United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 00-2367
00-2580
LIONEL PICARD, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
MEMBERS OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BOARD OF PROVIDENCE,
MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL FOR THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE,
VINCENT A. CIANCI, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR
OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, STEPHEN T. NAPOLITANO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS TREASURER OF THE CITY OF
PROVIDENCE AND THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Scott P. Tierney, with whom Amato A. DeLuca, Miriam Weizenbaum,
and DeLuca & Weizenbaum, LTD. were on brief, for appellants.
Kevin F. McHugh, Assistant City Solicitor, Department of Law, for
appellees.
December 28, 2001
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This civil rights action
represents another chapter in a pitched battle over the pension
benefits due to retired municipal employees of the City of Providence.
The district court below disposed of several of plaintiffs' claims at
summary judgment and, later, dismissed the remaining claims on
jurisdictional grounds. Plaintiffs seek reversal of the district
court's order dismissing their claims under the Contract Clause,
Takings Clause, and Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. We affirm the district court's judgment in toto.
I.
Although we ultimately resolve this appeal on straightforward
grounds, the attendant facts and procedural history are somewhat more
involved. We recite only the undisputed facts, unless otherwise noted.
A.
Plaintiffs are all former members of the police and fire
departments of the City of Providence who retired after January 1994.
Defendants include the City of Providence (City), members of the
Providence City Council (City Council), the mayor of the City of
Providence, and members of the City of Providence Employee Retirement
Board (Retirement Board).
At a meeting held on December 6, 1989, the Retirement Board
voted to approve a variety of retirement benefits for both Class A and
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Class B City employees,1 including a generous increase in the cost of
living adjustment (COLA) for pension benefits. Following the
Retirement Board's vote, however, the City chafed at the prospect of
honoring the terms of the newly enacted retirement plan. The City
hired outside counsel to challenge the validity of the Retirement
Board's action in state court. In its complaint, the City challenged
the Retirement Board's COLA and pension award action as ultra vires.
The case reached a bench trial before the Rhode Island Superior Court.
Upon completion of that trial, the trial judge entered a written
decision in which he determined that the Retirement Board's December 6,
1989, vote establishing the pension and COLA modifications was a valid
and binding exercise of its authority. Counsel to the case were
ordered to prepare and submit an appropriate judgment for entry by the
trial court.
Instead of preparing that judgment, counsel informed the
trial court that they were attempting to negotiate a final settlement
of the case, ostensibly to avoid further proceedings and bring finality
to the ongoing pension controversy. By December 17, 1991, an agreed
case settlement had been negotiated under which the beneficiaries to
the settlement would receive a 6% compounded COLA increase. The terms
of the proposed settlement were adopted formally by vote of the
1 As defined by City Ordinance § 17-181, Class B employees include
"members of the fire department and police department of the City of
Providence."
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Retirement Board at a December 18, 1991, meeting, and the settlement
was thereafter presented to the trial court for approval and entry as
a consent decree.
The City complied with the terms of the consent decree for
a period of roughly two years. Then, in 1993, the City again balked at
funding COLA benefits for retirees. On January 6, 1994, the City
Council passed Ordinance 1994-1, which terminated the 6% compounded
COLA increase for retired police and firefighters. On the same day,
the City Council also passed Ordinance 1994-2, which established a new
scheme of retiree benefits, but did not include the 6% compounded COLA
increase. The City's deviation from the terms of the consent decree
triggered a contempt proceeding in state court.
Meanwhile, the City Council and City filed a separate action
in state court in pursuit of a declaration that the consent decree was
invalid. The City Council and City argued that the decree had not been
entered with the permission or ratification of the City Council,
thereby rendering the decree unenforceable. The trial judge was asked
not only to determine the validity of the consent decree, but also to
resolve lingering doubts concerning the actual scope of the consent
decree. Numerous City employees who retired after December 18, 1991,
claimed entitlement to the 6% compounded COLA increase;2 the City
2 This group included a class of former police and firefighters which,
in turn, included plaintiffs. They were represented in the state-court
litigation and on appeal by their counsel in the present case.
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responded by arguing that the consent decree, even if valid, did not
apply to later retirees.
After a labyrinthine tour of the state court system, which
included an appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and subsequent
remand, the various consent decree litigations were ultimately
consolidated into a single appeal before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. In City of Providence v. Employee Retirement Board, 749 A.2d
1088 (R.I. 2000), the court held that the consent decree was valid and
binding upon the City. Id. at 1095. The court further held that the
decree covered only those employees who had retired on or before
December 18, 1991. Id. at 1099. Consequently, the court rejected the
employees' argument that any subsequent changes to COLA benefits would
effect an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights as applied to
those retiring after December 18, 1991. Id. at 1099-1100.
B.
