merits of Singletary’s
hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
C
Finally, we consider the district court’s denial of Single-
tary’s charge that the failure of RSA officials to promote him
to a supervisory position in 1991, in alleged violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, rendered
them personally liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for monetary damages
and injunctive relief against ‘‘[e]very person who, under color
of [law] TTT subjects, or causes to be subjected, any TTT other
person TTT to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’’ Id.10
10 Singletary’s amended complaint included section 1983 claims
not only against the individual defendants, but against the District
of Columbia as well. A municipality can be held liable under
section 1983, however, only when its ‘‘policy or custom TTT inflicts
the injury.’’ Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658,
17
Although the district court found that RSA’s 1991 failure to
promote Singletary constituted discriminatory retaliation in
violation of Title VII, it nonetheless rejected Singletary’s
Title VII claim on the ground that it was barred by that
statute’s 300–day limitations period. Singletary, 225 F. Supp.
2d at 59–60; see supra note 4. The court did not, however,
expressly consider the plaintiff’s claim that the 1991 adverse
action also constituted a denial of equal protection in violation
of section 1983. What the court did say was that ‘‘any
incidents that occurred before March 3, 1991’’ were time-
barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to suits
brought under section 1983 in the District of Columbia. 225
F. Supp. 2d at 63.11 Apparently, the court thought that the
1991 failure to promote took place in January 1991, and hence
fell outside the three year period. See id. at 57 (‘‘[P]laintiff
has demonstrated that within months of his second complaint
to the OHR, defendants failed to provide plaintiff with priori-
ty consideration when interviewing him, and ultimately reject-
ing him, for five supervisory positions in January 1991.’’).
This factual assumption was clear error. Although the five
vacancies were posted in January 1991, id. at 53, the decision
not to promote Singletary was made in April 1991 at the
earliest. See Letter from City Administrator to Counsel for
Singletary (March 5, 1993) (J.A. 52) (stating that Singletary
was considered for a supervisory position on April 26, 1991);
694 (1978). The district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
adduce any evidence that the defendants’ actions toward him ‘‘were
the result of a District of Columbia custom, policy or practice.’’
Singletary, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 63–64. Singletary’s opening brief
does not challenge that conclusion, see Appellant’s Br. at 27–29
(arguing for personal liability only), and, in any event, we do not
perceive clear error in the district court’s conclusion.
11Singletary filed his complaint in the district court on March 3,
1994. ‘‘The Supreme Court has held that TTT claims under section
1983 are governed by’’ the relevant state’s ‘‘residual or general
personal injury statute of limitations,’’ which in this case is the
three-year bar of D.C. Code § 12–301(8). Carney v. American
Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 243–50 (1989)).
18
Pl.’s EEOC Compl. (J.A. 17) (stating that Singletary was
interviewed on April 25, 1991 and notified that he was not
selected on June 8, 1991); see also Singletary, 225 F. Supp.
2d at 63 (noting that the selection process for the positions
took place during April and May of 1991). It is thus undis-
puted that the adverse action taken against Singletary in 1991
fell within the three-year limitations period. Hence, the
court’s implicit holding that the 1991 claim was untimely was
incorrect.
Of course, the fact that Singletary’s failure-to-promote
claim fell within the limitations period does not end the
matter. The district court has yet to consider either the
merits of Singletary’s claim or the individual defendants’
defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that ‘‘government officials per-
forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known’’). We there-
fore remand for the district court to determine whether
Singletary’s 1991 non-promotion constitutes a violation of
section 1983 for which the individual defendants may be held
liable.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district
court erred in: (1) rejecting Singletary’s Title VII retaliation
claim regarding the 1993 failure to promote on lack-of-
causation grounds, without recognizing the close temporal
proximity between the alleged retaliatory acts and Single-
tary’s protected activity; (2) holding Singletary’s Title VII
hostile work environment claim to be time barred, without
applying the appropriate limitations analysis; and (3) denying
Singletary’s section 1983 claim regarding the 1991 failure to
promote, on the erroneous assumption that the failure did not
take place within the limitations period. Accordingly, we
reverse the district court’s judgment on those three issues
19
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings.