Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC16-547
____________
LARRY DARNELL PERRY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[October 14, 2016]
PER CURIAM.
The issue before this Court is whether the newly enacted death penalty law,
passed after the United States Supreme Court held a portion of Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme unconstitutional in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)
(“Hurst v. Florida”), may be constitutionally applied to pending prosecutions for
capital offenses that occurred prior to the new law’s effective date. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal concluded in State v. Perry, 192 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 5th DCA
2016), that chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida (2016) (“the Act”), could apply to
pending prosecutions without constitutional impediment.1
In its decision, the Fifth District passed on the following questions, which
the court certified to be of great public importance:
1) DID HURST V. FLORIDA, 136 S. CT. 616 (2016), DECLARE
FLORIDA’S DEATH PENALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
2) IF NOT, DOES CHAPTER 2016-13, LAWS OF FLORIDA,
APPLY TO PENDING PROSECUTIONS FOR CAPITAL
OFFENSES THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVE
DATE?
Id. at 76.2 Perry filed his Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction in this Court
based upon the two certified questions. 3 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, §
3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
1. Two trial courts in two different circuits have recently held the Act
unconstitutional as to pending prosecutions because unanimity was not required in
the final vote for death or in the jury fact-finding. State v. Keetley, No. 10-CF-
018429 (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. Ct., June 9, 2016) (pending before the Second District
Court of Appeal in Case No. 2D16-2717); State v. Gaiter, No. F01-128535 (Fla.
11th Jud. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2016) (pending before the Third District Court of Appeal
in Case No. 3D16-1174).
2. After accepting jurisdiction and during merits briefing, this Court ordered
that Perry and the State “address whether the provision within section
921.141(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), Chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida,
requiring that ‘at least 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced
to death’ is unconstitutional.” Perry v. State, SC16-547 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Order filed
May 5, 2016).
3. William T. Woodward, the other defendant whose case was considered
by the Fifth District, moved for a motion for rehearing in the Fifth District, which
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We have addressed the first certified question in our opinion on remand in
Hurst v. State, No. SC12-1947 (slip op. issued Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) (“Hurst”).
Based on that decision, in which we concluded that the death penalty was not
declared unconstitutional, we answer the first certified question in the negative.
See Hurst, SC12-1947, slip op. at 50-51. Further, by its own terms, section
775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2013), is limited to those cases in which the
was still pending at the time Perry sought review in this Court. Woodward did not
move for joinder in this case, but instead filed a motion for leave to appear as
amicus curiae, which this Court granted on April 18, 2016. After the Fifth District
denied Woodward’s motion for rehearing on April 21, 2016, Woodward filed his
Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction in this Court. On April 29, 2016, this
Court stayed that case pending disposition of this case. See Woodward v. State,
No. SC16-696 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Order accepting jurisdiction filed April 29, 2016).
William T. Woodward and McClain & McDermott, P.A., the Law Offices of
Todd G. Scher, P.L. and the Law Offices of John Abatecola, filed amicus curiae
briefs on the certified questions in which they explain that they do not take the
positions of either party. Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South was granted
leave to appear as amicus curiae by joining in the brief filed by McClain &
McDermott, P.A., the Law Offices of Todd G. Scher, P.L., and the Law Offices of
John Abatecola.
The Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II,
the Constitution Project (TCP), and the American Civil Liberties Union Capital
Punishment Project (ACLU-CPP) and the American Civil Liberties Union of
Florida (ACLU-FL) filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Perry on the issue of
whether section 921.141(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), chapter 2016-13, Laws of
Florida, requiring that at least ten jurors determine that the defendant should be
sentenced to death is unconstitutional under the Florida or United States
Constitution. The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL),
Florida Capital Resource Center (FCRC), Florida International University College
of Law’s Center for Capital Representation (FIU CCR), and the Florida Public
Defender Association (FPDA) were granted leave to join as amici curiae and
adopted Mr. Dimmig’s amicus brief on the issue of the constitutionality of the ten-
juror recommendation.
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defendant was “previously sentenced to death.” Because this case involves a
pending prosecution where the death penalty is sought, section 775.082(2) is
inapplicable.
