UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 00-20781
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM DOUGLAS ROBERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
December 4, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
Our analysis turns on whether the Fourth Amendment permits a
non-routine, outbound search at the functional equivalent of the
border, when Customs Agents reasonably suspect a traveler is
smuggling contraband. William Douglas Roberts, convicted of
possession and interstate transportation of child pornography,
appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that
diskettes containing child pornography seized during a warrantless
search of his personal effects at an airport as he was departing
the United States were obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. AFFIRMED.
I.
On 7 July 1998, the Customs Service Resident Agent in Charge
for Lake Charles, Louisiana (RAC-Lake Charles), contacted Customs
Senior Special Agent Coffman and informed him: (1) a William
Roberts would be flying that day non-stop from Houston’s Bush
Intercontinental Airport (IAH) to Paris; (2) when he traveled, he
typically carried a computer and diskettes containing child
pornography; and (3) he usually carried the diskettes in a shaving
kit. Agent Coffman relayed this information to Customs Special
Agent Rios, and those two Agents proceeded to IAH. Roberts,
however, did not board a flight that day.
Approximately seven weeks later, on 24 August, another Agent
with RAC-Lake Charles notified Agent Rios that, the next day,
Roberts would fly from Louisiana to Houston and take an
international flight. RAC-Lake Charles also provided Roberts’
photograph. The next morning, 25 August, an Officer with the
Sheriff’s Office for Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana, informed Agent
Rios that Roberts was suspected of traveling with child pornography
on diskettes that would be packed in a shaving kit; this conformed
with the information provided by the RAC-Lake Charles on 7 July.
Upon receiving this information, Agent Rios and Special Agent
Stewart met Agent Coffman at IAH.
Agent Rios provided the information to Agent Coffman, and the
Agents checked a computer database, verifying that Roberts was
booked on a direct flight to Paris (Paris-flight). Agent Rios
2
showed Roberts’ photograph to Agent Coffman and informed him that
Roberts would be arriving on a flight from Louisiana at 12:18 p.m.
Agent Coffman watched the passengers disembark the flight from
Louisiana and, using the photograph, identified Roberts and noted
his clothing.
Agent Coffman then proceeded to organize an outbound
inspection of the Paris-flight. He informed the inspection group
that Roberts would be carrying diskettes containing child
pornography in a shaving kit and described Roberts’ clothing.
The Agents established the outbound inspection in the jetway
to the Paris-flight. As Roberts entered the jetway, Agent Coffman
identified him and directed him to a search table. Customs
Inspector Hanson asked Roberts: (1) if he possessed more than
$10,000 in currency he wanted to declare; and (2) to open his bags.
Roberts opened his luggage and the Inspector found a shaving kit.
The Inspector opened the kit and discovered six diskettes matching
the information the Agents had received. Inspector Hanson asked
Roberts what the diskettes contained, but Roberts gave no specific
response.
Agent Coffman identified himself and took over the interview.
He told Roberts he was with Customs and was looking for currency or
the exportation of high technology or other data prohibited by law.
Agent Coffman asked Roberts whether he was carrying anything that
3
did not belong to him. Roberts indicated he was not.1 Agent
Coffman told Roberts the Agents would have to search the diskettes
to ensure they could be carried out of the country legally. The
Agent offered Roberts the choice of either: continuing on the
Paris-flight, leaving the diskettes behind to be searched and
mailed to him; or remaining at the airport while the diskettes were
searched and departing on a later flight. Roberts indicated he
would wait.
Agents Coffman, Rios, and Stewart, and Inspector Hanson
escorted Roberts to a secondary inspection area. Agent Coffman
opened Roberts’ laptop computer and told Roberts he needed to scan
the material on it. Agent Coffman also asked Roberts if he could
describe what the diskettes contained. Roberts responded that he
wanted to cooperate but asked to speak privately with Agent
Coffman. Agent Coffman escorted him to an interview room.
There, Roberts told Agent Coffman “he was embarrassed that
there was some child pornography on the diskettes and he didn’t
want everybody to see it”. Agent Coffman asked, “What do you mean
child pornography, like the teen stuff on the internet...?”
Roberts replied, “No, young kids”, followed by “six”, which Agent
Coffman understood to mean the diskettes contained images of six-
year-old children. Agent Coffman then left the room and told Agent
1
“Indicated” appears in this opinion only to the extent it was
used in testimony.
4
Rios that Roberts had stated the diskettes contained child
pornography.
