United States v. Zorrilla

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                             

No. 95-2365

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                            Appellee,

                                v.

                         RAMON ZORRILLA,
                      Defendant, Appellant.
                                             

No. 95-2249

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                            Appellee,

                                v.

                    MIGUEL CALDERON SALMIENTO,
                      Defendant, Appellant.

                                             

          APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

         [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
                                                                 

                                             

                              Before

                      Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
                         Circuit Judges.
                                                 
                                             

     Gustavo  A. Gelpi, Jr.,  Assistant Federal  Public Defender,
                                     
with whom Benicio Sanchez Rivera, Federal Public Defender, was on
                                          
brief, for appellants.
     Jose A.  Quiles-Espinosa,  Senior Litigation  Counsel,  with
                                       
whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Antonio R. Bazan  and
                                                                      
Nelson  Perez-Sosa,  Assistant United  States Attorneys,  were on
                            
brief, for appellee.
                                             

                         August 19, 1996
                                             


          SELYA, Circuit  Judge.   Defendants Ramon  Zorrilla and
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                                         

Miguel Calderon  Salmiento were charged, inter  alia, with aiding
                                                              

and  abetting  each  other  in  the  intended  distribution of  a

controlled  substance  (approximately two  kilograms  of cocaine)

within 1,000  feet of a  school.   See 21 U.S.C.     841(a)(1)  &
                                                

(b)(1)(B),  860(a);   18  U.S.C.     2.1    They  challenged  the

constitutionality of section 860(a), but the district court ruled

against them.   See United States v. Salmiento, 898  F. Supp. 45,
                                                        

46-48  (D.P.R. 1996).    They then  pled  guilty to  the  charge,

reserving  the right  to revisit  the constitutional  question on

appeal.  The lower court sentenced them under 21 U.S.C.   841(b),

making use of  the enhancement  directed by 21  U.S.C.    860(a).

These proceedings followed.

          We review  the constitutionality of an  Act of Congress

de novo.   See United  States v. Gifford,  17 F.3d 462,  472 (1st
                                                  

Cir. 1994).  The statute that the appellants challenge, 21 U.S.C.

  860(a), by its terms applies to some    but not all   offenders

who  manufacture or  distribute, or  who possess  with intent  to

manufacture   or   distribute,  controlled   substances,  thereby

violating 21  U.S.C.    841(a)(1).   The selection  process under

section  860(a)  operates  by   plucking  from  the  mine-run  of

miscreants who  violate section 841(a)(1) those  whose crimes are

committed within 1,000 feet of a school  and essentially doubling

                    
                              

     1We   reproduce  the  relevant   text  of  sections  860(a),
841(a)(1), and  841(b)(1)(B) in the appendix.   18 U.S.C.   2 is,
of  course, the  familiar  statute that  criminalizes aiding  and
abetting, and we see no need to reprint it.

                                2


the maximum  available punishment.    Thus, section  860(a) is  a

sentence-enhancer, pure and simple.

          The defendants contend  that this  sentence-enhancement

scheme runs afoul of  the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const.  art. I,  

8,  cl.  3, because  Congress lacked  power  under the  Clause to

legislate in  this realm.   They pin their  hopes on  the Court's

opinion in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).  Their
                                           

reliance is mislaid.

          We need  not tarry.   Although  the Lopez  Court struck
                                                             

down  the   Gun-Free  School  Zones  Act,  18   U.S.C.     922(q)

(criminalizing the possession of  firearms within a school zone),

on the ground that the prohibited  conduct was not of a type that

substantially affects interstate commerce, 115 S. Ct. at 1631, it

did  so  because the  underlying  conduct    firearms  possession

simpliciter   "has nothing  to do with `commerce' or  any sort of
                     

economic  enterprise,  however  broadly one  might  define  those

terms."   Id. at 1630-31.   The Lopez  Court nonetheless  made it
                                               

perfectly clear  that, under the Commerce  Clause, Congress could

regulate, inter alia, those activities which have a consequential
                              

effect on,  or which  bear a  meaningful relation  to, interstate

commerce.  See  id. at 1629-30 (citing  NLRB v. Jones  & Laughlin
                                                                           

Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
                     

          This  is such  a  case.   Here,  unlike in  Lopez,  the
                                                                     

statutory  scheme has  an unmistakable  commercial nexus  and the

underlying  conduct possesses  a significant  economic dimension.

