Pena-Borrero v. Estremeda

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 03-1084

CECILIO PEÑA-BORRERO; ORLANDO PEÑA-AYALA;
ASTRY PEÑA-AYALA,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

JUAN ESTREMEDA; HECTOR MILLAN SANTIAGO,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Mauricio Hernández-Arroyo for appellants.
Eduardo A. Vera-Ramírez with whom Eileen Landrón Guardiola and
Landrón & Vera, LLP were on brief for appellees.

April 9, 2004
 COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. On November 10, 2000, appellant

Cecilio Peña-Borrero was arrested by officers of the Puerto Rico

Police Department on a valid warrant. He was released the same day

after posting a $300 bond. Nearly six weeks later, on December 21,

he was awakened at his home in the middle of the night and arrested

again; the warrant carried by the officers was facially identical

to the earlier document but was no longer active because of its

prior execution. Despite his protests of a mistake, and his

display of documents showing the earlier arrest and release, the

officers took him into custody and transported him to police

headquarters. He was released later that morning. Appellant

subsequently filed this action, claiming civil rights violations

under federal and Commonwealth law. The district court concluded

that the complaint failed to state a viable claim for relief and

thus granted defendants' motion to dismiss. We now vacate the

dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

We summarize the facts and allegations set forth in the

complaint. When police officers arrived at appellant's home at

approximately 3:30 a.m. on December 21, 2000, he and his two young

children, Orlando and Astry Peña-Ayala,1 were asleep. Appellant

heard a loud noise in the yard and looked out to see eight to ten

1
Although the children also are plaintiffs-appellants, for
simplicity, we refer only to Peña-Borrero as the appealing party.

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police officers gathered there. Informed that the officers had an

arrest warrant, appellant asked if it involved "the Sabana Grande

or Mayaguez case" and reported that the warrant already had been

executed. Two officers, one of whom was identified as Captain

Santiago, repeated the instruction for appellant to come outside.

As he opened the door to comply,2 officers entered the house,

pushed appellant's arms behind his back, and handcuffed him in

front of the two children. In the course of the arrest, he re-

injured his ribs and back, which previously had been injured in a

car accident.

Once outside, appellant told the officers that he had in the

trunk of his car a copy of the executed arrest warrant and a

receipt for the bond that he had posted to be released on bail.

Officers retrieved his car keys from inside the house, opened the

trunk, and found the copy of the executed warrant. It was

identical to the one possessed by defendants – showing its issuance

in Sabana Grande on October 19 – but bore a stamp showing that it

had been executed on November 10. The bond receipt also was dated

November 10.

Despite the obvious overlap, the officers persisted in taking

appellant to police headquarters. His children were taken away in

another vehicle. Appellant was placed in a cell with three other

2
Appellant stated that he immediately moved to exit the house
because the officers threatened to break down his door and gates
and used foul language.

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individuals. He met with his attorney at about 7 a.m. and was

taken to court at about 9 a.m., "chained together with other

arrestees." After some time, a judge reviewed the court papers,

ordered him released, and apologized for the mistake.

Appellant brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and

various provisions of Commonwealth law, contending that the

officers,3 inter alia, violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal

searches and seizures by subjecting him to false arrest, false

imprisonment, excessive force and an illegal search of his home.

He further asserted that the officers conspired to deprive him of

these rights. He claimed that the officers acted at least

recklessly by failing to check police records before executing a

two-month-old warrant and by ignoring the documentary evidence

showing that the warrant previously had been executed.

On defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court concluded

that, "[a]t best . . . plaintiff's allegations state negligence

claims, which, though actionable under Puerto Rico law, do not rise

to the level of reckless disregard or callous indifference required

for a constitutional claim." The court thus dismissed the federal

3
The complaint initially was brought against four named
officers and four additional unnamed officers, but appellant
dismissed the claims without prejudice against all but two
defendants: Héctor Millán-Santiago and Juan Estremeda.

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claims explicitly, implicitly dismissing as well the pendent

commonwealth claims.

On appeal, appellant contends that the district court

improperly applied a heightened pleading standard to assess his

claims and erred in finding his allegations inadequate to support

a constitutional violation.4

II. Discussion

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, keeping in

mind that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim

"'only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set

of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'"

Torres-Viera v. Laboy-Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (lst Cir. 2002)

(quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002));

see also Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 72 (lst Cir. 1998).