In addressing the second certified question of whether the Act may be
applied to pending prosecutions, we necessarily review the constitutionality of the
Act in light of our opinion in Hurst. In that opinion, we held that as a result of the
longstanding adherence to unanimity in criminal jury trials in Florida, the right to a
jury trial set forth in article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution requires that in
cases in which the penalty phase jury is not waived, the findings necessary to
increase the penalty from a mandatory life sentence to death must be found beyond
a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury.4 Hurst, SC12-1947, slip op. at 4. Those
findings specifically include unanimity as to all aggravating factors to be
considered, unanimity that sufficient aggravating factors exist for the imposition of
the death penalty, unanimity that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, and unanimity in the final jury recommendation for death. Id. at
23-24, 36.
4. In Hurst, we also decided the requirements of unanimity under both the
Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but our basic
reasoning rests on Florida’s independent constitutional right to trial by jury. Art. I,
§ 22, Fla. Const.
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While most of the provisions of the Act can be construed constitutionally in
accordance with Hurst, the Act’s requirement that only ten jurors, rather than all
twelve, must recommend a death sentence is contrary to our holding in Hurst. See
id. at 35 (“[W]e conclude under the commandments of Hurst v. Florida, [136 S. Ct.
616 (2016)], Florida’s state constitutional right to trial by jury, and our Florida
jurisprudence, the penalty phase jury must be unanimous in making the critical
findings and recommendation that are necessary before a sentence of death may be
considered by the judge or imposed.”). 5 Therefore, we answer the second certified
question in the negative, holding that the Act cannot be applied constitutionally to
pending prosecutions because the Act does not require unanimity in the jury’s final
recommendation as to whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.
BACKGROUND
In State v. Perry, the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed two cases
involving defendants awaiting trial for charges of first-degree murder, in which the
State filed notices of intent to seek the death penalty prior to the United States
Supreme Court issuing its decision in Hurst v. Florida on January 12, 2016. Perry,
5. The statutory provision requiring “at least 10 jurors recommend death”
was a result of compromise after the Florida House of Representatives and the
Florida Senate promulgated two separate proposals, the House’s proposing a final
recommendation of nine to three and the Senate requiring a unanimous
recommendation. Fla. S.B. 7068, § 3 (Feb. 3, 2016); Fla. H.B. 7101, § 2 (Feb. 5,
2016).
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192 So. 3d at 73 n.2. In Hurst v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held
that Florida’s capital “sentencing scheme [was] unconstitutional.” 136 S. Ct. at
619. On March 7, 2016, the Florida Legislature, in response to Hurst v. Florida,
amended Florida’s capital sentencing scheme (“the Act”). See ch. 2016-13, Fla.
Laws (2016). When the Act went into effect, the State had already filed its
petition in the Fifth District. Perry, 192 So. 3d at 73.
The first case addressed by the Fifth District involves Larry Darnell Perry,
who was indicted for first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse for the 2013
death of his son. Id. at 72. After Hurst v. Florida was issued, Perry moved to
strike the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Id. The second case
concerns William Theodore Woodward, who was charged with two counts of first-
degree murder for the 2012 deaths of his two neighbors. Id. After Hurst v.
Florida, Woodward moved to prohibit the death qualification of the jury. Id.
The trial courts in both cases granted the defendants’ respective motions
and, in both cases, the State filed petitions for writs of prohibition in the Fifth
District seeking to prohibit the trial courts from striking its notice of intent to seek
the death penalty in Perry’s case and refusing to death qualify the jury in
Woodward’s case. Id. The Fifth District consolidated the cases for the purposes of
disposition only. Id. at n.2.
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The Fifth District first determined that prohibition is appropriate when a trial
court strikes a notice of intent to seek the death penalty or refuses to death qualify
a jury in a capital case. Id. Then the Fifth District determined that the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida did not leave Florida without a
death penalty, as contended by Perry and Woodward, but rather “struck [only] the
process of imposing a sentence of death.” Id. at 73. Thus, the Fifth District
rejected Petitioners’ arguments that the Act does not apply because section
775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2015), provides for a mandatory, alternative sentence
of life imprisonment when the death penalty is stricken. Id. We rejected the same
arguments in Hurst, reasoning, first, that section 775.082(2) specifically applied
only to “individuals previously sentenced to death,” and, second, as stated above,
that Hurst v. Florida did not hold the death penalty unconstitutional. SC12-1947,
slip op. at 50-52.
