Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 94-1562

CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
Respondent.

YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Intervenor.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Cyr, Circuit Judge.

Jonathan M. Block, with whom Robert L. Quinn and Egan,

Flanagan and Cohen, P.C. were on brief for petitioner.

Charles E. Mullins, Senior Attorney, Office of the General

Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with whom Karen D.

Cyr, General Counsel, John F. Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo

Slaggie, Deputy Solicitor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Anne S. Almy, Assistant Chief, and William B. Lazarus, Attorney,

Appellate Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief for respondent.
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., with whom Ropes & Gray, was on brief

for intervenor.

July 20, 1995

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Citizens Awareness Network
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge

("CAN") petitions for review of a final order and opinion of the

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "the

Commission") denying CAN's request for an adjudicatory hearing

regarding decommissioning activities taking place at the Yankee

Nuclear Power Station ("Yankee NPS"). CAN's petition for review

rests on three grounds. First, CAN contends that the

Commission's order violates CAN members' right to due process

under the Fifth Amendment and 189a of the Atomic Energy Act

("AEA"), 42 U.S.C. 2239 (1988). Second, CAN argues that the

NRC's action violates the National Environmental Policy Act,

("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1988) by failing to conduct

an environmental analysis ("EA") or an environmental impact

statement ("EIS") prior to decommissioning. Finally, CAN argues

that the Commission's actions violate its own precedents and

regulations, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. Although we reject CAN's Fifth

Amendment arguments, we grant CAN's petition for review on the

other grounds stated.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

A. The Regulatory Framework
A. The Regulatory Framework

Operators of nuclear power plants must have a license

issued by the NRC. That license describes the facility and the

authorized activities that the operator may conduct. If the

operator, called the "licensee," wishes to modify the facility or

take actions not specifically authorized by the license, the

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licensee may seek an amendment to its license from the

Commission. See 42 U.S.C. 2131-2133, 2237 (1988).

Section 189a of the AEA provides that:

In any proceeding under this chapter, for
the granting, suspending, revoking, or
amending of any license or construction
permit, or application to transfer
control, and in any proceeding for the
issuance or modification of rules and
regulations dealing with the activities
of licensees, . . . the Commission shall
grant a hearing upon the request of any
person whose interest may be affected by
the proceeding, and shall admit any such
person as a party to such
proceeding. . . .

42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A). The Commission has issued regulations

specifically allowing a licensee to modify its facilities without

NRC supervision, unless the modification is inconsistent with the

license or involves an "unreviewed safety question." 10 C.F.R.

50.59(a)(1). If the proposed change is inconsistent with the

license, or does involve an unreviewed safety question (as that

term is defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.59(a)(2)(ii)), the licensee

must apply to the Commission for a license amendment, 10 C.F.R.

50.59(c), and only then are the statutory hearing rights of

189a triggered.

The procedures for decommissioning1 a nuclear power

plant are set forth principally in 10 C.F.R. 50.82, 50.75,

51.53, and 51.95 (1990). The formal process begins with the

1 "Decommissioning" means those activities necessary "to remove
[a facility] safely from service and reduce residual
radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property for
unrestricted use and termination of the license." 10 C.F.R.
50.2; 53 Fed. Reg. 24018, 24021 (June 27, 1988).

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filing of an application by the licensee, normally after the

plant has ceased permanent operations, for authority to surrender

its license and to decommission the facility. Five years before

the licensee expects to end plant operations, the licensee must

submit a preliminary decommissioning plan containing a cost

estimate for decommissioning and an assessment of the major

technical factors that could affect planning for decommissioning.

10 C.F.R. 50.75. Within two years after "permanent cessation

of operations" at the plant, but no later than one year prior to

expiration of its license, a licensee must submit to the

Commission an application for "authority to surrender a license

voluntarily and to decommission the facility," together with an

environmental report covering the proposed decommissioning

activities. 10 C.F.R. 50.82, 50.83. This application must be

accompanied by the licensee's proposed decommissioning plan,

which describes the decommissioning method chosen and the

activities involved, and sets forth a financial plan for assuring

the availability of adequate funds for the decommissioning costs.