Many  courts,   including  this   court,  have  held   that  drug

                                3


trafficking  is precisely  the kind  of economic  enterprise that

substantially  affects interstate  commerce and  that, therefore,

comes  within  Congress's  regulatory  power under  the  Commerce

Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 584-
                                                        

85 (1st Cir.  1996); United States v. Staples, 85  F.3d 461, 463,
                                                       

amended,      F.3d     (9th  Cir. 1996) [1996  WL 359984]; United
                                                                           

States v. Genao,  79 F.3d  1333, 1336-37 (2d  Cir. 1996);  United
                                                                           

States v. Wacker, 72  F.3d 1453, 1475 (10th Cir.  1995), petition
                                                                           

for  cert. filed, No. 95-9284 (U.S. June 10, 1996); United States
                                                                           

v.  Brown, 72  F.3d 96,  97 (8th  Cir. 1995) (per  curiam), cert.
                                                                           

denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); United  States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d
                                                                  

1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995).  Indeed, Congress made particularized

findings  to  this effect  when it  enacted  the full  panoply of

criminal laws anent controlled substances.  See 21 U.S.C.   801.
                                                         

          Given both this background and the truism "that courts,

when passing upon the constitutionality of a statutory provision,

must view it in the context of the whole  statutory scheme," Vote
                                                                           

Choice, Inc. v.  DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 33 (1st  Cir. 1993), it is
                                    

not  surprising to find that every court which has confronted the

appellants'  argument in  the post-Lopez  era has  upheld section
                                                  

860(a) against  a Commerce Clause  challenge.  See,  e.g., United
                                                                           

States v. Tucker,      F.3d     ,      (6th Cir.  1996) [1996  WL
                          

413411, at *1-4]; United States v. Rogers,     F.3d    ,     (7th
                                                   

Cir. 1996) [1996 WL  399850, at *11-12]; United States  v. Clark,
                                                                          

67 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (5th  Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.  Ct.
                                                              

1432 (1996); United  States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F.  Supp. 568,
                                                       

                                4


569-72 (D. Kan. 1995); see also United States v. McDougherty, 920
                                                                      

F.2d  569,  572 (9th  Cir.  1990)  (scuttling pre-Lopez  Commerce
                                                                 

Clause  challenge to earlier version of    860(a)), cert. denied,
                                                                          

499  U.S. 911 (1991).  Because we  do not doubt that Congress has

the authority under the Commerce  Clause to regulate an  activity

as  clearly  commercial in  character  as  drug trafficking,  and

because the  particular statute that the  appellants challenge is

nothing  more  than  a sentence-enhancer  applicable  to  certain

proscribed drug trafficking activities, we  hold that 21 U.S.C.  

860(a) does not trespass into constitutionally forbidden terrain.

See generally Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (hypothesizing that a law
                             

enacted  by virtue  of Congress's  "authority under  the Commerce

Clause   to  regulate   numerous   commercial   activities   that

substantially  affect  interstate  commerce and  also  affect the

educational process" would survive a constitutional attack).

          We need go  no further.2   The  challenged statute,  21

U.S.C.   860(a), passes  constitutional muster under the Commerce

Clause.   Hence, the  defendants' convictions and  sentences must

stand.

Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
                  

                    
                              

     2To the extent that  the appellants raise a  developed Tenth
Amendment challenge to 21 U.S.C.   860(a), it is unavailing.  See
                                                                           
Lerebours, 87 F.3d at  585; United States v. Owens,  996 F.2d 59,
                                                            
60-61 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

                                5


                        STATUTORY APPENDIX
                                                    

          The sentence-enhancing  statute,   21 U.S.C.    860(a),

provides in relevant part (with certain exceptions not applicable

here) that:

               Any   person    who   violates   section
          841(a)(1)   .   .   .  of   this   title   by
          distributing,   possessing  with   intent  to
          distribute,  or  manufacturing  a  controlled
          substance in  or on,  or within one  thousand
          feet  of,  the  real  property  comprising  a
          public or private elementary,  vocational, or
          secondary  school  or  a  public  or  private
          college, junior college,  or university, or a
          playground,  or housing  facility owned  by a
          public  housing authority, or within 100 feet
          of a public or  private youth center,  public
          swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is .
          .  .   subject  to  (1)  twice   the  maximum
          punishment  authorized  by section  841(b) of
          this title;  and (2) at least  twice any term
          of supervised release  authorized by  section
          841(b) of this title for  a first offense.  A
          fine up to twice  that authorized by  section
          841(b)  of  this  title  may  be  imposed  in
          addition   to   any   term  of   imprisonment
          authorized by this subsection . . . .

Section  860(a)  cross-references 21  U.S.C.    841(a)(1),  which

provides in relevant part:

               Except as [otherwise authorized by law],
          it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
          or intentionally  

               (1) to  manufacture, distribute, or
               dispense, or possess with intent to
               manufacture,     distribute,     or
               dispense, a  controlled substance .
               . . .

Section 860(a) also cross-references 21 U.S.C.   841(b)(1), which

provides in relevant part:

               Except as otherwise provided  in section
          859, 860,  or 861  of this title,  any person
          who violates subsection  (a) of this  section

                                6


          shall be sentenced as follows:

                              * * *
               (B)  In  the case  of  violation of
               subsection  (a)   of  this  section
               involving   
                              * * *
               (ii) 500 grams or more of a mixture
               or    substance     containing    a
               detectable amount of  
                              * * *
               (II)  cocaine,  its salts,  optical
               and geometric isomers, and salts of
               isomers;
                              * * *

               such person shall be sentenced to a term
          of imprisonment which may  not be less than 5
          years and not  more than 40 years  . . .  , a
          fine  not  to  exceed  the  greater  of  that
          authorized in accordance with  the provisions
          of Title  18, or $2,000,000 if  the defendant
          is an individual . . . .

                                7