ACCEPTED
06-15-00117-CR
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
11/19/2015 3:17:03 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
NO. 06-15-00117-CR
FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
11/19/2015 3:17:03 PM
IN THE
DEBBIE AUTREY
COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
FOR THE
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OF
TEXAS
AT TEXARKANA
JOSEPH LEO STREHL, III,
APPELLANT
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appeal from the 4th Judicial District Court of Rusk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CR15-075
BRIEF FOR
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Modesto E. Rosales
Asst. District Attorney
115 N. Main, Suite 302
Henderson, Texas 75652
P: 903-657-2265
F: 903-657-0329
mrosales@co.rusk.tx.us
SBN: 24076840
Attorney for the State
NO. 06-15-00117-CR
JOSEPH LEO STREHL, III
Appellant
vs
THE STATE OF TEXAS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 38.l(a)
Appellant: JOSEPH LEO STREHL, III JOE F GURNEY -TDCJ
Inmate# 02012399 Palestine, TX 75803
Appellant's JEFF SANDERS 120 S Broadway Ave
Trial Counsel Attmney at Law Tyler, TX 75702
State's ZACK WAVRUSA 115 N. Main, Suite 302
Trial Counsel Asst. County/District Attorney Henderson, TX 75652
Trial Judge HON. CLAY GOSSETT 115 N. Main, Suite 303
Presiding Judge Henderson, TX 75652
Appellant's JEFF SANDERS 120 S Broadway Ave
Appellate Counsel Attorney at Law Tyler, TX 75702
State's Counsel MODESTO E. ROSALES 115 N. Main, Suite 302
Asst. District Attorney Henderson, TX 75652
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .......................................... .i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................... ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................. 1-2
ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................... 2
1. Whether there was sufficient legal evidence for the trial court to admit
into evidence Appellant's prior conviction of the offense of Driving
While Intoxicated, State's Exhibit Six, for jurisdictional purposes.
2. Whether Appellant properly preserved, for appeal, his objection to the
introduction into evidence testimony regarding Appellant's traffic stop.
3. If properly preserved, whether the comi abused its discretion.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................................................ 2-4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................... .4-5
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .................................................. 5-15
ISSUE ONE .................................................................................. 5-9
ISSUE TW0 ............................................................................. 10-12
ISSUE THREE ......................................................................... 12-15
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 15
PRAYER .................................................................................................. 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................. 16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................... 16
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ......................... 6
Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002) ............ 13
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ......................... 13
Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ................... 5-8
Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ......................... 13
Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) .......................... 12
Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) .......................... 7
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................ 7, 9
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) .......................................... 6, 7, 9
James v. State, 102 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2003) ........... 14
Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ................... 10
Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) .................. 10
Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003) ............ 14
Richard v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 15119, *1 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Dec.
17, 2013) ..................................................................................................... 9
State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995) .............. 13
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968) ............................................................... 13
Thomas v. State, 884 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994) ......... 11, 12
Timberlake v. State, 711 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) .................... 5
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1(1989) ............................................ 13
Vessels v. State, 432 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) ........................ 6
iii
Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) .................... 7
Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................ 13
STATUTES PAGE
TEX. Evrn. R. 103 ..................................................................................... 1O
TEX. PENAL CODE§ 49.09(b) ................................................................. 5
TEX. R. APP. P. RULE 33 ....................................................................... 10
iv
NO. 06-15-00117-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OF
TEXAS
AT TEXARIZANA
JOSEPH LEO STREHL, III,
APPELLANT
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appeal from the 4th Judicial District Court of Rusk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CR15-075
BRIEF FOR
THE STATE OF TEXAS
TO THE HONORABLE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS -TEXARIZANA:
The State of Texas, Appellee, files this Brief in response to the Brief for
Appellant filed by Joseph Leo Strehl, III, and shows the Court the following:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Joseph Leo Strehl, III, was charged by indictment with the
offense of DWI 3rd or more, a third degree felony. RR. Vol. 3, P. 10-11. On June
1
16, 2015 a jury of twelve properly qualified jurors found the Appellant, Joseph Leo
Strehl, III, guilty of the offense of DWI third or more, a third degree felony. R.R.
