United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 29, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-60874
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DAVID CASTELO,
Defendant - Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal we consider whether the warrantless search of
the appellant’s truck falls within either the automobile exception
or the pervasively regulated industry exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
During a roadside inspection, Mississippi Department of
Transportation (“MDOT”) officers found approximately 112 pounds of
cocaine in the trailer of Castelo’s truck. At trial, Castelo moved
to suppress the cocaine. After a hearing, the motion was denied.
Castelo ultimately accepted a plea agreement, under which he
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. We hold that the Mississippi statutory scheme
satisfies the requirements of New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987), that the initial stop was lawful under that scheme, that
after the stop the officers acquired probable cause to believe the
truck contained contraband, and that the ensuing search was
properly conducted under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.
I
On November 12, 2003, David Castelo and Luis Roberto Quintero
were stopped by MDOT officers while driving a tractor-trailer rig
north on Interstate 55 in Grenada County, Mississippi. The
officers, Sergeant James T. Luttrell and Officer Mark Hendrix, were
designated as a “portable scale team”, assigned to weigh and
perform roadside inspections of commercial vehicles.
Luttrell motioned the driver, Quintero, to the rear of the
trailer and asked whether it was loaded. Quintero stated that the
trailer was loaded with scrap metal. When asked where the trailer
had been loaded, Quintero could not recall, but stated that it was
“just a few miles from here”. Luttrell then asked Quintero to
produce various required documents for inspection –- specifically,
the permit book, international fuel tax agreement, bill of lading,
log book, driver’s license, and registration. While Quintero was
retrieving the documents, the officers inspected the seal and
padlock on the trailer, and noted that the seal was fastened but
not locked.
Luttrell later testified that, while he was inspecting the
documents, Quintero was repeatedly sipping water from a bottle and
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kicking grass on the shoulder of the road, and generally appeared
uneasy. During the inspection, Luttrell discovered that the
vehicle’s registration had been illegally altered. When
questioned, Quintero admitted that he had changed the
registration’s expiration date by writing the number “1" in front
of the eight, causing the actual date –- November 8 –- to appear as
November 18 (thus falsely indicating that the registration was
valid at the time of the stop).
The officers then instructed Quintero to remove the padlock on
the trailer so that they could verify that the actual cargo matched
what was listed on the bill of lading. Quintero explained that the
trailer had been sealed, to which Luttrell responded that he would
break the seal, re-seal it after inspecting the cargo, and “sign
off on his bill [of lading] that he had broken the seal”.
Quintero proceeded to unlock the trailer and Luttrell entered
to inspect the load. Luttrell testified that he saw two “soft
carry bags” and a pillowcase lying on the floor of the trailer, and
that outlines of “brick-shaped objects” protruded from the sides of
the pillowcase. Suspecting that the objects were cocaine bricks,
Luttrell exited the trailer and called for backup. Once the scene
was secure, Quintero and Castelo were arrested. DEA agents
confirmed that the bags contained 45 bricks of cocaine, weighing
approximately 112 pounds.
Quintero and Castelo were each charged with one count of
possession of a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance with
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intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). At
trial, Castelo moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that
Luttrell’s warrantless search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. After a suppression hearing, the district court denied
the motion, as well as Castelo’s motion for reconsideration.
Castelo ultimately accepted a plea agreement, under which he
reserved –- under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) –- the right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
II
Castelo contends that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained via Officer Luttrell’s
warrantless search of the trailer. We start with the premise that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment “unless they fall within a few narrowly defined
exceptions”. United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 350
(5th Cir. 2002). Thus, the question before us is whether
Luttrell’s search fits within any such exception.
A
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the initial
stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Generally, where
the police lack probable cause to stop a vehicle –- or some
constitutionally adequate substitute therefor –- evidence obtained
from a subsequent search of the vehicle may be suppressed. See,
e.g., United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1998).
The government contends that both the stop and subsequent search of
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the trailer were permissible under the “pervasively regulated
industry” exception to the warrant requirement, as set forth in New
York v. Burger.