Agents Coffman and Rios presented Roberts a waiver form
stating his Miranda rights. Roberts initialed each right and
signed the waiver portion of the form. Agent Coffman informed
Roberts it is illegal to possess and transport child pornography
out of the country. When asked where he had obtained the
pornography, Roberts responded: he had downloaded it from internet
sites and chat rooms; he had not paid for it; and it was for
personal use and not resale.
Shortly thereafter, Agent Coffman presented, and Roberts
signed, a consent-to-search form, authorizing a complete search of
his luggage, computer, and diskettes. The form also provided:
“Agents are authorized by me to take any letters, papers,
materials, or other property which they may desire to examine”.
The Agents signed a “Custody receipt for Retained or Seized
Property”, which listed the items seized from Roberts. Roberts
signed the portion of the form titled “Notice of Abandonment and
Assent to Forfeiture”.
In accordance with Customs procedure, the Agents provided
Roberts a blank form on which to make a written statement, if he so
chose. They left Roberts alone, and he provided a four-page
handwritten statement. Agent Rios and another Agent then finished
the interview.
5
Agent Coffman testified at trial he believed another Agent
turned on Roberts’ computer that day and confirmed the presence of
pornographic materials. The Agents did not, however, search the
diskettes that day. The computer and diskettes were sent to a
forensic agent for an examination; it revealed more than 5,000
graphic images, mostly depicting teens and pre-teens engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.
On 20 July 1999, approximately 11 months after the search, the
Agents executed an arrest warrant on Roberts at IAH. Agent Rios
advised Roberts of his Miranda rights, and Roberts waived them in
writing. Roberts admitted he knew the diskettes seized on 25
August 1998 contained child pornography; stated he had downloaded
it from the internet; and denied having taken the photographs.
That August, Roberts was indicted on two counts for knowingly
possessing and transporting, in interstate commerce, child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1),
2252A(a)(5)(b), and 2256(8)(A). Roberts moved to suppress: (1) on
Fourth Amendment grounds, the evidence seized in the searches; and
(2) the statements he made on that date, as “fruit of the poisonous
tree”.
Through a comprehensive and insightful opinion analyzing the
constitutionality vel non of routine and non-routine outbound
border searches, the district court held, inter alia: (1) the
initial stop and luggage search in the jetway, as well as escorting
6
Roberts to the secondary search area, were permissible as a routine
border search; (2) Roberts consented to the search of his computer
and diskettes; and (3) even absent consent, the search of the
computer and diskettes would have been valid as a routine border
search. United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687-89 (S.D.
Tex. 2000). Regarding Roberts’ statements, the district court
held: (1) they were not “fruit of the poisonous tree”, as there was
no earlier Fourth Amendment violation; (2) they were not coerced;
and (3) they were not subject to suppression under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 689-90.
In a subsequent bench trial, Roberts was convicted on both
counts. He was sentenced to 51 months imprisonment and three years
supervised release.
II.
The underlying facts are essentially undisputed. Disputed
questions of law concerning a suppression ruling are reviewed de
novo, including whether there was reasonable suspicion for the
search. See United States v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 671 (5th Cir.
1999). The denial “should be upheld ‘if there is any reasonable
view of the evidence to support it’”. Id. (quoting United States
v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1993)).
A.
The Fourth Amendment provides in part: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons ... and effects, against
7
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....” As a result,
“warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless
they fall within a few narrowly defined exceptions”. United States
v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1134 (1994).
1.
One exception is for border searches; Agents may conduct a
“routine” search — one that does not “seriously invade a traveler’s
privacy”, id. at 1148 n.3 — “at the international border or its
functional equivalent without probable cause, a warrant, or any
suspicion to justify the search”. United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d
364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). The parties agree the
initial jetway search occurred at the functional equivalent of the
border but disagree on whether that search was “routine”.
Citing United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1991),
Roberts contends: an outbound border search may qualify as routine
only if the search is incident to some substantial national
interest, e.g., a search for currency; and, in the alternative, a
seizure of computer equipment cannot be routine because of its
intrusiveness on a traveler’s privacy. The Government counters:
the jetway search involved a routine search for currency and
technology; an additional subjective motive to search for child
pornography did not render it non-routine; and a limited search and
8
seizure of a person and his effects, including a computer, is
routine for purposes of the border search exception.
For obvious reasons, constitutional issues should be decided
on the most narrow, limited basis. See, e.g., Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Davis, 83 F.2d 322, 323 (5th Cir. 1936) (“[I]t is a
settled rule in the federal courts that questions of constitutional
law ... will be decided only where a present necessity for such
decision exists, and then only no more broadly than the precise
situation in question requires”.); see also Liverpool, N.Y. &
Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885) (admonishing “never to formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied”); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 330 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting Supreme Court practice of
“keeping constitutional adjudication, when unavoidable, as narrow
as circumstances will permit”). Accordingly, if possible, the
issue of whether the jetway search was “routine” should be avoided.
