NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-3479
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RONALD GOODE,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN CURRAN FROMHOLD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cv-00885)
District Judge: Honorable Norma L. Shapiro
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 26, 2016
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 25, 2016)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Ronald Goode appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights
action. For the following reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.
Goode brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Appellee, the
Warden of Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility, violated Goode’s First Amendment
rights by denying him Muslim religious services while Goode was housed at Curran
Fromhold awaiting trial on state charges. Goode styled his complaint as a class action
but no class was ever certified. As relief, Goode requested an injunction allowing the use
of facilities for the purpose of engaging in religious practice. His prayer for relief did not
request damages, but elsewhere his complaint alleged injuries that he named as public,
mental, and emotional.
The District Court eventually dismissed Goode’s complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. This appeal followed. After the appeal was docketed, Goode pleaded guilty to
certain state offenses and was given a state sentence. He was then transferred from
Curran Fromhold to SCI-Graterford.
That change in circumstance deprives us of jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Article
III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “cases
and controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III § 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
When the issues presented in a case are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome, the case becomes moot and the court no longer has
subject matter jurisdiction. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). A
2
change in the circumstances since the beginning of the litigation that precludes any
occasion for meaningful relief renders a case moot. Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 526
(3d Cir. 2006). A class action, for its part, may be dismissed when the named plaintiff’s
claim is rendered moot before filing a motion for class certification. Brown v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen claims of the named plaintiffs
become moot before class certification, dismissal of the action is required.”). But once a
class has been certified, mooting a class representative’s claim does not moot the entire
action. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
Here, Goode’s civil rights case was styled as a class action but was never certified
as one before the District Court dismissed Goode’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Goode’s request for injunctive relief is moot because he is no longer housed at Curran
Fromhold. See, e.g., Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 n.13 (3d Cir. 1981). Goode
therefore has no remaining legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the case.1
Consequently, we will dismiss the appeal.
1
As noted above, Goode’s complaint did not request damages in the prayer for
relief. That said, if it had been argued that the public, mental, and emotional “injuries”
that Goode named elsewhere in the complaint might have been construed as a prayer for
damages, he would still not have been entitled to relief and we would have affirmed the
District Court’s judgment in that respect. In particular, Goode has no viable claim for
damages based on the “injuries” he named because the Prison Litigation Reform Act
precludes the recovery of damages for mental or emotional injury absent physical harm,
which he did not allege. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
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