United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 25, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-61014
NYAKUNDI JOHN OMARI,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order from
the Board of Immigration Appeals
Before GARWOOD, SMITH and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Nyakundi John Omari (Omari) petitions for review of an order
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration
Judge’s order that Omari be removed from the United States. We
hold that the record does not reflect that the prior conviction on
which the removal order was based was for an aggravated felony, and
we accordingly grant the petition for review, vacate the removal
order, and remand to the BIA.
Facts and Proceedings Below
Omari is a native of Kenya who was admitted to the United
States in March 1990. In May 1998, he was convicted in Minnesota
state court for fifth degree assault against his wife. In June
2001, he was convicted based on his guilty plea in the Eastern
District of Texas for conspiracy to commit interstate
transportation of stolen property, contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and
2314.1 Specifically, Omari pleaded guilty to Count One of a two-
count indictment naming him and five other named co-conspirators as
well as “others known and unknown.”
Count One of the indictment includes a description of a scheme
in which one named co-conspirator (Lodhi) (and others known but
unnamed) “would burglarize travel agencies and steal blank airline
tickets,” and another named co-conspirator (Barney) would create
forged airline tickets using passenger and destination information
provided by several named co-conspirators, including Omari, and
that those co-conspirators would sell the stolen tickets through
travel agencies that they operated. Among the overt acts alleged
was that in May 1997, Lodhi and other unnamed known persons
“burglarized Dimension Travel and stole 3,000 blank airline
tickets.” In addition to selling stolen airline tickets, Omari was
1
Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 includes “conspir[ing] either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,” where “one or more of” those
so conspiring does “any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 371.
2
alleged to have traveled using some of the tickets. Of twenty-two
overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged in Count One,
four were allegedly committed by Omari, including three trips
allegedly taken using stolen airline tickets and one sale of two
stolen tickets. Count One specifically charges that Omari and five
named others (and “others known and unknown”) “knowingly and
willfully conspired to commit the following crime against the
United States: interstate transportation of stolen, converted and
fraudulently obtained property, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 2314.”
Count Two of the indictment charged the substantive offense of
interstate transportation of stolen property contrary to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314.2 The count consists in large part of an extensive table of
airline ticket numbers, with corresponding dollar values, travel
dates, and destinations. Count Two was dismissed as to Omari when
he pleaded guilty to Count One.
As a result of his guilty plea, Omari was sentenced on Count
One to six months’ imprisonment, three years’ probation, and
2
Count two states that Omari and the other five persons named in count one
(and others known and unknown) “did unlawfully transport, transmit and transfer,
and cause to be transported, transmitted, and transferred in interstate and
foreign commerce, from Plano, Texas to the places indicated below, goods, wares,
and merchandise, to wit: airline tickets having an aggregate value of $5,000.00
or more, the said defendants then and there well knowing said goods, wares, and
merchandise to have been stolen and converted, all as more particularly set out
below. . . .” The remainder of the count consists of the table of specific
airline tickets.
3
restitution of $16,366.48, for which he was jointly and severally
liable with two codefendants.3
In October 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)4 initiated deportation proceedings against Omari, alleging
that he was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an alien convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as
an alien convicted of a crime of domestic violence. In March 2003,
the immigration judge (IJ) determined that Omari was subject to
removal as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, the
aggravated felony being a fraud offense as defined by 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(M) and a conspiracy as defined by 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(U).5 The IJ also denied Omari’s application for
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), determining that
Omari was statutorily ineligible for consideration for such relief
3
It appears from our opinion in United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249
(5th Cir. 2002), that three of Omari’s co-defendants were convicted following
trial of counts one and two of this same indictment, and we affirmed their
convictions and sentences (except for a minor modification as to the amount of
restitution ordered respecting one defendant). Our opinion there reflects that
the sentence of one of these co-defendants included 115 months’ imprisonment,
another 24 months, and the third nine months.
4
Since March 2003, the deportation functions of the INS are with the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Department of Homeland Security.
5
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) defines “aggravated felony” as including “an
offense that–(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) defines an “aggravated
felony” as including “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in
this paragraph.” The IJ apparently did not reach the other grounds of removal
alleged (two or more crimes of moral turpitude or a crime of domestic violence).
4
because of his aggravated felony conviction.6 The IJ ordered that
Omari be deported to Kenya. Omari appealed the decision to the
BIA, contending that his prior conviction was not for an aggravated
felony. The BIA affirmed without opinion.
