Kosereis v. Department for

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 02-2358

UGURHAN AKTURK KOSEREIS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DEPARTMENT FOR CHILDREN,
YOUTH & FAMILIES, RHODE ISLAND TRAINING SCHOOL, ET AL.

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

Richard J. Savage for appellant.
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Deputy Chief, and Patrick Lynch,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, for appellees.

June 12, 2003
 BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant, Ugurhan

Akturk Kosereis ("Kosereis"), brought a discrimination claim in the

district court against his employer, the State of Rhode Island

Department of Children Youth and Families, Rhode Island Training

School ("the Training School"), and the director of the Training

School in his official capacity. Kosereis alleged that the

defendants discriminated against him based on his religion and

national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and various state laws.

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary

judgment because Kosereis failed to produce sufficient evidence

that he suffered from discrimination. Although the district

court's decision contained legal errors, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment,

we state the facts in the light most favorable to the opposing

party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Sands

v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 2000). Kosereis is

a Turkish-born Muslim who works as a vocational teacher at the

Training School. The Training School is a juvenile correction

facility that contains both classrooms and residences. Kosereis

has worked for the Training School since 1975. During his tenure,

he has taught woodworking, autobody, and at the times relevant to

this appeal, welding and auto mechanics.

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 Kosereis has experienced difficulties with tardiness and

absenteeism. In 1981, the Training School issued Kosereis a

reminder about taking excessive sick leave without proper

documentation. The problem became worse in the mid-1990s when

Arlene Chorney ("Chorney") was hired as principal of the Training

School. According to Kosereis, his discriminatory treatment

"started the day Dr. Chorney became principal."

Chorney instituted a new work schedule that, in Kosereis'

words, was "very complicated." Kosereis claims that the complexity

of the work schedule caused him to become confused about when he

was required to report for work. In 1995, for example,

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Kosereis because he

missed work without notifying the proper personnel. In 1996,

Kosereis was verbally disciplined for being late to a class. In

1997, Kosereis was given a written reprimand for failing to report

to his first period class. In 1998, Kosereis received a

disciplinary letter for falsifying his time records. This

reprimand, however, was later expunged from his record. In 1999,

Kosereis was verbally reprimanded after he failed to report for

work in the morning.

It is clear that Chorney made efforts to clarify the work

schedule. As part of the verbal reprimand in 1996, Chorney

explained the schedule to Kosereis in the presence of his union

representative. In Kosereis' 1997 letter, Chorney again offered

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Kosereis help:

As a professional, you are expected to arrive to school
and classes on time. You are also expected to follow
your schedule. If you are unable to understand your
schedule, I will assist you further.

In addition to the alleged complicated work schedule, Kosereis

claims that Chorney was responsible for a host of other problems.

He says that Chorney did not give him sufficient funding, adequate

supplies or proper facilities to teach auto mechanics. Kosereis

was required to work in a particular building that he says lacked

ventilation and was dirty. Chorney denied Kosereis' request for a

sabbatical to travel to Turkey and study that country's juvenile

justice system. Instead, Kosereis was granted a sabbatical to take

courses in Rhode Island. Kosereis also says that Chorney did not

do enough to stop students from calling him "turkey" and teachers

teasing him about his Turkish food in the lunchroom.

In 1995, Kosereis was laid off and soon after initiated an

administrative appeal with the Rhode Island Commissioner of

Education ("the Commissioner"). While the appeal was pending,

Kosereis filed a claim with the Rhode Island Commission for Human

Rights ("RICHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC") alleging that his job was terminated because of

discrimination. The EEOC ultimately issued Kosereis a right to sue

letter, but the RICHR did not.

In 1996, Kosereis' administrative appeal of his lay-off was

decided. The Commissioner determined that Kosereis was laid off

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for "good and just cause," but nevertheless reinstated him with

backpay because he did not receive a timely notice of his lay-off.

Two years after Kosereis returned to work, he filed another

set of claims with the RICHR and the EEOC. This time, he alleged

that Chorney's disciplinary actions stemming from his absenteeism

constituted discrimination. Kosereis claimed he was disciplined in

retaliation for filing his earlier claims of discrimination. Both

the RICHR and the EEOC issued right to sue letters.

Having properly navigated the administrative waters of the

RICHR and the EEOC, Kosereis filed a complaint in the district

court. He alleged that the defendants violated Title VII by

creating a hostile work environment and denying him equal terms and

conditions of employment because of his religion and national

origin. Kosereis then amended his complaint and added the

allegation of retaliation. Kosereis also raised claims under the

Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 (1998),

and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws

§ 28-5-1 (2000).

