J-A12002-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
TERRELL LARON WALKER, DAMAIRE
WALLACE, QUASHAAD RODNEY JAMES
AND MAURICE TOWNER, JR.
Appellee No. 2299 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000100-2015
CP-09-CR-0000101-2015
CP-09-CR-0000102-2015
CP-09-CR-0000103-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016
The Majority quashes the Commonwealth’s appeal on the basis of a
procedural irregularity, i.e., the Commonwealth filed a single notice of
appeal, which listed all four Appellees and their respective docket numbers,
instead of filing separate notices of appeal from the trial court’s consolidated
suppression order for each of the four Appellees. While the Majority offers a
thoughtful, cogent analysis, I disagree that this matter should be quashed,
and instead, would address the merits of the suppression issue presented by
the Commonwealth in its appellate brief.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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As the Majority indicates, the Commonwealth filed charges against
each Appellee with regard to an armed robbery occurring on October 26,
2014. Each Appellee filed a separate motion seeking to suppress physical
evidence seized by the police. However, since the issue presented in the
motions was the same, i.e., whether the stop of the subject motor vehicle in
which all four Appellees were located was supported by the necessary
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the suppression court consolidated
the motions and held a single suppression hearing.
Following the hearing, the suppression court entered a single
suppression order, which was filed separately at each Appellee’s docket
number. The Commonwealth then filed a single notice of appeal, which
listed each Appellee’s name and docket number. In the notice of appeal, the
Commonwealth indicated it was appealing “the [o]rder entered in this matter
on June 30, 2015, granting Appellees’ motion to suppress. . .entered in the
above-captioned cases.” Commonwealth’s Notice of Appeal, filed 7/27/15
(emphasis omitted). Thereafter, the Clerk of Courts docketed the
Commonwealth’s notice of appeal at each Appellee’s individual docket
number.
The filing of one notice of appeal from orders entered at different
docket numbers “has long been discouraged.” 20 G. Ronald Darlington, et
al., Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 341:3.102 (2013–2014 ed.) (footnote
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omitted). This policy is set forth in the Note to Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate procedure, which states that:
A party needs to file only a single notice of appeal to
secure review of prior non-final orders that are made final by the
entry of a final order. Where, however, one or more orders
resolve issues arising on more than one docket or relating to
more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be
filed.
Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note (citations omitted).
Courts, however, have not automatically quashed such appeals. For
instance, our Supreme Court considered this question in General Electric
Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1970),
where the appellant filed a single appeal from two separate judgments
entered against it. Upon considering these facts, our Supreme Court stated:
Taking one appeal from several judgments is not acceptable
practice and is discouraged. It has been held that a single
appeal is incapable of bringing on for review more than one final
order, judgment or decree. When circumstances have
permitted, however, we have refrained from quashing the whole
appeal, but this Court has quashed such appeals where no
meaningful choice could be made.
Id. at 452-53 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Similarly, this Court, citing General Electric Credit Corp., declined to
quash where counsel for the appellants filed only one notice of appeal from
separate orders denying each appellant's motion to intervene. See
Egenrieder v. Ohio Casualty Group, 581 A.2d 937, 940 n.3 (Pa.Super.
1990). The panel noted that counsel should have filed a separate notice of
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appeal for each appellant and that the appeals would then have been subject
to consolidation. See id.
Thus, the filing of one notice of appeal, in certain cases, is
“discouraged,” but both our Supreme Court and this Court have refrained
from quashing an appeal where the “circumstances have permitted.” Here,
my examination of the case leads me to conclude that the circumstances
permit this Court to exercise its discretion and accept the Commonwealth’s
appeal.
In quashing the instant matter, the Majority relies primarily upon
Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111 (Pa.Super. 2007). In C.M.K., a
jury convicted co-defendants C.M.K. and M.W.K. of multiple counts of
endangering the welfare of a child and simple assault. Both defendants filed
notices of appeal from their respective judgments of sentence. This Court
consolidated their direct appeals and, ultimately, vacated the judgments of
sentence and remanded for consideration of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 motion
challenging the weight of the evidence. After a hearing, the trial court
denied that motion and imposed separate sentences upon the defendants in
separate orders entered on separate dockets. Thereafter, C.M.K. and
M.W.K. filed a single notice of appeal from their separate judgments of
sentence.
This Court quashed the appeal in C.M.K., noting that Pennsylvania
courts disapprove of the practice of submitting a single appeal from multiple
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orders. C.M.K., 932 A.2d at 112. This Court reasoned that, while some
appellate issues regarding the two co-defendants might coincide, many
appellate claims would not overlap. Therefore, this Court held that the
defendants should have filed separate notices of appeal from each of the
judgments of sentence entered at the defendants' individual docket
numbers. Since they failed to do so, this Court quashed the appeal.
C.M.K. is distinguishable from the instant case. In C.M.K., the appeal
was taken from two judgments of sentence imposed on different charges. In
the case sub judice, on the other hand, the suppression court’s order is the
same as to each Appellee, and thus, the appellate suppression issue
presented by the Commonwealth overlaps. Moreover, in this case, the Clerk
of Courts noted the filing of the suppression court’s single order, as well as
the Commonwealth’s single notice of appeal, at each Appellee’s docket
number.
Accordingly, in light of the fact Appellees have not suffered any
prejudice (as they each had the opportunity to fully brief the suppression
issue on appeal), the circumstances permit this Court to accept the
Commonwealth’s appeal. Thus, contrary to the Majority, I would not quash
the appeal, but, in the interest of justice, would accept it. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
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