United States v. Bagdasarian

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 09-50529
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.  D.C. No.
3:09-CR-00083-H-1
WALTER EDWARD BAGDASARIAN,
OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
August 5, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed July 19, 2011

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Stephen Reinhardt and
Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Wardlaw

9797
9800 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN

COUNSEL

Ezekiel E. Cortez (argued), San Diego, California, for the
defendant-appellant.

Kyle W. Hoffman, Assistant United States Attorney (argued),
Karen P. Hewitt, United States Attorney, and Bruce R. Castet-
ter, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California,
for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The election of our first black President produced a cam-
paign with vitriolic personal attacks and, ultimately, senti-
ments of national pride and good will. The latter was short-
lived on the part of some, politicians and non-politicians
alike, and the vitriol continued as President Obama’s term of
office commenced. To those familiar with American political
history, none of this should have come as a surprise. Although
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9801
Justice Scalia writes that “[o]bservers of the past few national
elections have expressed concern about the increase of char-
acter assassination . . . engaged in by political candidates and
their supporters,”1 mudslinging has long been a staple of U.S.
presidential elections. Justice Scalia, though analyzing a cur-
rent issue, uncharacteristically overlooked the experience of
our Founding Fathers. In the country’s first contested presi-
dential election of 1800, supporters of Thomas Jefferson
claimed that incumbent John Adams wanted to marry off his
son to the daughter of King George III to create an American
dynasty under British rule; Adams supporters called Jefferson
“a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a half-breed
Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father.”2 Abraham
Lincoln was derided as an ape, ghoul, lunatic, and savage,3
while Andrew Jackson was accused of adultery and murder,4
and opponents of Grover Cleveland chanted slogans that he
had fathered a child out-of-wedlock.5 Still, the 2008 presiden-
tial election was unique in the combination of racial, reli-
gious, and ethnic bias that contributed to the extreme enmity
expressed at various points during the campaign.6 Much of
1
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
2
Paul F. Boller, Presidential Campaigns: From George Washington to
George W. Bush 11 (2004).
3
See Bruce L. Felknor, Dirty Politics 27 (1966).
4
See Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home
and in Washington 160 (1995).
5
See id. The Cleveland story at least may have been true. See Jean Kin-
ney Williams, Grover Cleveland 26 (2003).
6
See, e.g., Eileen Sullivan, Obama Faces More Personal Threats than
Other Presidents-Elect, Huffington Post (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/14/obama-faces-more-personal
_n_144005.html; Dave McKinney et al., A Plot Targeting Obama? 3 in
Custody May Be Tied to Supremacists, Said to Talk of Stadium Shooting,
Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 26, 2008, at 3.
Then-Senator Obama was the first presidential candidate in U.S. history
for whom Secret Service protection was authorized before being nomi-
9802 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
this bias was misinformed because although the presidential
candidate was indeed black, he was neither, as some insisted,
Muslim nor foreign born.7

Here, we review a district court’s conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 879(a)(3), which makes it a felony to threaten to kill
or do bodily harm to a major presidential candidate. The
defendant Walter Bagdasarian, an especially unpleasant fel-
low, was found guilty on two counts of making the following
statements on an online message board two weeks before the
presidential election: (1) “Re: Obama fk the niggar, he will
have a 50 cal in the head soon” and (2) “shoot the nig.”8

nated for the presidency. See Nedra Pickler, Racial Slur Triggers Early
Protection for Obama: He Called on Secret Service to Monitor Big
Crowds, Grand Rapids Pr., May 4, 2007, at A3; Shamus Toomey, “A Lot
to Do with Race”: Durbin Says Obama Needs Secret Service in Part
Because He’s Black, Chi. Sun-Times, May 5, 2007, at 6.
7
False accusations that a President is a member of an unpopular reli-
gious minority were prevalent in the 1930s. Wealthy critics of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and his policies referred to the New Deal as the Jew
Deal, convinced that the President was a Jew named Rosenfeld who “had
surrounded himself with Jews who made policy from a Jewish perspective
for their own benefit,” Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of the United States,
1654 to 2000, at 212-13 (2006); Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American
Life 42 (2000).
Today, there are a great number of critics of President Obama who con-
tinue to believe that he is a Muslim and many who still refuse to accept
the fact that he is a native born citizen. See Lauren Green, Nearly 1 in 5
Americans Thinks Obama is a Muslim, Survey Shows, FoxNews.com
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/08/19-nearly-
americans-thinks-obama-muslim-survey-shows (reporting that survey
found “those who say the president is a Muslim give him a negative job
approval rating”); Brian Stelter, On Television and Radio, Talk of
Obama’s Citizenship, N.Y. Times: Media Decoder, July 24, 2009 (noting
that “conspiracy theorists who have claimed for more than a year that
President Obama is not a United States citizen have found receptive ears
among some mainstream media figures in recent weeks,” discussing some
of America’s most prominent media figures).
8
The complete second statement appears in the next paragraph.
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9803
These statements are particularly repugnant because they
directly encourage violence.9 We nevertheless hold that nei-
ther of them constitutes an offense within the meaning of the
threat statute under which Bagdasarian was convicted.

I. Background

On October 22, 2008, when Barack Obama’s election was
looking more and more likely, Bagdasarian, under the user-
name “californiaradial,” joined a “Yahoo! Finance — Ameri-
can International Group” message board, on which members
of the public posted messages concerning financial matters,
AIG, and other topics. At 1:15 am on the day that he joined,
Bagdasarian posted the following statement on the message
board: “Re: Obama fk the niggar, he will have a 50 cal in the
head soon.” About twenty minutes later, he posted another
statement on the same message board: “shoot the nig country
fkd for another 4 years+, what nig has done ANYTHING
right???? long term???? never in history, except sambos.”
Bagdasarian also posted statements on the same message
board that he had been extremely intoxicated at the time that
he made the two earlier statements.10 He repeated at trial that
he had been drinking heavily on October 22. Another partici-
pant on the message board, John Base, a retired Air Force
9
Neither statement is thereby deprived of constitutional protection, how-
ever, because urging others to commit violent acts “at some indefinite
future time” does not satisfy the imminence requirement for incitement
under the First Amendment. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)
(holding that the imminence requirement under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969), is not satisfied by constitutionally protected speech
that “amount[s] to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some
indefinite future time”).
10
In the twenty minutes between the time at which he posted the
“Obama, fk the niggar” and the “shoot the nig” statements, Bagdasarian
posted a message that concluded: “burp more VINOOOOOOOO.” Several
hours later, he replied to another person’s message that he had reported
Bagdasarian’s statements to the authorities, “Listen up crybaby ole white
boy, I was drunk.”
9804 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
officer, reported Bagdasarian’s second statement regarding
Obama to the Los Angeles Field Office of the United States
Secret Service that same morning. Base told the Secret Ser-
vice that an individual identified by the username “californ-
iaradial” had made alarming statements directed at the
presidential candidate. He also provided the Secret Service
with the Internet address link to the “shoot the nig” message
board posting.