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment.

The district court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge who

recommended that the defendants' motion be granted. The district

court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both the federal and

state law claims. Kosereis filed a timely appeal, but challenged

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only the district court's rulings regarding the federal law claims.

It is to these rulings we now turn.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de

novo. See Muniz Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc., 229 F.3d 12, 14 (1st

Cir. 2000). Summary judgment for the defendants is appropriate

when the evidence is so one-sided that no reasonable person could

find in favor of the plaintiff. See Kearney v. Town of Wareham,

316 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2002). There are four issues we must

address in this appeal: whether Kosereis was precluded from

litigating issues pertaining to his lay-off; whether Kosereis was

treated differently than other co-workers because of his religion

and national origin; whether Kosereis suffered from a hostile work

environment; and whether Kosereis was subjected to discriminatory

retaliation.

A. Preclusion

Our initial inquiry is whether Kosereis can, as part of this

case, delve into matters related to his 1995 lay-off. The lay-off

is important to Kosereis in this litigation because he believes it

helps establish that he was subjected to disparate treatment, a

topic which we will discuss later.

The district court held that the doctrine of res judicata

barred Kosereis from litigating any issues related to his lay-off.

"Under federal law, the doctrine of res judicata dictates that a

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final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or

their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been

raised in that action." Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303,

311 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94

(1980)). The district court reasoned that Kosereis' administrative

appeal of the lay-off, and the Commissioner's subsequent ruling

that he was laid off for "good and just cause," amounted to a final

judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. This ruling

was incorrect.

The critical part of the district court's ruling stated that

"[t]he doctrine of res judicata applies to a decision of a quasi-

judicial administrative tribunal," such as the decision by the

Commissioner in the present case. To support this statement, the

district court cited to Department of Corrections of State of Rhode

Island v. Tucker, 657 A.2d 546, 549 (R.I. 1995), in which the Rhode

Island Supreme Court held that Rhode Island state courts give

preclusive effect to quasi-judicial administrative tribunals.

The district court was correct in looking to state law for

answers to questions regarding the preclusive effect of state

administrative decisions. Federal common law generally requires

that federal courts accord the decisions of state administrative

agencies acting in a judicial capacity "the same preclusive effect

to which it would be entitled in the State's courts." Univ. of

Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986). But that is not the

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end of the matter. Even if state courts apply res judicata to

state administrative decisions, federal courts will only follow

suit if doing so is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting

the federal statute at issue. See Astoria Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n

v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 (1991) (citing Elliot, 478 U.S. at

796). This means that when the preclusive effect of a state

administrative decision is in question, the central inquiry is one

of federal statutory interpretation. See Thomas v. Contoocook

Valley Sch. Dist., 150 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 1998). In this case,

the district court erred by looking no further than the

predilections of the state court; the district court failed to

consider the vital question of congressional intent.

That said, we need not canvass the congressional intent

underlying Title VII. The Supreme Court has already considered the

matter, and held that Congress did not intend that unreviewed state

administrative decisions would prohibit plaintiffs from bringing

subsequent Title VII actions in federal courts. See Elliot, 478

U.S. at 795-96. We will, of course, follow the Supreme Court's

ruling in Elliot. The administrative decision issued by the

Commissioner regarding Kosereis' lay-off was not reviewed by a

court. It therefore does not have a preclusive effect on Kosereis'

Title VII claims. See Thomas, 150 F.3d at 39 ("It is now settled,

however, that State agency findings that are not reviewed by a

state court are not entitled to any preclusive effect in a

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subsequent action under Title VII") (emphasis in original).

Kosereis is free to use the facts related to his lay-off as

evidence of disparate treatment. The district court's holding to

the contrary is overruled.

B. Disparate Treatment

Kosereis claims that he was denied equal terms and conditions

of employment because of his religion and national origin.

Kosereis concedes, however, that he lacks direct evidence of

discrimination. This means that the case turns on whether Kosereis

has presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

See Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 64

(1st Cir. 2002). To make this determination, we use the burden-

shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). See Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 33

(1st Cir. 2001).

Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case, which in turn gives rise to an

inference of discrimination. See Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141

F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1998). The employer then must state a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Zapata-

Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2002).

If the employer can state such a reason, the inference of

discrimination disappears and the plaintiff is required to show

that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.

