NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AUG 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JUAN CARLOS TORRES-SANTOYO, No. 15-71722
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-531-169
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Juan Carlos Torres-Santoyo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal, and
denying his motion to remand. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to remand, and review de
novo questions of law. Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 921, 923
(9th Cir. 2007). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Torres-Santoyo’s motion
to remand to the extent it concerns the same hardship grounds as his original
application for cancellation of removal. See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592,
601 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If . . . the BIA determines that a motion to reopen
proceedings in which there has already been an unreviewable discretionary
determination concerning a statutory prerequisite to relief does not make out a
prima facie case for that relief, [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes our visiting
the merits, just as it would if the BIA had affirmed the [immigration judge] on
direct appeal.”).
To the extent Torres-Santoyo presented non-cumulative evidence of
hardship to his qualifying relative in his motion to remand, the BIA did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion for failure to establish prima facie eligibility
for cancellation of removal. See Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir.
2010) (prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied).
We reject as unsupported Torres-Santoyo’s contention that the BIA failed to
2 15-71722
consider his evidence or provided insufficient reasoning. See Najmabadi v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (the BIA adequately considered
evidence and sufficiently announced its decision).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Torres-Santoyo’s unexhausted contention
that the agency applied an incorrect legal standard. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d
1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court lacks jurisdiction to consider legal claims not
presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the agency).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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