United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1157
ELAINE MAYMÍ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY; MR. MIGUEL SOTO-LACOURT,
Executive Director in his official and personal capacity;
MARITZA VALLE, Assistant to the Executive Director in her
official and personal capacity; CARMEN VANESSA DÁVILA, in her
official and personal capacity,
Defendants, Appellees,
RAQUEL MARTÍ-ORTIZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP SOTO-MARTÍ,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. Senior District Judge]
Before
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Delgado-Colón,* District Judge.
Godwin Aldarondo-Girald, with whom Aldarondo Girald Law Office
was on brief, for appellant.
Celina Romany, with whom Celina Romany Law Offices, was on
brief, for appellees in their official capacities.
Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General,
Department of Justice, with whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts,
Solicitor General, Mariana Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General, were on
brief, for appellees in their individual capacities.
*
Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
January 30, 2008
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Elaine Maymí filed
this complaint against the Puerto Rico Ports Authority and various
officials, alleging political discrimination and retaliation.1 She
asserted claims under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as analogous
provisions under Puerto Rico law. Upon motion by the defendants,
the district court allowed summary judgment on all federal claims
and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Maymí's supplemental
state claims. Maymí now appeals. After careful consideration, we
affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background
Maymí, a member of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"),
began her career with the Puerto Rico Ports Authority as an
"Attorney II" in 1985. She was later promoted to an "Attorney
III," and in that capacity defended the Ports Authority in various
legal proceedings. One of those suits was a 1993 civil claim filed
by Maritza Valle, who asserted that the Ports Authority, then
controlled by the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), engaged in
political discrimination. The case was dismissed in 1996 with
costs and attorneys' fees imposed on Valle. Undeterred, in 2000,
1
The individual defendants, in both their official and personal
capacities, are: (1) Miguel Soto Lacourt, Executive Director of the
Puerto Rico Ports Authority; (2) Maritza Valle, Executive Assistant
to the Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority; and
(3) Carmen Vanessa Dávila, Auxiliary Executive Director of
Administration of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority.
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Valle filed a second complaint alleging political discrimination
and retaliation by the NPP.
In January 2001, the PDP gained control of the
government. Miguel Pereira was appointed Executive Director of the
Ports Authority and Maymí was appointed as Auxiliary Executive
Director for Administration, a trust position.2 Maymí alleges that
after hearing of her appointment, Valle began directing criticism
against her. In December 2001, Valle amended her complaint and
added Maymí as a defendant, alleging that she was "an ally of the
NPP administration to persecute and discriminate against her."
Around that time, Pereira resigned as Executive Director and José
Baquero was appointed Executive Director. Maymí continued in the
same position.
In April 2003, Baquero resigned and Miguel Soto-Lacourt
was appointed as the new Executive Director. Upon his appointment,
Maymí submitted a letter offering to step down from her
2
We have previously recognized the legal distinction between
career and trust employees under Puerto Rico law:
Puerto Rico law distinguishes between "career" employees and
"trust" employees. Career employees are permanent and "'may
only be removed from their positions for just cause and after
due filing of charges.'" Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio,
221 F.3d 1, 3 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
21, § 4554(b)). By contrast, trust employees "shall be of
free selection and removal," i.e., removable with or without
cause. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1350.
Aguiar-Carrasquillo v. Agosto-Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.
2006).
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appointment, but expressing her interest in continuing in the
position. She received no response and remained in the trust
position. Soon after his appointment, Soto-Lacourt appointed Valle
as his Executive Assistant and the two allegedly instructed Maymí
to dismiss and remove employees who served in trust positions.
Among those affected was Gerónimo Vázquez, acting Director of the
General Services Office. According to Maymí, Soto-Lacourt stated
that despite Vázquez's past performance and years of service, he
wanted to remove him because of his affiliation with the NPP.
Furthermore, in the course of that same conversation, Soto-Lacourt
allegedly made reference to three secretaries who had also worked
with the NPP administration and expressed his interest in replacing
them with PDP members. Maymí explained that because the
secretaries held career positions, they could not be discriminated
against for political reasons. Soto-Lacourt allegedly expressed
frustration with her explanation.
Soto-Lacourt then asked Maymí to draft a contract
retaining the services of a consulting firm, Personnel Management
Group, to review and amend the existing job classification plan.