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See id. at 45.

Generally, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by

showing that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was

qualified for the job; (3) the employer took an adverse employment

action against him; and (4) the position remained open or was

filled by a person with similar qualifications. See St. Mary's

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Santiago-Ramos v.

Centential P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000).

The district court assumed, arguendo, that Kosereis made out

a prima facie case. In doing so, it quoted language in Rivera-

Rodriguez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.

2001), and described the fourth prong as requiring plaintiff to

show that "other similarly situated employees who were not members

of the protected class were treated more favorably." Id. at 25.

This language was dicta, however; the plaintiff's prima facie case

was not contested as part of that appeal. Nor did the case that

Rivera-Rodriguez cited, Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d

670, 673 (1st Cir. 1996), involve the prima facie showing required

for disparate treatment claims. Dicta, of course, is not binding

on future panels. See Municipality of San Juan v. Rullan, 318 F.3d

26, 28 n.3 (1st Cir. 2003).

In Conward v. Cambridge School Committee, 171 F.3d 12 (1st

Cir. 1999), in contrast, we explicitly rejected the notion that

plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases are required to demonstrate

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that they were treated differently as part of their prima facie

case.1 Rather, we held that:

[T]he time to consider comparative evidence in a
disparate treatment case is at the third step of the
burden-shifting ritual, when the need arises to test the
pretextuality vel non of the employer's articulated
reason for having acted adversely to the plaintiff's
interests.

Id. at 19. We have since repeated our Conward ruling. See

Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 584 ("[A] plaintiff need not show as part of

his prima facie case that the employer either recalled similarly

situated non-minority employees or otherwise treated employees of

different ethnic backgrounds more favorably.").

Our holding in Conward makes sense and is attuned to the

applicable law. We have described the prima facie case as a "small

showing," Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st.

Cir. 2001), that is "not onerous," Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 54,

and is "easily made," Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283

F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002). The pretext analysis, on the other

hand, is more demanding. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981) (stating that the pretext

analysis moves the inquiry "to a new level of specificity"). Thus,

Conward presents the applicable rule: in disparate treatment

1
It is a different issue if a plaintiff opts to provide
comparative data as part of a prima facie case. See, e.g.,
Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 585-86 (1st
Cir. 1999). Our question here is whether a comparative analysis is
required as part of a prima facie case.

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cases, comparative evidence is to be treated as part of the pretext

analysis, and not as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. 171

F.3d at 19.

As in Conward, the district court here went on to grant

summary judgment because there was insufficient evidence of

pretext. We agree that Kosereis failed to present adequate

evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment, and affirm on that

basis.

The "ultimate touchstone" of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is

whether the employer's actions were improperly motivated by

discrimination. Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 7 (1st

Cir. 2000). Evidence that the employer's stated reasons for its

actions are pretextual can be sufficient to show improper motive,

and hence, allow the plaintiff to survive summary judgment. See

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143

(2000); Fite, 232 F.3d at 7; Feliciano de la Cruz v. El

Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2000).

Plaintiffs can show that an employer's stated reasons are

pretextual in any number of ways. See Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at

55. One method is to produce evidence that the plaintiff was

treated differently than other similarly situated employees. See

Straughn, 250 F.3d at 43-44; Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581. To show

disparate treatment, Kosereis relies heavily on the claim that only

he was disciplined for failing to come to work on time. He says

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that other tardy employees were never disciplined.

The record, however, does not support Kosereis' claims. There

is simply no evidence that other teachers who failed to report to

work were not disciplined. In fact, the evidence is just the

opposite. Chorney testified at her deposition that she had issued

written or verbal reprimands to employees other than Kosereis for

being late to work.

Kosereis raises a number of other instances of disparate

treatment. All of these are insufficient to show pretext because

they do not involve facts or circumstances similar to those

Kosereis faced. To successfully allege disparate treatment, a

plaintiff must show "that others similarly situated to him in all

relevant respects were treated differently by the employer."

Conward, 171 F.3d at 20; see also Rosado v. Radio Shack, Inc., 312

F.3d 532, 534 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that to have a plausible

differential treatment claim, plaintiffs must show that others

similarly situated were treated differently). The examples of

disparate treatment "need not be perfect replicas, [but] they must

closely resemble one another in respect to relevant facts and

circumstances." Conward, 171 F.3d at 20.