The Fifth District next turned to the argument that application of the new
law to pending cases would constitute an ex post facto violation under the United
States and Florida Constitutions. Perry, 192 So. 3d at 74 (citing U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10; art. I, § 10, Fla. Const.). The Fifth District concluded that since ex post facto
principles generally do not bar the application of procedural changes to pending
criminal proceedings, and because it determined that the new law is procedural
rather than substantive, there was no ex post facto violation. Id. at 75. The court
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likened the situation to that in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), in which
the United States Supreme Court determined that Florida’s newly enacted death
sentencing law, passed in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), did
not constitute an ex post facto violation when it was applied to capital defendants
who had not yet been sentenced because it “simply altered the methods employed
in determining whether the death penalty was imposed.” Perry, 192 So. 3d at 75
(quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94). The Fifth District also found guidance in
this Court’s decision in Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015), which held
that the new juvenile sentencing law, enacted in response to Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), would apply to juvenile offenders whose offenses predated
the new law. Perry, 192 So. 3d at 75. After determining that the Act applies to
pending prosecutions, the Fifth District certified the two questions regarding the
applicability of the Act. Id. at 76.
ANALYSIS
We now address the important question of whether the Act, chapter 2016-13,
Laws of Florida, applies to cases in which the underlying crime was committed
prior to the Act’s effective date (March 7, 2016). We begin our analysis with an
explanation of the statutory changes and how we construe these changes consistent
with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida and our
decision in Hurst. Ultimately, we conclude that while most of the provisions of the
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Act can be construed constitutionally and could otherwise be validly applied to
pending prosecutions, because the Act requires that only ten jurors, rather than all
twelve, recommend a final sentence of death for death to be imposed, the Act is
unconstitutional to that extent pursuant to Hurst and requires us to answer the
second certified question in the negative.
I. STATUTORY CHANGES
We begin with a discussion of the Act’s changes to Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme. The most important changes made to the previously existing
statutes appear in sections 775.082, 782.04, and 921.141. Ch. 2016-13, Laws of
Fla. (2016). This Act was adopted shortly after the United States Supreme Court
held in Hurst v. Florida that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional because it did not require the jury to determine the facts necessary
for the imposition of the death penalty. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). As we explained in
Hurst:
The Supreme Court emphasized that under Florida law, before the sentence
of death may be imposed, the trial court alone must find “ ‘the facts . . .
[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’ and ‘[t]hat there are
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2012)). The
Supreme Court was explicit in Hurst v. Florida that the constitutional right to
an impartial jury “required Florida to base Timothy Hurst’s death sentence
on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding.” Id. at 624.
SC12-1947, slip op. at 21.
-9-
Section 1 of the Act amends section 775.082(1)(a), Florida Statutes, from
referring to the results of the sentencing procedure set forth in section 921.141 as
“findings by the court” to “a determination” that such person shall be punished by
death. Ch. 2016-13, § 1. Section 2 of the Act amends section 782.04(1) to create a
notice requirement whereby prosecutors must notify the defendant within forty-
five days after arraignment of the aggravating factors the State intends to prove at
trial. Id. at § 2. Though not required by the United State Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurst v. Florida, by providing notice of aggravating factors, this change
in section 2 provides a benefit to capital defendants that they were not previously
afforded. State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 543 (Fla. 2005) (finding that no statute,
rule of procedure, or decision of the Florida Supreme Court or United States
Supreme Court compelled a trial court to require advance notice of aggravating
factors).
Section 3 of the Act defines the facts required to be found by the jury for a
sentence of death to be imposed. Section 3 contains the most substantial changes,
significantly amending section 921.141, Florida Statutes. Ch. 2016-13, § 3.
Specifically, it changes the expression “aggravating circumstances” to
“aggravating factors” throughout section 921.141. The amended section
921.141(1) limits the State to presenting evidence of only those aggravating factors
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of which it provided notice to the defendant pursuant to section 782.04(1)(b), as
amended by section 2 of the law. Id.
The amended section 921.141(2) now expressly provides that the
requirements in the statute apply to cases in which the defendant has not waived
his or her right to a sentencing proceeding by a jury. Section 921.141(2)(a) now
requires the jury to determine whether at least one aggravating factor has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and section 921.141(2)(b) requires the jury to
find the aggravating factors unanimously and to specify which aggravating factors
have been found unanimously:
(2) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED SENTENCE BY
THE JURY. . . .
(a) After hearing all of the evidence presented regarding
aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, the jury shall
deliberate and determine if the state has proven, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the existence of at least one aggravating factor set forth in
subsection (6).