At oral argument, appellants' counsel acknowledged that the

conspiracy claim was thinly developed, and we agree with the

district court that the allegations in the complaint directed to

conspiracy are wholly conclusory and inadequate, under any pleading

standard, to support relief. No more is necessary on that issue.

The remaining § 1983 claims "need only comply with the liberal

'notice pleading' standards of the Federal Rules." Wilson v. Town

of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 10 (lst Cir. 2002) (citing Leatherman v.

4
An additional argument that the court improperly allowed
defendants to file a sur-reply concerning their motions to dismiss
is without merit, and we do not address it.

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Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.

163, 168 (1993)); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 ("Rule

8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions,

with limited exceptions.").5 With respect to those claims, we

accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable

inferences in plaintiff's favor.

Following these precepts, we accept as true that appellant was

abruptly awakened in the middle of the night, forcefully arrested,

and incarcerated for some six hours, despite unequivocal

documentary evidence that the warrant justifying his arrest had

been rendered invalid by prior execution. Moreover, officers had

failed to check with the precinct in which the warrant originated

to verify that it remained active.6

Based on these facts, we understand appellant to allege

violations of the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, stemming from both the fact of

5
The parties argue at some length about whether a heightened
pleading standard, as discussed in Judge, governs this case.
Putting aside the conspiracy claim, the heightened review discussed
in Judge would be inapplicable here because the claims do not
require proof of wrongful motive. See Judge, 160 F.3d at 74
(quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998)).
6
Appellant did not specifically allege in his complaint that
police department procedures required defendants to check internal
records before making an arrest under a months-old warrant, but he
made that assertion in his opposition to defendants' motions to
dismiss and the district court presumed the obligation existed. In
their brief on appeal and at oral argument, defendants accepted the
district court's summary of the facts and assumed the existence of
such a requirement.

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his arrest and its forceful nature. See Albright v. Oliver, 510

U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("deprivations of liberty

that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions" are properly

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395 (1989) (Fourth Amendment provides the guide for analyzing

claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force in the

course of an arrest or other seizure).

We begin our analysis with the claim of excessive force, which

is argued by appellant in highly abbreviated, conclusory form. His

complaint alleges that officers threatened to break down the door

and gates to gain entry to his home, used foul language, and

pushed both of [his] arms up behind his back up to almost
his neck, whereby plaintiff told them that they were
hurting him. Plaintiff was injured while being
handcuffed in front of his two children . . . .
Plaintiff reinjured his ribs near his chest which had
been fractured due to a prior car accident in 1997 and
his back was also injured where he has three (3)
herniated discs.

In essence, appellant asserts a constitutional violation based on

harsh language and handcuffing that was accomplished by pushing his

arms behind his back, causing injury exacerbated by prior non-

obvious injuries. Making only cursory reference to this claim in

his brief, he suggests that, since no force was necessary to

effectuate his arrest, any force was therefore unreasonable and

excessive. In our view, however, the allegations demonstrate no

more than the "degree of physical coercion," Graham, 490 U.S. at

396, typically attendant to an arrest. Given the unknown

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circumstances facing the officers as they entered appellant's home,

see id. ("a particular use of force must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight"), appellant's allegations of

forceful handcuffing are insufficient to state a constitutional

claim of excessive force. See id. ("'Not every push or shove, even

if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's

chambers,' Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d [1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)],

violates the Fourth Amendment."); cf. Alexis v. McDonald's

Restaurants of Mass., 67 F.3d 341, 352-53 (lst Cir. 1995) (finding

actionable excessive force claim where officers "suddenly and

violently grabbed and pulled" plaintiff from a restaurant booth and

across the table; handcuffed her hands tightly behind her back;

dragged her from the booth, bruising her legs; hoisted her by her

elbows and carried her to the police car, and then pushed her in).7

7
Although the complaint also refers to an illegal search,
neither the allegations contained therein nor the argument on
appeal are sufficiently developed to require our consideration.

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 The remaining claim, however, is not so easily dismissed.8

The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals "the right 'to be

secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures'

of the person." Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. Despite facially

authentic documentary evidence that the warrant was no longer

effective, and with knowledge that they had failed to follow

precautionary procedures to assure its vitality, the officers

persisted with appellant's arrest and detention. If any doubts

remained after appellant displayed the stamped warrant, a quick

phone call to the precinct presumably would have resolved them.