Soto-Lacourt allegedly stated that he was retaining the firm to
create a new, more flexible plan in order to grant positions and
increased salaries to those who "helped him and the PDP." Maymí
drafted the service contract and the Personnel Management Group was
retained. Despite her responsibility over human resources issues,
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she was excluded from all meetings concerning the new job
classification plan.
On May 29, 2003, Maymí was informed that she was to be
removed from her trust position and reinstated in her prior career
position as an "Attorney III" in the Legal Division. Soto-Lacourt
allegedly explained that she was being demoted "because of the
things we have previously discussed" which Maymí understood to
refer to her opposition to his desire to remove NPP members from
career positions.
Maymí's monthly salary decreased from $6,319 to $5,469 as
a result of her reassignment. According to Maymí, Valle ordered
her salary to be reduced further, below the salary for an "Attorney
III," to $5,327 per month. On June 9, 2003, Carmen Vanessa Dávila
was appointed as Auxiliary Executive Director of Administration
(Maymí's former position) and executed Valle's salary reduction
order. Maymí was allegedly also assigned inferior duties and
denied other benefits and rights, including work schedule
accommodations and the payment of her excess annual leave.
On October 31, 2003, Maymí filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
seeking compensatory and pecuniary damages and alleging violations
pursuant to the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
She also moved the Court to exercise its pendent jurisdiction
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regarding her state law claims. In August 2006, the defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment, concluding that, inter alia, Maymí had failed to
establish any of her federal claims. Having dismissed the federal
claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over her state law claims.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, we review a district court's entry of summary
judgment de novo. See Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98
(1st Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
record reveals that "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material if it has the
potential of determining the outcome of the litigation. See Calvi
v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 426 (1st Cir. 2006). "Once the
moving party avers the absence of genuine issues of material fact,
the nonmovant must show that a factual dispute does exist, but
summary judgment cannot be defeated by relying on improbable
inferences, conclusory allegations, or rank speculation." Ingram
v. Brink's, Inc., 414 F.3d 222, 228-29 (1st Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, reversal is proper only if, after reviewing the facts
and making all inferences in favor of the non-moving party (here,
Maymí), the evidence on record is "sufficiently open-ended to
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permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of
either side." Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d
731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995), quoted in Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53
F.3d 454, 456 (1st Cir. 1995).
B. Political Discrimination and First Amendment Claims
In making a political discrimination claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that
the defendants deprived her of federally protected rights while
acting under color of state law. Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414
F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005). In this case, Maymí's § 1983 claim
is based on alleged violations of the First Amendment right to
speech and, therefore, she must produce evidence that partisanship
was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment
action.3 See Jirau-Bernal v. Agrait, 37 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994).
In order to be redressable, the alleged adverse employment action
must result "in conditions 'unreasonably inferior' to the norm for
that position." Rosario-Urdaz v. Velazco, 433 F.3d 174, 178 (1st
Cir. 2006) (quoting Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.3d
1209, 1218-19 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc)). If the plaintiff can
3
In her complaint, Maymí also asserts that she was deprived of
her right to freedom of association, but makes only a cursory
argument that she suffered retaliation for befriending someone with
different political opinions. Given the particular facts in this
case, her allegations are more properly presented as a freedom of
speech issue. Regardless, as in the speech cases, it is perfectly
acceptable to remove a trust employee solely based on just this
kind of association: being a member of a political party. See,
e.g., Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2004).
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overcome that hurdle, the burden then shifts to the defendants to
demonstrate that they would have taken the same action for
constitutional reasons. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977).
1. Reassignment to Career Position
Generally, the First Amendment, as applied to the states
and, in this case, Puerto Rico, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits the dismissal of a public employee solely on the basis of
his or her political affiliation and beliefs. See Bd. of County
Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan., v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75
(1996); Gómez v. Rivera Rodríguez, 344 F.3d 103, 109-10 (1st Cir.
2003). One clear exception to this rule is in cases where
political affiliation is an "appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved." Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). Given the need for elected
officials to have a group of leaders and top subordinates who are
responsive to their policy goals, the focus of our inquiry is
whether the dismissed employee was "in close working relationships
with policymakers." Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 45 (1st
Cir. 1998) (recognizing that our cases have upheld dismissals on
political grounds of "mid- or upper-level officials or employees
who are significantly connected to policy-making"); cf. Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
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In this case, the district court held that with respect
to her demotion from Auxiliary Executive Director to "Attorney
III," Maymí had failed to establish a prima facie claim for either
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or for retaliation. In
essence, the court concluded that because she was a trust employee,
she was freely subject to removal from her position and, therefore,
had no claim for adverse employment or violation of First Amendment
rights to free speech.4 We agree.
