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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JESUS DELGADO
Appellant No. 1439 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002654-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 31, 2016
Appellant, Jesus Delgado, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered after a jury convicted him of fleeing to avoid apprehension. Delgado
argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that he was
aware of the warrant for his arrest. After careful review, we affirm.
Delgado had been paroled on his sentence for robbery with serious
bodily injury and was under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) in February 2013 when the PBPP determined
he had violated the conditions of his parole. See N.T., Trial, 5/21/15, at 29.
His parole officer directed him to appear at a conference on February 20 to
discuss what sanction would be imposed for his violation. See id., at 23.
Deglado did not report for his sanction conference on February 20. See id.
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His parole officer orally informed Delgado and sent him a certified
letter confirming his duty to attend a sanction conference on February 27.
See id., at 24. The certified letter was returned unclaimed. See id., at 46.
Delgado did not appear at the scheduled time on February 27. See id., at
24.
On March 2, his parole officer called him and informed him that he had
failed to appear at required conferences twice. See id., at 26. She further
informed him that if he failed to appear on March 6, an arrest warrant would
be issued. See id. Delgado immediately terminated the call, and refused to
answer any further calls from his parole officer. See id.
Delgado’s parole officer immediately initiated the process for procuring
an arrest warrant, as she determined that Delgado would not follow the
supervision guidelines. See id., at 27. Delgado did not appear at the
scheduled time on March 6. See id., at 28.
A warrant was issued for Delgado’s arrest, and on March 13, an officer
on patrol in the Hazleton Police Department observed Delgado driving and
recognized that he was subject to an arrest warrant. See id., at 51. The
officer pursued Delgado and initiated a traffic stop. See id., at 52. Delgado
pulled over in front of a warehouse. See id., at 53.
The officer pulled in behind Delgado’s vehicle, at which point Delgado
began revving the engine of his vehicle. See id. Several seconds later,
Delgado accelerated away at a high rate of speed. See id., at 54. After an
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extended chase through the city of Hazleton, at some points reaching 60
MPH, Delgado lost control of his vehicle and hit a parked vehicle as well as
the pursuing police vehicle. See id., at 55-59. Delgado proceeded to
attempt to exit the far side of his vehicle, but was thwarted by the officers.
See id., at 63-64.
A jury convicted Delgado of fleeing apprehension, and the trial court
sentenced Delgado to a term of 18 to 36 months imprisonment. Delgado
filed motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the trial court denied.
This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Delgado raises a single issue: the sufficiency of the
evidence at trial to support his conviction for fleeing apprehension.
Specifically, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding that he was aware that he was the subject of an arrest warrant. A
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence implicates the following principles:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
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all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
The relevant section of the Crimes Code provides that “[a] person who
willfully conceals himself or moves or travels within or outside this
Commonwealth with the intent to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment
commits a [crime.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a). After reviewing the testimony
set forth above, we conclude that the jury was entitled to infer that Delgado
was aware that his parole officer would seek his arrest. The jury was entitled
to credit the parole officer’s testimony that she had warned him that she
would issue an arrest warrant if he did not appear on March 6. Furthermore,
the circumstances of the police officer’s pursuit of Delgado permit an
inference of guilty knowledge. We therefore conclude that Delgado is due no
relief on this issue.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/31/2016
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