Mata v. Johnson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20756

RAMON MATA, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

GARY JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
April 17, 2000

Before WIENER, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, Ramon Mata, Jr. (“Mata”) appeals the dismissal of

his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1986, Mata, a Texas prison inmate, was convicted of capital

murder for killing a female prison guard with whom he claimed to be

romantically involved. He was sentenced to death. The Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1992.

See Mata v. State, No. 69,632 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4,

1
1992)(unpublished). After exhausting his state remedies, Mata

filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 18,

1995. The district court denied relief. This court reversed and

remanded Mata’s Sixth Amendment fair trial claim for an evidentiary

hearing. See Mata v. Johnson, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997). In

July, 1998, as the parties were preparing for the evidentiary

hearing on the merits of the fair trial claim, Mata wrote a letter

advising the district court that he wished to abandon his

collateral attack on his conviction and sentence and have an

execution date set.1 After Mata confirmed his decision in a second

letter, the district court dismissed the habeas petition without

ruling on the question of Mata’s competency. Mata’s attorneys

appealed on his behalf, raising the issue of Mata’s competence to

waive his appeal, and this court remanded the case for a

retrospective determination of Mata’s competency. On August 3,

1999, the district court entered Further Findings of Fact,

concluding that Mata was competent on July 16, 1998 when he

confirmed his decision to waive collateral review, on December 17,

1998, when he asked to reinstate collateral review and on July 25,

1999, when he advised the court that he had again decided to

abandon his appeal. We granted Mata a Certificate of Probable

Cause to appeal a single issue: whether the district court

conducted a constitutionally adequate fact-finding inquiry to make

1
Although Mata’s July 1998 decision to drop his appeal is the
focus of this appeal, Mata has written letters to the court, his
lawyers and the state dropping and later reinstating his appeals on
no fewer than eight separate occasions since his conviction in
1986. See infra, pp. 13-14.

2
a reliable determination of Mata’s competency to abandon collateral

review of his capital murder conviction and sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

In considering a federal habeas corpus petition presented by

a petitioner in state custody, we review the adequacy of the fact-

finding procedure, an issue of law, de novo. See Clark v. Scott,

70 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1995). The accuracy of the district

court’s factual conclusion concerning Mata’s competence is not

before us in this appeal.

B. Competency Determinations that Courts Have Found Adequate

We begin our analysis by examining the Supreme Court’s

guidance provided by Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).

In Rees, a petitioner directed his counsel to withdraw his

petition for certiorari and forgo any further attacks on his

conviction and death sentence. Id. at 313. The Supreme Court

remanded the case to the district court to make a determination as

to Rees’s mental competence, noting that it would be appropriate to

subject Rees to psychiatric and other medical examinations. Id. at

314. The Supreme Court instructed the district court to “hold such

hearings as it deems suitable, allowing the State and all other

interested parties to participate should they so desire[.]” Id.

The question presented to the district court was whether Rees has

the “capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice

with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on

the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease,

3
disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in

the premises.” Id.

We glean two conclusions from the Supreme Court’s Rees

opinion. First, the directive to hold “such hearings as it deems

suitable,” Rees, 384 U.S. at 314, clearly affords the district

court a measure of discretion in determining the type and extent of

procedures necessary to decide the issue of competency. Second,

there is a presumption that psychiatric and other medical

examinations will be included in the decision making process.

Following Rees, this circuit affirmed a district court’s

determination that a petitioner was competent to abandon collateral

review of his Texas capital murder conviction and death sentence.

See Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 396 (5th Cir. 1985).

Applying Rees, Rumbaugh set out a three part test directing the

district court to determine (1) whether that person suffers from a

mental disease, disorder, or defect; (2) whether a mental disease,

disorder, or defect prevents that person from understanding his

legal position and the options available to him; and (3) whether a

mental disease, disorder, or defect prevents that person from

making a rational choice among his options. See Rumbaugh, at 398.