On this record, it is possible to do so. Assuming the search
was not routine, it is well established that, for inbound traffic,
Customs Agents may conduct “non-routine” searches at the border or
its functional equivalent provided they reasonably suspect the
traveler is smuggling contraband. See Cardenas, 9 F.3d at 1148
9
n.3. It is on this more narrow constitutional basis that, for this
outbound traffic, the suppression ruling can be affirmed.2
2.
To date, our court’s non-routine border search jurisprudence
has involved only inbound searches. While cases involving arguably
non-routine outbound searches have arisen in our circuit, they have
been resolved on grounds alternative to the border search
exception. See, e.g., Samora v. United States, 406 F.2d 1095, 1099
(5th Cir. 1969) (finding probable cause and stating “[w]e need not
consider other grounds on which the government claims the search
was valid”). In Berisha, 925 F.2d at 795, our court extended the
border search exception to routine outbound searches conducted
2
Even Roberts seems to agree with the Government on the
constitutionality of this more narrow exception. In any event,
this issue was raised in district court. Roberts, of course,
maintains reasonable suspicion is lacking. For this alternative
basis for upholding the search, the district court noted:
If the border search exception applies to
export searches in the same way it applies to
searches of persons and property entering the
country, then the agents had the authority to
search the defendant’s computer and diskettes
even if that search would be “nonroutine.”
The agents needed only a “reasonable suspicion
of wrongdoing” to conduct a nonroutine search.
They had a reasonable suspicion based on the
information they had previously received about
the defendant and their corroboration of that
information in their preliminary observations
and during the routine detention and search in
the jetway.
United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688 n.4 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (emphasis added).
10
pursuant to a statute authorizing Customs Agents, for purposes of
detecting certain currency violations, to “stop and search, at the
border and without a search warrant ... any person entering or
departing from the United States”. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b).3
Our court declined, however, to adopt a blanket rule as to the
applicability of our border search jurisprudence to outbound
searches generally. See Berisha, 925 F.2d at 795 n.8.
Nevertheless, Berisha’s observations regarding the similarities
between inbound and outbound searches are pertinent to the
constitutionality vel non of the search at issue:
We note that both incoming and outgoing border
searches have several features in common; for
example, the government is interested in
protecting some interest of United States
citizens, there is a likelihood of smuggling
attempts at the border, and the individual is
on notice that his privacy may be invaded when
he crosses the border.
Id. at 795 (citing United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978)).
Perhaps most instructive for the present case is United States
v. Salinas-Garza, 803 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1986), where our court
considered whether, pursuant to an earlier version of the statute
3
That section provides: “For purposes of ensuring compliance
with the requirements of [31 U.S.C. §] 5316, a customs officer may
stop and search, at the border and without a search warrant, any
vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other conveyance, any envelope or
other container, and any person entering or departing from the
United States”. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b). The referenced § 5316
establishes a reporting requirement for persons transporting out of
the country monetary instruments greater than $10,000.
11
involved in Berisha, there was the then requisite “reasonable
cause” to permit an outbound stop and search for currency. The
earlier version authorized a border search only if a Customs Agent
“had reasonable cause to believe” a person was engaging in certain
currency violations. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (1984) (emphasis added).
In reviewing the denial of Salinas-Garza’s suppression motion, our
court observed:
Some circuits have extended the [border search
exception] to persons exiting the country.
Such a standard would allow a warrantless
search of a person leaving the country without
any modicum of suspicion of criminal activity.
However, we do not need to decide whether to
adopt such a position because even if such a
border search were constitutionally
permissible, Congress can further restrict the
search authority of federal agents, and has
done so in the context of this case. Thus, it
is not the constitutional standard of a border
search that regulates the behavior of the
custom agents in this case, but a statutory
one.
Salinas-Garza, 803 F.2d at 836-37 (emphasis added; internal
quotations, citations, and footnote omitted).
While our court purported not to decide a constitutional issue
in Salinas-Garza, id. at 836 n.4, 837, it implicitly did. The
opinion’s characterization that Congress “restricted” the search
authority of federal agents by imposing the “reasonable cause”
standard is only accurate to the extent that the search authority
prior to such Congressional action required something less than
reasonable cause. Restated, our court assumed that what Congress
12
restricted was the border search exception itself. For absent that
exception, the applicable standard for the search would have been
probable cause — a standard more restrictive than the reasonable
cause required by the statute. In short, for outbound border
searches, our court acknowledged, by implication, a constitutional
standard less stringent than probable cause.