(b) The jury shall return findings identifying each aggravating
factor found to exist. A finding that an aggravating factor exists must
be unanimous.
§ 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. (2016).
The revised statute also now states that if the jury does not unanimously find
at least one aggravating factor, the defendant is “ineligible for a sentence of death.”
Id. § 921.141(2)(b)1. The significance of this change is that the statute now
expressly indicates that a death sentence cannot be considered unless at least one
aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, this
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change is consistent with preexisting case law. See, e.g., Steele, 921 So. 2d at 543
(“To obtain a death sentence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at
least one aggravating circumstance, whereas to obtain a life sentence the defendant
need not prove any mitigating circumstances at all.”).
Next, section 3 changes former subsection (3) of section 921.141, which
required the court to find whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to
impose death and to determine that “there are insufficient mitigating circumstances
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” to subsection (2)(b)2. of the new
section 921.141, now requiring the jury to make a sentencing recommendation
based on the weighing of whether sufficient aggravating factors exist, whether
those aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist,
and based on those two considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced
to life or death:
(2) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED SENTENCE BY
THE JURY. . . .
...
(b) . . . If the jury:
...
2. Unanimously finds at least one aggravating factor, the
defendant is eligible for a sentence of death and the jury shall make a
recommendation to the court as to whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or to
death. The recommendation shall be based on a weighing of all of the
following:
a. Whether sufficient aggravating factors exist.
b. Whether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the
mitigating circumstances found to exist.
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c. Based on the considerations in sub-subparagraphs a. and b.,
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole or to death.
§ 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2016).
The change from a finding “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating
circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances” in section 921.141(3),
Florida Statutes (2015), to the jury considering whether “aggravating factors exist
which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist” in section
921.141(2)(b)2.b., Florida Statutes (2016), is a change to a reciprocal, synonymous
statement. The previous version of the statute also indicated that the jury’s
advisory recommendation would be based on “[w]hether sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist.”
§ 921.141(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). It has always been that death can be imposed
only when the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, rather
than the opposite.
Under the amended statute, the jury may recommend a death sentence so
long as at least ten jurors agree that the defendant should be sentenced to death,
whereas under the previous statute, a bare majority of the twelve-member jury was
sufficient. Compare § 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“If at least 10 jurors
determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death . . .”), with § 921.141(3),
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Fla. Stat. (2015) (“Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the
jury . . . ”). The new statute provides in pertinent part:
If at least 10 jurors determine that the defendant should be
sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to the court shall be a
sentence of death. If fewer than 10 jurors determine that the
defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to
the court shall be a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
§ 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).
Finally, the law expressly eliminates the ability of the court to override a
jury’s recommendation for a life sentence with the imposition of a sentence of
death, while expressly allowing the court to impose a life sentence even where the
jury recommends death. Id. § 921.141(3)(a)1. (setting forth that if the jury
recommends “[l]ife imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the court shall
impose the recommended sentence.”); id. § 921.141(3)(a)2. (setting forth that if the
jury recommends death, “the court, after considering each aggravating factor found
by the jury and all mitigating circumstances, may impose a sentence of life . . . .”).
Section 3 also removes all reference to the jury playing an “advisory” role in the
sentencing process. Ch. 2016-13, § 3.
As to the effective date, the Act provides, “[t]his act shall take effect upon
becoming a law.” Id. § 7. The Act became a law on March 7, 2016.
The amendments to section 921.141 clearly require the jury to explicitly find
at least one aggravating factor unanimously. Additionally, they require unanimity
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as to each aggravating factor that may be considered by the jury and trial court in
determining the appropriate sentence. The changes also require the jury to
consider whether there are sufficient aggravating factors to outweigh the mitigating
circumstances in order to impose death. The changes further mandate that a life
sentence be imposed unless ten or more jurors vote for death.
We reject Perry’s argument that the burden of proof is inverted. The burden
of proof is not inverted—the State still must prove the requisite facts beyond a
reasonable doubt to establish the same elements as were previously required under
the prior statute. The Act did not change the list of aggravating factors and
mitigating circumstances that affect the weighing process. The prior statute, which
is mirrored in the jury instructions, stated that “after hearing all the evidence, the
jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the
following matters: . . . Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which
outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat.
(2015); In re Std. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2013-03, 146 So. 3d
1110, 1120 (Fla. 2014). The statute, as well as this Court’s precedent, then
required that “if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing
its findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts[, including]
[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.” § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2015).