The record showed that prior to finding Rumbaugh competent, the

district court held a preliminary hearing to decide the necessary

proceedings under the circumstances. See id. at 397. The district

court then ordered that Rumbaugh be examined by a team of

psychiatrists and psychologists. See id. These mental health

professionals submitted written reports to the court and the

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parties. See id. The court held a two-day evidentiary hearing, at

which four mental health experts testified. See id. Rumbaugh also

testified about his desire to abandon his appeals. See id. Only

after this full opportunity to develop the facts regarding

Rumbaugh’s competence, did the district court make its ruling.

Recently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s

grant of a habeas petitioner’s request to dismiss his attorney and

to dismiss his collateral attack on his death sentence with

prejudice. See Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1999).

Before acting on Ford’s pro se request, the magistrate judge held

two evidentiary hearings. Id. at 611. At the first hearing, the

petitioner appeared in person and the magistrate judge inquired

into the petitioner’s decision and observed his mental condition.

See id. After the hearing, the magistrate judge examined the

petitioner’s prison medical records and appointed a psychiatric

expert suggested by petitioner’s counsel. See id. After the

expert evaluated the petitioner and filed a written report, the

magistrate judge appointed, at the request of petitioner’s counsel,

a neurologist to examine the petitioner. See id. at 612. At the

second evidentiary hearing, both the psychiatrist and the

petitioner testified. See id. Portions of the petitioner’s

testimony raised concerns which prompted the psychiatrist to

request a second opportunity to examine the petitioner. See id. at

613. The magistrate judge granted the request, and the

psychiatrist filed a supplement to his earlier written evaluation.

See id. In response to the psychiatrist’s conclusion that the

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petitioner was competent to abandon collateral review, petitioner’s

counsel submitted the mental health evaluation of the neurologist,

who concluded that Ford was not competent to abandon his appeal.

See id. at 614. The magistrate judge spoke once more with the

petitioner by telephone. See id. The magistrate judge then made

a report and recommendation to the district court, concluding that

Ford was competent to dismiss his appeal. The district court

adopted that recommendation after an independent review of the

evidence. Id. at 614-15.

While Rumbaugh and Ford afford two examples of

constitutionally adequate fact-finding inquiry into the competency

of a petitioner to abandon collateral review in a capital case,

they do not directly answer the question presented to us. In this

case, we must first ascertain the boundaries of the district

court’s discretion in fashioning procedures constitutionally

adequate to be used in such a competency proceeding and second we

must determine whether the district court acted within those

boundaries in this case.

C. Constitutionally adequate procedures

Although we have located no controlling precedent, we find

that jurisprudence developed in the context of waiver of due

process safeguards and related competency questions in criminal

trial proceedings instructive. We start from the proposition that

the conviction of a legally incompetent2 defendant violates

2
The competency standard for pleading guilty or for standing
trial is “whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

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constitutional due process. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,

378 (1966). A habeas petitioner may, on collateral review of his

state conviction, obtain relief if he can show that the state

procedures were inadequate to ensure that he was competent to stand

trial, for example if the trial court failed to conduct a

competency hearing. See Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 459 n.10

(5th Cir. 1997)(citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375). A state

court must conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s mental capacity

sua sponte if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to

competency. See id. In determining whether there is a “bona fide

doubt” as to the defendant’s competence, the court considers: (1)

any history of irrational behavior, (2) the defendant’s demeanor at

trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on competency. See Davis

v. Alabama, 545 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 1977). If the trial court

received evidence, viewed objectively, that should have raised a

reasonable doubt as to competency, yet failed to make further

inquiry, the defendant has been denied a fair trial. See Carter,

131 F.3d at 459 n.10.

Assuming, arguendo, that a court has not received evidence

understanding’ and a ‘rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him[.]’” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389,
396 (1993)(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960)). While that standard differs from the Rees competency
standard at issue in this case (“capacity to appreciate his
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation”), both standards inquire about the
discrete capacity to understand and make rational decisions
concerning the proceedings at issue, and the presence or absence of
mental illness or brain disorder is not dispositive. Compare
Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 398 with Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176
(1975).