A Secret Service agent located this posting and the “Obama
fk the niggar” posting on the Yahoo! message board, and, a
week later, Yahoo! provided the Secret Service with sub-
scriber information for californiaradial@yahoo.com, regis-
tered in La Mesa, California. Yahoo! also provided the Secret
Service with the Internet Protocol history for the “californ-
iaradial” email account, which Service agents used to identify
the IP address from which the “shoot the nig” and “Obama fk
the niggar” statements were posted. This IP address led the
Service agents to Bagdasarian’s home in La Mesa.

A month after the two statements for which Bagdasarian
was indicted were posted on the AIG message board, two
agents visited and interviewed him and he admitted to posting
the statements from his home computer. When asked, he also
told the agents that he had weapons in his home. The agents
found one weapon on a nearby shelf; Bagdasarian said he had
other weapons in addition. Four days later, agents executed a
federal search warrant at Bagdasarian’s home and found six
firearms, including a Remington model 700ML .50 caliber
muzzle-loading rifle, as well as .50 caliber ammunition.

The agents also searched the hard drive of Bagdasarian’s
home computer and recovered an email sent on Election Day
with the subject, “Re: And so it begins.” The email’s text
stated, “Pistol??? Dude, Josh needs to get us one of these, just
shoot the nigga’s car and POOF!” The email provided a link
to a webpage advertising a large caliber rifle. Another email
that Bagdasarian sent the same day with the same subject
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9805
heading stated, “Pistol . . . plink plink plink Now when you
use a 50 cal on a nigga car you get this.” It included a link to
a video of a propane tank, a pile of debris, and two junked
cars being blown up. These email messages would appear to
confirm the malevolent nature of the previous statements as
well as Bagdasarian’s own malignant nature. Unlike in the
case of his first two message board statements two weeks ear-
lier, this time he did not attempt to excuse his inexcusable
conduct on the ground that he was intoxicated.

After the Secret Service filed a criminal complaint against
Bagdasarian for the posting the “shoot the nig” and “Obama
fk the niggar” statements, the Government filed the supersed-
ing indictment at issue here, charging Bagdasarian in two
counts under 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3) with threatening to kill
and inflict bodily harm upon a major candidate for the office
of president of the United States. Bagdasarian waived his
right to a jury trial. His case was tried before a district judge
upon the foregoing stipulated facts. The district court found
Bagdasarian guilty on both counts. He appeals.

II. Analysis

[1] The federal statute under which Bagdasarian was
indicted, 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3), makes it a crime to “know-
ingly and willfully threaten[ ] to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily
harm upon . . . a major candidate for the office of President
or Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of
such candidate.” A statute like § 879, “which makes criminal
a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the com-
mands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.” Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). Although the State
cannot criminalize constitutionally protected speech, the First
Amendment does not immunize “true threats.” Id. at 708. The
Court held in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), that
under the First Amendment the State can punish threatening
expression, but only if the “speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
9806 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Id.
at 359. It is therefore not sufficient that objective observers
would reasonably perceive such speech as a threat of injury
or death.

[2] Because of comments made in some of our cases, we
begin by clearing up the perceived confusion as to whether a
subjective or objective analysis is required when examining
whether a threat is criminal under various threat statutes and
the First Amendment.11 Such a choice reflects a false dichot-
omy. The issue is actually whether, as to a threat prosecuted
under a particular threat statute, only a subjective analysis
need be applied or whether both a subjective and an objective
analysis is required. Whether we have held that a threat under
a particular statute must be examined under an objective stan-
dard, as with 18 U.S.C. § 871(a),12 which makes it unlawful
to threaten the President, or whether we have held that the
statute requires the application of both an objective and sub-
jective standard, as with 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3),13 the provision
11
See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir.
2005) (discussing perceived inconsistency in circuit authority as to defini-
tion of constitutionally proscribable “true threat” before concluding that
“we need not decide whether the objective or subjective ‘true threat’ defi-
nition should apply here . . . because the evidence establishes that [the
defendant’s] statement was a ‘true threat’ under either definition and thus
is not protected by the First Amendment” (footnote omitted)); United
States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Stewart for
the proposition that “our . . . case law” is “contradictory” as to whether
“an objective, rather than subjective, test [should be applied] to determine
whether [the defendant’s] statements constituted true threats[,]” but hold-
ing that “any error in the ‘true threats’ [jury] instruction was harmless”
because “the district court instructed the jury that specific intent to
threaten is an essential element of a § 875(c) conviction, and thus the jury
necessarily found that Defendant had the subjective intent to threaten in
convicting him of the offense”).
12
See United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Lincoln, 403 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1083 (2002); Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d
874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969).
13
See United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992),
overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of the Colum-
bia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9807
that we consider here, our analysis in its most important
respect is ultimately the same: In order to affirm a conviction
under any threat statute that criminalizes pure speech, we
must find sufficient evidence that the speech at issue consti-
tutes a “true threat,” as defined in Black. Because the true
threat requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjec-
tive test set forth in Black must be read into all threat statutes
that criminalize pure speech. The difference is that with
respect to some threat statutes, we require that the purported
threat meet an objective standard in addition, and for some we
do not.14
14
Prior to Black, we did not always apply a subjective test when consid-
ering alleged violations of a threat statute. For example, although § 879
includes both an objective and subjective test, see Gordon, 974 F.2d at
1117, § 871 includes only an objective and no subjective test, see Roy, 416
F.2d at 877, even though both statutes require that threats be made “know-
ingly and willfully,” §§ 871; 879, and even though we have specifically
“look[ed] for guidance,” in setting forth the statutory requirements of
§ 879, to Roy’s interpretation of the “closely analogous” § 871. Gordon,
974 F.2d at 1117.
It appears that we tried in Roy to impose a lower burden for conviction
under § 871, which applies to threats against a sitting President, because
“[a] President’s death in office has worldwide repercussions and affects
the security and future of the entire nation . . . regardless of whether the
person making the threat actually intends to assault the President . . . .”
Roy, 416 F.2d at 877 (citation omitted). Although in Roy, we sought to
make it easier to punish threats against a President under § 871, the adop-
tion of an objective standard serves the opposite function after Black.
Because Black requires that the subjective test must be met under the First
Amendment whether or not the statute requires it, an objective test is not
an alternative but an additional requirement over-and-above the subjective
standard.
To the extent that we may have suggested otherwise in a footnote in
Romo, 413 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (declining, based on pre-Black precedent, to
apply a subjective intent test under § 871(a) “because [the defendant] has
not raised First Amendment issues), such analysis would be inconsistent
with Black and must be limited to cases in which the defendant challenges
compliance only with the objective part of the test and does not contend
either that the subjective requirement has not been met, or that the statute
has been applied in a manner that is contrary to the Constitution. In all
other circumstances in which pure speech is prosecuted under a threat stat-
9808 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
As we explained in United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622
(9th Cir. 2005), although the “vagaries of our own case law,”
id. at 630, made it less than “entirely clear or consistent,”
“whether intent to threaten is a necessary part of a constitu-
tionally punishable threat,” id. at 628, Black “affirmed our
own dictum — not always adhered to in our cases — that ‘the
element of intent [is] the determinative factor separating pro-
tected expression from unprotected criminal behavior.” Id. at
632 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gilbert,
813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 1987)). Cassel made clear that
Black’s “definition of a constitutionally proscribable threat is
. . . binding on us even though it is in tension with some of
the holdings and language in prior cases of this circuit.” Id.
at 633 (citation omitted).15