Vol. 3, P. 139. After receiving the proper charge and hearing punishment
evidence, the jury returned to the court a verdict with a sentence of eighteen (18)
years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice and a $7,000 fine after finding the allegations of the State's
Brooks notice to be true. R.R. Vol. 4, PP. 25-26. The present appeal followed.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether there was sufficient legal evidence for the jury to consider
Appellant's prior conviction of the offense of Driving While Intoxicated,
State's Exhibit Six, for jurisdictional purposes.
2. Whether Appellant properly preserved, for appeal, his objection to the
introduction into evidence testimony regarding Appellant's traffic stop.
3. If properly preserved, whether the Court abused its discretion in denying
Appellant's motion.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of August 25, 2014, truck driver Scott Lake was at the
Henderson Depot getting fuel when he noticed a man who smelled of alcohol
asking how to get to Lowe's Home Improvement Store (Lowe's). RR. Vol. 3 PP.
17-18. Mr. Lake testified that he gave the man directions and then observed the
2
man enter his vehicle and then perform an unnecessary, unsafe tum-around in the
middle of the highway. RR. Vol. 3 PP. 18-19. Mr. Lake called the police,
identifying himself, and described a man who reeked of alcohol driving a white
Peterbilt truck with the letters "SAT Trucking" on the door with a flatbed hauling
concrete headed toward Lowe's. RR. Vol. 5. P. 2, State's Exhibit 1; RR. Vol. 3,
P.21.
On August 25, 2014, Henderson Police Officer Josiah Lemelin responded to
a call from dispatch about a possible drunk driver in a white Peterbilt truck
traveling towards Lowe's. RR. Vol. 3, P. 29. Officer Lemelin testified that he
located the vehicle that the caller had described to the dispatcher. Id. Officer
Lemelin observed two trucks in that area; he checked both vehicles and determined
the tiuck heading north was not a Peterbilt. RR. Vol. 3, P. 55. Once officer
Lemelin identified Appellant's vehicle he also observed it weave in the lane
headed in the direction of Lowe's. RR. Vol. 3, P. 29-30, 56. After the white
Peterbilt pulled over in the Lowe's parking lot, Officer Lemelin identified
Appellant as the driver and performed the standardized field sobriety tests, which
Appellant failed. RR. Vol. 3, PP. 31-5. Appellant was then aiTested for DWI. Id.
At trial, the State introduced two certified prior convictions from Johnson
County, Texas. RR. Vol. 3, PP. 104-8; RR Vol. 5, State's Exhibits 5-6. Retired
Rusk County DA's Investigator William Brown testified as a fingerprint expert in
3
relation to the finger prints found on the judgment of conviction on State's Exhibit
5 styled The State of Texas v. Joseph Leo Strehl, III in the County Court at Law
No. 2 of Johnson County. RR. Vol. 3, PP. 100-06. Investigator Brown concluded
that the fingerprints on State's Exhibit 5 matched the finger print on the Tens Card
that investigator Brown took of Appellant. RR. Vol 3, P. 106; see also State's
Exhibit 4. The State then admitted State's Exhibit 6; a judgment of conviction for
a felony grade offense of DWI styled "The State of Texas v. Joseph Leo Strehl,
III" in the 18th Judicial District Court of Johnson County, Texas. RR. Vol. 3 P.
109; State's Exhibit 6.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State proved (and Appellant does not refute) that State's Exhibit 5
contains the judgment of conviction of Appellant, Joseph Leo Strehl, III, for the
misdemeanor offense of DWI from Johnson County, Texas. Based on Appellant's
unique name and similar type offense occuffing in the same county, a jury could
reasonably infer that the Joseph Leo Strehl, III named in State's Exhibit 6 and
Appellant are one in the same.
Appellant argues that Court committed reversible error by denying his
motion to suppress evidence of Appellant's traffic stop. However, Appellant first
moves to suppress evidence, before the Court, after the jury heard testimony of the
4
traffic stop and without objecting to same. Therefore, Appellant cannot now raise
that issue on appeal.