Kosereis claims that a secretary and some teachers were not

disciplined after they returned late to work after going out to

lunch for "Secretary's Day." Kosereis admitted at his deposition,

however, that he did not know whether the secretary and the

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teachers violated any rules. Kosereis did not know, for example,

whether they had permission to return late or whether they used

personal time for the lunch. He also did not say whether the

teachers' late arrival caused them to miss classes, as was the case

in his situation.

In the same vein, Kosereis claims that other teachers who

behaved inappropriately were never disciplined. He cites an

instance where a student's fingers were cut by a machine in a

carpentry class. Chorney testified in her deposition that the

teacher in charge of the carpentry class was not punished because

the student had been told not to touch the machine, but disobeyed

the teacher's order. Kosereis cites an instance where a staff

member urinated outside the school. Chorney explained that the

staff member was not punished because the incident did not take

place on school property or on school time. Chorney also lacked

personal knowledge of the incident. Kosereis says that a staff

member once used profane language in Kosereis' classroom. Chorney

explained that she did not discipline the staff member because she

was not the staff member's supervisor, but she did forward a report

of the incident to the appropriate person. In short, the long

lunch for "Secretary's Day," the accident in the carpentry class,

the alleged urination, and the use of profanity are not

sufficiently similar to the facts and circumstances surrounding

Kosereis' discipline to give rise to a finding of pretext.

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 Kosereis also points to examples of disparate treatment

outside the context of disciplinary matters. Kosereis claims that

he was required to work in a particular building that was dirty and

lacked ventilation. Kosereis, however, admitted at his deposition

that other teachers were required to work in the same building.

Kosereis claims that he was not permitted to take a sabbatical

in Turkey to study that country's juvenile justice system. He has

presented no evidence, however, that other teachers were treated

more favorably by being permitted to take sabbaticals overseas.

Moreover, Kosereis was granted a sabbatical, albeit to take courses

in Rhode Island.

Kosereis says that other vocational teachers, such as the

carpentry and culinary arts teachers, were given equipment and

their own classrooms. Specifically, Kosereis complains that he was

not given a shop in which to teach auto mechanics and was not

permitted to use an automobile in his class. The record

demonstrates, however, that the auto mechanics program was not

unique in this regard. Chorney testified at her deposition that

the health vocational program, like the auto mechanics program,

does not have its own equipment or a special classroom.

Moreover, the Training School was without an auto mechanics

shop well before the alleged discrimination took place. Chorney

explained that there has not been an auto mechanics shop at the

Training School since at least 1989 because of budgetary

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constraints. She also said that Kosereis' proposal to bring an

automobile to school as a teaching aid was rejected for safety and

security reasons. Chorney was concerned that there was no place

inside the school to store the automobile, and that it would remain

outside and unsecured.

Kosereis alleges that in 1995 the Training School announced

that three other teachers, in addition to Kosereis, were to be laid

off, but only Kosereis' job was actually eliminated. Chorney

explained at her deposition that the other teachers were not laid

off because they resigned after learning of the lay-offs. Their

jobs were not filled and the positions were eliminated. There is

no evidence that Kosereis was treated differently than the teachers

who resigned.

There is one piece of evidence, however, that merits careful

analysis. In 1998, Kosereis received a written reprimand from

Chorney for falsifying his time records. Kosereis informed Chorney

that he was not working on the alleged date of the falsification.

Chorney then amended the written reprimand with new dates.

Kosereis contested the reprimand and it was ultimately expunged

from his record. Chorney maintains that she simply made a mistake

as to the dates. Kosereis says this evidence shows that Chorney's

disciplinary measures were pretextual. We do not think this one

incident, standing alone, is enough to permit a reasonable jury to

find that the defendants' explanation for Kosereis' discipline was

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pretextual. This is especially true in light of Kosereis'

numerous other instances of absenteeism and tardiness -- none of

which he contests. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (stating that

summary judgment may be appropriate "if the plaintiff created only

a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue

and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that

no discrimination had occurred."). Rather, Chorney's changing of

the dates creates only a "slight suggestion of pretext," which we

have held is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Zapata-

Matos, 277 F.3d at 47 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148).

To summarize, all of the instances of disparate treatment

cited by Kosereis, save the one involving the expunged reprimand,

are either unsupported by the record or are distinguishable in

important respects from the facts and circumstances that Kosereis

faced. See Straughn, 250 F.3d at 43-44. We have been

"particularly cautious" about affirming an employer's motion for

summary judgment on a discrimination claim when the case boils down

to whether the employer's stated reasons are pretextual. Hodgens

v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation

omitted). But the evidence that Kosereis presents regarding

pretext is so weak that we have no difficulty affirming the

district court's grant of summary judgment as to the disparate

treatment claim. See Zapata-Matos, 277 F.3d at 47-48.