Because § 879(a)(3), the provision at issue here, requires
subjective intent as a matter of statutory construction, see
Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117, it necessarily incorporates the con-
stitutional inquiry commanded by Black: Did the speaker sub-
jectively intend the speech as a threat? In order to “determine

ute, we cannot apply exclusively an objective standard, and any subjective
test must incorporate the constitutional requirement set forth in Black. 538
U.S. at 359.
Because the statements at issue in the case before us fail to pass either
of the two tests, we see no reason here to consider the question whether
to retain an objective test for presidential threat statutes in view of Black.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that an objective determination does not
provide a worthwhile test or that statutes criminalizing threats against the
President or others should require only a subjective test. We merely point
out a paradox in our treatment of threat statutes now that Black requires
proof of intent under the First Amendment in all such cases.
15
In a footnote to the passage just quoted, Cassel distinguished United
States v. Lincoln, 403 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2005), which relied on pre-
Black cases to suggest in dicta that the First Amendment requires applica-
tion of an objective rather than a subjective test. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 633
n .9. Cassel pointed out that Lincoln “did not raise or consider the implica-
tions of Virginia v. Black,” and therefore, in effect, that Lincoln must be
treated simply as a pre-Black case. Id.
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9809
whether the verdict [under the statutory elements] is sup-
ported by sufficient evidence,” we must answer the question
“whether the facts as found by the jury establish the core con-
stitutional fact of a ‘true threat.’ ” Stewart, 420 F.3d at 1015.
Our subjective intent analysis under § 879(a)(3) therefore sub-
sumes the subjective intent-based true threat inquiry as
described in Black.

A. Elements of the Offense

Two elements must be met for a statement to constitute an
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3): objective and subjective.
The first is that the statement would be understood by people
hearing or reading it in context as a serious expression of an
intent to kill or injure a major candidate for President. See
Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117. The second is that the defendant
intended that the statement be understood as a threat. Id.
Because Bagdasarian’s conviction under § 879 can be upheld
only if both the objective and subjective requirements are met,
neither standard is the obvious starting point for our analysis,
and our resolution of either issue may serve as an alternate hold-
ing.16

1. Objective Understanding

[3] We begin with the objective test. One question under
§ 879(a)(3) is whether a reasonable person who heard the
statement would have interpreted it as a threat. Gordon, 974
F.2d at 1117. This objective test requires the fact-finder to
“look[ ] at the entire factual context of [the] statements
including: the surrounding events, the listeners’ reaction, and
whether the words are conditional.” Id. It is necessary, then,
to determine whether Bagdasarian’s statements, considered in
their full context, “would be interpreted by those to whom the
16
See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949)
(“[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated
to the category of obiter dictum.”).
9810 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of
an intention to inflict bodily harm on or to take the life of
[Obama].” Id. (quoting Roy, 416 F.2d at 877-78). The evi-
dence is not sufficient to support a conclusion that a reason-
able person who read the postings within or without the
relevant context would have understood either to mean that
Bagdasarian threatened to injure or kill the Presidential candi-
date.17

[4] Neither statement constitutes a threat in the ordinary
meaning of the word: “an expression of an intention to inflict
. . . injury . . . on another.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 2382 (1976). The “Obama fk the niggar” state-
ment is a prediction that Obama “will have a 50 cal in the
head soon.” It conveys no explicit or implicit threat on the
part of Bagdasarian that he himself will kill or injure Obama.
Nor does the second statement impart a threat. “[S]hoot the
nig” is instead an imperative intended to encourage others to
take violent action, if not simply an expression of rage or frus-
tration. The threat statute, however, does not criminalize pre-
dictions or exhortations to others to injure or kill the President.18
17
In Planned Parenthood, we applied a standard of review close to de
novo to the question whether pure speech constitutes a “true threat” unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. 290 F.3d at 1070. Here, both parties
briefed and argued the case on the basis of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). For that reason,
and because we would decide this case the same way under either Planned
Parenthood or Jackson, we do not determine what standard of review
applies here or in any future case.
18
The Fourth Circuit has written that “an essential element of guilt
[under § 871, which punishes threats against the President or successors
to the presidency] is a present intention either to injure . . . or to incite oth-
ers to injure,” but added that “[m]uch of what we say here is dicta.” United
States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc). No other cir-
cuit has concluded that incitement can be punished under a threat statute,
and over forty years ago, in a case since cited approvingly in almost every
presidential threat case in our circuit, we expressed doubt that § 871
makes criminal an intention or tendency to encourage others to injure the
President. Roy, 416 F.2d at 877. We explained that “if Congress desired
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9811
It is difficult to see how a rational trier of fact could reason-
ably have found that either statement, on its face or taken in
context, expresses a threat against Obama by Bagdasarian.19

There is no disputing that neither of Bagdasarian’s state-
ments was conditional and that both were alarming and dan-
gerous. The first statement, which referred to Obama as a
“niggar” who “will have a 50 cal in the head soon,” coupled
a racial slur with an assassination forecast during a highly
controversial campaign that would ultimately make Obama

to prevent incitement of others to assault the President, then it could have
limited the statute to make it a crime to incite or induce others to assault
or attempt to assault the President.” Id. Having previously “look[ed] for
guidance,” in construing § 879, to Roy’s interpretation of the “closely
analogous” § 871, Gordon, 974 F.2d at 1117, we here follow Roy in refus-
ing to find that incitement qualifies as an offense under § 879. We also
reach that conclusion independently on the basis of the plain language of
the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3) (making it a crime to “knowingly
and willfully threaten[ ] to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon . . . a
major candidate for the office of President.”); see also supra at 9803 n.9
(discussing imminence requirement for incitement under the First Amend-
ment).
19
The dissent’s interpretation of Bagdasarian’s statements as threats can
be traced to its misplaced reliance on three cases. See Dissent at 9826-27.
Hanna, which was decided before Black, reversed the threat conviction
and remanded for a new trial, noting that if the defendant were “convicted
again based on admissible evidence, he w[ould] be entitled to have the
appellate court independently review the record to ensure that the sur-
rounding facts found by the jury establish the constitutional fact of a true
threat.” 293 F.3d at 1088. Planned Parenthood, also decided before Black,
is readily distinguishable on the law and the facts: There can be no ques-
tion that the anti-abortionist group “was aware that a ‘wanted’-type poster
would likely be interpreted as a serious threat of death or bodily harm by
a doctor in the reproductive health services community who was identified
on one, given the previous pattern of ‘WANTED’ posters identifying a
specific physician followed by that physician’s murder.” 290 F.3d at 1063.
The facts here present no such pattern. Finally, Romo declined altogether
to address whether the defendant’s speech constituted a true threat under
§ 871(a) because he “has not raised First Amendment issues.” 413 F.3d at
1051 n.6.
9812 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
the country’s first black president. No less troubling is the
defendant’s second statement imploring others to “shoot the
nig,” lest the “country [be] fkd for another 4 years+” because
“never in history” has a black person “done ANYTHING
right.” There are many unstable individuals in this nation to
whom assault weapons and other firearms are readily avail-
able, some of whom might believe that they were doing the
nation a service were they to follow Bagdasarian’s command-
ment. There is nevertheless insufficient evidence that either
statement constituted a threat or would be construed by a rea-
sonable person as a genuine threat by Bagdasarian against
Obama.

