United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2101
JACQUELINE T. BENHAM,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LENOX SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Roy T. Englert, Jr., with whom Daniel Solin, Arnon D. Siegel and
Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner, LLP were on brief, for
appellant.
James E. Wallace, Jr., with whom Renee E. Hackett and Bowditch &
Dewey, LLP were on brief, for appellee.
June 4, 2002
-2-
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Jacqueline T.
Benham ("Benham") appeals from the district court’s judgment against
her on her claim of discrimination under the Employment Retirement and
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Specifically,
Benham argues that the district court’s judgment is predicated upon a
factual finding that has no support in the record. Because we conclude
that the district court relied upon a clearly erroneous factual finding
in reaching its holding, we reverse and remand this case for a new
trial.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
From 1976 until 1997, Benham worked full-time at the Lenox
Savings Bank (the "Bank") in Lenox, Massachusetts. During her tenure
at the Bank, Benham held several positions, ranging in importance from
bank teller to senior vice-president in charge of consumer lending. In
1997, the Bank’s president, Michael Christopher, abruptly terminated
Benham’s employment.
On January 15, 1998, Benham filed suit in district court
claiming that the Bank unlawfully discharged her in violation of § 510
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, which prohibits the firing of an employee
for the purpose of depriving her of employee benefits.1 During the
1 Section 510 of ERISA provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a
participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which
-3-
bench trial, Benham introduced several pieces of circumstantial
evidence to substantiate her claim. First, because of her seniority
and years of experience, Benham’s benefits far exceeded those of any
other bank employee. Second, Christopher’s bonus was directly
proportional to the Bank’s profits, which gave him an incentive to
reduce employee benefits. Finally, Christopher actually reduced
several of the Bank’s employee benefit plans. For Benham, this
evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that she was fired so that
the Bank could avoid paying her costly employee benefits.
In response, the Bank asserted that Benham was discharged
because she made several improper intra-family loans. In particular,
the Bank argued that Benham created multiple conflicts of interest when
she approved and defined the terms of loans given to Paula and Joseph
Czop, her daughter and son-in-law. According to the appellee, then,
Benham was fired for violating the Bank’s Code of Conduct, which
prohibits the authorization of loans to family members and the
extension of credit to them on preferential terms.
Rather than crediting either of the proffered reasons for
Benham’s termination, the district court introduced an alternative
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become
entitled under the plan . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1140.
-4-
explanation. The court found that Christopher fired Benham "to make an
example of her, to demonstrate his power as president of the Lenox
Savings Bank." Believing that the district court erred in reaching
this factual determination, Benham filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
It is well settled in our jurisprudence that a district
court’s factual findings regarding an employer’s intent are reviewed
for clear error. See Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1995).
Pursuant to this standard, we will reverse a lower court’s decision
only if "after careful evaluation of the evidence, we are left with an
abiding conviction that . . . [the court's] findings are simply wrong."
State Police Ass'n v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997);
accord Indus. Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 44 F.3d 40, 46
(1st Cir. 1995) (ruling that an appellate court must have a "strong,
unyielding conviction that the district court was mistaken" before
reversing on clear error grounds).
Benham argues that the district court clearly erred in
finding that she was fired because Christopher "wanted to make an
example of her, to demonstrate his power as president of the Lenox
Savings Bank." After carefully reviewing the record, we have found no
evidence whatsoever to support the district court’s factual
determination. Our search results are corroborated by the Bank's brief
-5-
to this Court, which does not cite a single piece of evidence in
defense of the district court’s theory.
Instead, the Bank argues that "[t]he [District] Court’s
finding that Christopher wanted 'to make an example of' Benham may be
a comment on his management style, but it is not an 'alternative
explanation' for his decision to terminate her." The Bank’s argument,
however, is directly contradicted by the explicit language of the
district court’s findings. In a colloquy with itself, the district
court asked and answered the critical question:
This leaves us with the key issue. Why at the
time [Christopher] fired [Benham] did he do so?
. . . He did so to make an example of her, to
demonstrate his power as president of the Lenox
Savings Bank.
It is clear from this discussion that the district court was
specifically describing what motivated Christopher to discharge Benham.
Furthermore, this reason was the only one advanced by the district
court to explain what caused the termination of Benham's employment.2
Having found no support for the district court's ultimate
factual finding, we are left with a "strong, unyielding conviction that
the district court was mistaken." Indus. Gen. Corp., 44 F.3d at 46.
2 Though the district court found that Christopher believed that Benham
violated the Bank's Code of Conduct, the court concluded that what
actually caused Christopher to fire Benham was a need to demonstrate
his authority. Notwithstanding the Bank's arguments to the contrary,
the district court never found that Christopher terminated Benham
because he believed that she violated the Code of Conduct.
-6-
We therefore conclude that the district court committed clear error in
its findings of fact.
Not satisfied with a reversal, Benham argues that we should
enter judgment in her favor because all of the district court’s
subsidiary findings of fact compel that conclusion. Though rare, an
appellate court may make findings of fact where the record permits only
one resolution of the factual issue. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1982); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 463 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that "appellate
factfinding is permissible only when no other resolution of a factbound
question would, on the compiled record, be sustainable").
Though the district court made some findings of fact that
clearly support Benham’s claim,3 it cannot be seriously argued that the
court’s subsidiary findings compel the conclusion that judgment should
be entered in her favor. The district court, for instance, found that
Benham directly authorized at least one loan to her family -- an act
which may have violated the Bank's Code of Conduct. Thus, the
subsidiary findings of fact can be used as much to support Benham’s
claim as to defend the Bank’s.
In the end, there remains competent evidence from which a
factfinder could credit either Benham’s or the Bank’s version of
3 For example, the district court found "that it was a particular theme
of Mr. Christopher's management of the bank to reduce . . . the
benefits to be afforded to bank officers and employees."
-7-
events. Rather than usurping the district court's function and
entering judgment in favor of either party, we reverse and remand this
case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's
judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
-8-