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The changes made by the Act, enacted in response to the United States
Supreme Court’s declaration in Hurst v. Florida, that Florida’s prior statute was
unconstitutional in not requiring the jury to make all findings necessary to render
the defendant eligible for the death penalty, clearly place the jury in the all-
important and constitutionally required factfinding role.
II. WHETHER THE AMENDED STATUTE COMPLIES WITH HURST
We next construe the statutes amended by the Act to ensure that the Act is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, as
we interpreted that decision in Hurst. This Court has an obligation to construe a
statute in a way that preserves its constitutionality. See State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d
315, 316-17 (Fla. 1978) (construing section 812.021(3), in a constitutional manner
where the statute was procedurally flawed); see also Fla. Dep’t of Children &
Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 (Fla. 2004) (stating that the Court has an
obligation to construe a statute in a way that preserves its constitutionality). It is
this Court’s duty to “save Florida statutes from the constitutional dustbin whenever
possible.” Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934 (Fla. 1998). This Court is bound
to “resolve all doubts as to the validity of the statute in favor of its
constitutionality, provided the statute may be given a fair construction that is
consistent with the federal and state constitutions as well as with legislative intent.”
Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., Inc., 963 So. 2d 189, 207 (Fla. 2007) (citation
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omitted). However, this Court may only do so, if “to do so does not effectively
rewrite the enactment.” State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1994)
(quoting Firestone v. News-Press Publ’g Co., 538 So. 2d 457, 459-60 (Fla. 1989)).
In Hurst, we held that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst
v. Florida and Florida’s right to a jury trial provided under article I, section 22 of
the Florida Constitution require the jury’s findings of the aggravating factors, that
there are sufficient aggravating factors to impose death, that those aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigation, and that death is the appropriate sentence are all
required to be found unanimously by the jury for the defendant to be sentenced to
death. Hurst, SC12-1947, slip op. at 23-24. We also held that, based on Florida’s
requirement for unanimity in jury verdicts and on the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, a jury’s ultimate recommendation of the death sentence
must be unanimous. Id. at 4. We interpret the Act consistent with those opinions
defining the parameters of a defendant’s right to a jury trial before the maximum
penalty—a death sentence—may be constitutionally imposed. See id. at 24-28.
The Act amends Florida’s death penalty statute to provide that the jury must
make a recommendation that is “based on” the “considerations” of whether
sufficient aggravating factors exist and whether they outweigh the mitigating
circumstances found to exist, but it does not specify whether these findings
themselves must be unanimous or explicit. § 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2016).
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We recognize that the amended statute also provides that the death
recommendation must be made by only ten jurors. See id. The statute is not
explicit as to whether the requirement of a ten-to-two vote applies to the factual
findings that there are sufficient aggravators and that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating circumstances or to the ultimate death recommendation.
Compare § 921.141(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016), with § 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).
Consistent with our decision in Hurst, we construe section 921.141(2)(b)2. to
require the penalty phase jury to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that
each aggravating factor exists, that sufficient aggravating factors exist to impose
death, and that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist. Hurst,
slip op. at 23. Clearly, if the intent was to apply a non-unanimous vote
requirement to those separate factual findings, this would be unconstitutional as
inconsistent with Hurst, where we have held that those findings must be made
unanimously. See id.
However, we determine that the sentencing recommendation is a separate
conclusion distinct from the jury’s findings of whether sufficient aggravating
factors exist and whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation. It has
long been true that a juror is not required to recommend the death sentence even if
the jury concludes that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 717 (Fla. 2002) ( “[W]e
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have declared many times that ‘a jury is neither compelled nor required to
recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.’ ”
(quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 249-50 (Fla. 1996))). That instruction
is contained in the jury instructions used before Hurst v. Florida:
If, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you
determine that at least one aggravating circumstance is found to exist
and that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, or, in the absence of mitigating factors, that the
aggravating factors alone are sufficient, you may recommend that a
sentence of death be imposed rather than a sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Regardless of your findings in this
respect, however, you are neither compelled nor required to
recommend a sentence of death.
In re Std. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2013-03, 146 So. 3d at 1127-28
(emphasis added). This final jury recommendation, apart from the findings that
sufficient aggravating factors exist and that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, has sometimes been referred to as the “mercy”
recommendation. See, e.g., Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 540 (Fla. 1975),
receded from on other grounds, Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1988)
(explaining that the jury and judge may exercise mercy in their recommendation
even if the factual situations may warrant capital punishment).