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C. Hostile Work Environment

A hostile work environment exists in violation of Title VII

"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and

create an abusive working environment." See Harris v. Forklist

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). There is no "mathematically precise test" to determine

whether Kosereis presented sufficient evidence that he was

subjected to a hostile work environment. Id. Rather, we look to

all the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the

discriminatory conduct, whether it was physically threatening or

humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with Kosereis'

work performance. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 116 (2002); Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466,

472 (1st Cir. 2002).

Kosereis claims that he was subjected to a hostile work

environment when the residents of the Training School called him

"turkey," when fellow teachers teased him in the lunchroom about

his food, and when Chorney issued him repeated reprimands for his

absenteeism. Mindful that "[t]he accumulated effect of incidents"

can amount to a hostile work environment over time, we consider

Kosereis' evidence collectively. O'Rourke v. City of Providence,

235 F.3d 713, 729 (1st Cir. 2001).

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 The name calling by the residents of the Training School and

the teasing by the teachers in the lunchroom do not rise to the

level of "severe or pervasive conduct," that is required for a

hostile work environment claim. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). A hostile work environment

generally is not created by a "mere offensive utterance," Harris,

510 U.S. at 23; nor does it arise from "simple teasing, offhand

comments, and isolated incidents." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Courts are supposed to use "[c]ommon

sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context," to

distinguish between such innocuous behavior and severely hostile or

abusive conduct. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523

U.S. 75, 82 (1998).

Here, Kosereis, an adult, was called names by children who

reside at a juvenile correction facility. When Kosereis complained

to Chorney about the name calling, she met with the children and

other staff members on two separate occasions to resolve the

problem. As for the teasing by fellow teachers about Kosereis'

food, there is no evidence in the record that this teasing was

frequent or severe. It also bears mentioning that Kosereis has not

produced any evidence that the comments about which he complains,

either those made by the children or those made by his colleagues,

were physically threatening or interfered with his work

performance.

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 There is even less merit to Kosereis' claim that he suffered

a hostile work environment because of Chorney's repeated

reprimands. The reprimands were frequent only because Kosereis

continued to miss work. If Kosereis wished for the reprimands to

stop, then he could have simply arrived at work on time. The name

calling by the children, the alleged teasing by the teachers, and

Chorney's reprimands did not create a hostile work environment.

See, e.g., DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 311 (1st Cir.

1997). The district court's grant of summary judgment on Kosereis'

hostile work environment claim is affirmed.

D. Retaliation

To maintain a claim of discriminatory retaliation, a plaintiff

must produce evidence that (1) he engaged in protected conduct

under Title VII; (2) he experienced an adverse employment action;

and (3) a casual connection exists between the protected conduct

and the adverse action. See Gu v. Boston Police Dep't, 312 F.3d 6,

14 (1st Cir. 2002). The parties dispute only the final prong of

the analysis, and our discussion is limited accordingly.

Kosereis says that Chorney's reprimands and her denial of his

sabbatical to Turkey constituted retaliation for filing his claims

of discrimination with the RICHR and the EEOC. After carefully

examining the record, we can find no evidence that a casual

connection exists between the denial of the sabbatical and

Kosereis' charges of discrimination. In fact, Kosereis was

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permitted to take a sabbatical in Rhode Island.

Nor is there any evidence connecting Kosereis' reprimands to

the discrimination charges he filed with the RICHR and the EEOC in

1996. "It is insufficient for [Kosereis] to simply recount that he

complained and that he was disciplined . . . ." King v. Town of

Hanover, 116 F.3d 965, 968 (1st Cir. 1997). In fact, the warning

letter Kosereis received in 1981 and the disciplinary proceedings

that were initiated against him in 1995 demonstrate that Kosereis

had been disciplined for instances of absenteeism well before the

alleged discrimination took place. The district court's grant of

summary judgment on Kosereis' retaliation claim is affirmed.

III. CONCLUSION

After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to

Kosereis, we conclude that he has failed to produce evidence that

he was treated differently than fellow co-workers because of his

religion or national origin, was subjected to a hostile work

environment, or suffered discriminatory retaliation. The district

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants is

AFFIRMED. No costs are awarded on appeal. So ordered.

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