[5] When our law punishes words, we must examine the
surrounding circumstances to discern the significance of those
words’ utterance, but must not distort or embellish their plain
meaning so that the law may reach them. Here, the meaning
of the words is absolutely plain. They do not constitute a
threat and do not fall within the offense punished by the stat-
ute. In Watts, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under
a presidential threat statute. 394 U.S. at 705-06. The defen-
dant there had said, “[a]nd now I have already received my
draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights
is L.B.J.” Id. at 706. The Court held that “we must interpret
the language Congress chose ‘against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials’ ”; adding that “[t]he language of the political arena
. . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” Id. at 708
(citations omitted).

The Government argues that among the relevant elements
of the factual context is that the defendant’s messages were
anonymous, posted only under the screen name “californ-
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9813
iaradial.” We grant that in some circumstances a speaker’s
anonymity could influence a listener’s perception of danger.
But the Government offers no support for its contention that
the imperative “shoot the nig” or the prediction that Obama
“will have a 50 cal in the head soon” would be more rather
than less likely to be regarded as a threat under circumstances
in which the speaker’s identity is unknown.20 Whatever the
effect, in other circumstances, of anonymity on a reasonable
interpretation of Bagdasarian’s statements, the financial mes-
sage board to which he posted them is a non-violent discus-
sion forum that would tend to blunt any perception that
statements made there were serious expressions of intended
violence.

[6] When, in this case, we look to “[c]ontextual informa-
tion . . . that [could] have a bearing on whether [Bagdasari-
an’s] statements might reasonably be interpreted as a threat,”
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 502 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009), the only possible evidence is
that three or four discussion board members wrote that they
planned to alert authorities to the “shoot the nig” posting,
20
In some circumstances, anonymity may generate greater concern
because listeners cannot rely on the speaker’s identity to discount any seri-
ous intentions. Cf. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi
Bishop Estate, 625 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., joined
by Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (rejecting
the propositions that “plaintiffs may be unreasonable in fearing severe
threats of physical retaliation because they are made via the internet” or
that “litigants do not reasonably fear threats of serious harm when they are
made by unidentified people, some of whom may not intend to carry them
out”). In other circumstances, however, listeners may give less credence
to anonymous statements because they cannot identify any association
between the speaker and a group that engages in violence, or otherwise
ascertain that the speaker is an individual whose threat should be taken
seriously. Whether a particular speaker’s threat would be taken more or
less seriously if made anonymously may depend on who that speaker is.
Still, all threats against the President or a major presidential candidate
must be taken seriously until it is established that there is no reason to do
so.
9814 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
although only one reader, Air Force Officer Base, actually
did. The dissent identifies the responsive postings as the
“[m]ost telling” evidence that a reasonable person would have
perceived Bagdasarian’s messages as a threat. In doing so, it
mischaracterizes these postings as “indicat[ing] that [their
authors] perceived ‘shoot the nig’ as a threat to candidate
Obama.” Dissent at 9828. In fact, none of the responses said
anything about a threat. Their authors may well have thought
that Bagdasarian’s messages were impermissible or offensive
for some other reason or that they encouraged racism or vio-
lence. We fail to see why the fact that several people had neg-
ative reactions to the messages should be taken to mean that
they or others interpreted them as a threat. It is certainly more
significant that among the numerous persons who read Bagda-
sarian’s messages, the record reveals only one who was suffi-
ciently disturbed to actually notify the authorities.21

[7] The Government contends that two additional facts
show that Bagdasarian’s statements might reasonably be
interpreted as a threat. The first is that when Bagdasarian
made the statement that Obama “will have a 50 cal in the head
soon,” Bagdasarian actually had .50 caliber weapons and
ammunition in his home. The second is that on Election Day,
two weeks after posting the messages, he sent an email that
read, “Pistol . . . plink plink plink Now when you use a 50 cal
21
The Stipulated Facts indicate only that Base “saw the ‘shoot the nig’
message,” that he “was concerned that the posting threatened harm to
Barack Obama,” and that he “telephoned the Los Angeles Field Office of
the United States Secret Service and reported the ‘shoot the nig’ posting.”
The Record does not contain evidence as to whether Base posted a
response to the message board. Even under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979), the facts are insufficient to support a verdict that Bagdasarian
threatened to kill Obama. The “critical inquiry” in Jackson “is whether the
record evidence,” when viewed by any rational trier of fact in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, “could reasonably support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added). Here,
the record is far too thin to support such a conclusion. See also 9810 n.17
(noting that in Planned Parenthood, we applied a standard of review close
to de novo).
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9815
on a nigga car you get this,” and linked to a video of debris
and two junked cars being blown up. Nobody who read the
message board postings, however, knew that he had a .50 cali-
ber gun or that he would send the later emails. Neither of
these facts could therefore, under an objective test, “have a
bearing on whether [Bagdasarian’s] statements might reason-
ably be interpreted as a threat” by a reasonable person in the
position of those who saw his postings on the AIG discussion
board. Parr, 545 F.3d at 502.

2. Subjective Intent

Even if “shoot the nig” or “[he] will have a 50 cal in the
head soon” could reasonably have been perceived by objec-
tive observers as threats within the factual context, this alone
would not have been enough to convict Bagdasarian under 18
U.S.C. § 879(a)(3). The Government must also show that he
made the statements intending that they be taken as a threat.
A statement that the speaker does not intend as a threat is
afforded constitutional protection and cannot be held criminal.
In Black, the Court explained that the State may punish only
those threats in which the “speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”
538 U.S. at 359. And in Gordon, we held as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation that Congress “construe[d] ‘knowingly and
willfully’ [in § 879] as requiring proof of a subjective intent
to make a threat,’ ” and thus requires the application of a sub-
jective as well as an objective test. 974 F.2d at 1117 (alter-
ations in original) (quoting 128 Cong. Rec. 21,218 (1982)).

[8] We have explained, supra at 9809-13, why neither of
Bagdasarian’s statements on its face constitutes a true threat
unprotected by the First Amendment. Most significantly, one
is predictive in nature and the other exhortatory. For the same
reasons, the evidence is not sufficient for any reasonable
finder of fact to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
that Bagdasarian intended that his statements be taken as
9816 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
threats. See Jackson, 433 U.S. at 319. Both under the constitu-
tional requirement established in Black that we must read into
§ 879, and under the statutory requirement that we found
extant in Gordon, the district court’s inference of Bagdasari-
an’s intent to threaten is unreasonable taken in context and
does not, even when considered in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, lie within the permissible range of interpreta-
tions of his message board postings. As a matter of law, nei-
ther statement may be held to constitute a “true threat.”