Under Burger, a warrantless search of a pervasively regulated
business is permitted if: (1) there is a substantial government
interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the
inspection is made; (2) the inspection is necessary to further the
regulatory scheme; and (3) the statutory or regulatory scheme
provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. See
482 U.S. at 702-03.
Initially, it is clear that commercial trucking is a
pervasively regulated industry. As we noted in United States v.
Fort, the myriad federal and state statutes that govern commercial
trucking place it squarely within the class of industries to which
Burger applies. See 248 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2001). It is also
clear that Mississippi has a substantial interest that informs the
regulatory scheme –- i.e., random roadside inspections and weighing
of commercial vehicles –- pursuant to which the stop and search
occurred. See id. (“[T]he state has a substantial interest in
traveler safety and in reducing taxpayer costs that stem from
personal injuries and property damage caused by commercial motor
carriers.”).
Thus, whether the stop was permissible under the pervasively
regulated industry exception turns on whether the last two prongs
of the Burger test are satisfied –- that is, (1) whether the stop
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was necessary to further Mississippi’s regulatory scheme, and (2)
whether that scheme provides a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant.
1
Castelo contends that the stop in this case exceeded the
statutory authority conferred to MDOT officers. As such, Castelo
argues, the stop was not conducted in furtherance of Mississippi’s
regulatory scheme, as required under the second prong of Burger.
The argument is without merit.
Section 63-5-49(1) of the Mississippi Code gives MDOT officers
the authority to require drivers of commercial vehicles to “stop
and submit to a weighing of the vehicle”. Section 63-5-49(3)
provides that “pursuant to subsection (1) ... [MDOT officers] shall
have the authority to inspect such vehicle to determine whether or
not such vehicle is engaged in the illegal transportation of
contraband”.
Castelo contends that, because the officers never actually
weighed the rig in this case, Luttrell’s search was not “pursuant
to” a weighing stop, and therefore cannot be justified under § 63-
5-49(3). This argument misses the point. As explained infra, the
search of the trailer was supported by probable cause stemming from
Quintero’s conduct and various irregularities in the truck’s
documentation. As such, the government’s reliance upon the
“pervasively regulated industry” exception need extend only so far
as the initial stop. Once the government establishes that the stop
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was authorized under § 63-5-49(1), the question of whether the
ensuing search was “pursuant to” that stop, as required by § 63-5-
49(3), becomes moot for our purposes today.
Luttrell and Hendrix were designated as a “portable scale
team” and were carrying portable scales at the time of the stop.
Although it is true that they ultimately did not weigh the vehicle,
Quintero’s unusual behavior intervened and gave Luttrell probable
cause to search the trailer and discover a large quantity of
cocaine.
Thus, the initial stop in this case was authorized under § 63-
5-49(1) of the Mississippi Code. We therefore hold that the stop
was carried out in furtherance of Mississippi’s regulation of the
commercial trucking industry, as required under the second prong of
Burger, and was a lawful stop.
2
Castelo further contends that, even if the initial stop was
authorized under the relevant statutory provisions, those
provisions fail to provide a “constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant”, as mandated by the third prong of the Burger test.
We do not agree.
In order to satisfy Burger’s requirement of a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant, a regulatory regime must (1)
advise the owner of the regulated business that the inspection is
being made pursuant to law; and (2) limit the discretion of the
inspecting officers. See 482 U.S. at 703. Castelo concedes that
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§§ 63-5-49(1) and (3) provide notice to commercial drivers that
they may be subject to random stops and inspections. Thus, the
question before us is whether Mississippi’s regulatory scheme
adequately limits the discretion of MDOT officers.
The government contends that the Mississippi Code limits the
discretion of MDOT officers in three ways. First, the particular
regulatory scheme at issue in this case applies exclusively to
commercial vehicles. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-5-49(1). Second, and
more generally, officers may stop and inspect only vehicles
“operating upon the highways of [the] state”. MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-
19-137. Finally, the scope of the officers’ discretion is limited
by the scope of their duties.