As our court noted in Salinas-Garza, other circuits have
acknowledged the full force of the border search exception for
outbound searches. See, e.g., Stanley, 545 F.2d at 665-67; United
States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“Accordingly, we ... conclud[e] that the traditional rationale for
the border search exception applies as well in the outgoing border
search context.”); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th
Cir. 1982) (“Since this was a search at a ‘border’, of a person
leaving the country, there is no need for probable cause, warrants
or even suspicion.”), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983); United
States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting
Second Circuit law to hold “the border search exception applies to
items leaving as well as entering the country”), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1111 (1981). Even so, as in Berisha, it is not necessary on
this record to fully extend the border search exception to all
outbound searches.4
4
The Supreme Court has suggested — albeit in dicta — that such
a result is permissible: “[T]hose entering and leaving the country
13
Pursuant to the plain wording of the Fourth Amendment (“right
to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures”),
“[t]he ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness”. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). In
addition, “the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of
the Government and the privacy of the individual is ... struck much
more favorably to the Government at the border”. United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985). Accordingly, based
on this record, and bringing into play only the most narrow
constitutional basis, a non-routine outbound search is permissible
when the following factors are present: (1) the outbound search is
at the border or its functional equivalent; (2) Customs Agents have
reasonable suspicion that a particular traveler will imminently
engage in the felonious transportation of specific contraband in
foreign commerce; and (3) the search is relatively unintrusive and
only of the area where the contraband is allegedly secreted.
Factors (1) and (3) are satisfied for the initial search at the
jetway; factor (2) (reasonable suspicion), as discussed below in
part II.B., is as well.
Again, our holding establishes only the most narrow basis for
a non-routine outbound search being constitutional. Expansion, if
may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all without
violating the Fourth Amendment....” Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974).
14
any, of this holding must await another case. Obviously, each case
will turn on its facts.
B.
“Reasonable suspicion is defined as ‘a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person’ of smuggling
contraband.” Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367 (quoting Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. at 541). Such suspicion must be based upon “specific
facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom,
reasonably warrant an intrusion”. Cardenas, 9 F.3d at 1153. “In
determining whether government agents possessed a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, we must consider
‘the totality of the particular circumstances.’” Rivas, 157 F.3d
at 367 (quoting Cardenas, 9 F.3d at 1148). As stated earlier, each
reasonable suspicion case ultimately turns on its own facts.
United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
The facts at hand are not novel. Almost 25 years ago, in
United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978), our court
reviewed the denial of a motion to suppress cocaine discovered and
seized by Customs Agents in the course of a strip search of two
flight attendants who had entered the United States. Id. at 1327-
28. Those Agents acted pursuant to a tip from a confidential
source with whom the Agents had had no prior contact. The
informant provided the following information: (1) a particular
15
person (defendant Vidal-Garcia); (2) would fly into the country
(Miami); (3) from a foreign country (Colombia); (4) on a particular
flight (Aerocondor 204); (5) on a particular date (3 January 1977);
(6) traveling as a stewardess; (7) carrying a particular type of
contraband (cocaine). Id. at 1327. Upon the specified flight’s
arrival, Customs authorities verified Vidal-Garcia had arrived as
a stewardess on the specified flight and date. After a primary
search of the crew’s luggage revealed nothing suspicious, and
“[s]olely on the basis of the partially verified confidential tip
regarding Vidal-Garcia, customs inspectors were instructed by their
supervisor ... to search all six members of the Aerocondor crew”.
Id. In the ensuing strip searches, Agents discovered cocaine on
the persons of Vidal-Garcia and another crew member. Id. at 1327-
28.
In affirming the denial of the motion to suppress as to Vidal-
Garcia, our court stated:
We believe the applicable standard of
“reasonable suspicion” is met in a strip
search case where the authorities have
received information as detailed as that
received in this case, specifying that a named
individual traveling in a specified capacity
will be body carrying a particular type of
contraband on a particular date and flight,
where the identifying portion of that
information has been verified by the
authorities on the flight’s arrival, and where
the authorities have no reason to believe the
informant is unreliable and have taken
affirmative steps to insure that the informant
is not being paid for the information and has
no criminal record.
16
Id. at 1329 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Afanador is clear:
where the Government has received information of requisite detail
from a confidential source, and where enough of that detail has
been verified (albeit detail of otherwise innocent activity),
reasonable suspicion to conduct a non-routine border search is
established.