Between 1991 and 1995, during the pendency of the ongoing
consent decree controversies, the City and plaintiffs (acting through
their collective bargaining representatives) negotiated and agreed to
a series of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that provided for
a 5% compounded COLA increase. Although § 17-27 of the Providence Code
of Ordinances requires that the City Council ratify all CBAs between
the City and a labor organization, it is undisputed that the City
Council never ratified the CBAs in question.
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Then, beginning in 1995, the City Council passed a handful
of municipal ordinances, each of which placed the amount of plaintiffs'
COLA benefits below the levels established under the CBAs: Chapter
1995-17 established a 3% non-compounded COLA increase; Chapter 1996-4
provided a 3% non-compounded increase up to the first $10,000 of the
retirement allowance; and Chapter 1998-22 provided a 3% non-compounded
increase up to the first $1,000 of the retirement allowance.
C.
In 1998, plaintiffs commenced the present suit in federal
court alleging numerous constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The amended complaint asserted that, by adopting an ordinance
that terminated the COLA provisions of the consent decree, defendants
deprived plaintiffs of property in violation of the Due Process Clause
(Count 1). By adopting various city ordinances that are at odds with
provisions of the collective bargaining agreements, defendants were
also alleged to have violated: the Due Process Clause (Count 2); the
due process component of the Rhode Island Constitution (Count 3); the
Contract Clause and a cognate provision of the Rhode Island
Constitution (Count 6); and the Takings Clause (Count 7). Lastly, the
complaint contained a claim for violation of the Equal Protection
Clause (Count 4) and a broad-brush due process claim (Count 5).
In November 1998, both parties moved for summary judgment on
all counts of the complaint. In September 1999, the district court
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below entered a written order allowing partial judgment in favor of
defendants. At the outset, the district court noted that plaintiffs'
claims essentially comprised an attack on two fronts:
First, they challenge defendants' efforts to
reduce the amount of COLAs to which plaintiffs
claim they are entitled under the consent decree.
Next, they challenge defendants' efforts to
provide COLAs that are less than those called for
under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements (which . . . were never formally
ratified by the City Council).
Picard v. City of Providence, Nos. 98-40-L & 98-95-M, slip op. at 7
(D.R.I. Sept. 29, 1999). The district court then abstained from ruling
on the merits of the claims arising from the consent decree because
neither party had addressed a lurking jurisdictional issue under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3 In particular, the court noted that its
jurisdiction to entertain those claims was questionable in light of a
state superior court ruling that held that the consent decree applied
only to those who had retired on or before December 18, 1991. Id. at
7-8 (referring to Mansolillo v. Employee Ret. Bd., No. 93-5266, 1998 WL
799129 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998)).4
3 As explained more fully below, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides
that federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to
directly review the decisions of state courts.
4 The state court's holding in Mansolillo was later affirmed by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in City of Providence v. Employee Retirement
Board, 749 A.2d 1088 (R.I. 2000).
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The district court did not, however, feel similarly
constrained in ruling on plaintiffs' second means of attack. The court
entered summary judgment against plaintiffs on their claims based on
the CBAs. The district court reasoned that the failure of the City
Council to ratify the CBAs pursuant to § 17-27 of the Providence Code
of Ordinances rendered those agreements void and thereby foreclosed the
possibility of finding any enforceable contract rights protected by the
Constitution. Id. at 11-12 (citing Providence City Council v. Cianci,
650 A.2d 499, 501 (R.I. 1994)). Accordingly, the district court
granted summary judgment as to Counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 and denied summary
judgment as to the remaining claims.
Later, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the remaining
consent decree claims based on lack of standing, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs filed
no opposition to the motion; nor did plaintiffs' counsel attend a
status conference held in the case. On September 19, 2000, the
district court granted the motion to dismiss for the reasons presented
in defendants' memorandum and for plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the
claim. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration
explaining counsel's absence from the status conference, but offering
no legal argument on the merits of the motion to dismiss. In response
to plaintiffs' motion, the district court withdrew its statement that
plaintiffs had failed to prosecute the claim and stated that its
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dismissal rested solely on the substantive grounds set forth in
defendants' motion to dismiss. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed their
notice of appeal.
II.
A.
The district court's September 19, 2000, order disposed of
the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of defendants' motion to dismiss
for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. Valentín v. Hosp. Bella
Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The proper vehicle for
challenging a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)."). The facts relevant to the district
court's decision are essentially undisputed. We therefore exercise de
novo review. See id. at 365 ("Because the facts are not in issue, the
court's determination engenders de novo review.").
B.