There is no dispute that Maymí's appointment as Auxiliary
Executive Director for Administration established her in a trust
position. The job description states: "This is executive work
which participates and collaborates in the formulation and
implementation of public policy of the agency." Pursuant to Puerto
Rico law, she was a trust employee who is "of free selection and
removal." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1350.5 Furthermore, her own
actions belie any argument that she believed her position to be
immune from political dismissal. Upon the appointment of Soto-
4
On appeal, Maymí also asserts that the district court erred in
failing to rule on her motion to strike Soto-Lacourt's unsworn
statement under penalty of perjury. The court's summary judgment
order was based on Maymí's failure to make an initial showing of
discrimination. Accordingly, we need not address this argument, as
it appears the unsworn statement was irrelevant to the court's
analysis.
5
We have recently cautioned that the label of "trust employee,"
alone, does not automatically leave an employee vulnerable to
patronage dismissal. See Montfort-Rodríguez v. Rey-Hernández, 504
F.3d 221, 225 n.10 (2007). On appeal, there is no argument as to
whether Maymí's position involved policy-making responsibilities.
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Lacourt in April 2003, Maymí submitted a letter in which she
expressed her desire to remain in the trust position, but
recognized that she may be dismissed. Accordingly, Maymí was
clearly not protected from partisan-based dismissal from her trust
position.
Maymí's next argument, that her dismissal was in
retaliation for the exercise of her rights to free speech and
association, is similarly unavailing. A government employee's
First Amendment rights depend on a "balance between the interests
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch.
Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Among those state interests which
may be impaired by an employee's comments are discipline, promoting
harmony among co-workers, interference with duties, and the
interest in preserving a close working relationship for which
personal loyalty and confidence is necessary. Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
The particular speech at issue in this case is Maymí's
opposition to Soto-Lacourt's personnel decisions.6 Maymí asserts
6
On appeal, Maymí also appears to claim that she suffered
retaliation for her "speech" while defending the Ports Authority
against the civil complaint filed by Valle. To the extent this is
her argument, it is likewise unavailing. This "speech," which was
made in the course of providing legal representation as a public
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that she was retaliated against for objecting to the dismissal of
employees affiliated with the NPP, some of whom were career
secretaries. According to Maymí, after explaining that the
secretaries were excellent employees and could not be discriminated
against and removed because of partisan affiliation, Soto-Lacourt
responded: "I cannot understand why you defend so much the NPP
people." Later that same month, she was removed from her trust
position and reinstated as a career attorney.
Generally, we have recognized a "reasonable working rule"
that "where the employee is subject to discharge for political
reasons under the Elrod and Branti cases, a superior may also --
without offending the First Amendment's free speech guarantee --
consider the official's substantive views on agency matters in
deciding whether to retain the official in a policy related
position." Flynn, 140 F.3d at 47 (referring to Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)). Thus,
even assuming for summary judgment that Maymí's statements
challenging Soto-Lacourt's authority to terminate the secretaries'
employment contributed to her dismissal, her position as a trust
employee forecloses her claim.
employee, is not afforded protection under the First Amendment.
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006) (holding
that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communications from employer discipline").
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Here, Maymí's speech involved decisions regarding the
hiring and firing of employees within the office. We have
previously held that such speech is of the kind that may lead an
employer reasonably to question the trust and confidence necessary
to retain the employee:
The issues about which [the plaintiffs] spoke -- and the
speech to which they attribute their firings -- related to the
operation of the office (primarily to matters of hiring, firing and
discipline). Yet it is issues of this kind, and the views of
management employees about these issues, that are properly
considered by the head of the office in deciding who is best suited
to be her direct subordinates. Id. We are unpersuaded by Maymí's
attempts to distinguish this case from Flynn.