Of course, this case differs from Afanador in one respect —
here, an outbound search is involved. This case mirrors Afanador,
however, in almost every other respect. First, the information
provided to Customs Agents here was the same in kind and degree as
that provided to Customs Agents in Afanador. Between 24 and 25
August 1998, Rios learned: (1) Roberts; (2) would fly into IAH; (3)
from Louisiana; (4) on 25 August 1998; (5) continue on an
international flight; (6) carrying a shaving kit; (7) holding
diskettes; (8) containing child pornography.
Second, the degree of independent corroboration here is nearly
identical to that in Afanador. That Roberts was flying from
Louisiana to Houston was corroborated when Agent Coffman matched
Roberts to his photograph as he disembarked the flight from
Louisiana. That Roberts would connect to an international flight
was corroborated when Agents checked the flight database and
confirmed Roberts was scheduled on the Paris-flight.
That the source of the information on which Agents in the
present case acted (other law enforcement officers) differed from
17
that on which the Agents in Afanador acted (a confidential
informant) is of no consequence.5 As discussed supra,
Salinas-Garza involved an outgoing border search conducted pursuant
to the earlier “reasonable cause” version of 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b).
In that case, the Customs Agent who conducted the stop and search
had received information from a Drug Enforcement Agent:
DEA agent Saldana called Cano early in the
morning informing him that a specifically
named person, Salinas-Garza, would be
attempting to cross the border at 6:00 A.M.
with a large sum of money in a dark colored
Ford pickup truck having a specifically
identified license plate. At 6:15 A.M. a dark
colored Ford pickup truck approached, with a
license plate number identical but for one
transposed digit. Upon asking for
identification, the customs agents verified
the person as Salinas-Garza.
803 F.2d at 837. Our court concluded that the information received
and corroborated created “a reasonable cause or suspicion to stop
the vehicle and inquire whether Salinas-Garza was transporting
monetary instruments”. Id. Moreover, our court ruled that,
“[a]fter [Salinas-Garza] responded in the negative and since all
the other information proved to be correct, it was reasonable for
the agents to believe Salinas-Garza was violating section
5316(a)(1)(A) and to then search the vehicle”. Id.
5
Agent Rios testified he was unaware of the source or
reliability of the information received from RAC-Lake Charles and
the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s Office.
18
Salinas-Garza moved to suppress evidence seized during the
search, contending in part “that reasonable suspicion did not exist
because the only basis for the search was information from [DEA
Agent] Saldana, who received it from an unidentified source of
unknown reliability”. Id. at 838. Our court held: “While it is
not entirely clear where the information originally came from, ...
when the details of the tip are corroborated by independent
investigation, it may give rise to a reasonable suspicion”. Id.
As in Salinas-Garza, “[t]he accurate transmission by ... law
enforcement agent[s] of articulable objective facts, subsequently
corroborated, was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion in
the minds of the customs agents”, id. at 837, to search Roberts’
luggage, including the shaving kit, at the jetway. Further
corroborated by Roberts’ evasiveness and the discovery of the
diskettes in his shaving kit, that suspicion warranted the Agents’
escorting Roberts to the secondary area for questioning.
C.
Concerning the subsequent searches of Roberts’ computer and
diskettes, the district court ruled, and we agree, that Roberts
consented to both: Roberts waived his Miranda rights; signed a
consent-to-search form authorizing the Agents to “conduct a
complete search of [his] luggage, computer, [and] diskettes” and
“take any letters, papers, materials, or other property which they
19
may desire to examine”; and signed a notice of abandonment and
assent to forfeiture.
Roberts contends his consent was obtained unlawfully,
maintaining that the Agents induced his consent by threatening to
proceed with the search regardless. His assertion is irrelevant;
before the Agents searched the computer or diskettes, Roberts
admitted to Agent Coffman that the diskettes contained child
pornography. “Admissions of crime, like admissions against
proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of
credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable
cause.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971). The
subsequent search and seizure of the computer and diskettes were
justified on probable cause grounds at that point, and the Agents
properly and immediately administered the Miranda warnings.
III.
The initial jetway search was permitted by reasonable
suspicion that Roberts was about to board an international flight
with child pornography in tote. The subsequent search and seizure
of the computer and diskettes were permitted by probable cause
resulting from Roberts’ admission. Because there was no unlawful
search or seizure, there was likewise no poisonous fruit.
Therefore, all evidence obtained, including Roberts’ statements,
was admissible.
AFFIRMED
20