10 C.F.R. 50.82(b). The Commission then reviews the

decommissioning plan, prepares either an environmental impact

statement ("EIS") or an environmental assessment ("EA") in

compliance with NEPA, and gives notice to interested parties. 10

C.F.R. 51.95. If the NRC finds the plan satisfactory (i.e., in

accordance with regulations and not inimical to the common

defense or the health and safety of the public), the Commission

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issues a decommissioning order approving the plan and authorizing

decommissioning. 10 C.F.R. 50.82(e).

The Commission has stated that its regulations allow a

licensee to conduct certain, limited decommissioning activities

prior to obtaining NRC approval:

[I]t should be noted that [10 C.F.R.]
50.59 permits a holder of an operating

license to carry out certain activities

without prior Commission approval unless
these activities involve a change in the
technical specifications or an unreviewed
safety question. However, when there is
a change in the technical specifications
or an unreviewed safety question, 50.59
requires the holder of an operating
license to submit an application for
amendment to the license pursuant to
50.90 . . . . [T]his rulemaking do[es]
not alter a licensee's capability to
conduct activities under 50.59.
Although the Commission must approve the

decommissioning alternative and major

structural changes to radioactive

components of the facility or other major

changes, the licensee may proceed with

some activities such as decontamination,
minor component disassembly, and shipment
and storage of spent fuel if these

activities are permitted by the operating

license and/or 50.59.

53 Fed. Reg. at 24025-24026 (emphasis added). The Commission

adhered to this position from the issuance of this statement in

1988 until 1993. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co., 33 N.R.C.

at 73 n.5 ("Major dismantling and other activities that

constitute decommissioning under the NRC's regulations must await

NRC approval of a decommissioning plan"); Sacramento Mun. Util.

Dist. (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), 35 N.R.C. 47, 62

n.7 (1992) (same).

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B. Factual Background
B. Factual Background

On February 27, 1992, licensee Yankee Atomic Electric

Company ("YAEC") announced its intention to cease operations

permanently at Yankee NPS, a nuclear power plant located near

Rowe, Massachusetts. One month later, YAEC applied for a license

amendment to limit its license to a POL, a possession-only

license, thus revoking YAEC's authority to operate the plant.

The NRC published a Notice of Proposed Action informing the

public of its opportunity to be heard on the license amendment

request, pursuant to 189a of the AEA. 57 Fed. Reg. 13126,

13140 (April 15, 1992). There were no hearing requests;

accordingly, the NRC issued the requested amendment to YAEC's

license on August 5, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 37558, 37579 (Aug. 19,

1992). In the cover letter accompanying YAEC's amended license,

the Commission reminded YAEC that "[t]he NRC must approve . . .

major structural changes to radioactive components of the

facility . . . ." See Issuance of Amendment No. to Facility

Operating License No. DPR-3 (N.R.C. Docket No. 50-029).

At a meeting between YAEC and NRC representatives on

October 27, 1992, YAEC proposed that the NRC grant permission for

YAEC to initiate an "early component removal project" (the

"CRP"), prior to submission and approval of its decommissioning

plan, and hence prior to conducting an environmental assessment

of decommissioning at the site. YAEC explained that it wished

expeditious commencement of this early CRP because of the

unexpected availability of space in the Barnwell, South Carolina

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Low-level Waste Disposal facility. If made to wait for

submission and approval of a decommissioning plan, YAEC would

lose its chance to use the Barnwell facility.

Pursuant to this proposed CRP, YAEC would first remove

the four steam generators and the pressurizer from the nuclear

reactor containment, remove core internals from the reactor

pressure vessel, and transport all of these radioactive

components to the Barnwell facility. After this dismantling,

YAEC proposed to then cut up the nuclear reactor core baffle

plate (which is too radioactive to meet low-level waste criteria

and thus cannot be dumped in the Barnwell site), and store the

pieces in canisters in the spent fuel pool for future delivery to

a U.S. Department of Energy waste site. Finally, YAEC planned to

remove and transport the four main coolant pumps to the Barnwell

site. These CRP activities would result in the permanent

disposal of 90% of the nonfuel, residual radioactivity at Yankee

NPS, all prior to approval of the actual decommissioning plan.

