15-3242
Oparah v. New York City Department of Education
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 9th day of November, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
PETER W. HALL,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges,
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,*
District Judge.
_____________________________________
Oma Oparah,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 15-3242
New York City Department of Education,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Oma Oparah, pro se, Rosedale, NY
* Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
FOR APPELLEE: VICTORIA SCALZO, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Scott N.
Shorr, Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the brief) for
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New
York, New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment and order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Koeltl, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED in part, and the order denying reconsideration is
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Oma Oparah, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment
enforcing an oral settlement agreement, whereby Oparah agreed to the dismissal of his claims
against his former employer, the Department of Education (“DOE”), in exchange for $100,000 and
a neutral employment reference. He also appeals from the denial of his motion to reconsider that
judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
As a preliminary matter, we note that, although Oparah designates in his notice of appeal
that he is challenging only the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration, we
read his notice of appeal as also challenging the underlying judgment. See Elliott v. City of
Hartford, 823 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that “in the absence of prejudice to an
appellee, we read a pro se appellant’s appeal from an order closing the case as constituting an
appeal from all prior orders”). As the DOE argues in its brief, however, we lack jurisdiction to
review the underlying judgment. A motion for reconsideration filed within 28 days of the
judgment tolls the 30-day deadline to appeal. Fed R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Unlike the
jurisdictional 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal, the 28-day tolling deadline for filing a
motion for reconsideration is a “claim-processing rule” that is subject to waiver and equitable
exception. Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc., 802 F.3d 307, 311-13 (2d Cir. 2015). Here, Oparah
moved for reconsideration past the 28-day deadline for doing so, the DOE has not waived its
timeliness challenge, and Oparah does not argue that he is entitled to an equitable exception to
excuse his untimely filing. His motion for reconsideration, therefore, did not toll the 30-day
jurisdictional deadline within which he had to appeal from the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A); Weitzner, 802 F.3d at 311-13. Because Oparah’s notice of appeal was filed outside
the 30-day jurisdictional deadline, and his untimely motion for reconsideration did not toll the time
to appeal, we lack jurisdiction to review the underlying judgment and may only consider the denial
of reconsideration.
We review the denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Gomez v. City of New
York, 805 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2015). The standard for granting a motion to reconsider “is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1995). Because Oparah fails to identify any such issue with the district court’s decision
denying reconsideration, we are unable to conclude that the district court exceeded the bounds of
its discretion.
Oparah’s appeal from the underlying judgment is DISMISSED, and the order denying
reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk