UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1743
J.W., by and through his father and next friend Eugene
Wikle,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CORPORAL CARRIER; ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY; RAMONE JARVIS; DARCEL PARKER; KYLE
MCKNETT,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
ARUNDEL MIDDLE SCHOOL; ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-02386-MJG)
Submitted: March 28, 2016 Decided: April 19, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Hopkins, Mount Rainier, Maryland, for Appellant. Nancy
McCutchan Duden, County Attorney, Hamilton F. Tyler, Deputy
County Attorney, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
J.W., by and through his father and next friend Eugene
Wikle, appeals the district court’s orders granting summary
judgment to Defendants and denying reconsideration. J.W. argues
that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues
of material fact exist as to whether Corporal Carrier’s use of
force was reasonable. We affirm.
We “review[] de novo the district court’s order granting
summary judgment.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts,
780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). “A district court ‘shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 568 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, “we view the facts and all justifiable
inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to
. . . the nonmoving party.” Id. at 565 n.1 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“A ‘claim that law enforcement officials used excessive
force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or
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other seizure of a person’ is ‘properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.’” Estate
of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d
892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 388 (1989) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted)). “Evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s
actions ‘requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.’”
Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Graham,
490 U.S. at 397). We look to three factors when making this
determination: “[f]irst, . . . the severity of the [conduct] at
issue; second, . . . the extent to which the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officer[] or others; and
third, . . . whether [the suspect] is actively resisting” the
officer’s attempts. Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question is whether the
officer[’s] actions are objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting [him], without regard to
[his] underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Corporal Carrier’s use of force in lifting
J.W.’s arm was objectively reasonable. Immediately prior to
placing J.W. in handcuffs, Carrier heard J.W. threaten to harm
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himself and saw J.W. tip over a desk near a teacher. J.W.
resisted the initial handcuffing and continued to resist Carrier
once in handcuffs; J.W. tried to pull his hands from the
handcuffs and kicked Carrier in the thigh. It was only at that
point that Carrier lifted J.W.’s arm, resulting in injury to
J.W.
While “the government has little interest in using force to
effect [a] seizure” justified by preventing harm to the subject
of the seizure, Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 901, at the time Carrier
lifted J.W.’s arm, Carrier could have reasonably believed that
J.W. posed a threat to both himself and others. Moreover, J.W.
was actively resisting the seizure at the time Carrier lifted up
J.W.’s arm. We therefore conclude that Carrier’s use of force
was objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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