On November 25, 1992, YAEC sent a letter to the NRC

which set forth YAEC's arguments as to how NRC regulations,

Statements of Consideration issued with those regulations, and

Commission precedents could be "interpreted" to allow approval of

the early CRP, despite the fact that the Commission's

interpretative policy at that time explicitly required NRC

approval for major structural changes.

During this period, CAN also wrote two letters to the

NRC, on November 2, 1992 and again on December 21, 1992,

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requesting inter alia that the Commission halt or postpone any

and all dismantling activities at Yankee NPS until a

decommissioning plan was submitted, moved through the public

notice-and-comment process, and approved. In a December 29, 1992

letter to CAN, Kenneth Rogers, the Acting Chairman of the

Commission, responded that the Commission was "considering a

public meeting in the vicinity of the plant early in 1993 to

provide information to the public on NRC's review of

decommissioning in general and on expected site activities which

will occur prior to the licensee's submittal of a decommissioning

plan in late 1993."

On January 14, 1993, following internal review of its

decommissioning policies, the Commission issued a Staff

Requirements Memo ("SRM"), setting forth a significant,

substantial change from previously held agency positions on

decommissioning activities, and essentially adopting YAEC's

proposed "interpretation" of prior agency precedents and

positions. Without any explanation for the substantial

modification, or any further analysis, the SRM stated:

Notwithstanding the Commission's

statements in footnote 3 of CLI-90-08
[Long Island Lighting Co., 33 N.R.C. 61

(1991)] and the Statements of
Consideration for the decommissioning
rules at 53 Federal Register 24025-26,
licensees should be allowed to undertake
any decommissioning activity (as the term
"decommission" is defined in 10 C.F.R.
50.2) that does not -- (a) foreclose the
release of the site for possible
unrestricted use, (b) significantly
increase decommissioning costs, (c) cause
any significant environmental impact not

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previously reviewed, or (d) violate the
terms of the licensee's existing license
(e.g., OL, POL, OL with confirmatory
shutdown order etc.) or 10 C.F.R. 50.59
as applied to the existing license. . . .
The staff may permit licensees to use
their decommissioning funds for the
decommissioning activities permitted
above . . ., notwithstanding the fact

that their decommissioning plans have not

yet been approved by the NRC.

Shortly after the Commission issued this SRM, YAEC advised the

NRC that it planned to begin its CRP activities in accordance

with this new policy.2

On June 30, 1993, the Commission issued another SRM

reiterating its new decommissioning policy, and stating that it

had voted to formally amend 10 C.F.R. 50.59 to reflect this new

position. This proposed rulemaking is still underway. The

Commission also stated that approval of a decommissioning plan is

not an action that triggers hearing rights under 189a of the

AEA, but that the Commission staff could, in its discretion,

formulate an informal hearing process for decommissioning plan

approval.

On September 8, 1993, CAN again wrote to the NRC, again

requesting a hearing on the CRP at Yankee NPS. CAN also

generally alleged that the NRC was in violation of its own

regulations, and in violation of "the rule making process," by

allowing a licensee to engage in a CRP without prior Commission

2 Later, YAEC submitted a decommissioning plan, which is
currently under NRC review. YAEC completed most of the CRP
activities, however, before it ever submitted its decommissioning
plan to the Commission, and well before any environmental
assessment was performed.

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approval. The Commission responded to these allegations in a

letter dated November 18, 1993, stating that CAN had "failed to

identify the proposed action that might be taken by the NRC Staff

that requires the offer of a hearing."

The next day, CAN filed a petition for agency review

under 10 C.F.R. 2.206,3 requesting that the NRC halt the CRP

activities pending an investigation by the Inspector General's

office. In the petition, CAN reiterated its position that the

CRP constitutes decommissioning, and that the NRC was thus in

violation of its own regulations in allowing CRP activities at

Yankee NPS prior to approval of a decommissioning plan. The NRC

responded by letter dated December 29, 1993, explaining its

policy change as set forth in the SRMs, and concluding that CAN's

petition "does not provide any new information regarding why

public health and safety warrants suspension of the CRP and

therefore does not meet the threshold for treatment under 10 CFR

2.206."

After a flurry of letters, in which CAN repeatedly

requested formal hearings on the CRP and the Commission

consistently denied these requests on the grounds that the CRP

was inaccord withthe newpolicy, CANfiled thispetition forreview.4

3 Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, members of the public may request
agency enforcement action against a licensee that is allegedly in
violation of an NRC regulation or requirement.

4 In April 1993, CAN also filed a motion in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking a
temporary restraining order to halt the CRP activities. The
district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC, 854 F. Supp.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review agency actions and decisions with substantial

deference, setting them aside only if found to be "arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle

16, 18-19 (1994). In so doing, however, the district court
wrote:

The court makes this decision with a
heavy heart. The plaintiffs have been
diligently attempting for months to get a
hearing on the appropriateness and
competence of the NRC's actions. Many of
them live near the site of the
decommissioned nuclear plant. They and
their families are the most directly at
risk if the job of removing contaminated
materials is bungled. . . . Not only have
the plaintiffs been denied the
opportunity to present their concerns and
to hear the response of the NRC at a
formal hearing, they have not as yet even
been afforded a forum in which to argue
their entitlement to a hearing. They had

no incentive to seek a hearing when the
NRC originally issued the POL, because at
that time it was the policy of the NRC to

require final approval and NEPA
compliance before authorizing early
component removal. Months later, the NRC
now concedes, this policy changed and the
NRC decided to view the POL as itself
authorizing early component removal
without more. Requests for hearing at
this point were denied. . . . This course
of conduct suggests a concerted
bureaucratic effort to thwart the efforts
of local citizens to be heard about an
event that vitally affects them and their
children. . . . The prospect that this
tactic may be used nationally, as more
nuclear plants shut down, . . . is, to
put it mildly, disquieting.

Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).

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Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).

The scope of this review is narrow; a court should not substitute

its judgment for that of the agency, and agency decisions will be

upheld so long as they "'do not collide directly with substantive

statutory commands and so long as procedural corners are squarely

turned.'" Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting

Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993)).

This deference is especially marked in technical or scientific

matters within the agency's area of expertise. Id.

While this is a highly deferential standard of review,

it is not a rubber stamp; in order to avoid being deemed

arbitrary and capricious, an agency decision must be rational.

Id.; Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 8 F.3d at 77. Moreover, when an

administrative agency departs significantly from its own

precedent, "it must confront the issue squarely and explain why

the departure is reasonable." D vila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1,

5 (1st Cir. 1994). This is not to say that agencies must forever

adhere to their precedents; agencies may "refine, reformulate and

even reverse their precedents in the light of new insights and

changed circumstances." Id. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.

173, 186-87 (1991). An agency changing its course must, however,

supply a reasoned analysis for the change. Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42; Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 8 F.3d at 77.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of CAN's

petition.

ANALYSIS
ANALYSIS

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CAN raises three principal arguments. First, CAN

contends that the NRC's refusal to grant CAN a formal hearing

before allowing YAEC to conduct decommissioning constitutes a

regulatory taking of their property without due process or

compensation, denies CAN members their right to due process under

the Fifth Amendment, and violates the hearing requirements of

189a of the AEA. Second, CAN argues that the Commission has

violated NEPA by allowing YAEC to accomplish almost 90% of its

decommissioning activities before conducting any environmental

assessment. Finally, CAN contends that the NRC's unexplained

change in its decommissioning policy was irrational and contrary

to its own duly-promulgated regulations, in violation of the

procedural requirements of the APA. We address these contentions

in reverse order.

A. The NRC's Change In Policy
A. The NRC's Change In Policy

CAN argues that the Commission's significant policy

shift, manifested in its two Staff Requirements Memos, improperly

revoked duly-promulgated Commission regulations, interpretations

and precedents, without the benefit of rulemaking procedures or

even a rational explanation for the change. By allowing YAEC to

commence the CRP activities notwithstanding its own precedents

and regulations, CAN contends, the Commission acted arbitrarily

and capriciously, in violation of the APA. In defense of the

unexplained change in its decommissioning policy, the NRC

maintains that the former policy had never been incorporated into

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the regulations themselves, and, in any case, that agencies are

free to alter their interpretations of their own regulations.5

While this is certainly true, any such alteration or

reversal must be accompanied by some reasoning -- some indication

that the shift is rational, and therefore not arbitrary and

capricious. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 8 F.3d at 77-78. See also

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412

U.S. 800, 808 (1973)("Whatever the ground for the [agency's]

departure from prior norms, . . . it must be clearly set forth so

that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency's

action."). Courts should not attempt to supply a reasoned basis

for the action that the agency itself has not given. Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. While this is not a

difficult standard to meet, the Commission has not met it here.

The prior Commission policy regarding decommissioning,

embodied in 10 C.F.R. 50.59 and explicated in the Commission's

published Statement of Consideration, required NRC approval of a

decommissioning plan before a licensee undertook any major

structural changes to a facility. This policy was developed

through a lengthy notice and comment period, with substantial

public participation. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24018, 24020 (a total of

5 We are baffled by the Commission's assertion that "CAN has not
challenged this modification of NRC policy," as we count three
pages of argument in CAN's brief devoted to this precise issue.
Nor can the Commission claim that CAN did not raise this issue
prior to filing this petition for review. In both its September
8, 1993 letter to the NRC and its 2.206 enforcement petition, CAN
alleged that the Commission was in violation of its own
regulations and of the "rule making process."

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143 individuals and organizations submitted comments on proposed

rule). The Commission adhered to this policy for almost five

years, reiterating its position in at least two adjudicatory

decisions. Then, rather suddenly, the Commission circulated two

internal staff memos that completely reversed this settled

policy, without any notice to the affected public. More

troubling, however, was the Commission's failure to provide in

those memos, or anywhere else, any justification or reasoning

whatsoever for the change. The memos did not set forth any new

facts, fresh information, or changed circumstances which would

counsel the shift. Nor did they provide any legal analysis of

how the new policy comported with, or at least did not conflict

with, existing agency regulations. With nothing more than a

breezy "notwithstanding," the Commission abruptly disposed of

five years' worth of well-reasoned, duly-promulgated agency

precedent.

Moreover, the NRC's actions are inconsistent with the

plain terms of the AEA, the NRC's enabling statute, which provide

that "in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules

and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees, . . .

the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any

person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding. . . ."

42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). While the NRC's

policy shift involved an interpretation of its regulation, and

not the regulation itself, it was an interpretative policy that

provided a great deal of substantive guidance on the rather

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ambiguous language of the regulation, by specifically delineating

the permissible activities of licensees. We think that the

statute's phrase "modification of rules and regulations"

encompasses substantive interpretative policy changes like the

one involved here, and therefore that the Commission cannot

effect such modifications without complying with the statute's

notice and hearing provisions. See Natural Resources, Etc. v.

NRC, 695 F.2d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1982)("Fair notice to affected

parties requires that the Commission not alter suddenly and sub

silentio settled interpretations of its own regulations.").6

Finally, we agree with the petitioners that the

Commission's new policy appears utterly irrational on its face.

By allowing licensees to conduct most, if not all, of the

permanent removal and shipment of the major structures and

radioactive components before the submittal of a decommissioning

plan, it appears that the Commission is rendering the entire

decommissioning plan approval process nugatory. Why should a

licensee be required to submit such a plan if its decommissioning

is already irreversibly underway? Why offer the public the

opportunity to be heard on a proposed decommissioning plan if the

actual decommissioning activities are already completed? In

6 The Commission points out that in June 1993 it held a public
meeting, attended by several CAN members. Although the meeting
was ostensibly to address the community's questions about the
decommissioning activities at Yankee NPS, the transcript of the
meeting indicates that the NRC representatives carefully
sidestepped the few questions raised about the recent change in
Commission policy regarding decommissioning. We do not think
that this type of forum or proceeding meets the hearing
requirements of the AEA.

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short, the Commission's new decommissioning policy seems to

render any regulatory oversight of the decommissioning process

moot. Perhaps a rational basis for this policy exists, but we

cannot see one, and the Commission has not provided one.

The Commission's failure to provide any explanation for

its seemingly irrational change in policy renders its new policy

arbitrary and capricious, and not in accordance with the

requirements of 42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A). We therefore remand

the issue of the NRC's change in decommissioning policy for

further proceedings, in accordance with the AEA's hearing

requirements and this opinion.

B. Petitioner's NEPA Arguments
B. Petitioner's NEPA Arguments

CAN also contends that the Commission's irrational

interpretation of its regulations has led to the agency's

permitting YAEC to accomplish over 90% of the decommissioning

activities at Yankee NPS prior to conducting any EA or EIS, in

violation of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332.7 In response, the

7 The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et

seq., requires all federal agencies, including the NRC, to

prepare a "detailed statement," containing specified
environmental information, for all proposed "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2)(C). When the NRC plans to
issue a license amendment or take some other form of regulatory
action that requires NEPA compliance, the NRC will publish either
an EA stating that there is no significant impact on the
environment from the proposed action, or an EIS, reviewing the
impact of the proposed action and listing alternatives. 10
C.F.R. 51.20, 51.21. When approving a licensee's request to
decommission, the NRC prepares either a supplemental EIS for the
post-operating license stage, or an EA updating the prior
environmental review for the facility, as it deems appropriate.
10 C.F.R. 51.95(b).

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Commission claims that the CRP activities do not constitute a

"major federal action" triggering NEPA compliance. The

Commission explains that it did not actively permit YAEC to

initiate CRP activities; rather, it "simply reviewed YAEC's

implementation of the CRP, as a part of its everyday oversight of

its licensee's activities, and found no reasons to interfere with

YAEC's plans." Because mere "regulatory oversight, as opposed to

active permission, does not implicate NEPA," the NRC argues, no

EA or EIS was required.

This argument is completely devoid of merit. First,

the Commission holds in trust certain funds set aside by

licensees, including YAEC, to finance decommissioning activities.

42 U.S.C. 2232(a). The Commission therefore had to approve the

release of these set-aside funds in order to finance YAEC's CRP

activities. See Letter from Morton B. Fairtile re:

Decommissioning Funds, N.R.C. Docket No. 50-029 (April 16, 1993).

In essence, the Commission had to actively permit the release of

funds, or YAEC could not have initiated the CRP. Far from being

"mere oversight," we think the Commission's approval of financing

certainly constitutes its active permission of the CRP. Second,

it is undisputed that decommissioning is an action which, even

under the Commission's new policy, requires NEPA compliance. 10

C.F.R. 51.95(b). In "advising" YAEC that it could initiate

decommissioning prior to submitting a decommissioning plan, the

NRC effectively granted YAEC permission to commence activities

normally conducted after decommissioning plan approval, including

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the removal and storage of almost all of the radioactive

components. This permission, in turn, allowed YAEC to

decommission its facility without the benefit of NEPA compliance

by the Commission.

Regardless of the label the Commission places on its

decision to release the necessary funds to YAEC and "advise" the

licensee to go ahead with its CRP, it was effectively, even

explicitly, permitting YAEC to decommission the facility. An

agency cannot skirt NEPA or other statutory commands by

essentially exempting a licensee from regulatory compliance, and

then simply labelling its decision "mere oversight" rather than a

major federal action. To do so is manifestly arbitrary and

capricious.

We note that the Commission's arguments on this issue

are implicitly predicated on the assumed validity of its new

interpretative policy. As we have explained, however, the

Commission has failed to provide any rational explanation for

this policy, thus rendering it arbitrary and capricious. The

Commission therefore cannot rely on its new policy as a basis for

its decision that NEPA compliance was unnecessary prior to

decommissioning at Yankee NPS. Accordingly, we find that the

Commission's action in allowing YAEC to complete 90% of the

decommissioning at Yankee NPS prior to NEPA compliance lacked any

rational basis, and was thus arbitrary and capricious. We remand

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this issue to the Commission for actions in accordance with this

holding.8

C. Petitioner's Remaining Arguments
C. Petitioner's Remaining Arguments

1. Petitioner's Fifth Amendment Arguments
1. Petitioner's Fifth Amendment Arguments

CAN contends that because the property interests of its

members have been "invaded by radiation due to the NRC's

regulatory decisions concerning the decommissioning" of Yankee

NPS, the NRC's actions constitute a regulatory taking of their

property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We need not dwell

on this argument, however, as CAN has not stated a cognizable

takings claim. Beyond its general statement that its property

interests have been "invaded" by radiation, CAN has not explained

or argued even generally how this is so, nor does it offer any

factual support for its claims regarding radiation.9 CAN also

does not seek compensation for any alleged invasion of its

property interests, but simply wishes a hearing on the CRP

activities. Given the sparsity of its allegations and the

8 We recognize that this holding comes too late to prevent much
of the CRP activity. There remains, however, a significant
amount of radioactive material and structures at the Yankee NPS
site, the removal of which will continue to affect CAN members.
This continued removal will undoubtedly continue to pose health,
safety and environmental questions, thereby requiring NRC
oversight and NEPA compliance. CAN's arguments on this point
are therefore not moot.

9 In its brief, CAN does point to the statement made in an
affidavit by CAN member Will Sparks, describing the NRC's actions
as "a form of invasion, like have [sic] a stranger in the house,
like being burglarized." Even assuming that Mr. Sparks'
affidavit is properly part of the record in this petition, this
statement is simply insufficient to support a broad takings claim
like the one put forth here.

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complete lack of argument or factual support for its bare

assertion, we see no reason to depart from the well-settled rule

in this circuit that "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are

deemed waived." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st

Cir. 1990). "It is not sufficient for a party to mention a

possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to

. . . put flesh on its bones." Id. Consequently, we reject

CAN's takings claim.

Nor do we find any merit in CAN's rather vague allusion

to a more general Fifth Amendment argument, presumably that the

NRC's actions deprived its members of life, liberty or property

without due process of law. This contention suffers from the

same deficiencies as CAN's takings claim, being overbroad, vague,

and unaccompanied by factual support or analysis. Moreover, as

the NRC points out, "generalized health, safety and environmental

concerns do not constitute liberty or property subject to due

process protections." West Chicago, Ill. v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632,

645 (7th Cir. 1983). We simply cannot fashion a constitutional

violation out of whole cloth on the basis of the kind of

nonspecific and unsupported allegations raised by CAN here.

Accordingly, we reject CAN's allegations that the NRC's actions

violated its members' Fifth Amendment due process rights.

2. Petitioner's Atomic Energy Act Arguments
2. Petitioner's Atomic Energy Act Arguments

CAN contends that Commission approval of YAEC's CRP

violated AEA section 189a, which requires the Commission to grant

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a hearing upon request by any party in interest whenever it

undertakes any proceeding to "amend" a license. 42 U.S.C. 2239

(a)(1)(A). CAN argues that Commission approval of YAEC's CRP was

a de facto "amendment" of YAEC's POL because it authorized YAEC

(as well as other extant and prospective licensees) to engage in

materially different conduct not permitted under the pre-1993

POL, namely, major component dismantling absent prior NRC

approval of a final decommissioning plan. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24018,

24020 (1988). The Commission counters that its so-called

"approval" of the CRP cannot be deemed a license "amendment"

proceeding since the language requiring NRC approval for major

structural changes was never expressly incorporated into YAEC's

license.10 Instead, it says, the decommissioning plan

procedure, which is subject to procedural protections (e.g.,

public hearings, preparation of environmental assessments)

entirely different from those designated in section 189a, was

described only in a cover letter accompanying the license, and

the Commission has never treated the decommissioning plan process

as "amendatory" for section 189a purposes.

We reject the Commission's claim that its abrupt policy

change in 1993, to the extent it substantially enlarged the

authority of an extant licensee (YAEC) retroactively, nonetheless

10 As a threshold matter, the Commission repeats its contention
that no 2239(a)(1)(A) "proceeding" occurred, because it took no
affirmative action and merely refused to intervene to prevent
YAEC from undertaking the CRP. For the reasons previously noted
in our discussion of the Commission's NEPA violations, see supra

at 17-18, we disagree with this characterization.

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did not entitle CAN to the requested section 189a hearing. As

the Commission itself concedes, by its nature a license is

presumptively an exclusive -- not an inclusive -- regulatory

device. See Brief for Respondent at 5 ("Th[e] license describes

the facility and the authorized activities that the operator may

conduct under the license. If the holder of the licensee (sic) .

. . wishes to modify the facility or to take actions that are not

specifically authorized under the license, the licensee may need

to seek a change or 'amendment' to the terms of the license.")

