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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SETH STEINMAN
Appellant No. 150 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 17, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1006661-2000
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2016
Appellant, Seth Steinman, appeals pro se from the order entered in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his serial
petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. On April 19, 2004, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, sexual
assault, and simple assault. The court sentenced Appellant on May 19,
2005, to an aggregate term of 10½-22 years’ imprisonment. This Court
affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 15, 2006, and our Supreme
Court denied allowance of appeal on May 24, 2007. See Commonwealth
v. Steinman, 915 A.2d 150 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 592 Pa. 766,
923 A.2d 1174 (2007). Appellant sought no further review. Instead, on July
20, 2007, Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition, which the court
denied on June 17, 2008. This Court affirmed on May 19, 2009, and our
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Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December 1, 2009. See
Commonwealth v. Steinman, 976 A.2d 1216 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal
denied, 603 Pa. 709, 985 A.2d 219 (2009). On May 31, 2012, Appellant
filed the current, serial pro se PCRA petition. The court issued Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 notice on May 21, 2013; Appellant responded pro se on July 11, 2014.
The court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely on December 17, 2015.
On December 31, 2015, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal. No
Rule 1925(b) statement was ordered or filed.
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be filed within one
year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or
at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness provisions allow for
very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be
excused; and a petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a
petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2). Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on August 22, 2007, upon expiration of the time to
file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (allowing 90 days to file petition for writ of certiorari).
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Appellant filed the current petition on May 31, 2012, which is patently
untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant now purports to invoke
the “new constitutional right” exception to the PCRA’s time bar under
Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), claiming Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct.
1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) and Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132
S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), both decided on March 21, 2012, set
forth newly recognized constitutional rights, related to the ineffective
assistance of counsel, and held them to apply retroactively on collateral
review.1 Appellant contends he learned about the Lafler and Frye decisions
on April 17, 2012, after reading an article in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly
and insists he timely filed his PCRA petition within 60 days of reading that
article. Assuming Appellant even satisfied the 60-day rule, this Court has
specifically held that neither Lafler nor Frye created a new constitutional
right. See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(explaining Lafler and Frye simply applied Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and ineffectiveness test to circumstances where counsel’s conduct
resulted in lapse or rejection of plea offer, to petitioner’s detriment;
petitioner’s reliance on these decisions to satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
exception to PCRA’s time restrictions is unavailing). See also
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1
Specifically, Appellant claims the prosecution offered a plea deal in his case
for an aggregate term of 7½-15 years’ imprisonment, which trial counsel
rejected because counsel thought he could “beat this case.”
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Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa.Super. 2013) (holding
appellant’s claim that his petition fits within Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception
lacks merit because neither Lafler nor Frye created new constitutional
right). Thus, Appellant’s current PCRA petition remains time barred, and the
court properly dismissed it as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/2016
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