The nub of plaintiffs' first argument on appeal is that the
district court erred in dismissing Counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the
complaint by overlooking plaintiffs' contention that the City entered
an implied-in-fact contract to provide the 5% compounded COLA increase
in conformity with the unratified CBAs. Plaintiffs assert that this
implied-in-fact contract was consummated when the City accepted the
benefits of plaintiffs' work and allowed them to continue contributing
a portion of their salaries toward the pension fund. Cf. Marshall
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Contractors, Inc. v. Brown Univ., 692 A.2d 665, 669 (R.I. 1997) ("[An
implied-in-fact contract] is a form of express contract wherein the
elements of the contract are found in and determined from the relations
of, and the communications between the parties, rather than from a
single clearly expressed written document."). According to this
theory, the enactment of subsequent ordinances restricting the COLA
increase impaired these vested contractual rights in violation of
numerous provisions of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs
therefore seek reversal of the September 2000 order. Defendants, on
the other hand, contend that state law clearly establishes that
plaintiffs have no constitutionally protected property or contract
right in the unratified CBAs.5
In evaluating whether a purported contract or property right
is entitled to constitutional protection under the Takings Clause,
Contract Clause, or Due Process Clause, this Court generally looks to
state law as interpreted by the state's highest court. See Phillips v.
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) ("[A] State may not
5 Defendants also rejoin with the argument that plaintiffs have
forfeited any claim based on the CBAs by failing to designate in their
notice of appeal the district court's September 1999 order granting
summary judgment on those claims. We find, however, that the notice of
appeal sufficiently apprised this Court and the defendants that
plaintiffs were appealing the final judgment of the district court.
"[I]t has been uniformly held that a notice of appeal that designates
the final judgment encompasses not only that judgment, but also all
earlier interlocutory orders that merge in the judgment." John's
Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., Inc., 156 F.3d 101, 104 (1st
Cir. 1998).
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sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property
interests long recognized under state law.") (emphasis added); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (holding that for
purposes of the Contract Clause, although the question whether a
contract was made is a federal question, a court must "accord
respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State's
highest court") (citations and quotations omitted); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976) (deciding whether North Carolina had created a
property interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause by reference
to state law as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court).
Plaintiffs assert that a series of CBAs negotiated but never ratified
by the City Council created a vested right in the higher COLA benefit.
Yet, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has repeatedly held that a CBA
that is not ratified by the City Council is void and unenforceable.
See Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d 388, 391
(R.I. 1997); Providence Teachers Union v. Providence Sch. Bd., 689 A.2d
384, 385-86 (R.I. 1996); Providence City Council, 650 A.2d at 501; cf.
5 Eugene McQuillan, Law of Municipal Corporations § 15.03, at 68 (3d
ed. rev. 1996) ("[W]here the charter provides that a particular power
shall be exercised by ordinance, its exercise in any other manner, as
by contract or resolution, would not be legal.") (footnote omitted).
Given this clear precedent from the state's highest court, we find no
basis for concluding that plaintiffs were deprived of a property or
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contract right in violation of the Constitution. Therefore, the
district court was correct in dismissing these claims.
C.
With respect to the claims based solely on the consent
decree, Counts 1, 4, and 5, plaintiffs have offered no argument or
authority -- either in their brief or at oral argument -- that supports
reversal. That fact alone would justify affirmance under our long-
standing precedent. See Acevedo López v. Police Dep't of P.R., 247
F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that court will not consider
claims for which arguments are not presented in the party's brief or at
oral argument); see also United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027,
1034 (1st Cir. 1997) ("We have steadfastly deemed waived issues raised
on appeal in a perfunctory manner, not accompanied by developed
argumentation.").
Moreover, even if the plaintiffs had mounted an adequate
challenge to the district court's order of dismissal, their arguments
would be doomed in any event. Their claim is foreclosed by a textbook
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983). In describing the contours of this jurisdictional
doctrine, we have stated:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal
district and circuit courts from reviewing state
court judgments. Where a party did not actually
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present its federal claims in state court,
Rooker-Feldman forecloses lower federal court
jurisdiction over claims that are "inextricably
intertwined" with the claims adjudicated in a
state court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16.
A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state-court claims "if the federal claim
succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it." See Hill
v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir.
1999).
Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted).
In the present case, the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim based
on the consent decree is that the terms of the decree extended to
police and firefighters retiring after January 1995 and entitled them
to the 6% compounded COLA increase provided therein. This issue was
squarely addressed when these parties were before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in City of Providence v. Employee Retirement Board, 749
A.2d 1088 (R.I. 2000). In that decision, the court held that:
[T]he group of city employees who retired prior
to December 18, 1991, and the nineteen city
employees who retired effective December 18,
1991, were the only city retirees that could
benefit from [the consent decree's] pension grant
provisions, and all members of that group
continue to remain entitled to those benefits.
Id. at 1100 (emphasis added).
Any attempt to make out a constitutional violation under the
Due Process Clause, Contract Clause, or Takings Clause would require
plaintiffs to establish -- at a minimum -- some property or contract
right stemming from the consent decree. Thus, it is plain that
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plaintiffs' claims could only succeed to the extent the Rhode Island
Supreme Court wrongly decided the question of the consent decree's
coverage. We therefore must decline jurisdiction, as plaintiffs'
claims represent an improper attempt to seek federal review of a final
state court judgment.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed. Costs are assessed against plaintiffs. Fed. R. App. P.
39(a)(2).
Affirmed.
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