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raising a bona fide doubt as to competency, Supreme Court

jurisprudence nonetheless mandates that courts indulge every

reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional

rights. See Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1982). Johnson

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the classic case delineating the

standard for measuring an effective waiver of a constitutional

right, requires that a waiver be an “intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right.” The Supreme Court refined the

Johnson standard in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), by

requiring that valid waivers be not only voluntary but also

“knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the

relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 748. The

cases draw no distinction between waiver of the right to remain

silent during interrogation, the right to confer with counsel, the

right to representation by competent counsel at trial, the right to

contest accusations of criminality through a plea of not guilty,

the right to trial by jury and the right to be present at trial.

See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1975).

From the courts’ applications of these constraints to the waiver of

a wide range of constitutional protections, we infer that similar

constraints are appropriate in the case at bar.

Applying the rationale employed in Pate and Carter to the

question of whether a death row inmate is competent to drop his

collateral attack on his conviction and sentence, we conclude that

a habeas court must conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s mental

capacity, either sua sponte or in response to a motion by

8
petitioner’s counsel, if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as

to his competency. See id. The extent and severity of the

petitioner’s history of mental health problems which have been

brought to the court’s attention influence the breadth and depth of

the competency inquiry required. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.

162 (1975), a criminal defendant claimed that he had been deprived

of due process of law by the failure of the trial court to order a

psychiatric examination to determine his competence to stand trial

for forcible rape of his wife, a capital offense. Drope’s attorney

moved for a continuance of the trial “in order that petitioner

might be examined and receive psychiatric treatment.” Id. at 164.

Treatment had been suggested by a psychiatrist who had examined

petitioner at his counsel’s request and whose report was attached

to the motion. See id. at 165. The trial court denied the

continuance. At trial, Drope’s wife testified that Drope had tried

to choke her the night before the trial commenced. The second

morning of trial, Drope attempted suicide by shooting himself in

the abdomen. The trial judge denied Drope’s counsel’s motion for

mistrial, finding that Drope had waived his right to be present at

his capital trial, because his absence “was due to his own

voluntary act in shooting himself.” Id. at 902. The Supreme

Court reversed, concluding that “when considered together with the

information available prior to trial and the testimony of

petitioner’s wife at trial, the . . . suicide attempt created a

sufficient doubt of his competence to stand trial to require

further inquiry on the question.” Id. at 180. Drope teaches that,

9
in order to adequately protect the petitioner’s due process rights,

“the correct course was to suspend the trial until [a psychiatric]

evaluation could be made.” Id.

Following Drope, the Fifth Circuit has held that a suicide

attempt, by itself, is not necessarily sufficient to create

“reasonable cause” for a competency hearing. State v. Davis, 61

F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995). Instead, that evidence must be

weighed in conjunction with all other evidence presented with

respect to a defendant’s mental stability and competence. See id.

The opportunity for face-to-face dialogue between the court

and the petitioner and the ability of the court to personally

observe the petitioner is likewise important to the equation. The

Supreme Court held that Drope’s absence from trial after the

suicide attempt bore on its analysis, in that “the trial judge and

defense counsel were no longer able to observe him in the context

of the trial and to gauge from his demeanor whether he was able to

cooperate with his attorney and to understand the nature and object

of the proceedings against him.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 181. The Fifth

Circuit has instructed that a district court, faced with a criminal

defendant who wishes to waive his right to a conflict-free defense

attorney, should “follow a procedure akin to that promulgated in

rule 11 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] whereby the

defendant’s voluntariness and knowledge of the consequences of a

guilty plea will be manifest on the face of the record.” United

States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975). The trial

court was directed to “scrupulously” and “carefully” evaluate the

10
defendant’s effort to waive his constitutional rights and to

“actively participate in the waiver decision.” Id. at 277. “As in

Rule 11 procedures, the district court should address each

defendant personally and forthrightly advise him of the potential

dangers of representation by counsel with a conflict of interest.

The defendant must be at liberty to question the district court as

to the nature and consequences of his legal representation.” Id.

at 278. The court should seek to elicit a narrative response from

the defendant that he has been advised of his rights, that he

understands the details and has discussed the matter with his

attorney, and that he wishes to waive his constitutional

protections. See id.