As we discussed in the previous section, the prediction that
Obama “will have a 50 cal in the head soon” is not a threat
on its face because it does not convey the notion that Bagda-
sarian himself had plans to fulfill the prediction that Obama
would be killed, either now or in the future. Neither does the
“shoot the nig” statement reflect the defendant’s intent to
threaten that he himself will kill or injure Obama. Rather,
“shoot the nig” expresses the imperative that some unknown
third party should take violent action. The statement makes no
reference to Bagdasarian himself and so, like the first state-
ment, cannot reasonably be taken to express his intent to
shoot Obama.22

As with our analysis of the objective test, we do not confine
our examination of subjective intent to the defendant’s state-
ments alone. Relying on United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d
944 (9th Cir. 2007), the Government points to the two facts
22
We are aware that an Internet radio host was recently convicted by a
federal jury under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), which punishes threats
against, inter alia, a federal judge with intent to intimidate or retaliate. He
was convicted for statements made regarding three Seventh Circuit judges
who had issued a ruling that he disagreed with. See United States v. Tur-
ner, 1:09-cr-00650-DEW-JMA (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010); Mark Fass,
Blogger Found Guilty of Threatening Judges in Third Federal Trial, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 16, 2010, at 1. That case has not reached the appellate courts
and thus does not affect our analysis here. It would in any event not cause
us to change our view with respect to the constitutional question answered
by Black or the result that we reach in this case.
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9817
that we discussed in our analysis of objective understanding
as evidence that Bagdasarian intended to make a threat: (1)
that he was later found to possess a .50 caliber gun like the
one he mentioned in the “Obama fk the niggar” posting, and
(2) that the Election Day email referred to the use of “a 50 cal
on a nigga car.” Neither fact is sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bagdasarian intended to make a threat
when, two weeks before Election Day, he posted the two
statements for which he was indicted.

In Sutcliffe, we affirmed a conviction under another threat
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which, in addition to the knowing
transmission of an interstate threat, requires specific intent to
threaten. 505 F.3d at 952, 960-61; see also United States v.
Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). We held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the Gov-
ernment to present evidence of the defendant’s gun possession
to demonstrate that he actually intended to threaten violence.
Id. at 959. The fact of the defendant’s gun possession was not
determinative of the defendant’s intent, however, but just one
among many pieces of evidence relevant to the language and
context of the threats that we considered in determining that
the defendant had the requisite specific intent to threaten.
Most important in Sutcliffe were the first-person and highly
specific character of messages such as “I will kill you,” “I’m
now armed,” and “You think seeing [your license plate num-
ber posted on my website] is bad . . . trust us when we say [it]
can get much, much, worse. . . . [I]f you call this house again
. . . , I will personally send you back to the hell from where
you came.” Id. at 951-52 (first omission and second alteration
in original).

Given that Bagdasarian’s statements, “Re: Obama fk the
niggar, he will have a 50 cal in the head soon” and “shoot the
nig” fail to express any intent on his part to take any action,
the fact that he possessed the weapons is not sufficient to
establish that he intended to threaten Obama himself. Simi-
larly, the Election Day emails do little to advance the prosecu-
9818 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
tion’s case. They simply provide additional information —
weblinks to a video of debris and two junked cars being
blown up and to an advertisement for assault rifles available
for purchase online — that Bagdasarian may have believed
would tend to encourage the email’s recipient to take violent
action against Obama. But, as we have explained, incitement
to kill or injure a presidential candidate does not qualify as an
offense under § 879(a)(3).23

[9] Taking the two message board postings in the context
of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the prosecution
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Bagdasarian had the subjective intent to
threaten a presidential candidate. For the same reasons that his
statements fail to meet the subjective element of § 879, given
any reasonable construction of the words in his postings,
those statements do not constitute a “true threat,” and they are
therefore protected speech under the First Amendment. See
Black, 538 U.S. at 359. Accordingly, his conviction must be
reversed.

REVERSED.

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissent-
ing in part:

I concur fully with the majority’s analysis of the law of
“true threats.” The First Amendment prohibits the criminal-
ization of pure speech unless the government proves that the
speaker specifically intended to threaten. Thus, in every
threats case the Constitution requires that the subjective test
is met. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). In this case,
the statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(3), also requires that
a reasonable person would foresee that his statement would be
23
See supra at 9810-11 n.18.
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9819
perceived as a threat to harm a presidential candidate.
Because there is sufficient evidence supporting a finding of
objective intent, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979), and because even under the heightened standard of
review that we apply to constitutional facts, Planned Parent-
hood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), the
subjective intent requirement is also met, I conclude there is
sufficient evidence to find Mr. Bagdasarian guilty of threaten-
ing harm against then-presidential candidate Barack Obama.

I.

In the wee hours of the morning of October 22, 2008, Mr.
Bagdasarian, under the user name “californiaradial,” joined a
Yahoo! Finance — American International Group message
board, an internet site on which members of the public could
post messages concerning financial matters, AIG, and other
hot topics of the day. Californiaradial’s first posting about
candidate Obama, at 1:00 a.m., was to the “thread” headed
“re: Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran favor Obama 100 to
0,” where he said “blow up all the mother fkers, please carpet
bomb the middle east . . . give me the switch, no prob, thump
and poof sand niggar.”1 Two minutes later on the same thread
he posted: “I would really lose no sleep if middle morons
gone . . . nuke bombing . . . .” At 1:15 a.m., under another
thread with the subject header “OBAMA,” he posted the first
of the two threats charged in the indictment: “fk the niggar,
he will have a 50 cal in the head soon.” Six minutes after that,
Californiaradial combined his pro-bomb and anti-Obama rhet-
oric in another post on the “OBAMA” thread: “yea, the hon-
est people have NO guns and the scum bags, niggars and drug
fks do, thanx obombhaaaaa.” He reiterated his racist animus
on a thread referencing Obama’s Irish heritage: “full monkey,
hey can you crank the music box, I wanna see the puppet
1
The posts appear here as they do in the record; because of their nature,
“sic” designations are omitted.
9820 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
monkey dance . . . .” Four minutes later, at 1:26 a.m. he
added, “a lepraaaaaaniggggggggamuch? blank that one, yahoo
a-holes.” At 1:35 a.m., Californiaradial created his own anti-
Obama thread, under the subject header “shoot the nig.”
There he posted the second threat charged in the indictment:
“country fkd for another 4 years+, what nig has done ANY-
THING right???? long term???? never in history, except sam-
bos.”

At this point, the other message board participants reacted
to the serious nature of Californiaradial’s threats. “Dan757x”
immediately responded on the “shoot the nig” thread:
“You’ve been reported by me, a good ole’ white boy.” “Fred-
die226” weighed in to support Dan, who next posted: “I hope
everyone reports this type of garbage.” Under the same
thread, “Sniper1agent” posted: “Be advised Federal Law
Enforcement is monitoring . . . ,” and “Brown.romaine”
advised: “I am reporting this post to the Secret Service.” And,
in fact, John Base, a retired Air Force officer who saw Cali-
forniaradial’s “shoot the nig” message did report the threats
to the Los Angeles Field Office of the United States Secret
Service because, as set forth in the Stipulated Facts, he was
“concerned that the posting threatened harm to Barack
Obama.”

