FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: MARY MARGARET No. 14-56763
CUNNINGHAM,
D.C. No. 8:14-cv-00652-JFW
Debtor.
MEMORANDUM*
MARY MARGARET CUNNINGHAM,
Appellant,
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, Putative
Assigness of FDIC as Receiver for
Washington Mutual Bank its assignees
and/or successors in interest J.P. Morgan
Subsidiary; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 27, 2016**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Chapter 7 debtor Mary Margaret Cunningham appeals pro se from the
district court’s orders affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders dismissing
Cunningham’s adversary proceeding without leave to amend and denying
Cunningham’s motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1). We review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a
bankruptcy court, applying the same standard of review the district court applied to
the bankruptcy court’s decision. In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.3d 1162, 1166
(9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly dismissed Cunningham’s adversary
proceeding because Cunningham lacks standing to pursue claims that are property
of the bankruptcy estate. See Canatella v. Towers (In re Alcala), 918 F.2d 99, 102
(9th Cir. 1990) (causes of action which accrued before a Chapter 7 petition is filed
are part of the estate vested in the trustee); see also 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (“[P]roperty
of the estate that is not abandoned under this section and that is not administered in
the case remains property of the estate.”); Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino
Cty. Superior Court Case Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.
2006) (bankruptcy code endows bankruptcy trustee with exclusive right to sue on
behalf of estate).
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The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cunningham
leave to amend her complaint because her lack of standing could not be cured by
amendment. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[T]he court need not extend the general rule that parties are allowed to
amend their pleadings if amendment would be an exercise in futility” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cunningham’s
motion under Rule 59(e) because Cunningham failed to demonstrate any basis for
relief. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 applicable to
bankruptcy cases); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.
2001) (discussing factors for granting a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e)).
We reject as without merit Cunningham’s contentions that the bankruptcy
court exhibited bias and violated due process.
AFFIRMED.
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