United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1340
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CARLOS MARES, JR.,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
and Dyk,* Circuit Judge.
Thomas F. McGuire, on brief, for appellant.
Virginia M. Vander Jagt, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, were on
brief, for appellee.
November 3, 2005
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Police officers arrested
Defendant Carlos Mares, Jr. ("Defendant"), for crimes related to
the sale of heroin. Defendant moved to suppress evidence found in
his bedroom after his parents consented to a search of their house,
and the district court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded guilty
but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. In this appeal, we consider whether the district court
properly denied his motion to suppress. We affirm the district
court's decision.
I.
On November 20, 2001, the police department in Holyoke,
Massachusetts received a tip from an informant that drug dealers
were selling heroin in a public park and that a man named Carlos
was distributing heroin to the dealers from a house at 611 South
Summer Street in Holyoke. Based upon information received from the
informant, the police set up surveillance of the public park. They
observed what they believed to be drug transactions, and they
confirmed this by confronting a suspected buyer, who admitted to
purchasing heroin in the park. The police followed the dealer to
611 South Summer Street and observed him enter the house and leave
a few minutes later. The police confronted the dealer, who
consented to a search, which revealed 50 packets of heroin.
The police then entered the house at 611 South Summer
Street without obtaining a search warrant. The officers spoke with
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Mrs. María Pérez ("Mrs. Pérez"), Defendant's mother, and Mr. Carlos
Mares, Sr. ("Mr. Mares"), Defendant's father. Mrs. Pérez signed a
consent form to allow the officers to search the house. The
officers entered Defendant's room and saw $1,840 in cash in plain
view. An officer then went into the closet and felt a closed
knapsack. The officer believed that weapons were inside, and he
opened the knapsack to find 750 packets of heroin and three
firearms. The officers then arrested Defendant.
The parties contest the events surrounding the police
entry into the house and the solicitation of Mrs. Pérez's consent.
According to Defendant, the police forcefully entered the house and
coerced Mrs. Pérez into signing the consent form. Defendant claims
that his sister answered the door and that the police pushed her
inside so that they could enter the house. Defendant maintains
that the police then threatened Mrs. Pérez, saying that they would
arrest everyone in the house if she did not sign the form granting
consent to search the house, and that Mrs. Pérez signed the consent
form because of this threat.
According to the Government, the officers entered the
house without objection, and the consent to search was freely
given. The Government states that the young woman who answered the
door stepped back, which the police took to be an implicit consent
to enter. About six people, none of them Mrs. Pérez or Mr. Mares,
were in the living room making comments to the police such as
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"leave" and "you need a warrant." The government asserts that an
officer yelled to the six people in the living room to be quiet or
else they would be arrested. The police explained the consent form
to Mr. Mares and Mrs. Pérez, and Mr. Mares explained the consent
form to Mrs. Pérez in Spanish. Mrs. Pérez signed the form, and Mr.
Mares orally consented to the search. Defendant never objected to
the consent granted by his parents.
After the arrest, Mrs. Pérez and Mr. Mares drove to the
police station. Mr. Mares gave a signed statement to police
describing what happened prior to the search: "The detectives asked
if they could search the house, and if I would sign a paper giving
permission to search. My wife signed and gave a permission to
search." Mrs. Pérez was present and did not object to the
statement signed by Mr. Mares.
Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment. Count
I charged him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
heroin, Count II charged him with possession with intent to
distribute heroin, and Count III charged him with possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his
bedroom, and the district court held a suppression hearing on
January 17, 2003. Three witnesses testified for Defendant, and
four officers testified for the Government. The court found that
the defense witnesses lacked credibility. The court further found
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that the officers entered the house lawfully with the consent of
the person who answered the door and that Mrs. Pérez voluntarily
signed the consent form. The court denied Defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence seized in his bedroom.
Defendant pleaded guilty to Counts II and III of the
indictment but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress. As part of the agreement, the Government
dismissed Count I of the indictment.
II.
Defendant raises three arguments on appeal. The first
argument is that the police officers did not have probable cause to
enter and search the apartment. The second argument is that there
were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry and
search. The third argument is that the officers coerced Mrs. Pérez
into consenting to the search of the house.
Defendant's first two arguments are simply irrelevant.
The court below found that "the officers entered the house lawfully
with the consent of someone whom they reasonably perceived to be an
occupant and remained inside with the implicit permission of Mrs.
Pérez." The court also found that Mrs. Pérez and Mr. Mares
voluntarily consented to the search of their home. Once such
consent has been freely given, the police do not need probable
cause or a search warrant to search the home. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973). Since a search warrant
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was not necessary, the Government does not need to show any exigent
circumstances. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1992).
Defendant's final argument is that the officers coerced
Mrs. Pérez into consenting to the search of her house. "[T]he
question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. The district court
considered the testimony of witnesses on behalf of both parties and
found that Mrs. Pérez's consent was voluntary. There is no
contention that Mrs. Pérez lacked authority to consent to the
search. "[W]e must accept the district court's findings of fact
unless those findings are shown to be clearly erroneous." United
States v. Laine, 270 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 2001).
In support of his argument that the officers coerced Mrs.
Pérez into giving consent, Defendant merely restates his version of
the facts and makes no attempt to show that the district court's
findings of fact were clearly erroneous. From our own examination
of the record, we find the district court's findings of fact to be
well supported. Mrs. Pérez, Mr. Mares, Benito Morales, and Michele
Mares testified on behalf of the Defendant. The court amply
explained why it discredited the testimony of the defense
witnesses. We will briefly enumerate here just a few of the
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district court's reasons: (1) Mrs. Pérez contradicted her own
testimony on the stand, and the logic of her story was faulty; (2)
Mr. Mares's testimony contradicted the statement he signed at the
police station after Defendant was arrested; (3) Benito Morales
"offered an incoherent story and retracted some of his just-
elicited narrative in favor of another version"; and (4) Michele
Mares's testimony was inconsistent with that of the other defense
witnesses and the police officers. Defendant does not even attempt
to discredit the testimony of the officers, and nothing in the
record gives us any reason to discredit the officers' testimony.
We therefore find no error in the factual findings of the district
court.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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