In response, a Secret Service agent searched the message
board, located the “shoot the nig” posting, and also discov-
ered the “50 cal in the head” posting. From Yahoo!, the Secret
Service obtained the IP address for the user registered as
“californiaradial,” and it used that information to get sub-
scriber data from Cox Communications. This trail of bread
crumbs led the Secret Service to La Mesa, California, and, on
November 21, 2008, agents appeared at Californiaradial’s
doorstep.

They discovered that, in the real world, the user known as
“californiaradial” in cyberspace was Mr. Bagdasarian. Mr.
Bagdasarian admitted to posting the “fk the nig” and “50 cal
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9821
in the head” message from his home computer. When asked,
he stated that he had weapons in his home. A search warrant
executed a few days later revealed that Mr. Bagdasarian pos-
sessed six firearms, including a Remington model 700 ML .50
caliber muzzle-loading rifle. Agents also discovered .50 cali-
ber ammunition in Mr. Bagdasarian’s home. The agents
searched Mr. Bagdasarian’s computer, where they discovered
a November 4, 2008, email message from Mr. Bagdasarian to
an associate with the foreboding subject line “Re: And so it
begins.” The email stated, “Pistol??? Dude, Josh needs to get
us one of these, just shoot the nigga’s car and POOF!” The
email then provided a link to a photograph of a rifle on a Bar-
rett Rifles website. A second email that Mr. Bagdasarian sent
the same day under the same subject line stated, “Pistol . . .
plink plink plink Now when you use a 50 cal on a nigga car
you get this.” The email then directed the reader to a You-
Tube video of a car being blown up.

II.

“Whether a particular statement may properly be consid-
ered to be a threat is governed by an objective standard —
whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communi-
cates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm
or assault.” Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074 (quoting
United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1990)). “Alleged threats should be considered in light of
their entire factual context, including the surrounding events
and reaction of the listeners.” Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at
1265. “[C]ontext is critical in a true threats case and history
can give meaning to the medium.” Planned Parenthood, 290
F.3d at 1078. In determining whether Mr. Bagdasarian’s state-
ments constituted objective threats, we must look “at the
entire factual context of those statements including: the sur-
rounding events, the listeners’ reaction, and whether the
words are conditional.” United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d
1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992).
9822 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
Reading the two statements charged in the indictment in
isolation, the majority dissects them to conclude that they
were not even threats. It fails to consider the ominous back-
drop of America’s history of racial violence, the uniquely
racial and violent undercurrents of the 2008 presidential elec-
tion, the entirety of Mr. Bagdasarian’s postings on October
22, two weeks before the 2008 election, and the listeners who
not only perceived the posts as threatening when they were
made, but who acted on that perception.2

Mr. Bagdasarian’s statements portended no less impending
harm because they did not completely spell out the threat. For
example, given this country’s history of Ku Klux Klan vio-
lence, a burning cross can signify “a message of intimidation”
and “the possibility of injury or death.” Black, 538 U.S. at
357. Parking a Ryder truck outside an abortion clinic, after the
Oklahoma City bombing, can indicate a serious intent to
harm. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078-79. And, as the
district court recognized, in the wake of September 11, telling
a flight attendant that you are carrying a bomb is not a joke.
Mr. Bagdasarian posted at a time when violent and racist
threats against candidate Obama were being taken very seri-
ously. Though President Obama currently resides in the White
House, the prospect of his election ignited polarizing racial
animus, including “racist chatter on white supremacist Web
2
The majority also disregards the evidence presented at trial of our
country’s experience with political assassinations. The sheer number of
presidents (nearly ten percent of the presidents who have served) who
have been targeted and killed by assailants with guns in our nation’s short
history undermines the conclusion that a reasonable person would inter-
pret Mr. Bagdasarian’s “50 cal in the head” comment as a joke or mere
political rhetoric. Moreover, as the recent example of the shooting of Ari-
zona Representative Gabrielle Giffords demonstrates, what begins as a
bizarre post on the Internet can erupt as a devastating outburst of violence.
See Alexandra Berzon, John R. Emshwiller & Robert A. Guth, Postings
of a Troubled Mind, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 2011; Marc Lacey & David M.
Herszenhorn, Congresswoman Is Shot in Rampage Near Tucson, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 2011.
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9823
sites.” Nedra Pickler, Racial Slur Triggers Early Protection
for Obama, Associated Press, May 4, 2007. Not only did this
animus materialize in at least one viable assassination
attempt, see Dave McKinney, Frank Main & Natasha
Korecki, A Plot Targeting Obama?, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 26,
2008,3 but the heightened fear that candidate Obama would be
the target of violence spurred the Department of Homeland
Security to authorize Secret Service protection as early as
May 2007, before candidate Obama was even nominated for
the presidency, making him the only presidential candidate to
receive protection so early.4 Pickler, Racial Slur.

Certainly as of fall 2008, our country’s collective experi-
ence with internet threats and postings that presaged tragic
events made it all the more likely that a reasonable person
would foresee that even anonymous internet postings would
be perceived as threats.5 The country had witnessed the 1999
Columbine High School shootings by Dylan Klebold and Eric
Harris, who had posted death threats on his website, along
with discussions of bombmaking and killing students and
teachers. See Michael Janofsky, Parents Want New Inquiry
into Columbine Killings, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2002; Kirk John-
son, Columbine Evidence Is Placed on Chilling Public Dis-
play, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2004; Kim Murphy, Warning
3
A similar plot planned on the internet by white supremacists involving
a killing spree that would end with the assassination of candidate Obama
was derailed by the arrest of two men who were charged with, among
other things, making threats against a major presidential candidate. See
Richard A. Serrano, Pair Accused of Plotting to Kill Obama, 102 Blacks,
L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 2008. A Wisconsin man who threatened over the
internet to kill President-elect Obama shortly before the inauguration for
what he claimed was the “country’s own good” was arrested in Missis-
sippi. Obama Threat Leads to Arrest, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 2009.
4
Then-Senator Hillary Clinton received Secret Service protection
throughout her candidacy due to her status as a former First Lady. Pickler,
Racial Slur.
5
The majority acknowledges that a speaker’s anonymity can render a
statement more threatening.
9824 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
Signs of Massacre Were Hidden in Plain Sight, LA. Times,
May 9, 1999. In 2005, days after an Orange County teenager
posted on an Internet message board that he would “start a
Terror Campaign to hurt those that have hurt me,” the teen
went on a neighborhood shooting spree, killing a man and his
daughter. Kimi Yoshino, Threats Online: Is There a Duty to
Tell?, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 2005. Also in 2005, a teenager
who was an “avid participant in Internet discussion groups . . .
with postings under his name that mention weapons and vio-
lence amid broader conversations about politics, the paranor-
mal, time travel, reincarnation and Big Foot” killed seven
people and himself at his high school in Minnesota. Kirk
Johnson, Survivors of High School Rampage Left with Inju-
ries and Many Questions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2005.