Both cases involve claims brought by policymaking
employees who were removed allegedly after expressing disagreement
with partisan hiring and firing decisions within the office. In
Flynn, the plaintiffs claimed that they suffered retaliation for
disagreeing with the director's alleged desire to fire the entire
central office staff and replace them with her own supporters and
to fire those senior staff members who had worked for the previous
director. Although the plaintiffs in Flynn were "public servants
honestly resisting very dubious behavior by a superior," we
concluded that the alleged speech was not protected as it was an
expression of "disagree[ment] with their superior on a number of
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policy and personnel issues before the agency [which they] (quite
properly, based on their allegations) expressed . . . to her." Id.
at 46. Likewise, in this case, Maymí expressed her disagreement
with the defendants' alleged desire to terminate specific career
employees on the basis of political affiliation. Importantly, she
does not allege that she was required or ordered to carry out those
allegedly illegal acts. In fact, much of her complaint and
testimony indicates that she was excluded from human resource
decisions and the dismissal process, generally.7 Under Flynn, even
if the plaintiff could prove at trial that her disagreement
contributed to her firing, an employer is permitted to discharge an
employee for insufficient trust and confidence on the basis of that
disagreement. Accordingly, we conclude that any retaliation
suffered as a result of the particular speech at issue here is
unprotected by the First Amendment.8
7
During the central conversation alleged in the complaint, Soto-
Lacourt expressed to the plaintiff his desire to terminate career
employee secretaries despite their strong performance records.
There is no indication that he ordered Maymí to take any specific
action against them. Rather, it appears that she was only
expressing her disagreement with and disapproval of such course of
action.
8
Maymí also argues that this case comes within the exception
identified in Flynn –- "[t]his does not mean that anything goes for
policy-related positions: this would be a different case if an
executive were fired for reporting a crime or fraud or for
expressing adherence to one church or another." Id. Her reliance
is misplaced; the facts in this case do not raise such concerns.
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2. Retaliatory Actions in Career Position
While Maymí's status as a trust employee bars any claims
regarding her dismissal, she also argues that she suffered
retaliation after her reinstatement as an "Attorney III," a career
employment position.9 Specifically, she asserts that she was
assigned inferior duties, denied benefits, not provided with
reasonable work accommodations, and deprived of her full salary.
She contends that those adverse employment actions were undertaken
in retaliation for her exercise of protected speech.
A government employee who does not occupy a policy-making
position of confidence and trust is protected from adverse
employment decisions based on political affiliation. See Figueroa-
Serrano, 221 F.3d at 7. A plaintiff bringing a political
discrimination claim bears the burden of "producing sufficient
direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably may
infer that [the plaintiff's] constitutionally protected conduct
. . . was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind" his
adverse employment action. Acevedo-Díaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66
(1st Cir. 1993). Proving that political affiliation was a
substantial or motivating factor "requires more than 'merely
juxtaposing a protected characteristic -- someone else's politics
-- with the fact that the plaintiff was treated unfairly.'"
9
The district court did not address the claims involving her
treatment while an "Attorney III."
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Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago, 464 F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir. 2006)
(quoting Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74
(1st Cir. 2000)). The mere fact that an adverse action was taken
after an employee exercises First Amendment rights is not enough to
establish a prima facie case. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668, 685 (1996).
After review of the facts on the record, we conclude that
Maymí has failed to allege sufficient facts to support her claim of
political discrimination. Maymí specifically alleges that it was
Valle, acting in concert with Soto-Lacourt, who instructed that her
salary be reduced as a result of discriminatory animus. She
further alleges that Valle prevented her from receiving appropriate
salary increases (uncorrected and allowed by Soto-Lacourt). A
significant thrust of her claim is that the animosity stems from
prior litigation in which Maymí successfully defended the Ports
Authority against Valle. There is also evidence indicating that
Soto-Lacourt denied Maymí's requests for bonuses, leave payouts,
and a flexible working schedule.10
Even taking the evidence in as favorable a light as
possible, the most that her allegations support is either a finding
10
In his deposition, Soto-Lacourt defends his denials: bonuses
were given by discretion for "extraordinary work;" the flexible
work schedule request failed to set forth "exceptional
circumstances;" and the request for liquidated leave was among
numerous such requests. Because we conclude that the plaintiff
fails to make a prima facie case of discrimination, we need not
address the sufficiency of those explanations.
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that Valle had a personal vendetta against her or that she was
treated unfairly. Those claims of personal conflict and unfair
treatment, absent a showing that political affiliation was a
substantial motivating factor, however, are insufficient to allege
a claim of political discrimination. Maymí must establish evidence
in the record which "would permit a rational fact finder to
conclude that [her dismissal] stemmed from a politically based
discriminatory animus." LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st
Cir. 1996) (quoting Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st
Cir. 1994)). Maymí's cursory allegations regarding Valle and Soto-
Lacourt are insufficient to support her contention that the alleged
adverse employment actions occurred as a result of her political
opinions.