Assuming arguendo that Appellant has preserved the second point of error,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion as the police officer had enough facts
given the totality of the circumstances to initiate a traffic stop.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.
THE JURY COULD REASONABLY INFER THAT THE JOSPEH LEO
STREHL, III NAMED IN THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
INTRODUCED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 6 WAS THE SAME JOSEPH LEO
STREHL, III AT TRIAL.
Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of Driving While Intoxicated 3rd or more if
the person is operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and the
Defendant has twice been convicted of the offense of DWI. TEX. PENAL CODE §
49.09(b ).
To establish that a defendant has a prior conviction, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and (2) the defendant
is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex.Crim.
App. 2007); see also Timberlake v. State, 711 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (" [T]he facts of each case must contain reliable evidence showing that the
defendant had been previously convicted of the offense for which evidence is
5
offered."). These two elements may be shown by certified copies of a judgment
and a sentence. See Vessels v. State, 432 S.W.2d 108, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
There is no required mode of proof; the State may prove a prior conviction in a
number of different ways. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921-22 ("Just as there is more
than one way to skin a cat, there is more than one way to prove a prior
conviction."). In proving the elements, the State may use "[a]ny type of evidence,
documentary or testimonial." Id. at 922; see Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 836
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The factfinder looks at the totality of the evidence to
determine whether there was a previous conviction and whether the defendant was
the person convicted. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923.
In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must
look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to
determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912
(Tex. Crim. App. 20lO)(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
Viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the verdict" under a legal-
sufficiency standard means that the reviewing court is required to defer to the
jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of
the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319. Additionally, the reviewing court must defer to the responsibility
6
of the jury to "fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)(citingJackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19).
When applying this analysis, the appellate comi uses a "hypothetically
correct" jury charge to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. Grotti v. State,
273 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The hypothetically correct jury charge
sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase
the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restricts the State's theories of
liability, and adequately describes the paiiicular offense for which the defendant
was tried. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Analysis of the Law as Applied to the Facts Presented
It is undisputed and the State proved through expeii testimony that the
thumbprint on the judgment of conviction in State's Exhibit 5 belonged to
Appellant Joseph Leo Strehl, III. State's Exhibit 5 shows that Joseph Leo Strehl,
III was convicted of a DWI in Johnson County, Texas. State's Exhibit 6 is a
judgment of conviction of Joseph Leo Strehl, III in Johnson County for the offense
of felony DWI.
In Flowers, the State used a Dallas County computer printout of Flowers's
conviction record to establish that Flowers had a prior DWI conviction. Flowers,
220 S.W.3d at 923. The printout was corroborated by Flowers's Texas DPS
7
driver's license record. Id. at 921. Flowers challenged the use of the printout,
stating that, because it was not a certified copy of a final judgment, the State could
not prove that it referred to him. The court disagreed and stated that Texas law
does not require that the existence of a prior conviction be proven in any specific
manner. Id. at 922. The court stated, "Just as there is more than one way to skin a
cat, there is more than one way to prove a prior conviction." Id.
Like the evidence in Flowers that the Jurors had to put together like a jigsaw
puzzle, jurors in this case had several pieces of information in evidence to put
together. First, Appellant's name is particularly unique. This was not a John
Smith, a Joseph Strehl, or even a Joseph Leo Strehl; this was Joseph Leo Strehl,
III. Joseph Leo Strehl, III was the named Defendant in both judgments of
conviction in State's Exhibit 5 and 6 with no variation in spelling.
Next, the State's expert took fingerprints of Appellant and compared it to the
thumbprints found on the judgment of conviction in State's Exhibit 5 and
concluded Appellant was one in the same. The judgment in State's Exhibit 5 is a
conviction for the offense of DWI from Johnson County, Texas. The jury then
considered State's Exhibit 6, a judgment of conviction for felony DWI of Joseph
Leo Strehl, III from Johnson County, Texas. The jury put all of these facts
together and concluded that Appellant was the same person.
