United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1473
AARON STAELENS; NADINE STAELENS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
LYNN DOBERT; RONALD DOBERT,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
G. David Sharp, with whom Corash and Zurn, LLP was on brief,
for appellants.
John S. Ferrara, with whom Dalsey, Ferrara, & Albano was on
brief, for appellees.
February 5, 2003
STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. This case involves a motor
vehicle accident, in which defendant-appellee Lynn Dobert struck a
gasoline tanker driven by plaintiff-appellant Aaron Staelens, who
three to five hours after the collision injured his knee when he
tripped over a piece of equipment left by a state employee
investigating the accident. Staelens and his wife sued Dobert and
her husband, alleging that Dobert's negligence proximately caused
Staelens's injuries. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Doberts; we affirm.
I.
As this case comes to us on a grant of summary judgment,
we relate the facts in the light most favorable to the Staelens,
drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. Crawford v.
Lamantia, 34 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994). At approximately 6:00
p.m., on December 17, 1997, Dobert negligently drove her automobile
into a gasoline tanker driven by Staelens. State Police, including
an accident reconstruction team, firefighters, and an ambulance
arrived on scene. Although Staelens escaped injury from the
impact, Dobert did not, and was transported from the scene by an
ambulance. After the reconstruction team completed its
investigation, a Department of Transportation ("DOT") inspector
arrived to inspect the tanker. Finished with inspecting the
tanker's lights, the DOT inspector told Staelens that he could turn
them off. As Staelens approached the door to the cab, he stepped
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on a creeper,1 which had been left out by the DOT inspector, fell
onto his back, and injured his knee. Staelens's fall occurred
three to five hours after the initial impact.
After limited discovery, the Doberts filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that the DOT inspector's negligence
was an intervening and superseding cause that relieved the Doberts
of liability. The district court agreed and granted the motion
solely on that ground.2
II.
Under Massachusetts law, "[i]n addition to being the
cause in fact of the injury [the but for cause], the plaintiff must
show that the negligent conduct was a proximate or legal cause of
the injury as well." Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 320, 771
N.E.2d 770 (2002). To establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must
show that his or her injuries were within the reasonably
foreseeable risks of harm created by the defendant's negligent
conduct. Id.; Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, Inc., 423 Mass.
637, 639-41, 670 N.E.2d 383 (1996). Generally, intervening
negligent conduct of a third person will not relieve the original
tortfeasor from liability where such conduct was reasonably
1
A creeper is a flat board with underlying wheels used to
inspect the underside of a vehicle.
2
The negligence of the relevant actors--Dobert, the DOT
inspector, and Staelens--was not an issue before the district
court.
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foreseeable. Poskus, 423 Mass. at 639-40, 670 N.E.2d 383; Jesionek
v. Mass. Port Authority, 376 Mass. 101, 105-06, 378 N.E.2d 995
(1978).
Although the question of proximate cause--i.e., whether
a risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable--is ordinarily for the
jury, summary judgment may be appropriate when the evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom lead to but one conclusion.
Kent, 437 Mass. at 320-22, 771 N.E.2d 770; Poskus, 423 Mass. at
636-41, 670 N.E.2d 383; Young v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 400 Mass.
837, 842, 512 N.E.2d 272 (1987). This is such a case: no jury
could conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable that, three to
five hours after the collision, Staelens would trip over a piece of
equipment brought to the scene sometime after the accident by a
state employee inspecting the tanker. Staelens suffered no injury
from the collision itself nor from any risk of harm resulting
therefrom; e.g., he did not slip on fluids or trip over debris from
the vehicles involved in the accident. Instead, Staelens's injury
resulted from an independent agency, the DOT inspector's conduct,
after the risks of harm resulting from Dobert's negligent conduct
had come to rest. Indeed, as we have said, three to five hours
passed without incident.
To find in favor of Staelens would be to substantially
extend the scope of reasonable foreseeability as set forth in
Massachusetts case law and stretch the concept beyond reason, a
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course we decline to follow. Dobert did not become an insurer of
Staelens's safety against all conceivable harms merely because she
struck the tanker he was driving. As instructed by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, "[t]here must be limits to
the scope or definition of reasonable foreseeability based on
considerations of policy and pragmatic judgment." Poskus, 423
Mass. at 640, 670 N.E.2d 383; see also Kent, 437 Mass. at 320-21,
771 N.E.2d 770; Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, ch. 10, § 180, at
443 (2001) ("The proximate cause issue, in spite of the
terminology, is not about causation at all but about the
appropriate scope of responsibility."). Otherwise, liability would
extend endlessly, one harm leading inevitably to others. In sum,
the undisputed facts would not permit a fair-minded jury to
conclude that Staelens's injuries were within the reasonably
foreseeable risks of harm resulting from Dobert's negligent
conduct.
Affirmed, costs to appellees.
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