Discussion
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) this court does not have
jurisdiction to review the removal decision if Omari’s prior
conviction was an aggravated felony.7 However, we do have
jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction, i.e., to determine
whether the conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. Lopez-
Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2000). With
respect to determining whether a prior conviction falls within a
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), we “accord
substantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA”
itself and definitions of phrases within it. Smalley v. Ashcroft,
6
Section 1229b(a) provides:
“(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if
the alien –
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence for not less than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7
years after having been admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.”
7
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) provides in relevant part that “no court shall
have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section .
. . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) . . . of this title,” and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable.”
5
354 F.3d 332, 335–36 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).
We then review de novo whether the particular statute that the
prior conviction is under falls within the relevant INA definition.
Smalley, 254 F.3d at 336; Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 258
(5th Cir. 2002).
II. Involving Fraud or Deceit
For Omari to have been convicted of an aggravated felony under
relevant provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) and (U), his
conviction must be for an offense “involv[ing] fraud or deceit in
which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000," or for an
attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense. 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(43)(M), (U). The IJ’s opinion indicates that the
indictment and judgment for Omari’s conspiracy conviction made it
clear that Omari was convicted of conspiring to violate the second
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which the IJ found to be an offense
involving fraud or deceit.8 Omari argues that the conspiracy
alleged in count one was to commit the offense denounced by the
8
18 U.S.C. § 2314 provides in relevant part:
“Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or
foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of
the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen,
converted or taken by fraud; or
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transports or
causes to be transported, or induces any person or persons to travel in,
or to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce in the execution or
concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person or those
persons of money or property having a value of $5,000 or more; or
. . . .
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
. . . .”
6
first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which does not necessarily
involve fraud or deceit, and that he did not plead guilty to a
conspiracy to violate the second paragraph of section 2314.
Although neither the IJ nor the BIA defined “fraud or deceit,”
the BIA has argued in other cases that “fraud” and “fraud and
deceit” as appearing in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) should be used in
their commonly understood legal sense. See, e.g., Valansi v.
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2002). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “fraud” as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or
her detriment,” and “deceit” as “the act of intentionally giving a
false impression.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 413, 670 (7th ed. 1999).
In determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as an
aggravated felony (or meets other similar criteria for immigration
or sentence enhancement purposes), we employ a categorical approach
in which we look at the statute under which the alien was convicted
rather than at the particular underlying facts. Lopez-Elias, 209
F.3d at 791. When the aggravated felony provision uses “involves”
language, we inquire whether violation of the statute necessarily
entails the “involved” behavior. See United States v. Montgomery,
402 F.3d 482, 486–88 (5th Cir. 2005) (for a prior conviction to
involve a serious potential risk of physical injury, violation of
the statute convicted under must necessarily entail a serious
potential risk of physical injury). In the case of 8 U.S.C. §
7
1101(a)(43)(M), we therefore consider whether violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2314 necessarily entails fraud or deceit.
The first five paragraphs of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 set out five
alternative ways that the statute can be violated. The first
paragraph describes violation by “whoever transports, transmits, or
transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more,
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”
18 U.S.C. § 2314. Violation of this paragraph does not necessarily
entail fraud or deceit, since the paragraph can be violated by
transporting or transferring goods known to be stolen. For
example, the goods could be transferred to someone who knew they
were stolen, so that there would be no misrepresentation or deceit.
A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is therefore not necessarily a
conviction for an offense involving fraud or deceit.
We recognize an exception to the categorical approach when a
statute is divisible into discrete subsections, violation of one or
more of which would in itself meet the criterion at issue. See
Smalley, 354 F.3d at 336; Omagah, 288 F.3d at 260; Hamdan v. United
States, 98 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (all noting this exception
for the purpose of determining whether a conviction was for a crime
involving moral turpitude). If the statute is divisible, we look
to the record of conviction to determine whether the conviction was
necessarily for a particular subsection of the statute that meets
8
the criterion (here, that of involving fraud or deceit). In the
case of guilty plea convictions, the Supreme Court has held that
examination of the record of conviction for this purpose may
include consideration of the “charging document, written plea
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”
Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257 (2005) (concerning
the assessment of a prior burglary conviction as a “violent felony”
for sentence enhancement purposes). Documents not of that kind,
including police reports and complaint applications, may not be
considered. Id.
In the instant appeal, there is no plea agreement or plea
colloquy transcript in the record of the immigration proceedings.9
We therefore have only the indictment and the district court’s
judgment to consider in determining whether Omari necessarily
pleaded guilty to a subsection of the statute involving fraud or
deceit. The judgment declared Omari guilty of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 through “Conspiracy to Commit Interstate Transportation of
Stolen Property” as set out in Count One of the indictment. The
judgment therefore does not in itself indicate that Omari was
necessarily found guilty of an offense involving fraud or deceit.