8
This Court upheld a conviction based on similar circumstances in Richard v.
State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 15119, *16, 2013 WL 6669388 (Tex. App.
Texarkana Dec. 17, 2013):
To establish the second enhancement allegation, the State introduced a
Louisiana pen packet ·containing a 1978 judgment for burglary of a
building, committed in Jefferson Parish, against "Johnny R. Richard."
The judgment recites that Richard provided his date of birth as "12-
14-56." Given that this offense was committed in the same parish as
the 1981 conviction by a person with the same date of birth and same
first name, middle initial, and last name as Richard's, it would be
unlikely that this offense was committed by someone else.
Again, given that State's Exhibit 6 in this case recites that offense was committed
in the same county as the earlier conviction by a person with the same first name,
middle name, last name, and suffix (III), it would be unlikely that this offense was
committed by someone else. These are the kinds of pieces of the jigsaw puzzle we
entrust the jurors to weigh and determine.
The Appellant in this case is asking this Court to invade the province of the
Jury. But it is incumbent upon this Court to defer to the responsibility of the jury
"to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to
ultimate facts" and uphold the jury's decision. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)(citingJackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19).
9
II.
APPELLANT HAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS MOTION TO
SUPRESS AS HE FIRST MOVES TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, BEFORE
THE COURT, AFTER THE JURY HEARD TESTIMONY OF THE
TRAFFIC STOP AND WITHOUT OBJECTING TO SAME. THEREFORE,
APPELLANT FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE ANY ERROR
Applicable Law
"A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the
error affects a substantial right of the party and: ( 1) if the ruling admits evidence, a
party, on the record: (A) timely objects or moves to strike; and (B) states the
specific ground ...." TEX. EVID. R. 103 (emphasis added); see TEX. R. APP. P.
RULE 33. An objection is timely when made as soon as the ground for objection
becomes apparent. Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 618, (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 139 L. Ed. 2d 235, 118 S. Ct. 305 (1997). "If a
defendant fails to object until after an objectionable question has been asked and
answered, and he can show no legitimate reason to justify the delay, his objection
is untimely and error is waived." Id. Further, a defendant who states he has no
objection to the admission of evidence sought to be suppressed has waived any
complaint over the admission. Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986).
Analysis of the Law as Applied to the Facts Presented
10
Appellant complains about evidence related to the traffic stop for the first
time after the officer was direct-examined by the State and cross-examined by
Appellant. RR. Vol. 3, PP. 27-81. By that time, the jury had been presented with
testimony from the independent fact witness, testimony from the officer initiating
the traffic stop, and the video from the officer's patrol unit. At no time during the
officer's testimony did Appellant object to the introduction of any evidence or
conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to suppress any evidence.
The procedural history in this case is substantially similar to the procedural
history in Thomas v. State, 884 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994 pet. ref d).
In Thomas, Appellant appealed from a conviction for possession of cocaine for
which he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Id. at 216. Appellant in Thomas
contended that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of an illegal
arrest and search of his person. Id. However, Appellant in Thomas "did not obtain
a hearing or ruling upon his motion to suppress before trial, and he agreed that the
motion to suppress could be carried over to trial and raised by objection at the
appropriate time." Id. The record in Thomas reflected that Appellant did not object
to any evidence until after two police officers testified, to the jury, extensively as
to the evidenced gathered. Id. The Court in Thomas found that Appellant "failed
to object at the earliest opportunity, and by so doing, waived error." Id. at 217
(internal citations omitted).
11
In Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), the Court of
Criminal Appeals carved out one specialized exception to this general rule. In
Garza, the trial Judge made specific comments prior to trial about his intention to
not take up the motion to suppress until the jury had heard the complained of
evidence; it essentially made the Appellant wait until after the complained about
evidence was presented to the jury before being able to object and move to
suppress the evidence. Id. at 83-85. The Court found that "the special instructions
by the judge were such that appellant preserved error by seeking a ruling after the
officers' and expe1i's testimony had been given." Id. The Comi in Garza made
clear that their holding was "not meant to apply in situations outside the special
circumstances of [that] case." Id.