C. Due Process Claims
Maymí also alleges violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
right to procedural and substantive due process.11 The district
court concluded that she had no property interest or legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment as a trust employee
and could not, therefore, allege a procedural due process
violation. The court also held that she had failed to establish a
violation of her substantive due process rights. We agree with
both conclusions.
11
On appeal, Maymí concedes that she has no due process claim
under the Fifth Amendment.
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Maymí contends that her procedural due process rights
were violated as a result of both her dismissal from the trust
position and the alleged deprivations of salary and benefits
inflicted after her reinstatement as a career employee. She
alleges that although she was reinstated with a monthly salary of
$5,469.50, her salary was improperly reduced to $5,427.50 at
Valle's order.
To establish a procedural due process claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must alleged that she was deprived of a property
interest by defendants acting under color of state law and without
the availability of a constitutionally adequate process. See
Marrero-Gutiérrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects government
employees "who possess property interests in continued public
employment." Galloza, 389 F.3d at 33 (citing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)). Maymí's position
as a trust employee, however, provides her with no such protected
interest. We have previously held that trust employees who are of
"free selection and removal" have no constitutionally protected
interest in that position. Galloza, 389 F.3d at 34 (citing P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1350(8)). Accordingly, Maymí cannot assert a
procedural due process violation with respect to her dismissal from
the trust position.
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Her allegations of salary and benefit deprivations
suffered after her reinstatement as a career attorney require us to
examine the existing state remedies. See Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d
748, 755 (1st Cir. 1990) (requiring review of "'the procedural
safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure
. . . effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous
deprivations provided by statute or tort law'" (quoting Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990))). Pursuant to the Public Service
Personnel Act, the Puerto Rico legislature created an appeals
process by which citizens are provided a legal forum in which to
challenge administrative agency determinations; those decisions are
then subject to judicial review. 3 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 1394,
1396, 2172, 2176.12 In her deposition, Maymí conceded that she had
availed herself of these administrative procedures -- she had been
reinstated to the appropriate salary, obtained retroactive relief,
and was awaiting relief for damages pursuant to state law. We are
convinced, therefore, that the state remedies provide sufficient
procedural due process for the harms allegedly suffered after
reinstatement as an "Attorney III."13
12
In 2004, the Public Service Personnel Act, Act No. 5 of
October 14, 1975, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1394, was repealed and
substituted by Act No. 184 of August 3, 2004. Act No. 184 replaced
the Appeal Board for the Personnel Administration System with the
Appellative Commission of the Public Service Human Resources
Administration System. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 1468, 1468p.
13
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, Maymí failed to allege facts
demonstrating that the alleged reduction in her salary was fueled
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With respect to her substantive due process claim, Maymí
argues that her removal as a trust employee "shocks the
conscience." A substantive due process claim requires allegations
that the government conduct was, in and of itself, inherently
impermissible irrespective of the availability of remedial or
protective procedures. Amsden, 904 F.2d at 753. The state conduct
itself must be so brutal, demeaning, and harmful that it is
shocking to the conscience. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952); Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 ("state action must in and of
itself be egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-
shocking"). The allegations amount to a case in which Maymí was
reinstated to a career position with inferior duties and a
decreased salary. Such allegations, even if true, are insufficient
to cross this constitutional threshold.
D. Conspiracy
Lastly, Maymí alleges that the defendants conspired to
deprive her of civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and
1986. In order to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under
§ 1985, a plaintiff must prove that the conspiracy was motivated by
some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 102 (1971)); see also Donahue v. Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 122 (1st
by political animus.
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Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the
conspiracy was "aimed at interfering with protected rights."
Donahue, 304 F.3d at 122 (citation omitted); see also Aulson v.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). In this case, Maymí
failed to fulfill either requirement. Furthermore, absent a
showing of conspiracy, she has no claim under § 1986, which extends
liability to those who knowingly failed to prevent conspiracies
under § 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
III. Conclusion
After dismissing all of the complaint's federal claims,
the district court properly exercised its discretion in declining
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.14 See Morales-
Santiago v. Hernández-Pérez, 488 F.3d 465, 472 (1st Cir. 2007).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
allowing the motions for summary judgment and dismissing the
complaint is affirmed.
Affirmed.
14
Since we agree with the district court that all of the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the federal claims,
we need address neither Dávila's personal involvement in the case
nor the defendants' qualified immunity defense.
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