FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 24 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-56742
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
5:14-cv-01240-VAP-SP
v.
STEPHEN DEAN, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 7, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, NOONAN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Stephen Dean appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for return of
property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Under Rule 41(g), a district court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to
grant a motion for the return of property by a “person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(g). Where, as here, there are no criminal proceedings pending against the
movant, “a district court must exercise caution and restraint before assuming
jurisdiction.” Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). This court reviews a district court’s
decision whether to exercise its equitable jurisdiction under Rule 41(g) for an
abuse of discretion. Id.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
declined to exercise equitable jurisdiction over Dean’s motion. Dean did not
establish that the four Ramsden factors weighed in his favor, as required for the
district court to assume jurisdiction over a pre-indictment Rule 41(g) motion.
We AFFIRM the district court’s order without prejudice to Dean renewing
his Rule 41(g) motion on the basis that nearly three years have passed since the
government seized the property in question.1
1
Dean’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted. See Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b)(2).
2