(emphasis added). The sophistical suggestion that the

decommissioning plan procedures were never formally incorporated

into YAEC's POL license ignores licensing realities. Licenses

customarily delineate the types of regulated conduct in which the

licensee may engage. Regulated conduct which is neither

delineated, nor reasonably encompassed within delineated

categories of authorized conduct, presumptively remains

unlicensed. YAEC's original license did not authorize it to

implement major-component dismantling of the type undertaken in

the CRP.

Thus, if section 189a is to serve its intended purpose,

surely it contemplates that parties in interest be afforded a

meaningful opportunity to request a hearing before the Commission

retroactively reinvents the terms of an extant license by voiding

its implicit limitations on the licensee's conduct. See Skidgel

v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1993)

(statutory language must be interpreted in context, including its

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legislative purpose). The claimed right to deny such a hearing

request undermines the integrity of the licensing process. At

the time YAEC obtained its original license, and again when it

amended the original license to a POL, parties in interest,

including CAN, presumably refrained from any request for a

section 189a hearing -- to which they would unquestionably have

been entitled -- in reasonable reliance upon such implicit

limitations in YAEC's license.

The Commission correctly points out that we have

observed that the term "amend," as used in section 189a, is to be

construed quite literally. See Commonwealth of Mass. v. United

States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 878 F.2d 1516, 1522 (1st Cir.

1989). But we were careful to note as well that it is the

substance of the NRC action that determines entitlement to a

section 189a hearing, not the particular label the NRC chooses to

assign to its action. Id. at 1521 (citing Columbia Broadcasting

Syst. Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942)).11

11 Moreover, Commonwealth is readily distinguishable on its

facts. There, the NRC decision approving resumption of
operations by a licensee, which had shut down its facility
voluntarily prior to any formal suspension or revocation of its
operating license by the NRC, did not implicate section 189a.
Rather, the NRC requirements for license "reinstatement" were
simply additional interim license restrictions -- imposed

pursuant to pre-existing Commission regulations -- none of which

conflicted with, or required the alteration of, any term of the
original license. Commonwealth, 878 F.2d at 1520-21 (citing and

adopting rationale in In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc., 771

F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986)).

Thus, the operator obtained no greater authority (literally,

"license") than it had before its license was reinstated by the
NRC. Id. at 1520. Even though the Commission temporarily

exempted the licensee from one restriction generally applicable
to other licensees, the discretionary exemption was expressly

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By contrast, the policy change adopted by the

Commission in 1993, relating to "minor" component dismantling,

was in no sense provisional. Moreover, it undeniably

supplemented the operating authority of extant licensees

generally, and YAEC in particular, which might henceforth engage

in major forms of component disassembly beyond the ambit of their

original licenses. Prior to 1993, parties in interest reasonably

could presume that YAEC was not authorized to undertake this type

of CRP unless it submitted to the lapidary process of preparing a

final decommissioning plan and environmental assessment

acceptable to the NRC, or it moved to amend its existing license.

Then, in 1993, the Commission, by ambiguous fiat,

declared that some forms of "major component disassembly" hence-

forth were to be outside the license-amendment process, whereas

more "serious" types of component removal were to remain subject

to the amendment process. See 10 C.F.R. 50.59. In our view,

however, the latter provision plainly confirms that the

Commission had always considered component disassembly, similar

to that involved in YAEC's CRP, as action beyond the ambit of the

presumptive authority granted under the licenses it issued.

The Commission elevates labels over substance. It

would have us determine that a "proceeding" specifically aimed at

excusing a licensee from filing a petition to amend its license

authorized and granted under pre-existing agency regulations, see

id. at 1521, so that parties in interest were on notice from the

time the license was granted that NRC retained the discretion to

approve the limited exemption at any time in the future.

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is not the functional equivalent of a proceeding to allow a de

facto "amendment" to its license. As this construct would

eviscerate the very procedural protections Congress envisioned in

its enactment of section 189a, we decline to permit the

Commission to do by indirection what it is prohibited from doing

directly. See 42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(A) (Commission must afford

hearing "in any proceeding for the . . . modification of rules

and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees."). We

therefore hold that CAN was entitled to a hearing under section

189a in connection with the NRC decision to permit YAEC's early

CRP.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant CAN's petition for

review in part, and remand to the Commission for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

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