In this case, Appellant filed a motion to suppress and decided to carry it
through trial. RR. Vol. 3, P. 6. Like Appellant in Thomas, Appellant in this case
did not object to any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, or urge the motion to
suppress until after the jury heard the complained of evidence. And unlike the trial
judge in Garza, the judge in this case did not make any comments that would have
precluded Appellant from lodging objections at the earliest oppmiunity.
Therefore, the Appellant has waived any point of error on this issue.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT PRESERVED ERROR ON
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TRIAL COURT
12
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AS THE POLICE OFFICER HAD
ENOUGH FACTS GIVEN THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
TO INITIATE A TRAFFIC STOP.
Applicable Law
A police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts
that criminal activity "may be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable cause.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968);
Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585,
104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989). The justification for making the stop must amount to more
than a mere hunch or suspicion. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). Reasonable suspicion exists ifthe officer has specific articulable facts
that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to
reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged in, or is or soon will be
engaging in, illegal conduct. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001).
The reasonableness of a given detention will tmn on the totality of the
circumstances in that particular case. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.
13
Crim. App. 1997); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App.-Fmi Worth
1995, pet refd). The court's review is not limited to the violations officers list in
making the stop. See James v. State, 102 S.W.3d 162, 172 (Tex. App.-F01i
W01ih 2003). Rather, the test is whether the articulated facts about which the
officer testified would, in light of the officer's experience and personal knowledge,
together with inferences from those facts, warrant a reasonable person to believe
that a violation had occuned. Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649, 653-54 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
Analysis of the Law as Applied to the Facts Presented
In Pipkin v. State, the officer testified that he was patrolling the area when
he received the call from dispatch advising him about an erratic driver on the
freeway. Id. at 653. The officer testified that dispatch relayed to him information
provided by a civilian. Id. The officer then saw a dark blue Dodge Durango
identified by the civilian witness and initiated a traffic stop. See Id.
Here, like the citizen-eyewitness in Pipkins, Scott Lake repmied to the 911
dispatcher a detailed description of appellant's vehicle, its location, as well as the
concerning driving behavior he witnessed. Lake also gave the 911 dispatcher his
name and testified at trial. Relying on the information Lake gave the dispatcher,
officer Lemelin was able to locate and identify Appellant's truck. Following
Appellant's truck, Lemelin confi1med enough facts to reasonably conclude that the
14
information given by Lake and relayed to him by the 911 dispatcher was reliable.
Those facts, together with his own observations of Appellant's vehicle, provided
the officer with reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal
activity, i.e., driving while intoxicated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant, Joseph Leo Strehl, III was properly convicted of the offense of
DWI 3rd or more. The Jury was able to use State's Exhibit 5 and 6 to fit the puzzle
pieces together to conclude that Appellant was twice before convicted of DWI.
Appellant wishes to appeal a point of error that was not properly
preserved. Even if it had been properly preserved, there was no error in the judge
admitting the testimony and evidence of the traffic stop because the officer had
reasonable suspicion that Appellant was operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated.
PRAYER
The State of Texas prays that the jury verdict in this case be affirmed. The
State prays that Appellant be denied the relief requested.
15
Respectfully submitted,
Isl Modesto E. Rosales
Modesto E. Rosales
Asst. District Attorney
SBN: 24076840
115 N. Main, Suite 302
Henderson, TX 75652
P: 903-657-2265
F: 903-657-0329
mrosales@co .rusk. tx. us
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of this brief was mailed to Jeff Sanders, Attmney at Law, 120 S
Broadway Ave., Tyler, TX 75702, on the 19th day ofNovember, 2015.
Isl Modesto E. Rosales
Modesto E. Rosales
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 with
respect to the number of words. According to the word counter in Microsoft
Word, the total number of words in this document is ~4__,,_16_4______
Isl Modesto E. Rosales
Modesto E. Rosales
16