IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2016
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2015-SC-000436-MR U u
H,oliait 14;„ bc_
ROBERT MAY APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
NO. 14-CR-00666
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On October 13, 2014, Appellant, Robert James May, led police officers on
a high-speed car chase while driving a stolen vehicle. The pursuit was initiated
after officers observed Appellant driving at a high rate of speed forcing a car off
the road, causing the car to crash into a residence located near the road.
Appellant eventually abandoned the vehicle and fled on foot.
Louise Martin was at her daughter's house located in a nearby
subdivision when she observed Appellant run by a window. Ms. Martin, who
was approximately sixty-nine years old at the time, went to the garage where
she encountered Appellant. While outside of the garage, he stated that he had
been jogging and needed water. He then walked through the garage and
toward the door to the house. Ms. Martin told him to leave. Appellant refused
and attempted to enter the van that was located in the garage. Ms. Martin
repeatedly said "no, you're not taking the car." Appellant stopped and exited
the car. Ms. Martin removed the keys which were inside the car.
While still inside the garage, Appellant again walked toward the door to
the house. Ms. Martin pursued him but then started to leave the scene
believing that Appellant was attempting to trap her in the garage by closing the
garage doors. Appellant grabbed her multiple times, causing her to fall to the
ground. She suffered physical injuries as a result.
Appellant eventually released Ms. Martin, who then fled the scene. While
fleeing, she observed Appellant enter the house. The police arrived sometime
thereafter and searched the house. Appellant was not inside. He was
eventually discovered near a tree line by the police dog Pharaoh, who bit
Appellant, causing puncture wounds to his side. Appellant was then taken
into custody.
Appellant was subsequently arrested and indicted on several charges. A
Hardin Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant of first-degree burglary, receiving
stolen property (over $500), first-degree fleeing or evading the police, and for
being a first degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was acquitted of
kidnapping Ms. Martin. The jury recommended a total sentence of 20 years'
imprisonment. The trial court imposed a total sentence of 25 years'
imprisonment. Appellant now appeals his judgment and sentence as a matter
of right pursuant to § 110(2)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution. Two issues are
raised and addressed as follows.
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Directed Verdict
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the first-degree burglary charge. We will reverse the trial
court's denial of a motion for directed verdict "if under the evidence as a whole,
it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt[.]" Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660
S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983) (emphasis added)). Our review is confined to the proof at
trial and the statutory elements of the alleged offense. Lawton v.
Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 565, 575 (Ky. 2011).
First-degree burglary, as charged against Appellant, requires proof of
physical injury. KRS 511.020(1)(b). Pursuant to KRS 500.080(13), physical
injury is defined as "substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical
condition." The Commonwealth presented evidence indicating that Ms. Martin
was attacked by Appellant in her daughter's garage while he was attempting to
steal a van that was located in the garage. As previously stated, the victim
testified that Appellant grabbed her multiple times while she was attempting to
flee, causing her to fall to the ground. As a result of the encounter, the victim's
shirt was torn, she had marks on her body indicating a struggle, and her ear
was bleeding. The Commonwealth introduced photographic evidence taken
soon after the commission of the crime documenting the victim's injuries. The
victim required medical attention, including having her' ear lobe sutured as a
result of her ear ring being torn from her ear during the altercation.
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In support of his argument, Appellant cites to Ms. Martin's trial
testimony, wherein she stated that she did not feel any injury to her ear during
the physical encounter with Appellant and that she could not say whether
Appellant caused the injury to her ear lobe. Appellant claims that because the
victim could have injured herself at various points during and after the
altercation, the precise moment of her injury is unknown. As such, Appellant
argues that no reasonable juror could have found that Appellant caused the
victim's physical injury. We disagree.
The Commonwealth presented more than enough evidence here to
instruct the jury on the first-degree burglary charge. Ms. Martin's testimony
that she did not feel any injury to her ear while in the heat of the moment as
well as her inability to pinpoint the precise moment of her injury did not
require a directed verdict in Appellant's favor. There was no error here.
Sentencing
Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
ran one of Appellant's sentences consecutively instead of concurrently, which
the jury had recommended. Appellant specifically argues that Kentucky's
sentencing scheme violates his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. This issue
is unpreserved and we will review for palpable error. See Walker v.
Commonwealth, 349 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Ky. 2011) ("even alleged constitutional
errors, if unpreserved, are subject to palpable error review."); see also Jones v.
Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Ky. 2010).
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Appellant correctly observes that Kentucky law authorizes a trial judge to
run sentences consecutively even if the jury recommended concurrent
sentences. KRS 532.110; and Dotson v. Commonwealth, 740 S.W.2d 930 (Ky.
1987). As previously stated, however, Appellant argues that our sentencing
scheme violates this Sixth Amendment. He relies primarily on the recent U.S.
Supreme Court case of Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (2016).
Hurst involved Florida's capital sentencing scheme under which an advisory
jury issues a sentencing recommendation to a judge, and then the judge makes
the ultimate findings needed for imposition of a death sentence. The Court
held that such a sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment. See also
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that Iciapital defendants, no
less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in
their maximum punishment.").
Unlike Hurst and Ring, the judge in the present case did not make any
findings of fact constituting "the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense[.]" Id. at 585 (citation omitted). Nor was he required to make
any findings. He merely ordered that one of the sentences be ran consecutively
instead of concurrently with the remaining sentences. Such a determination is
permissible under Kentucky law and current U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not
inhibit States from assigning to judges, rather than to juries, finding of facts
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necessary to imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for
multiple offenses.) Therefore, there was no error here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Hardin
Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
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