This provision of the Act not requiring that the jury’s ultimate
recommendation for death be unanimous is unconstitutional under this Court’s
holding in Hurst, and we are unable to construe that provision to be consistent with
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Hurst. As we held in Hurst, “under the commandments of Hurst v. Florida,
Florida’s state constitutional right to trial by jury, and our Florida jurisprudence,
the penalty phase jury must be unanimous in making the critical findings and
recommendation that are necessary before a sentence of death may be considered
by the judge or imposed.” SC12-1947, slip. op. at 35.
In conclusion, we resolve any ambiguity in the Act consistent with our
decision in Hurst. Namely, to increase the penalty from a life sentence to a
sentence of death, the jury must unanimously find the existence of any aggravating
factor, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to warrant a sentence of death,
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and must
unanimously recommend a sentence of death. Id. at 23-24. While most of the Act
can be construed constitutionally under our holding in Hurst, the Act’s 10-2 jury
recommendation requirement renders the Act unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning of our opinion in Hurst, we answer both certified
questions in the negative. As to the second question, we construe the fact-finding
provisions of the revised section 921.141, Florida Statutes, constitutionally in
conformance with Hurst to require unanimous findings on all statutory elements
required to impose death. The Act, however, is unconstitutional because it requires
that only ten jurors recommend death as opposed to the constitutionally required
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unanimous, twelve-member jury. Accordingly, it cannot be applied to pending
prosecutions.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
POLSTON, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority in approving the Fifth District’s rejection of Perry’s
argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida “leave[s] Florida
without a death penalty.” I therefore concur with the majority in answering the
first certified question in the negative.
But I dissent from the negative answer to the second certified question.
Although I agree with the majority that the Fifth District correctly rejected Perry’s
argument that application of Florida’s new death penalty statute to his case would
be an ex post facto violation, I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion
that the new statute is unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida. As I explained in
my dissent in Hurst, SC12-1947, slip op. at 75 (Canady, J., dissenting), the
Supreme Court “repeated[ly] identifi[ed]” “Florida’s failure to require a jury
finding of an aggravator as the flaw that renders Florida’s death penalty law
unconstitutional.” See, e.g., Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s
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sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find the existence of an
aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”). The new statute has
remedied that flaw. See § 921.141(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2016).
The Legislature’s work in enacting the new statute reflects careful attention
to the holding of Hurst v. Florida, which does not require jury sentencing. In
rejecting the new statute, the majority has “fundamentally misapprehend[ed] and
misuse[d] Hurst v. Florida,” Hurst, SC12-1947, slip op. at 76 (Canady, J.,
dissenting).
POLSTON, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
Fifth District - Case No. 5D16-516
(Osceola County)
J. Edwin Mills and Frank J. Bankowitz, III, Orlando, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Carol M. Dittmar, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida; and Vivian Ann Singleton, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
Martin J. McClain and Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton
Manors, Florida; Todd Gerald Scher of the Law Offices of Todd G. Scher, P.L.,
Dania Beach, Florida; John Paul Abatecola of John Abatecola, P.A., Estero,
Florida; and Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Southern
Region, Suzanne Myers Keffer, Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional
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Counsel – Southern Region, and Michael Chance Meyer, Staff Attorney, Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel – Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Capital Law Offices Specializing in Capital Appeals and
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Southern Region
Robert Ralph Berry of Eisenmenger, Berry, Blaue & Peters, P.A., Viera, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae William Woodward
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Robert Arthur Young, General Counsel,
Steven L. Bolotin and Peter Mills, Assistant Public Defenders, Tenth Judicial
Circuit, Bartow, Florida; Sonya Rudenstine, Gainesville, Florida; Karen Marcia
Gottlieb, Florida International University College of Law’s Center for Capital
Representation; and Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,
and President of the Florida Public Defender Association, Tampa, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, Florida
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Florida Capital Resource Center,
Florida International University College of Law’s Center for Capital
Representation, and Florida Public Defender Association
Elliot H. Scherker of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project
Nancy Gbana Abudu, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc.,
Miami, Florida; and Norman Adam Tebrugge, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida, Inc., Tampa, Florida,
for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, and American
Civil Liberties Union of Florida
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