The district court, of course, retains discretion to determine

the best course of action in each particular case. For instance,

in some cases an expert report already in the record may be

sufficiently current that a new examination is not necessary, or a

court may be able to decide the issue on documents without taking

live testimony. In any event, the procedures employed must satisfy

basic due process concerns. In sum, if the evidence before the

district court raises a bona fide issue of petitioner’s competency

to waive collateral review of a capital conviction and death

sentence, the court can afford such petitioner adequate due process

by ordering and reviewing a current examination by a qualified

medical or mental health expert, allowing the parties to present

any other evidence relevant to the question of competency and, on

the record and in open court, questioning the petitioner concerning

11
the knowing and voluntary nature of his decision to waive further

proceedings.

D. Adequacy of the Procedures Employed in Mata’s Case

1. Details of the procedures employed by the district court

We now turn to the issue of whether the district court acted

within these due process boundaries in resolving the question of

Mata’s competency. Mata wrote letters to the court, to his lawyers

and to the prosecutor dropping, then later reinstating, his appeals

in state court in 1991 and in February and May of 1994. In 1994,

the state judge set a competency hearing and appointed Dr. Allen

Childs, M.D., a psychiatrist, and Dr. Murphey, a psychologist, to

evaluate Mata. After the evaluations were completed, but before

the hearing in state court, Mata again changed his mind and decided

to continue his appeals, whereupon the state judge canceled the

competency hearing. After his state habeas petition was denied in

January 1995, Mata continued to vacillate between pursuing post

conviction relief in federal court and dropping his appeals. In

1996, the district court initially denied Mata’s first federal

habeas petition. In 1997, we reversed that decision in part and

remanded Mata’s Sixth Amendment fair trial claim for an evidentiary

hearing. See Mata v. Johnson, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997). As

the parties were preparing for the evidentiary hearing on the

merits of the remanded claim, Mata wrote a letter to the district

court abandoning his collateral attack. On July 10, 1998, Mata’s

attorney filed a Motion to Declare Petitioner Incompetent or, in

the Alternative, to Hold a Competency Hearing. The motion related

12
that Mata had thirty years of documented mental health problems,

had made repeated suicide attempts and had engaged in numerous

hunger strikes while incarcerated on death row. The motion

requested that the district court declare Mata incompetent based on

reports of the mental health experts appointed by the state court

in 1994 who had concluded that Mata was not competent to drop his

appeals, as well as extensive medical records from the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. The motion requested, in the

alternative, that the district court hold a hearing to determine

Mata’s competency. The district court allowed oral argument on the

motion, at which the district court characterized Mata’s attorney’s

position as “trendy and trashy psycho-analytical analysis.” The

district court then entered an order informing Mata that if he did

not desire to abandon his habeas action, he must inform the court

by July 24, 1998, and had it delivered directly to Mata, who had

not been present at the hearing. On July 16, 1998, Mata filed a

second letter with the court asking that his habeas action be

dismissed. On July 22, 1998, the district court dismissed Mata’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus without ruling on the competency

motion.

Mata’s attorneys appealed on his behalf. On December 17,

1998, Mata indicated his desire to reinstate his federal collateral

review. On February 3, 1999, we remanded the case to the district

court for a determination of Mata’s competence on July 16, 1998 and

December 17, 1998, requiring the district court “to set forth not

just its conclusion but its findings and reasoning in sufficient

13
detail to allow meaningful review by this court.” Mata v. Johnson,

No. 98-20756 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished). On remand, the

Respondent filed a motion requesting that the court appoint a

disinterested expert to evaluate Mata’s competency (1) at the

present time, (2) in December 1998, and (3) in July 1998. Although

Respondent advised the court that the motion was opposed, Mata’s

attorneys filed nothing further on the issue. Mata again wrote to

the district court on July 25, 1999, urging the court grant the

Respondent’s motion for a competency exam, but stating that he did

not want to continue with his appeals and wished to be executed as

soon as possible.

On August 3, 1999, the district court entered findings of

fact, without benefit of an expert examination of Mata or any

further evidence or hearings. The district court found that Mata

was competent on July 16, 1998, based on the 1985 expert reports

finding him legally competent to stand trial for capital murder.