These limitations are markedly similar to the limits on
officer discretion in Burger and Fort. In Burger, the Supreme
Court held that a New York statute, authorizing warrantless
inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses, sufficiently limited
officer discretion as to the “time, place, and scope” of the
inspections because it: (1) limited inspections to regular business
hours; (2) limited the scope of inspections to vehicles or parts of
vehicles covered under the relevant statute; and (3) applied only
to vehicle dismantling businesses. See 482 U.S. at 711-12.
Likewise, in Fort, we held that a Texas statute sufficiently
limited officer discretion because it limited inspections to “motor
carriers” –- i.e., commercial vehicles -- at “reasonable time[s]”.
See 248 F.3d at 482.
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Mississippi’s regulatory scheme limits the scope of officer
discretion in much the same manner as the statute in Burger,
insofar as only commercial vehicles may be stopped and searched.
Moreover, since MDOT officers may only stop commercial vehicles
operating on a state highway, their discretion as to the time and
place of a stop is likewise constrained. We therefore hold that
the provisions of the Mississippi Code regulating commercial
trucking place adequate limits on the discretion of inspecting
officers, and thus, provide a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant.
In sum, having found all three prongs of the Burger test to be
satisfied with respect to the Mississippi scheme, we hold that the
initial stop of Castelo’s vehicle by the MDOT officers was
permissible under the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to
the warrant requirement.
B
Thus, we reach the final determinant of this case: whether
Luttrell’s warrantless search of the trailer falls within any
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The
government contends that the search was permissible under both the
automobile exception and the “pervasively regulated industry”
exception. This may well be true, but because we hold that the
former applies, we need not address the latter.
A warrantless search is permissible under the automobile
exception if (1) the officer conducting the search had “probable
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cause to believe that the vehicle in question contain[ed] property
that the government may properly seize”; and (2) exigent
circumstances justified the search. See United States v. Reyes,
792 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1986). Given that Castelo and Quintero
were stopped while traveling on an interstate highway, the
requisite exigent circumstances were clearly present. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1996)
(exigent circumstances are supplied by “the fact of the
automobile’s mobility”). As such, the sole question before us is
whether Luttrell’s search was supported by probable cause.
Probable cause to search an automobile exists where
“trustworthy facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal
knowledge would cause a reasonably prudent man to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband”. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d
883, 895 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978).
In determining whether probable cause exists, “[e]ach individual
layer of information is not to be weighed. Rather the ‘laminated
total’ of the facts available is the source of the justification
for a vehicle search”. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 358
F.2d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
The government contends that Luttrell had probable cause to
search the trailer based on six facts:
1. Quintero’s illegal alteration of the
expiration date of his registration;
2. Quintero’s inability to recall where he
loaded the trailer, although he insisted
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the location was “just a few miles from
here”;
3. The fact that the trailer was not sealed;
4. The fact that Quintero’s log book showed
that he had stopped in El Paso, Texas –-
a known “source city” for illegal drugs
–- for two full days;
5. Quintero’s abnormal behavior, including
refusal to make eye contact with the
officers, repeatedly kicking the ground
and sipping water, and glancing at the
back of the trailer; and
6. Castelo’s climbing out onto the running
boards of the cab to watch events unfold
at the back of the trailer.
We agree that these facts, when considered in context, support a
finding that Luttrell had probable cause to search the trailer.
Castelo further contends that, even if probable cause existed
to search the trailer, the further search of the bags in which the
cocaine was found violated the Fourth Amendment. We find no merit
in this argument. Where probable cause justifies the search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle, “it justifies the search of every part of
the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search”. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
Moreover, the “brick shaped” outlines visibly protruding from the
bags would have established probable cause to search them,
independent of the facts justifying the search of the trailer. We
therefore hold that both Luttrell’s search of the trailer and the
subsequent search of the bags were permissible under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.
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III
Because both the initial stop of the vehicle and Luttrell’s
subsequent search of the trailer satisfy the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the district court did not err
in denying Castelo’s motion to suppress the evidence in this case.
The judgment of the district court is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
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