While the officers arguably were simply negligent in failing to

check on the warrant before they acted on it, following through on

the arrest and detention once confronted with appellant's documents

reflected a much more deliberate disregard for whether the warrant

remained valid. We thus conclude that the complaint's allegations

would support a jury conclusion that defendants acted unreasonably

in arresting appellant and taking him into custody. See Graham,

490 U.S. at 397 ("[T]he reasonableness inquiry [in the Fourth

8
Appellant's complaint suggests that he is asserting
independent claims for "false arrest" and "false imprisonment." In
this context, we view the former as a subset of the latter and
believe it most appropriate to view the allegations as stating a
single claim for violation of appellant's Fourth Amendment right to
be free from an unreasonable seizure. Cf. Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos,
151 F.3d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 1998) ("The right to be free from
unreasonable seizure (and, by extension, unjustified arrest and
detention) is clearly established in the jurisprudence of the
Fourteenth Amendment (through which the Fourth Amendment constrains
state action).").

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Amendment context] . . . is an objective one: the question is

whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light

of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

their underlying intent or motivation.").

The documentary evidence that appellant presented to the

officers distinguishes this case from the mistaken identity setting

of Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), cited by the district

court. In Baker, the Supreme Court found no constitutional claim

was stated where the plaintiff was arrested on a valid warrant that

was issued in his name but intended for his brother. In the course

of its decision, the Court observed that "a sheriff executing an

arrest warrant is [not] required by the Constitution to investigate

independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based

on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite

intent." Id. at 145-46. In this case, however, appellant's claim

of improper arrest arguably required no independent investigation;

he did not simply assert a mistake, but also provided

substantiation.

Our decision in Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d

224, 227 (lst Cir. 1990), also supports appellant's right to pursue

his claim. In that case, the plaintiff similarly was arrested and

transported to court despite his protests that the underlying

matter had been resolved and the arrest warrant vacated. We

concluded that the general marshal of the court that issued the

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warrant could be found liable under § 1983 for recklessly

recirculating an old warrant without first checking the court's

records, which included a notation that the warrant had been

vacated. See id. at 227.9 In this case, where the officers had at

hand proof that the warrant was deficient, the decision to proceed

with appellant's arrest and incarceration appears even more

reckless than the general marshal's conduct in Torres Ramirez, and

more clearly unreasonable.

Defendants make two other attempts to dispose of the

complaint. First, they contend that the allegations fail to

attribute specific acts to either defendant. Reading the complaint

in the light most favorable to appellant, however, we have no

difficulty concluding that the Fourth Amendment claim remains

viable against Millán. He is identified as the supervisor of the

group of officers at the scene; as such, he presumably had the

authority to call off the arrest – or check with the issuing

precinct – when presented with the evidence casting doubt on the

warrant's continuing validity. We also conclude that it is

premature to dismiss the claim against defendant Estremeda.

Although he is mentioned by name only once – appellant allegedly

9
We note that neither the Supreme Court in Baker nor our
panel in Torres Ramirez analyzed the plaintiffs' cases under the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard and instead viewed the
plaintiffs' claims as alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection against deprivations of liberty without due
process of law. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 142; Torres Ramirez, 898
F.2d at 226.

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saw Estremeda "abruptly wake up his sleeping children" – at this

stage of the case, appellant's allegation that "codefendants found

the court papers but ignored them completely" is properly

attributable to each of the officers on the scene. See Judge, 160

F.3d at 76 n.13 ("[G]eneral allegations of omissions by all of the

officer defendants as a group gave the defendants 'fair notice' .

. . of at least the general nature of [the plaintiff's] claims

against them.") (citation omitted).

The defendants' second point of attack is via the doctrine of

qualified immunity. "An officer is entitled to qualified immunity

when his conduct is objectively reasonable based on the information

available at the time and in light of clearly established law."

Torres Ramirez, 898 F.2d at 228; see also Kelley v. LaForce, 288

F.3d 1, 6-7 (lst Cir. 2002). We think it apparent that defendants

may not use this defense to extinguish appellant's case. Taken in

the light most favorable to appellant, the allegations show that

defendants pursued appellant's arrest and incarceration in the face

of unambiguous evidence that their warrant was unenforceable. In

our view, such a seizure could be objectively unreasonable and a

violation of appellant's clearly established Fourth Amendment

rights. If a jury so finds, defendants would not be protected by

qualified immunity, and dismissal on that basis is therefore

unavailable.

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 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is vacated and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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