And in 2007, following a disturbing online posting, a Vir-
ginia Tech student shot and killed thirty-two people on the
campus. Benedict Carey, For Rampage Killers, Familiar
Descriptions, “Troubled” and “Loner,” but No Profile, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 2007. In the wake of this experience, it is
only logical to conclude that on-line postings of impending
violence would be perceived by reasonable people as serious
threats. As one district attorney put it following yet another
student’s threat to shoot his classmates, “Any kid that makes
a direct threat of this nature on the tail of what happened in
Santee can reasonably expect there to be a very dramatic reac-
tion.” Ofelia Casillas, Teen Pleads Not Guilty to Making
Bomb Threat, L.A. Times, Mar. 20, 2001.

In a similar case involving internet threats, a federal district
judge in 2009 denied a motion filed by Harold Turner, a blog-
ger and internet radio host, seeking to dismiss an indictment
against him for threatening three judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On his blog, Turner
had posted information about the judges, and had written:
“Let me be the first to say this plainly: These judges deserve
to be killed. Their blood will replenish the tree of liberty. A
small price to pay to assure freedom for millions.” David Kra-
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9825
vets, Blogger Threatened to Murder Judges, Feds Say, Wired,
June 24, 2009. The district court found that the fact that Tur-
ner, who lived in New Jersey, posted threats against Chicago-
based judges did not diminish the threat, reasoning:

In an era when physicians have been murdered in
their places of worship; families of Judges have been
slain; a Judge of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals and State Court Judges have been blown up
or shot; a Federal Courthouse ripped apart by home-
made explosives, all in the name of political dissent
or religious fanaticism, it cannot be said that Defen-
dant’s statements are unlikely to incite imminent
lawless action.

United States v. Turner, 2009 WL 726501, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
2009). As the majority points out, Turner was subsequently
convicted.

The majority does not dispute that Mr. Bagdasarian’s state-
ments were nonconditional,6 alarming, and dangerous, but
finds their threatening nature blunted by the fact that Mr. Bag-
dasarian posted them on a financial “non-violent” message
board. Although the message board itself focused on AIG’s
2008 financial meltdown, the individuals who posted natu-
rally veered into the political implications of the crashing
6
The majority cites Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
(per curiam), for the proposition that we must interpret Bagdasarian’s
statements in light of our national commitment to free and open political
debate. While this principle is undoubtedly correct, Watts itself is inappo-
site. Black’s subjective intent requirement prevents free and open public
debate from being swept up in the prohibition of “true threats.” In Watts,
however, the Supreme Court examined the defendant’s statement under
the objective standard and concluded that the statement at issue would not
be perceived as a threat because the statement was “expressly condition-
al,” rather than immediate. Id. Thus, not only does Watts fail to support
the majority’s assertion that Bagdasarian’s meaning was “plain,” it lends
further support to my view of the objectively threatening nature of Bagda-
sarian’s postings, which were not conditional.
9826 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
financial markets.7 Mr. Bagdasarian’s own postings on the
board contained increasingly political, violent, and vicious
attacks targeting candidate Obama. That he posted on a finan-
cial message board does not diminish the nature of the threats;
just as they would be no less diminished had he shouted them
on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.

The majority focuses narrowly on the charged threats and
dismisses them as mere imperatives or predictions. But our
case law is to the contrary. We do not require that the speaker
in a threats case explicitly threaten that he himself is going to
injure or kill the intended victim; rather, we examine the sur-
rounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable
person in the speaker’s shoes would foresee that his state-
ments would be perceived as threats.

For example, in United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080,
1082-83 (9th Cir. 2002), we determined that there was suffi-
cient evidence for a jury to conclude that Hanna had threat-
ened the President,8 where no explicit threat had been made.
Rather, the documents underlying the charges merely depicted
President Clinton along with statements such as “KILL THE
BEAST,” “666,” “willie jeffer jackal,” and “WANTED FOR
MURDER, DEAD OR ALIVE.” We held that: “Although
Hanna did not explicitly indicate that he was going to kill the
President, a jury could conclude that a reasonable person in
Hanna’s position would foresee that such statements would be
7
A thread headed “re: Nobodys Watchin the Store in America” emerged
on which “Sheeeyaright” posted “its up to us.No Obama.” There ensued
a colorful discussion about how the economic situation had changed dur-
ing the administrations of President Clinton and President Bush, and what
might be expected from a President Obama. This led to still other threads
not started by Mr. Bagdasarian entitled “Obama will make the US a 3rd
world Country” and “Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran favor Obama 100
to 0.”
8
In Hanna, we reversed the conviction only due to other trial errors
which indicated that the jury’s deliberations may have been tainted by
improperly admitted evidence.
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9827
perceived as threats by the recipients of the statements.” Id.
at 1088.

Similarly, in United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 1051
(9th Cir. 2005), an opinion relied upon by the district court,
we upheld a threats conviction where then-incarcerated Romo
“wrote and mailed a letter stating that someone should put a
bullet in the President’s head and that he would like to do it.”
We found this to be an “unequivocal” threat, stating that a
“clearer threat is difficult to imagine.” Id. at 1050, 1051. And,
in Planned Parenthood, anti-abortion activists circulated on
the internet and elsewhere a series of “WANTED” and
“GUILTY” posters identifying doctors who performed abor-
tions, and who were thereafter murdered, along with a “Nu-
remberg Files” poster where lines were drawn through the
names of the murdered physicians. Although the posters did
not contain an explicit threat of harm, it was proper to con-
sider them in context. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at
1064-65. We concluded substantial evidence supported con-
victions under the FACE Act,9 in that the anti-abortionist
group “was aware that a ‘wanted’-type poster would likely be
interpreted as a serious threat of death or bodily harm by a
doctor in the reproductive health services community who
was identified on one, given the previous pattern of
‘WANTED’ posters identifying a specific physician followed
by that physician’s murder.” Id. at 1063. We were “indepen-
dently satisfied” that the posters “amounted to a true threat”
and were not protected speech.10 Id.
9
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE”) makes it a
crime when a person “by force or threat of force . . . intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with . . . any person because that person is or has
been . . . obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(a)(1).
10
That Hanna and Romo do not deal with Black’s subjective intent
requirement does not discount the persuasiveness of the objective intent
analysis in those cases. Black clarified that the subjective test governs
whether a statement constitutes a “true threat”; it did not disturb how we
9828 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
Most telling were the contemporaneous reactions of the
recipients of Mr. Bagdasarian’s posted threats.11 At least four
individuals indicated that they perceived “shoot the nig” as a
threat to candidate Obama, and the threat was in fact reported
to the United States Secret Service, which then launched into
action to prevent the threat from materializing. There can be
no doubt that “construing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the prosecution,” Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1166 (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319), there was sufficient evidence for
“a rational juror” to find objective intent. Id.