The district court stated that [s]ince that time, nothing indicates

that he has become incompetent. The psychological reports in the

record support Mata’s competence.” The district court made no

mention of Dr. Childs’s report and conclusion to the contrary. The

district court went on to find Mata competent on December 17, 1998,

when he asked to reinstate his appeal, and July 25, 1999, when he

again wrote the district court abandoning his legal attacks on his

sentence.

2. Evidence raising bona fide question of Mata’s competence

The record contains evidence that Mata suffers from an organic

14
brain disorder resulting from closed head injuries and has a

history of mental health problems both before and after his capital

murder trial. Since 1986, physicians at the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice have prescribed numerous psychotherapeutic and

antidepressant medications to alleviate the symptoms of mental

illness.3 He has made numerous suicide attempts and engaged in

several hunger strikes. There is a report from Dr. Allen Childs

detailing his findings in 1994 that Mata suffers from delusional

disorder with paranoid and erotomanic features and borderline

personality organization. Dr. Childs opined that Mata’s efforts at

suicide as well as his delusions of seeing and talking with his

murder victim are genuine. Dr. Childs also wrote a letter in

1998, based on his examination of Mata in 1994, stating that Mata

was not competent to drop his appeals. We conclude that all the

evidence presented with respect to Mata’s mental stability and

competence is sufficient to create “reasonable cause” for a

competency hearing. See State v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir.

1995).

3. Current examination by an expert

The district court based his fact finding on the expert

examination performed twelve years earlier in conjunction with

Mata’s original trial. The lapse of time, coupled with extensive

evidence of change in Mata’s condition, lead us to conclude that

3
The medical records attached to the original motion for
competency examination note prescriptions for Asendin, Sinequan,
Triavil, Mallaril, Haldol, Tofranil, Triavil, Elavil, Desyrel, and
Zoloft. See generally PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (Medical Economics
Data Production Co. 48th ed. 1994).

15
the district court did not base its decision on a current

examination by an expert.

4. Opportunity for the parties to present other evidence

Except for the attachments to the original motion, no evidence

was presented to the court on the issue of Mata’s competence. The

court never afforded the parties the opportunity to present

testimony or documentary evidence. The court’s statement that

nothing indicates that Mata had become incompetent since his trial

in 1985 is meaningless in the absence of a hearing or even a

summary judgment-type procedure in which the parties could develop

the record. We therefore find that the district court did not

afford the parties a meaningful opportunity to present evidence

relevant to the question of Mata’s competency to discontinue his

appeals.

5. District court dialogue with Mata

Mata has not personally appeared before the district court

since the question of his competency to drop his appeal arose. The

district court received some hand written notes from Mata, but

there has been no face-to-face dialogue between the court and the

petitioner and no opportunity for the court to personally observe

Mata.

6. Proceedings inadequate

Because the evidence submitted by Mata raised a bona fide

question that he lacked competency to drop his appeal, and because

there is no current evaluation of Mata’s competence by a medical

expert, no opportunity for the parties to present evidence, and no

16
appearance by Mata in open court, we conclude that the proceedings

in this case failed to afford the minimum due process guaranteed by

the Constitution.

III. CONCLUSION

We do not imply that a petitioner is free to manipulate the

collateral review process by endlessly vacillating between dropping

and reinstating his capital appeal. We are sympathetic to the

district court’s frustration over the length of the appeals

process, frustration that was heightened by the district court’s

perception that Mata was playing for time and his attorneys were

maximizing their fees in this case. Nevertheless, the answer is

not to eviscerate the constitutional protections for state habeas

petitioners, but to promptly afford the parties the opportunity to

procure and present evidence on the question of competency, resolve

the factual questions presented and allow the petitioner, if found

competent, to choose his course of action. Once a reliable,

constitutionally adequate competency determination is made, a

district court would certainly be justified in presuming that a

petitioner continues to be competent. However, such a presumption

cannot survive a twelve year gap, coupled with the extensive

evidence of incompetency in this record.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s order

dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Further, we direct that

this case be reassigned to a different judge, to avoid the

appearance of bias arising from the district court’s remarks in

17
this record. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1333 (5th Cir.

1997).

REVERSED and REMANDED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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