9
The presentence report ordered by the district court indicates that there
was a written plea agreement, and Omari’s counsel stated at oral argument that
there was also a plea colloquy transcript, but neither the plea agreement nor any
of the plea colloquy transcript were in the record before the IJ or the BIA (nor
are they otherwise before us).
9
The specific crime charged in Count One of the indictment is
conspiracy “to commit . . . interstate transportation of stolen,
converted and fraudulently obtained property in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 2314.” This closely tracks the
language of the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which does not
necessarily involve fraud or deceit, as noted above.10 The scheme
as laid out in the indictment refers to stolen airline tickets, not
fraudulently obtained ones, so that nothing in the indictment
indicates that Omari pleaded guilty to transporting fraudulently
obtained goods.11
The IJ concluded that Omari had been convicted of violating
the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which does describe an
offense involving fraud (see note 8 supra). The indictment does
not support this conclusion, however. The second paragraph of
10
Reference in the indictment to “stolen, converted and fraudulently
obtained property,” as opposed to “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” as
recited in the statute, does not mean that Omari was necessarily convicted of
transferring fraudulently obtained property. Indictments often allege
conjunctively elements that are disjunctive in the corresponding statute, and
this does not require either that the government prove all of the statutorily
disjunctive elements or that a defendant admit to all of them when pleading
guilty. See Valansi, 278 F.3d at 216 n.10; United States v. McCann, 465 F.2d
147, 162 (5th Cir. 1972).
11
If the tickets had been fraudulently obtained, Omari’s conviction for
knowingly transporting or transferring them might well have been a conviction for
an offense involving fraud or deceit. Whether an offense “involves” fraud is a
broader question than whether it constitutes fraud. Cf. United States v.
Winbush, 407 F.3d 703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempted possession of controlled
substance with intent to distribute is offense “involving . . . manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance,” and therefore a “serious drug offense”); Richards v.
Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 125, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2005) (possession of forged instrument
with intent to defraud or deceive is offense “relating to” forgery, though not
actual forgery).
10
section 2314 refers to transport of persons rather than goods.
See, e.g., United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1475 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1993) (noting that the second paragraph “applies only to the
interstate transportation of people, not property”); United States
v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 933 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2004). Violation of the second
paragraph “requires the devising of a scheme to defraud any person
of money by false representations and causing or inducing that
person to travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of that
scheme.” Kelly, 569 F.2d at 933. Although Omari’s selling of
airline tickets as alleged in the indictment could be construed as
an inducement of the ticket buyers to travel in interstate
commerce, the description of the criminal scheme in the indictment
does not indicate that the scheme was intended to defraud or
deceive the ticket buyers (as opposed to the airlines), or that the
ticket buyers were deceived as to the nature of the tickets. For
the second paragraph of section 2314 to apply, the person being
induced to travel must be the person being defrauded.
Because 18 U.S.C. § 2314 does not necessarily involve fraud or
deceit, the judgment and indictment do not indicate that Omari was
necessarily convicted of an offense involving fraud or deceit,12 and
12
Although some, but not all, of the “overt acts” alleged in the indictment
do involve fraud, Omari could be guilty of conspiracy whether or not such fraud
involving overt acts were committed, since under 18 U.S.C. § 371 there needs be
only one overt act by one of the conspirators. Omari’s guilty plea to Count One
therefore does not necessarily constitute an admission to any particular one or
more of the alleged overt acts.
11
the plea agreement and colloquy are not a part of the record, we
must conclude that the record does not suffice to establish that
Omari was convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(M) or (U).
Conclusion
Based on the record before us, we find that Omari’s conviction
was not shown to be an offense (or a conspiracy to commit the same)
involving fraud or deceit, and we therefore do not consider whether
Omari’s conviction was shown to be an offense in which the loss to
the victims exceeded $10,000. For the same reason, we do not reach
Omari’s additional argument, based on Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. 2004), that his offense is a hybrid fraud/theft
offense which must satisfy the requirements of both 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(M) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).13 Because Omari’s
conviction was not shown to be one for an aggravated felony, we do
have jurisdiction over his petition for review.
The petition is GRANTED, the removal order is VACATED, and the
case is REMANDED to the BIA for any further appropriate proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
13
Section 1101(a)(43)(G) is not met because Omari’s term of imprisonment
for his conviction was less than one year.
12