have applied the objective test. Thus, the holdings of Hanna and Romo,
analyzing the threats under the objective standard and concluding it was
satisfied where the speakers “stated or at least suggested that the President
should be killed,” remain controlling authority as to the objective standard.
Hanna, 293 F.3d at 1088. We reversed the conviction in Hanna only
because of certain improperly admitted evidence which may have tainted
the jury’s deliberations. Therefore, this reversal does not detract from
Hanna’s holding that the suggested threat to the President met the objec-
tive standard. Nor does the fact that Romo declined to address whether
Romo’s speech constituted a “true threat” bear any relevance to this dis-
cussion. As the majority itself reiterates, when First Amendment issues are
raised, the subjective intent standard must be applied to determine whether
the speech is a “true threat” that may be constitutionally criminalized.
Romo’s objective test analysis is pertinent here, and it remains good law.
See Romo, 413 F.3d at 1051-52.
11
The majority is correct that none of the other message board partici-
pants used the word “threat” in reaction to Bagdasarian’s postings, but that
they perceived a threat to candidate Obama is made obvious by their post-
ings that the threats had been “reported” and their references to “Federal
Law Enforcement” and the “Secret Service.” The majority then errone-
ously relies on its own speculation to conjure up other possible reasons for
the readers’ reactions. Even if the comments did support the inferences
suggested by the majority, however, the trial court made a finding that the
readers’ comments confirmed that Bagdasarian’s postings were objec-
tively perceived as threats, and we “must defer to that resolution.” See
United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“[W]hen ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting
inferences’ a reviewing court ‘must presume — even if it does not affir-
matively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such
conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’ ”
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326)).
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9829
III.

Although it is a closer question, as questions of subjective
intent generally are, after independently reviewing the record,
I believe the district court did not err in finding that Mr. Bag-
dasarian subjectively intended to threaten presidential candi-
date Obama. To prove subjective intent, the government must
show that “the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an unlawful act of vio-
lence.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359. The government need not
prove that Mr. Bagdasarian “himself will kill” candidate
Obama, but need demonstrate only the intent to threaten. “The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.
Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protects individuals from
the fear of violence,’ . . . in addition to protecting people
‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’ ”
Id. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
388 (1992)).

In a night of posting on the AIG board, Mr. Bagdasarian
made numerous explosive comments aimed at candidate
Obama. Although only two of his posts were charged as
threats, they, together with his other posts, indicate that he
intended to threaten. Others on the message board posted
comments that could be described as political rhetoric, but it
was Mr. Bagdasarian alone who introduced the posts tinged
with violence and racism toward Obama and it was Mr. Bag-
dasarian alone who took the affirmative step of introducing
the ominous thread headed “shoot the nig,” against which the
other board participants reacted so strongly. And at the very
time that Mr. Bagdasarian posted “fk the niggar, he will have
a 50 cal in the head soon,” he possessed in his home a Rem-
ington model 700 ML .50 caliber muzzle-loading rifle and .50
caliber ammunition with which to load it. See United States
v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding
that possession of a weapon is evidence of subjective intent
to threaten where the threat involves the infliction of harm).
9830 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
As the district court found, Mr. Bagdasarian’s posts were
not casual one-off comments. When other participants con-
fronted him with the gravity of starting a thread labeled
“shoot the nig” by indicating they were reporting him and that
law enforcement was monitoring him, he evidenced his own
belief that his posts were threatening. First, he wanted to
know “which [law enforcement] agency” was monitoring the
message board. Then he began to make excuses for his threat-
ening comments, posting: “Listen up, crybaby ole white boy,
I was drunk.”

Mr. Bagdasarian had imbibed some alcohol that night, but
it did not prevent him from tracking the conversations occur-
ring on multiple threads and posting responses over a seven-
hour period. Moreover, his postings that night were specific,
relevant to the context of each thread and even included word-
play. If anything, his intake of “vino,” as he described it, may
have lowered his inhibitions sufficiently that he was in fact
posting his genuinely held views about Obama, including a
true expression of his intent to threaten the candidate with
harm. As the district court found, that Mr. Bagdasarian was
drinking does not make his statements any less threatening
than they were at the time he made them, and his 8:00 a.m.
posting that he was drunk when he started the “shoot the nig”
thread at 1:35 a.m. that morning only indicates that he woke
up to realize the serious nature of his threats.

And Mr. Bagdasarian’s continuing threats of harm to
President-elect Obama two weeks later, when he was presum-
ably sober, further evidence his intent to threaten. He sent two
emails on Election Day headed: “And so it begins.” The first,
which provided a link to the “www.barrettrifles.com” website
depicting a Barrett model 82a1 rifle, stated: “Josh needs to get
us one of these, just shoot the nigga’s car and POOF!” The
second provided a link to a YouTube video showing a car
being blown up. That email stated: “Pistol . . . plink plink
plink Now when you use a 50 cal on a nigga car you get this.”
 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN 9831
The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Bagdasarian, an adult
man who knowingly possessed a .50 caliber rifle, intention-
ally posted on the “OBAMA” thread: “fk the niggar, he will
have a 50 cal in the head soon,” understanding he had access
to that very weapon and could implement the threat. Only
twenty minutes later he initiated the “shoot the nig” thread,
under which he wrote “country fkd for another four years+,
what nig has done ANYTHING right???? long term????
never in history, except sambos.” That Mr. Bagdasarian later
made a public apology does not detract from his intent at the
time; his intent to threaten harm to candidate Obama gener-
ated fear for the candidate’s safety and mobilized the Secret
Service, which tracked Mr. Bagdasarian down. Mr. Bagda-
sarian did not come forward; the Secret Service had to locate
him. He hid behind his “californiaradial” cloak of anonymity
with the hope, one can infer, that he would not be found out.
Therefore, independently reviewing the entire record, I con-
clude that at the time Mr. Bagdasarian made the charged
threats, he acted with the specific intent to threaten candidate
Obama.

IV.

The prohibition on true threats “protects individuals from
the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engen-
ders.” Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Undoubtedly, the need for protection takes on
exceptional importance in the context of a presidential candi-
dacy. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (discussing threats against
the president); Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th
Cir. 1969) (“Thus, it appears that the statute [prohibiting
threats against the President] was designed in part to prevent
an evil other than assaults upon the President or incitement to
assault the President. It is our view that the other evil is the
detrimental effect upon Presidential activity and movement
that may result simply from a threat upon the President’s
life.”). Not only could the fear engendered by true threats
limit a candidate’s freedom to participate fully in the debate
9832 UNITED STATES v. BAGDASARIAN
leading up to the election — thus depriving the campaign pro-
cess of its valuable public function, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (per curiam) — but the failure to take
such threats seriously could ultimately deprive our country of
a public servant and potential leader. Because the evidence
presented at trial as to objective intent is more than sufficient
to allow at least one rational trier of fact to find that Mr. Bag-
dasarian’s statements were threats in violation of § 879(a)(3),
and because an independent review convinces me that the
constitutional requirement of subjective intent is met, I would
affirm Mr. Bagdasarian’s conviction.